2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The RSA public-key cryptosystem
|
|
|
|
*
|
2020-08-07 13:07:28 +02:00
|
|
|
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
|
2023-11-03 13:21:36 +01:00
|
|
|
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-10-02 11:00:37 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2016-01-20 01:44:42 +01:00
|
|
|
* The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation
|
|
|
|
* of the RSA algorithm:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [1] A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
|
|
|
|
* R Rivest, A Shamir, and L Adleman
|
|
|
|
* http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs.html#RSA78
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [2] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 8
|
|
|
|
* Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
2017-03-22 14:38:28 +01:00
|
|
|
* [3] Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks
|
|
|
|
* Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice and
|
|
|
|
* Stefan Mangard
|
|
|
|
* https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08719v2
|
|
|
|
*
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-03 01:43:33 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "common.h"
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-09 18:05:11 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
|
2023-11-21 10:33:54 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "bignum_core.h"
|
2021-03-09 17:04:12 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h"
|
2015-03-09 18:05:11 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
|
2018-04-17 16:51:09 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
|
2019-11-22 14:21:35 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
|
2021-10-20 12:09:35 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "constant_time_internal.h"
|
2021-10-19 12:22:25 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
|
2023-03-28 11:38:08 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "md_psa.h"
|
2012-08-23 09:46:58 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-06 14:43:58 +01:00
|
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
|
|
|
2020-08-03 17:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
2015-02-06 14:43:58 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-09 18:05:11 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
|
2014-02-01 22:50:26 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
|
|
|
|
* operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value
|
|
|
|
* (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen
|
|
|
|
* in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
|
|
|
|
* is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which
|
|
|
|
* one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* \param input The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5
|
|
|
|
* encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM"
|
|
|
|
* by the terminology.
|
|
|
|
* \param ilen The length of the payload in the \p input buffer.
|
|
|
|
* \param output The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the
|
|
|
|
* PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of
|
|
|
|
* length \p output_max_len bytes.
|
|
|
|
* \param olen The address at which to store the length of
|
|
|
|
* the payload. This must not be \c NULL.
|
|
|
|
* \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* \return \c 0 on success.
|
|
|
|
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE
|
|
|
|
* The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload.
|
|
|
|
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
|
|
|
|
* The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input,
|
|
|
|
size_t ilen,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *output,
|
|
|
|
size_t output_max_len,
|
|
|
|
size_t *olen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
|
|
size_t i, plaintext_max_size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must
|
|
|
|
* not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than
|
|
|
|
* the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise
|
|
|
|
* this would open the execution of the function to
|
|
|
|
* side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle
|
|
|
|
* attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory
|
|
|
|
* access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access
|
|
|
|
* to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to
|
|
|
|
* an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared
|
|
|
|
* branch predictor). */
|
|
|
|
size_t pad_count = 0;
|
2023-05-17 13:28:51 +02:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad;
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_ct_condition_t pad_done;
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t plaintext_size = 0;
|
2023-05-17 13:28:51 +02:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_ct_condition_t output_too_large;
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
plaintext_max_size = (output_max_len > ilen - 11) ? ilen - 11
|
|
|
|
: output_max_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant
|
|
|
|
* memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
|
2023-05-17 13:28:51 +02:00
|
|
|
bad = mbedtls_ct_bool(input[0]);
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
|
|
|
|
* where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
|
2023-08-10 12:58:18 +02:00
|
|
|
bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[1], MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT));
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
|
|
|
|
* the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
|
2023-05-17 13:28:51 +02:00
|
|
|
pad_done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE;
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) {
|
2023-08-10 12:58:18 +02:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_ct_condition_t found = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(input[i], 0);
|
2023-05-17 13:28:51 +02:00
|
|
|
pad_done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(pad_done, found);
|
2023-08-10 13:11:31 +02:00
|
|
|
pad_count += mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_bool_not(pad_done), 1);
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
|
2023-05-17 13:28:51 +02:00
|
|
|
bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(pad_done));
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */
|
2023-08-10 12:58:18 +02:00
|
|
|
bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(8, pad_count));
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of
|
|
|
|
* remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding
|
|
|
|
* is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the
|
|
|
|
* output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output
|
|
|
|
* buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
|
|
|
|
* validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
|
|
|
|
* size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
|
2023-05-17 16:51:59 +02:00
|
|
|
plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output
|
|
|
|
* buffer and to 1 otherwise. */
|
2023-08-10 12:58:18 +02:00
|
|
|
output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(plaintext_size,
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
plaintext_max_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return:
|
|
|
|
* - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0).
