In case truncated HMAC must be used but the Mbed TLS peer hasn't been updated
yet, one can use the compile-time option MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT to
temporarily fall back to the old, non-compliant implementation of the truncated
HMAC extension.
The truncated HMAC extension as described in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066.html#section-7 specifies that when truncated
HMAC is used, only the HMAC output should be truncated, while the HMAC key
generation stays unmodified. This commit fixes Mbed TLS's behavior of also
truncating the key, potentially leading to compatibility issues with peers
running other stacks than Mbed TLS.
Details:
The keys for the MAC are pieces of the keyblock that's generated from the
master secret in `mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys` through the PRF, their size being
specified as the size of the digest used for the MAC, regardless of whether
truncated HMAC is enabled or not.
/----- MD size ------\ /------- MD size ----\
Keyblock +----------------------+----------------------+------------------+---
now | MAC enc key | MAC dec key | Enc key | ...
(correct) +----------------------+----------------------+------------------+---
In the previous code, when truncated HMAC was enabled, the HMAC keys
were truncated to 10 bytes:
/-10 bytes-\ /-10 bytes-\
Keyblock +-------------+-------------+------------------+---
previously | MAC enc key | MAC dec key | Enc key | ...
(wrong) +-------------+-------------+------------------+---
The reason for this was that a single variable `transform->maclen` was used for
both the keysize and the size of the final MAC, and its value was reduced from
the MD size to 10 bytes in case truncated HMAC was negotiated.
This commit fixes this by introducing a temporary variable `mac_key_len` which
permanently holds the MD size irrespective of the presence of truncated HMAC,
and using this temporary to obtain the MAC key chunks from the keyblock.
Previously, MAC validation for an incoming record proceeded as follows:
1) Make a copy of the MAC contained in the record;
2) Compute the expected MAC in place, overwriting the presented one;
3) Compare both.
This resulted in a record buffer overflow if truncated MAC was used, as in this
case the record buffer only reserved 10 bytes for the MAC, but the MAC
computation routine in 2) always wrote a full digest.
For specially crafted records, this could be used to perform a controlled write of
up to 6 bytes past the boundary of the heap buffer holding the record, thereby
corrupting the heap structures and potentially leading to a crash or remote code
execution.
This commit fixes this by making the following change:
1) Compute the expected MAC in a temporary buffer that has the size of the
underlying message digest.
2) Compare to this to the MAC contained in the record, potentially
restricting to the first 10 bytes if truncated HMAC is used.
A similar fix is applied to the encryption routine `ssl_encrypt_buf`.
* development: (30 commits)
update README file (#1144)
Fix typo in asn1.h
Improve leap year test names in x509parse.data
Correctly handle leap year in x509_date_is_valid()
Renegotiation: Add tests for SigAlg ext parsing
Parse Signature Algorithm ext when renegotiating
Minor style fix
config.pl get: be better behaved
config.pl get: don't rewrite config.h; detect write errors
Fixed "config.pl get" for options with no value
Fix typo and bracketing in macro args
Ensure failed test_suite output is sent to stdout
Remove use of GNU sed features from ssl-opt.sh
Fix typos in ssl-opt.sh comments
Add ssl-opt.sh test to check gmt_unix_time is good
Extend ssl-opt.h so that run_test takes function
Always print gmt_unix_time in TLS client
Restored note about using minimum functionality in makefiles
Note in README that GNU make is required
Fix changelog for ssl_server2.c usage fix
...
Fix the x509_get_subject_alt_name() function to not accept invalid
tags. The problem was that the ASN.1 class for tags consists of two
bits. Simply doing bit-wise and of the CONTEXT_SPECIFIC macro with the
input tag has the potential of accepting tag values 0x10 (private)
which would indicate that the certificate has an incorrect format.
This commit fixes a comparison of ssl_session->encrypt_then_mac against the
ETM-unrelated constant MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED. Instead,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED should be used.
The typo is has no functional effect since both constants have the same value 0.
Remove a check introduced in the previous buffer overflow fix with keys of
size 8N+1 which the subsequent fix for buffer start calculations made
redundant.
