Fix handling of HS msgs in mbedtls_ssl_read if renegotiation unused
Previously, if `MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION` was disabled, incoming handshake messages in `mbedtls_ssl_read` (expecting application data) lead to the connection being closed. This commit fixes this, restricting the `MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION`-guard to the code-paths responsible for accepting renegotiation requests and aborting renegotiation attempts after too many unexpected records have been received.
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1 changed files with 3 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -6878,7 +6878,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
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}
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}
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
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if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received handshake message" ) );
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@ -6920,6 +6919,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
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/* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */
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if( ! ( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ||
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( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
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@ -6947,6 +6947,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
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}
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}
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else
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
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{
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/*
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* Refuse renegotiation
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@ -6987,6 +6988,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
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}
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
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else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING )
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{
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if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 )
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