|
|
|
|
* - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
|
|
|
|
* plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
|
|
|
|
* - 0 if the padding is correct. */
|
2023-09-22 10:52:15 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ct_error_if(
|
2023-05-17 13:28:51 +02:00
|
|
|
bad,
|
2023-09-22 10:52:15 +02:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(output_too_large, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE)
|
2023-05-17 13:28:51 +02:00
|
|
|
);
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the
|
|
|
|
* data that we're about to copy to the output buffer.
|
|
|
|
* We need to copy the same amount of data
|
|
|
|
* from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to
|
|
|
|
* avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or
|
|
|
|
* through memory or cache access patterns. */
|
2023-05-17 13:28:51 +02:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if(mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, output_too_large), input + 11, ilen - 11);
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size.
|
|
|
|
* Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
|
|
|
|
* revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
|
|
|
|
* for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
|
2023-05-17 16:51:59 +02:00
|
|
|
plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large,
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
(unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned) plaintext_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in
|
|
|
|
* the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from
|
|
|
|
* the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that
|
|
|
|
* does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the
|
|
|
|
* starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive
|
|
|
|
* information. */
|
2023-05-17 13:28:51 +02:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(input + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
|
|
|
|
plaintext_max_size,
|
|
|
|
plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size);
|
2023-05-09 12:10:21 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output
|
|
|
|
* buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer
|
|
|
|
* and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined
|
|
|
|
* behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the
|
|
|
|
* user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext
|
|
|
|
* length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other
|
|
|
|
* secrets. */
|
|
|
|
if (output_max_len != 0) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case
|
|
|
|
* of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen
|
|
|
|
* when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent
|
|
|
|
* to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */
|
|
|
|
*olen = plaintext_size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-11 12:00:19 +02:00
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
const mbedtls_mpi *N,
|
|
|
|
const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
|
|
|
|
const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E)
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-22 14:21:35 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((N != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->N, N)) != 0) ||
|
|
|
|
(P != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->P, P)) != 0) ||
|
|
|
|
(Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->Q, Q)) != 0) ||
|
|
|
|
(D != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->D, D)) != 0) ||
|
|
|
|
(E != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->E, E)) != 0)) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (N != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char const *N, size_t N_len,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char const *P, size_t P_len,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char const *Q, size_t Q_len,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char const *D, size_t D_len,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len)
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-01-10 08:12:01 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (N != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->N, N, N_len));
|
|
|
|
ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (P != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->P, P, P_len));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (Q != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->Q, Q, Q_len));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (D != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->D, D, D_len));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (E != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->E, E, E_len));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Checks whether the context fields are set in such a way
|
|
|
|
* that the RSA primitives will be able to execute without error.
|
|
|
|
* It does *not* make guarantees for consistency of the parameters.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static int rsa_check_context(mbedtls_rsa_context const *ctx, int is_priv,
|
|
|
|
int blinding_needed)
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-10-12 11:54:53 +02:00
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
|
|
|
/* blinding_needed is only used for NO_CRT to decide whether
|
|
|
|
* P,Q need to be present or not. */
|
|
|
|
((void) blinding_needed);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->len != mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N) ||
|
|
|
|
ctx->len > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2018-01-05 09:14:49 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* 1. Modular exponentiation needs positive, odd moduli.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Modular exponentiation wrt. N is always used for
|
|
|
|
* RSA public key operations. */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) <= 0 ||
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->N, 0) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
|
|
|
/* Modular exponentiation for P and Q is only
|
|
|
|
* used for private key operations and if CRT
|
|
|
|
* is used. */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (is_priv &&
|
|
|
|
(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) <= 0 ||
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->P, 0) == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) <= 0 ||
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->Q, 0) == 0)) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* 2. Exponents must be positive
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Always need E for public key operations */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-11 20:10:23 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
/* For private key operations, use D or DP & DQ
|
|
|
|
* as (unblinded) exponents. */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (is_priv && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (is_priv &&
|
|
|
|
(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DP, 0) <= 0 ||
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DQ, 0) <= 0)) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Blinding shouldn't make exponents negative either,
|
|
|
|
* so check that P, Q >= 1 if that hasn't yet been
|
|
|
|
* done as part of 1. */
|
2017-10-11 20:10:23 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (is_priv && blinding_needed &&
|
|
|
|
(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) <= 0 ||
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) <= 0)) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* It wouldn't lead to an error if it wasn't satisfied,
|
2017-10-17 10:20:57 +02:00
|
|
|
* but check for QP >= 1 nonetheless. */
|
2017-10-11 20:10:23 +02:00
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (is_priv &&
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->QP, 0) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_complete(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
|
2017-08-23 15:06:45 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2020-01-23 23:23:52 +01:00
|
|
|
int have_N, have_P, have_Q, have_D, have_E;
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
|
|
|
int have_DP, have_DQ, have_QP;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
have_N = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0);
|
|
|
|
have_P = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0);
|
|
|
|
have_Q = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0);
|
|
|
|
have_D = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0);
|
|
|
|
have_E = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0);
|
2020-01-23 23:23:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
have_DP = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DP, 0) != 0);
|
|
|
|
have_DQ = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DQ, 0) != 0);
|
|
|
|
have_QP = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->QP, 0) != 0);
|
2020-01-23 23:23:52 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check whether provided parameters are enough
|
|
|
|
* to deduce all others. The following incomplete
|
|
|
|
* parameter sets for private keys are supported:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* (1) P, Q missing.