Added a changelog entry for the buffer start calculation fix.
For a key of size 8N+1, check that the first byte after applying the
public key operation is 0 (it could have been 1 instead). The code was
incorrectly doing a no-op check instead, which led to invalid
signatures being accepted. Not a security flaw, since you would need the
private key to craft such an invalid signature, but a bug nonetheless.
The check introduced by the previous security fix was off by one. It
fixed the buffer overflow but was not compliant with the definition of
PSS which technically led to accepting some invalid signatures (but
not signatures made without the private key).
I don't think this can cause a crash as the member accessed is in the
beginning of the context, so wouldn't be outside of valid memory if the actual
context was RSA.
Also, the mismatch will be caught later when checking signature, so the cert
chain will be rejected anyway.
Fix buffer overflow in RSA-PSS signature verification when the hash is
too large for the key size. Found by Seth Terashima, Qualcomm.
Added a non-regression test and a positive test with the smallest
permitted key size for a SHA-512 hash.
The function mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base did not wipe the stack buffer used to
hold the private exponent before returning. This commit fixes this by not using
a stack buffer in the first place but instead calling mpi_fill_random directly
to acquire the necessary random MPI.
This commit modifies mpi_read_binary to always allocate the minimum number of
limbs required to hold the entire buffer provided to the function, regardless of
its content. Previously, leading zero bytes in the input data were detected and
used to reduce memory footprint and time, but this non-constant behavior turned
out to be non-tolerable for the cryptographic applications this function is used
for.
Previously, if `MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION` was disabled, incoming handshake
messages in `mbedtls_ssl_read` (expecting application data) lead to the
connection being closed. This commit fixes this, restricting the
`MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION`-guard to the code-paths responsible for accepting
renegotiation requests and aborting renegotiation attempts after too many
unexpected records have been received.
1) use `pk_get_rsapubkey` instead of reimplementing the parsing
2) rename the key files, according to their type and key size
3) comment in the data_files/Makefile hoe the keys were generated
4) Fix issue of failure parsing pkcs#1 DER format parsing, missed in previous commit
Signature algorithm extension was skipped when renegotiation was in
progress, causing the signature algorithm not to be known when
renegotiating, and failing the handshake. Fix removes the renegotiation
step check before parsing the extension.
As the optional RSA parameters DP, DQ and QP are effectively discarded (they are only considered for their length to
ensure that the key fills the entire buffer), it is not necessary to read them into separate MPI's.
The number of loop iterations per candidate in `mbedtls_deduce_primes` was off
by one. This commit corrects this and removes a toy non-example from the RSA
test suite, as it seems difficult to have the function fail on small values of N
even if D,E are corrupted.
Signature algorithm extension was skipped when renegotiation was in
progress, causing the signature algorithm not to be known when
renegotiating, and failing the handshake. Fix removes the renegotiation
step check before parsing the extension.
This commit splits off the RSA helper functions into separate headers and
compilation units to have a clearer separation of the public RSA interface,
intended to be used by end-users, and the helper functions which are publicly
provided only for the benefit of designers of alternative RSA implementations.
1) move the change into Features from Changes, in the changLog
2) Change the feature alternative configuration MBEDTLS_ECDH_ALT
definition to function alternative defintions
MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT
1) update ChangLog to have new feature in Features instead of Changes
2) Change MBEDTLS_ECDSA_ALT to function specific alternative definitions:
MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT
It is not necessary to pass a CSPRNG to `mbedtls_rsa_deduce_moduli`, as there
exist well-working static strategies, and even if a PRNG is preferred, a
non-secure one would be sufficient.
Further, the implementation is changed to use a static strategy for the choice
of candidates which according to some benchmarks even performs better than the
previous one using random candidate choices.
This commit reconciles the code path responsible for resending the
final DTLS handshake flight with the path for handling resending of
the other flights.
This commit restricts WANT_READ to indicate that no data is available on the
underlying transport. To signal the need for further processing - which was
previously also handled through this error code - a new internal error code
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING is introduced.
DTLS records from previous epochs were incorrectly checked against the
current epoch transform's minimal content length, leading to the
rejection of entire datagrams. This commit fixed that and adapts two
test cases accordingly.
Internal reference: IOTSSL-1417
- Enhances the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail (return
the number of bytes left in the current application data record, if
there is any).
- Introduces a new public function mbedtls_ssl_check_pending for
checking whether any data in the internal buffers still needs to be
processed. This is necessary for users implementing event-driven IO
to decide when they can safely idle until they receive further
events from the underlying transport.
Give a note on the debugging output on the following occasions:
(1) The timer expires in mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input
(2) There's more than one records within a single datagram
Change ssl_parse_server_hello() so that the parsed first four random
bytes from the ServerHello message are printed by the TLS client as
a Unix timestamp regardless of whether MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C is defined. The
debug message will only be printed if debug_level is 3 or higher.
Unconditionally enabling the debug print enabled testing of this value.
Change ssl_parse_server_hello() so that the parsed first four random
bytes from the ServerHello message are printed by the TLS client as
a Unix timestamp regardless of whether MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C is defined. The
debug message will only be printed if debug_level is 3 or higher.
Unconditionally enabling the debug print enabled testing of this value.
Further, state explicitly that wrong key types need not be supported by alternative RSA implementations, and that those
may instead return the newly introduced error code MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
This commit returns to using constant macros instead of global variables for the DHM group constants. Further, macros
providing the binary encoding of the primes from RFC 3526 and RFC 7919 are added. The hex-string macros are deprecated.
This commit modifies the PKCS1 v1.5 signature verification function `mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify` to prepare the
expected PKCS1-v1.5-encoded hash using the function also used by the signing routine `mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign`
and comparing it to the provided byte-string afterwards. This comes at the benefits of (1) avoiding any error-prone
parsing, (2) removing the dependency of the RSA module on the ASN.1 parsing module, and (3) reducing code size.
This commit moves the code preparing PKCS1 v1.5 encoded hashes from `mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign` to a separate
non-public function `rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode`. This code-path will then be re-used by the signature verification function
`mbetls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify` in a later commit.
Original intention was to be allowed to perform in-place operations like changing the byte-order before importing
parameters into an HSM. Now a copy is needed in this case, but there's no more danger of a user expecting the arguments
to be left untouched.
State explicitly that `pk_parse_pkcs8_undencrypted_der` and `pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der` are not responsible for
zeroizing and freeing the provided key buffer.
This commit changes the implementation of `mbedtls_rsa_get_len` to return
`ctx->len` instead of always re-computing the modulus' byte-size via
`mbedtls_mpi_size`.
Although the variable ret was initialised to an error, the
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK macro was overwriting it. Therefore it ended up being
0 whenewer the bignum computation was successfull and stayed 0
independently of the actual check.
This commit renames the test-only flag MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG to ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG to make it more transparent
that it's an internal flag, and also to content the testscript tests/scripts/check-names.pl which previously complained
about the macro occurring in a comment in `entropy.c` without being defined in a library file.
This commit removes extension-writing code for X.509 non-v3 certificates from
mbedtls_x509write_crt_der. Previously, even if no extensions were present an
empty sequence would have been added.
Fix compilation error on Mingw32 when `_TRUNCATE` is defined. Use
`_TRUNCATE` only if `__MINGW32__` not defined. Fix suggested by
Thomas Glanzmann and Nick Wilson on issue #355
* mbedtls-2.6: (27 commits)
Update version number to 2.6.0
Fix language in Changelog for clarity
Improve documentation of PKCS1 decryption functions
Fix style and missing item in ChangeLog
Add credit to Changelog to fix for #666
Fix naked call to time() with platform call
Fix ChangeLog for duplication after merge
Rename time and index parameter to avoid name conflict.