|
|
|
|
* (2) D and potentially N missing.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
n_missing = have_P && have_Q && have_D && have_E;
|
|
|
|
pq_missing = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && have_D && have_E;
|
|
|
|
d_missing = have_P && have_Q && !have_D && have_E;
|
|
|
|
is_pub = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && !have_D && have_E;
|
Always deduce N from P, Q in mbedtls_rsa_complete
Previously, a parameter set of (-, P, Q, -, E) was completed, but (-, P, Q, D,
E) wasn't - this is odd.
2017-09-29 12:46:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* These three alternatives are mutually exclusive */
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
is_priv = n_missing || pq_missing || d_missing;
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!is_priv && !is_pub) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
Always deduce N from P, Q in mbedtls_rsa_complete
Previously, a parameter set of (-, P, Q, -, E) was completed, but (-, P, Q, D,
E) wasn't - this is odd.
2017-09-29 12:46:40 +02:00
|
|
|
* Step 1: Deduce N if P, Q are provided.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!have_N && have_P && have_Q) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->N, &ctx->P,
|
|
|
|
&ctx->Q)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
|
Always deduce N from P, Q in mbedtls_rsa_complete
Previously, a parameter set of (-, P, Q, -, E) was completed, but (-, P, Q, D,
E) wasn't - this is odd.
2017-09-29 12:46:40 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
|
Always deduce N from P, Q in mbedtls_rsa_complete
Previously, a parameter set of (-, P, Q, -, E) was completed, but (-, P, Q, D,
E) wasn't - this is odd.
2017-09-29 12:46:40 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Step 2: Deduce and verify all remaining core parameters.
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (pq_missing) {
|
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes(&ctx->N, &ctx->E, &ctx->D,
|
|
|
|
&ctx->P, &ctx->Q);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (d_missing) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent(&ctx->P,
|
|
|
|
&ctx->Q,
|
|
|
|
&ctx->E,
|
|
|
|
&ctx->D)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
Always deduce N from P, Q in mbedtls_rsa_complete
Previously, a parameter set of (-, P, Q, -, E) was completed, but (-, P, Q, D,
E) wasn't - this is odd.
2017-09-29 12:46:40 +02:00
|
|
|
* Step 3: Deduce all additional parameters specific
|
2017-10-10 18:56:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* to our current RSA implementation.