Correct comment
Adapt ChangeLog
Reliably zeroize sensitive data in AES sample application
Reliably zeroize sensitive data in Crypt-and-Hash sample application
Fix potential integer overflow parsing DER CRT
Fix potential integer overflow parsing DER CRL
Move the git scripts to correct path
Update after @sbutcher-arm comments
Fix slash direction for linux path
Add note for the git_hoos README file
Pre push hook script
Check return code of mbedtls_mpi_fill_random
...
The stack buffer used to hold the decrypted key in pk_parse_pkcs8_encrypted_der
was statically sized to 2048 bytes, which is not enough for DER encoded 4096bit
RSA keys.
This commit resolves the problem by performing the key-decryption in-place,
circumventing the introduction of another stack or heap copy of the key.
There are two situations where pk_parse_pkcs8_encrypted_der is invoked:
1. When processing a PEM-encoded encrypted key in mbedtls_pk_parse_key.
This does not need adaption since the PEM context used to hold the decoded
key is already constructed and owned by mbedtls_pk_parse_key.
2. When processing a DER-encoded encrypted key in mbedtls_pk_parse_key.
In this case, mbedtls_pk_parse_key calls pk_parse_pkcs8_encrypted_der with
the buffer provided by the user, which is declared const. The commit
therefore adds a small code paths making a copy of the keybuffer before
calling pk_parse_pkcs8_encrypted_der.
If CRT is not used, the helper fields CRT are not assumed to be present in the
RSA context structure, so do the verification directly in this case. If CRT is
used, verification could be done using CRT, but we're sticking to ordinary
verification for uniformity.
This commit adds the function mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt for validating a set of CRT parameters. The function
mbedtls_rsa_check_crt is simplified accordingly.
Primality testing is guarded by the configuration flag MBEDTLS_GENPRIME and used in the new RSA helper functions. This
commit adds a corresponding preprocessor directive.
Alternative RSA implementations can be provided by defining MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT in
config.h, defining an mbedtls_rsa_context struct in a new file rsa_alt.h and
re-implementing the RSA interface specified in rsa.h.
Through the previous reworkings, the adherence to the interface is the only
implementation obligation - in particular, implementors are free to use a
different layout for the RSA context structure.
This is the first step towards making verify_chain() iterative. While from a
readability point of view the current recursive version is fine, one of the
goals of this refactoring is to prepare for restartable ECC integration, which
will need the explicit stack anyway.
Besides avoiding near-duplication, this avoids having three generations of
certificate (child, parent, grandparent) in one function, with all the
off-by-one opportunities that come with it.
This also allows to simplify the signature of verify_child(), which will be
done in next commit.
This is from the morally 5th (and soon obsolete) invocation of this function
in verify_top().
Doing this badtime-skipping when we search for a parent in the provided chain
is a change of behaviour, but it's backwards-compatible: it can only cause us
to accept valid chains that we used to reject before. Eg if the peer has a
chain with two version of an intermediate certificate with different validity
periods, the first non valid and the second valid - such cases are probably
rare or users would have complained already, but it doesn't hurt to handle it
properly as it allows for more uniform code.
This may look like a behaviour change because one check has been added to the
function that was previously done in only one of the 3 call sites. However it
is not, because:
- for the 2 call sites in verify(), the test always succeeds as path_cnt is 0.
- for the call site in verify_child(), the same test was done later anyway in
verify_top()
There are 3 instance that were replaced, but 2 instances of variants of this
function exist and will be handled next (the extra parameter that isn't used
so far is in preparation for that):
- one in verify_child() where path_cnt constraint is handled too
- one in verify_top() where there is extra logic to skip parents that are
expired or future, but only if there are better parents to be found
This is a slight change of behaviour in that the previous condition was:
- same subject
- signature matches
while the new condition is:
- exact same certificate
However the documentation for mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() (note on trust_ca)
mentions the new condition, so code that respected the documentation will keep
working.
In addition, this is a bit faster as it doesn't check the self-signature
(which never needs to be checked for certs in the trusted list).
When we're looking for a parent, in trusted CAs, 'top' should be 1.
This only impacted which call site for verify_top() was chosen, and the error
was then fixed inside verify_top() by iterating over CAs again, this time
correctly setting 'top' to 1.
This is the beginning of a series of commits refactoring the chain
building/verification functions in order to:
- make it simpler to understand and work with
- prepare integration of restartable ECC
md() already checks for md_info == NULL. Also, in the future it might also
return other errors (eg hardware errors if acceleration is used), so it make
more sense to check its return value than to check for NULL ourselves and then
assume no other error can occur.
Also, currently, md_info == NULL can never happen except if the MD and OID modules
get out of sync, or if the user messes with members of the x509_crt structure
directly.
This commit does not change the current behaviour, which is to treat MD errors
the same way as a bad signature or no trusted root.
There were preprocessor directives in pk.c and pk_wrap.c that cheked
whether the bit length of size_t was greater than that of unsigned int.
However, the check relied on the MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 macro being defined
which is not directly related to size_t. This might result in errors in
some platforms. This change modifies the check to use the macros
SIZE_MAX and UINT_MAX instead making the code more robust.
As noted in #557, several functions use 'index' resp. 'time'
as parameter names in their declaration and/or definition, causing name
conflicts with the functions in the C standard library of the same
name some compilers warn about.
This commit renames the arguments accordingly.
Modify the function mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der() so that it checks the
parsed CSR version integer before it increments the value. This prevents
a potential signed integer overflow, as these have undefined behaviour
in the C standard.
Rename the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_ALT to
MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT to make the name more descriptive
as this macro enables/disables both functions.
Add the following two functions to allow platform setup and teardown
operations for the full library to be hooked in:
* mbedtls_platform_setup()
* mbedtls_platform_teardown()
An mbedtls_platform_context C structure is also added and two internal
functions that are called by the corresponding setup and teardown
functions above:
* mbedtls_internal_platform_setup()
* mbedtls_internal_plartform_teardown()
Finally, the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_ALT is also added to allow
mbedtls_platform_context and internal function to be overriden by the
user as needed for a platform.
The previous commit bd5ceee484f201b90a384636ba12de86bd330cba removed
the definition of the global constants
- mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len,
- mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len,
- mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa, and
- mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa.
This commit restores these to maintain ABI compatibility.
Further, it was noticed that without SHA256_C being enabled the
previous code failed to compile because because the SHA1 resp. SHA256
certificates were only defined when the respective SHAXXX_C options
were set, but the emission of the global variable mbedtls_test_ca_crt
was unconditionally defined through the SHA256
certificate. Previously, the RSA SHA1 certificate was unconditionally
defined and used for that.
As a remedy, this commit makes sure some RSA certificate is defined
and exported through the following rule:
1. If SHA256_C is active, define an RSA SHA256 certificate and export
it as mbedtls_test_ca_crt. Also, define SHA1 certificates only if
SHA1_C is set.
2. If SHA256_C is not set, always define SHA1 certificate and export
it as mbedtls_test_ca_crt.
The previous commit b3e6872c9381ed4ce020d631dda1e0126c42b64f changed
to public functions from ssl_ciphersuite.h to static inline. This
commit reverts this change.
Fix a resource leak on windows platform, in mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path,
in case a failure. when an error occurs, goto cleanup, and free the
resource, instead of returning error code immediately.
Protecting the ECP hardware acceleratior with mutexes is inconsistent with the
philosophy of the library. Pre-existing hardware accelerator interfaces
leave concurrency support to the underlying platform.
Fixes#863
Modify the function mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der() so that it checks the
parsed CSR version integer before it increments the value. This prevents
a potential signed integer overflow, as these have undefined behaviour
in the C standard.
Rename the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_ALT to
MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT to make the name more descriptive
as this macro enables/disables both functions.
Add the following two functions to allow platform setup and teardown
operations for the full library to be hooked in:
* mbedtls_platform_setup()
* mbedtls_platform_teardown()
An mbedtls_platform_context C structure is also added and two internal
functions that are called by the corresponding setup and teardown
functions above:
* mbedtls_internal_platform_setup()
* mbedtls_internal_plartform_teardown()
Finally, the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_ALT is also added to allow
mbedtls_platform_context and internal function to be overriden by the
user as needed for a platform.