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-23 15:06:45 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-23 08:43:27 +02:00
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (is_priv && !(have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP)) {
|
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
|
|
|
|
&ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 08:43:27 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
|
2017-08-23 15:06:45 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
* Step 3: Basic sanity checks
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return rsa_check_context(ctx, is_priv, 1);
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *N, size_t N_len,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *P, size_t P_len,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *Q, size_t Q_len,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *D, size_t D_len,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *E, size_t E_len)
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
int is_priv;
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check if key is private or public */
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
is_priv =
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!is_priv) {
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key,
|
|
|
|
* something must be wrong. */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (N != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->N, N, N_len));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (P != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->P, P, P_len));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (Q != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->Q, Q, Q_len));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (D != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->D, D, D_len));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (E != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->E, E, E_len));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:06:45 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2017-08-23 15:06:45 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_export(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E)
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-22 14:21:35 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
int is_priv;
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check if key is private or public */
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
is_priv =
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!is_priv) {
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key,
|
|
|
|
* something must be wrong. */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Export all requested core parameters. */
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((N != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(N, &ctx->N)) != 0) ||
|
|
|
|
(P != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(P, &ctx->P)) != 0) ||
|
|
|
|
(Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(Q, &ctx->Q)) != 0) ||
|
|
|
|
(D != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(D, &ctx->D)) != 0) ||
|
|
|
|
(E != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(E, &ctx->E)) != 0)) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Export CRT parameters
|
|
|
|
* This must also be implemented if CRT is not used, for being able to
|
|
|
|
* write DER encoded RSA keys. The helper function mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt
|
|
|
|
* can be used in this case.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP)
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-22 14:21:35 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
int is_priv;
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check if key is private or public */
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
is_priv =
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0;
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!is_priv) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-23 07:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Export all requested blinding parameters. */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((DP != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(DP, &ctx->DP)) != 0) ||
|
|
|
|
(DQ != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(DQ, &ctx->DQ)) != 0) ||
|
|
|
|
(QP != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(QP, &ctx->QP)) != 0)) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 07:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
|
|
|
|
DP, DQ, QP)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
|
2017-08-23 07:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:06:45 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Initialize an RSA context
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context));
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-05 11:11:14 +02:00
|
|
|
ctx->padding = MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15;
|
|
|
|
ctx->hash_id = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
|
2013-09-29 14:58:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
|
2021-02-01 17:57:41 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Set ctx->ver to nonzero to indicate that the mutex has been
|
|
|
|
* initialized and will need to be freed. */
|
|
|
|
ctx->ver = 1;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex);
|
2013-09-29 14:58:17 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-10 21:55:35 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set padding for an existing RSA context
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id)
|
2014-03-10 21:55:35 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
switch (padding) {
|
2021-06-08 10:22:28 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
|
2021-06-08 10:22:28 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-06-03 18:51:59 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-07-05 10:25:06 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) &&
|
|
|
|
(hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)) {
|
2022-07-15 13:18:15 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Just make sure this hash is supported in this build. */
|
2023-03-30 09:42:10 +02:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_id) == NULL) {
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-06-03 18:51:59 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-07-05 10:25:06 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-03-10 21:55:35 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->padding = padding;
|
|
|
|
ctx->hash_id = hash_id;
|
2021-06-03 18:51:59 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-03-10 21:55:35 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2023-03-15 09:46:34 +01:00
|
|
|
* Get padding mode of initialized RSA context
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-03-01 03:18:19 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2023-03-15 09:50:31 +01:00
|
|
|
return ctx->padding;
|
2023-03-01 03:18:19 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-01 03:20:02 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-03-17 11:54:22 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
|
2023-03-01 03:20:02 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-03-15 09:50:31 +01:00
|
|
|
return ctx->hash_id;
|
2023-03-01 03:20:02 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-01 03:18:19 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get length in bytes of RSA modulus
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ctx->len;
|
2017-08-23 15:11:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Generate an RSA keypair
|
2018-02-15 04:27:13 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This generation method follows the RSA key pair generation procedure of
|
|
|
|
* FIPS 186-4 if 2^16 < exponent < 2^256 and nbits = 2048 or nbits = 3072.