The previous commit bd5ceee484f201b90a384636ba12de86bd330cba removed
the definition of the global constants
- mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len,
- mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len,
- mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa, and
- mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa.
This commit restores these to maintain ABI compatibility.
Further, it was noticed that without SHA256_C being enabled the
previous code failed to compile because because the SHA1 resp. SHA256
certificates were only defined when the respective SHAXXX_C options
were set, but the emission of the global variable mbedtls_test_ca_crt
was unconditionally defined through the SHA256
certificate. Previously, the RSA SHA1 certificate was unconditionally
defined and used for that.
As a remedy, this commit makes sure some RSA certificate is defined
and exported through the following rule:
1. If SHA256_C is active, define an RSA SHA256 certificate and export
it as mbedtls_test_ca_crt. Also, define SHA1 certificates only if
SHA1_C is set.
2. If SHA256_C is not set, always define SHA1 certificate and export
it as mbedtls_test_ca_crt.
The previous commit b3e6872c9381ed4ce020d631dda1e0126c42b64f changed
to public functions from ssl_ciphersuite.h to static inline. This
commit reverts this change.
Fix a resource leak on windows platform, in mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path,
in case a failure. when an error occurs, goto cleanup, and free the
resource, instead of returning error code immediately.
Protecting the ECP hardware acceleratior with mutexes is inconsistent with the
philosophy of the library. Pre-existing hardware accelerator interfaces
leave concurrency support to the underlying platform.
Fixes#863
Modify the function mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der() so that it checks the
parsed CSR version integer before it increments the value. This prevents
a potential signed integer overflow, as these have undefined behaviour
in the C standard.
The RSA key generation test needs strong entropy to succeed. This commit captures the presence of a strong entropy
source in a preprocessor flag and only runs the key generation test if that flag is set.
Rename the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_ALT to
MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT to make the name more descriptive
as this macro enables/disables both functions.
Add the following two functions to allow platform setup and teardown
operations for the full library to be hooked in:
* mbedtls_platform_setup()
* mbedtls_platform_teardown()
An mbedtls_platform_context C structure is also added and two internal
functions that are called by the corresponding setup and teardown
functions above:
* mbedtls_internal_platform_setup()
* mbedtls_internal_plartform_teardown()
Finally, the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_ALT is also added to allow
mbedtls_platform_context and internal function to be overriden by the
user as needed for a platform.
The previous commit bd5ceee484f201b90a384636ba12de86bd330cba removed
the definition of the global constants
- mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len,
- mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len,
- mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa, and
- mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa.
This commit restores these to maintain ABI compatibility.
Further, it was noticed that without SHA256_C being enabled the
previous code failed to compile because because the SHA1 resp. SHA256
certificates were only defined when the respective SHAXXX_C options
were set, but the emission of the global variable mbedtls_test_ca_crt
was unconditionally defined through the SHA256
certificate. Previously, the RSA SHA1 certificate was unconditionally
defined and used for that.
As a remedy, this commit makes sure some RSA certificate is defined
and exported through the following rule:
1. If SHA256_C is active, define an RSA SHA256 certificate and export
it as mbedtls_test_ca_crt. Also, define SHA1 certificates only if
SHA1_C is set.
2. If SHA256_C is not set, always define SHA1 certificate and export
it as mbedtls_test_ca_crt.
The previous commit b3e6872c9381ed4ce020d631dda1e0126c42b64f changed
to public functions from ssl_ciphersuite.h to static inline. This
commit reverts this change.
Fix a resource leak on windows platform, in mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path,
in case a failure. when an error occurs, goto cleanup, and free the
resource, instead of returning error code immediately.
Protecting the ECP hardware acceleratior with mutexes is inconsistent with the
philosophy of the library. Pre-existing hardware accelerator interfaces
leave concurrency support to the underlying platform.
Fixes#863
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
This change moves the calls to mbedtls_sha256_starts() and
mbedtls_sha512_starts() out of the mbedtls_entropy_init() function as
these now have return codes which need to be checked.