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int nbits, int exponent)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-22 14:21:35 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
2018-02-14 00:50:36 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi H, G, L;
|
2018-09-03 16:37:01 +02:00
|
|
|
int prime_quality = 0;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-09-03 16:37:01 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the modulus is 1024 bit long or shorter, then the security strength of
|
|
|
|
* the RSA algorithm is less than or equal to 80 bits and therefore an error
|
|
|
|
* rate of 2^-80 is sufficient.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (nbits > 1024) {
|
2018-09-03 16:37:01 +02:00
|
|
|
prime_quality = MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-09-03 16:37:01 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&H);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&G);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&L);
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-07-20 18:26:58 +02:00
|
|
|
if (exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0) {
|
2021-02-02 21:06:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2023-06-30 17:48:19 +02:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-07-20 18:26:58 +02:00
|
|
|
if (nbits < MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS) {
|
2021-02-02 21:06:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* find primes P and Q with Q < P so that:
|
2018-02-15 04:27:13 +01:00
|
|
|
* 1. |P-Q| > 2^( nbits / 2 - 100 )
|
|
|
|
* 2. GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1
|
|
|
|
* 3. E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) > 2^( nbits / 2 )
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ctx->E, exponent));
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(&ctx->P, nbits >> 1,
|
|
|
|
prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng));
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(&ctx->Q, nbits >> 1,
|
|
|
|
prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng));
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-02-15 04:27:13 +01:00
|
|
|
/* make sure the difference between p and q is not too small (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 step 5.4) */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
|
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&H) <= ((nbits >= 200) ? ((nbits >> 1) - 99) : 0)) {
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-02-15 04:27:13 +01:00
|
|
|
/* not required by any standards, but some users rely on the fact that P > Q */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (H.s < 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_swap(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-09-21 14:18:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-23 07:59:15 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Temporarily replace P,Q by P-1, Q-1 */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
|
2018-02-14 00:50:36 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-02-15 04:27:13 +01:00
|
|
|
/* check GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 2(a)) */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G, &ctx->E, &H));
|
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&G, 1) != 0) {
|
2018-02-14 00:50:36 +01:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-02-14 00:50:36 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-02-15 04:27:13 +01:00
|
|
|
/* compute smallest possible D = E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(b)) */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(&L, NULL, &H, &G));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->D, &ctx->E, &L));
|
2018-02-14 00:50:36 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->D) <= ((nbits + 1) / 2)) { // (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(a))
|
2018-02-14 00:50:36 +01:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-02-14 00:50:36 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
} while (1);
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-23 07:59:15 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Restore P,Q */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1));
|
2017-08-23 07:59:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
|
2018-02-15 04:27:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
|
2017-08-23 07:59:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-02-14 00:50:36 +01:00
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* DP = D mod (P - 1)
|
|
|
|
* DQ = D mod (Q - 1)
|
|
|
|
* QP = Q^-1 mod P
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
|
|
|
|
&ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP));
|
2017-08-23 07:59:15 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-23 07:45:10 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Double-check */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(ctx));
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&H);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&G);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&L);
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_rsa_free(ctx);
|
2021-04-01 17:00:01 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((-ret & ~0x7f) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED, ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check a public RSA key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-07-11 00:38:58 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) < 128) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
|
2017-10-02 14:16:10 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->E, 0) == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->E) < 2 ||
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&ctx->E, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
|
2017-10-02 14:16:10 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
* Check for the consistency of all fields in an RSA private key context
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(ctx) != 0 ||
|
|
|
|
rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_rsa_validate_params(&ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q,
|
|
|
|
&ctx->D, &ctx->E, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-08-30 12:06:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-23 07:59:48 +02:00
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
else if (mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
|
|
|
|
&ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-25 09:03:21 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2011-05-05 13:49:20 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-06 14:02:51 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check if contexts holding a public and private key match
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub,
|
|
|
|
const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv)
|
2014-11-06 14:02:51 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(pub) != 0 ||
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(prv) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
|
2014-11-06 14:02:51 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->N, &prv->N) != 0 ||
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->E, &prv->E) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
|
2014-11-06 14:02:51 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-11-06 14:02:51 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Do an RSA public key operation
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_public(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *input,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *output)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-22 14:21:35 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
2011-04-24 10:57:21 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t olen;
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi T;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */)) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-10-10 18:57:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-08-27 11:30:58 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-08-27 11:30:58 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&T, input, ctx->len));
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&T, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
|
2015-08-28 10:32:21 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
olen = ctx->len;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen));
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-03-27 15:06:07 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-10 13:29:30 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2013-09-10 13:37:26 +02:00
|
|
|
* Generate or update blinding values, see section 10 of:
|
|
|
|
* KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA,
|
2015-04-03 13:48:06 +02:00
|
|
|
* DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer
|
2013-09-10 13:37:26 +02:00
|
|
|
* Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113.
|
2013-09-10 13:29:30 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static int rsa_prepare_blinding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
|
2013-09-10 13:29:30 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-10-04 15:18:38 +02:00
|
|
|
int ret, count = 0;
|
2020-06-26 11:19:12 +02:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi R;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&R);
|
2013-09-10 13:29:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->Vf.p != NULL) {
|
2013-09-10 13:37:26 +02:00
|
|
|
/* We already have blinding values, just update them by squaring */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N));
|
2013-09-10 13:37:26 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-08-27 11:30:58 +02:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2013-09-10 13:37:26 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-04 15:18:38 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Unblinding value: Vf = random number, invertible mod N */
|
|
|
|
do {
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (count++ > 10) {
|
2020-07-16 09:23:30 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-10-04 15:18:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng));
|
2013-09-10 13:29:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2020-07-16 09:48:54 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Compute Vf^-1 as R * (R Vf)^-1 to avoid leaks from inv_mod. */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &R));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N));
|
2020-06-26 11:19:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2020-07-16 09:48:54 +02:00
|
|
|
/* At this point, Vi is invertible mod N if and only if both Vf and R
|
|
|
|
* are invertible mod N. If one of them isn't, we don't need to know
|
|
|
|
* which one, we just loop and choose new values for both of them.