This patch modifies the entropy.c module to ensure that the sha256 and
sha512 contexts are correctly initialised and freed instead of skipping
these calls or simply zeroizing with memset() or mbedtls_zeroize().
This is important as the sha contexts might otherwise leak memory or
other resources, and even more so in the context of hardware
accelerators where the configuration of the device might be done in the
init and free calls.
This patch modifies the internal md context structure in md_wrap.c to
add return values to the function pointers. This enables us to use the
new API in the corresponding MD modules so that failures can be
found at any point in an MD computation.
The following function calls are being deprecated to introduce int
return values.
* mbedtls_sha512()
* mbedtls_sha512_starts()
* mbedtls_sha512_update()
* mbedtls_sha512_finish()
* mbedtls_sha512_process()
The return codes can be used to return error values. This is important
when using hardware accelerators.
The following function calls are being deprecated to introduce int
return values.
* mbedtls_sha256()
* mbedtls_sha256_starts()
* mbedtls_sha256_update()
* mbedtls_sha256_finish()
* mbedtls_sha256_process()
The return codes can be used to return error values. This is important
when using hardware accelerators.
The following function calls are being deprecated to introduce int
return values.
* mbedtls_ripemd160()
* mbedtls_ripemd160_starts()
* mbedtls_ripemd160_update()
* mbedtls_ripemd160_finish()
* mbedtls_ripemd160_process()
The return codes can be used to return error values. This is important
when using hardware accelerators.
The following function calls are being deprecated to introduce int
return values.
* mbedtls_md5()
* mbedtls_md5_starts()
* mbedtls_md5_update()
* mbedtls_md5_finish()
* mbedtls_md5_process()
The return codes can be used to return error values. This is important
when using hardware accelerators.
The following function calls are being deprecated to introduce int
return values.
* mbedtls_md4()
* mbedtls_md4_starts()
* mbedtls_md4_update()
* mbedtls_md4_finish()
* mbedtls_md4_process()
The return codes can be used to return error values. This is important
when using hardware accelerators.
The following function calls are being deprecated to introduce int
return values.
* mbedtls_md2()
* mbedtls_md2_starts()
* mbedtls_md2_update()
* mbedtls_md2_finish()
* mbedtls_md2_process()
The return codes can be used to return error values. This is important
when using hardware accelerators.
The following function calls are being deprecated to introduce int
return values.
* mbedtls_sha1()
* mbedtls_sha1_starts()
* mbedtls_sha1_update()
* mbedtls_sha1_finish()
* mbedtls_sha1_process()
The return codes can be used to return error values. This is important
when using hardware accelerators.
The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.
This commit replaces the check by a safe version.
This patch modifies the function mbedtls_gcm_self_test() function to
ensure that AES-GCM-192 tests are only run if the key size is supported
by the available implementation. This is useful when using
MBEDTLS_AES_ALT as some hardware crypto accelerators might not support
AES-192.
This patch modifies the function mbedtls_aes_selftest() function to
ensure that AES-192 tests are only run if the key size is supported by
the available implementation. This is useful when using MBEDTLS_AES_ALT
as some hardware crypto accelerators might not support AES-192.
This commit renames the new AES table packing option introduced in the
previous MBEDTLS_AES_PACK_TABLES and documents its use and memory vs.
speed tradeoff. It also enhances the documentation of the other
AES-related option MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES.
* restricted/iotssl-1398:
Add ChangeLog entry
Ensure application data records are not kept when fully processed
Add hard assertion to mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer
Fix mbedtls_ssl_read
Simplify retaining of messages for future processing
This commit fixes the following case: If a client is both expecting a
SERVER_HELLO and has an application data record that's partially
processed in flight (that's the situation the client gets into after
receiving a ServerHelloRequest followed by ApplicationData), a
subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_read will set keep_current_message = 1
when seeing the unexpected application data, but not reset it to 0
after the application data has been processed. This commit fixes this.
It also documents and suggests how the problem might be solved in a
more structural way on the long run.