|
|
|
|
* (Each iteration succeeds with overwhelming probability.) */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) {
|
2020-06-26 11:03:19 +02:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-06-26 11:03:19 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
} while (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE);
|
2020-09-24 18:11:50 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Finish the computation of Vf^-1 = R * (R Vf)^-1 */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &R));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N));
|
2013-09-10 13:29:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2020-07-16 09:48:54 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N
|
2020-06-26 11:19:12 +02:00
|
|
|
* (Vi already contains Vf^-1 at this point) */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
|
2013-09-10 13:29:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-10-04 17:07:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-10 13:29:30 +02:00
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&R);
|
2020-06-26 11:19:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2013-09-10 13:29:30 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-11-21 10:33:54 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Unblind
|
|
|
|
* T = T * Vf mod N
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-11-21 15:20:08 +01:00
|
|
|
static int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi *T, mbedtls_mpi *Vf, mbedtls_mpi *N)
|
2023-11-21 10:33:54 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
|
|
const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p);
|
|
|
|
const size_t nlimbs = N->n;
|
|
|
|
const size_t tlimbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(nlimbs);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi RR, M_T;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&M_T);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&M_T, tlimbs));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(T, nlimbs));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Vf, nlimbs));
|
|
|
|
|
2023-12-27 11:22:59 +01:00
|
|
|
/* T = T * Vf mod N
|
|
|
|
* Reminder: montmul(A, B, N) = A * B * R^-1 mod N
|
|
|
|
* Usually both operands are multiplied by R mod N beforehand (by calling
|
|
|
|
* `to_mont_rep()` on them), yielding a result that's also * R mod N (aka
|
|
|
|
* "in the Montgomery domain"). Here we only multiply one operand by R mod
|
|
|
|
* N, so the result is directly what we want - no need to call
|
|
|
|
* `from_mont_rep()` on it. */
|
2023-11-21 10:33:54 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(T->p, T->p, N->p, nlimbs, mm, RR.p, M_T.p);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(T->p, T->p, Vf->p, nlimbs, N->p, nlimbs, mm, M_T.p);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&M_T);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 14:38:28 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Exponent blinding supposed to prevent side-channel attacks using multiple
|
|
|
|
* traces of measurements to recover the RSA key. The more collisions are there,
|
|
|
|
* the more bits of the key can be recovered. See [3].
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Collecting n collisions with m bit long blinding value requires 2^(m-m/n)
|
2021-12-21 06:14:10 +01:00
|
|
|
* observations on average.
|
2017-03-22 14:38:28 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For example with 28 byte blinding to achieve 2 collisions the adversary has
|
2021-12-21 06:14:10 +01:00
|
|
|
* to make 2^112 observations on average.
|
2017-03-22 14:38:28 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* (With the currently (as of 2017 April) known best algorithms breaking 2048
|
|
|
|
* bit RSA requires approximately as much time as trying out 2^112 random keys.
|
|
|
|
* Thus in this sense with 28 byte blinding the security is not reduced by
|
|
|
|
* side-channel attacks like the one in [3])
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This countermeasure does not help if the key recovery is possible with a
|
|
|
|
* single trace.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING 28
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Do an RSA private key operation
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *input,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *output)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-22 14:21:35 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
2011-04-24 10:57:21 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t olen;
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Temporary holding the result */
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi T;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Temporaries holding P-1, Q-1 and the
|
|
|
|
* exponent blinding factor, respectively. */
|
2017-03-22 16:13:15 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi P1, Q1, R;
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
|
|
|
/* Temporaries holding the results mod p resp. mod q. */
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi TP, TQ;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Temporaries holding the blinded exponents for
|
|
|
|
* the mod p resp. mod q computation (if used). */
|
2017-03-22 16:13:15 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi DP_blind, DQ_blind;
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
/* Temporary holding the blinded exponent (if used). */
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi D_blind;
|
2017-08-25 12:50:00 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-25 12:45:35 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double
|
|
|
|
* checked result; should be the same in the end. */
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi I, C;
|
2013-10-04 17:07:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (f_rng == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-06-15 11:29:26 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private key checks */,
|
|
|
|
1 /* blinding on */) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2017-10-12 11:54:53 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-30 10:56:25 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* MPI Initialization */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
|
2017-03-22 16:13:15 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&P1);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&Q1);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&R);
|
2017-03-22 16:13:15 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 14:38:28 +01:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&D_blind);
|
2017-03-22 16:13:15 +01:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP_blind);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ_blind);
|
2017-03-22 14:38:28 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&TP); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TQ);
|
2013-10-04 17:07:12 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&I);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&C);
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
/* End of MPI initialization */
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&T, input, ctx->len));
|
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&T, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
|
2015-08-28 10:32:21 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-06-15 11:29:26 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Blinding
|
|
|
|
* T = T * Vi mod N
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_prepare_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N));
|
2021-06-15 11:29:26 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-21 10:46:43 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&I, &T));
|
|
|
|
|
2021-06-15 11:29:26 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Exponent blinding
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&P1, &ctx->P, 1));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&Q1, &ctx->Q, 1));
|
2017-03-22 14:38:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 16:13:15 +01:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2021-06-15 11:29:26 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
|
|
|
|
f_rng, p_rng));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &P1, &Q1));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &R));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D));
|
2017-03-22 16:13:15 +01:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2021-06-15 11:29:26 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
|
|
|
|
f_rng, p_rng));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DP_blind, &P1, &R));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DP_blind, &DP_blind,
|
|
|
|
&ctx->DP));
|
2021-06-15 11:29:26 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
|
|
|
|
f_rng, p_rng));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DQ_blind, &Q1, &R));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DQ_blind, &DQ_blind,
|
|
|
|
&ctx->DQ));
|
2017-03-22 14:38:28 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
|
2013-08-30 11:00:25 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2023-12-27 11:33:00 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &D_blind, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
|
2014-11-06 18:15:12 +01:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-03-22 14:38:28 +01:00
|
|
|
* Faster decryption using the CRT
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
* TP = input ^ dP mod P
|
|
|
|
* TQ = input ^ dQ mod Q
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-12-27 11:33:00 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, &DP_blind, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, &DQ_blind, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ));
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
* T = (TP - TQ) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&T, &TP, &TQ));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&TP, &T, &ctx->QP));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &TP, &ctx->P));
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
* T = TQ + T * Q
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&TP, &T, &ctx->Q));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&T, &TQ, &TP));
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
|
2013-08-30 11:00:25 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-03 08:49:52 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&C, &T, &ctx->E,
|
|
|
|
&ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
|
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&C, &I) != 0) {
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-11-21 10:46:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Unblind
|
|
|
|
* T = T * Vf mod N
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_unblind(&T, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N));
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
olen = ctx->len;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen));
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-10-04 17:07:12 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2015-08-27 11:30:58 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&P1);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&Q1);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&R);
|
2017-03-22 16:13:15 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 14:38:28 +01:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&D_blind);
|
2017-03-22 16:13:15 +01:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&DP_blind);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&DQ_blind);
|
2017-03-22 14:38:28 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&TP); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TQ);
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&C);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&I);
|
2017-05-03 16:10:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Generate and apply the MGF1 operation (from PKCS#1 v2.1) to a buffer.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2011-11-10 14:33:51 +01:00
|
|
|
* \param dst buffer to mask
|
|
|
|
* \param dlen length of destination buffer
|
|
|
|
* \param src source of the mask generation
|
|
|
|
* \param slen length of the source buffer
|
2022-07-15 12:09:08 +02:00
|
|
|
* \param md_alg message digest to use
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src,
|
|
|
|
size_t slen, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg)
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char counter[4];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
2011-04-24 10:57:21 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned int hlen;
|
|
|
|
size_t i, use_len;
|
2023-03-28 11:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
|
2017-07-20 15:26:37 +02:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2022-07-27 10:42:31 +02:00
|
|
|
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
|
|
|
|
if (md_info == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-07-15 12:09:08 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) {
|
2022-07-15 12:09:08 +02:00
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-07-15 12:09:08 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
|
2022-07-27 10:42:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
memset(mask, 0, sizeof(mask));
|
|
|
|
memset(counter, 0, 4);
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Generate and apply dbMask */
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
p = dst;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
while (dlen > 0) {
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
use_len = hlen;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (dlen < hlen) {
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
use_len = dlen;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) {
|
2017-06-28 12:46:46 +02:00
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, src, slen)) != 0) {
|
2017-06-28 12:46:46 +02:00
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, counter, 4)) != 0) {
|
2017-06-28 12:46:46 +02:00
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, mask)) != 0) {
|
2017-06-28 12:46:46 +02:00
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < use_len; ++i) {
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
*p++ ^= mask[i];
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
counter[3]++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dlen -= use_len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-05-05 19:24:06 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-06-28 12:46:46 +02:00
|
|
|
exit:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mask, sizeof(mask));
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
|
2017-06-28 12:46:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Generate Hash(M') as in RFC 8017 page 43 points 5 and 6.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* \param hash the input hash
|
|
|
|
* \param hlen length of the input hash
|
|
|
|
* \param salt the input salt
|
|
|
|
* \param slen length of the input salt
|
2022-07-15 13:10:54 +02:00
|
|
|
* \param out the output buffer - must be large enough for \p md_alg
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* \param md_alg message digest to use
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static int hash_mprime(const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *out, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg)
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char zeros[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
|
2022-07-27 10:42:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
|
2022-07-29 11:27:46 +02:00
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
|
|
|
|
if (md_info == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) {
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) {
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, zeros, sizeof(zeros))) != 0) {
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hlen)) != 0) {
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt, slen)) != 0) {
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, out)) != 0) {
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
exit:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-07-15 13:10:54 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Compute a hash.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* \param md_alg algorithm to use
|
|
|
|
* \param input input message to hash
|
|
|
|
* \param ilen input length
|
|
|
|
* \param output the output buffer - must be large enough for \p md_alg
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static int compute_hash(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *output)
|
2022-07-15 13:10:54 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
|
|
|
|
if (md_info == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-07-15 13:10:54 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return mbedtls_md(md_info, input, ilen, output);
|
2022-07-15 13:10:54 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT function
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
|
|
|
|
size_t ilen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *input,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *output)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t olen;
|
2019-11-22 14:21:35 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *p = output;
|
2011-11-27 22:07:34 +01:00
|
|
|
unsigned int hlen;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (f_rng == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-28 11:14:24 +02:00
|
|
|
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (hlen == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
olen = ctx->len;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* first comparison checks for overflow */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
memset(output, 0, olen);
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
2010-07-18 10:29:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Generate a random octet string seed */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, hlen)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-07-18 10:29:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
p += hlen;
|
2010-07-18 10:29:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Construct DB */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = compute_hash((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id, label, label_len, p);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
p += hlen;
|
|
|
|
p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 1;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ilen != 0) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p, input, ilen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-05-19 10:43:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen,
|
2023-07-13 12:42:41 +02:00
|
|
|
(mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) {
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-05-19 10:43:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1,
|
2023-07-13 12:42:41 +02:00
|
|
|
(mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) {
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-28 12:46:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output);
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT function
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
|
|
void *p_rng, size_t ilen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *input,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *output)
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
size_t nb_pad, olen;
|
2019-11-22 14:21:35 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *p = output;
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
olen = ctx->len;
|
2016-02-11 10:35:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* first comparison checks for overflow */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ilen + 11 < ilen || olen < ilen + 11) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-11-27 22:07:34 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen;
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (f_rng == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-05-13 19:26:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
|
2013-01-03 11:08:31 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
while (nb_pad-- > 0) {
|
2021-05-13 19:26:49 +02:00
|
|
|
int rng_dl = 100;
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-05-13 19:26:49 +02:00
|
|
|
do {
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, 1);
|
|
|
|
} while (*p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0);
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-05-13 19:26:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Check if RNG failed to generate data */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-05-13 19:26:49 +02:00
|
|
|
p++;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ilen != 0) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p, input, ilen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output);
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
* Add the message padding, then do an RSA operation
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
|
|
size_t ilen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *input,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *output)
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
switch (ctx->padding) {
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng,
|
|
|
|
ilen, input, output);
|
2013-08-30 12:06:24 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0,
|
|
|
|
ilen, input, output);
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT function
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
|
|
|
|
size_t *olen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *input,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *output,
|
|
|
|
size_t output_max_len)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-22 14:21:35 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
2013-11-29 12:49:44 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t ilen, i, pad_len;
|
2023-09-18 19:46:19 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
2023-09-20 20:06:02 +02:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad, in_padding;
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
|
2023-03-28 11:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned char lhash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
|
2011-04-24 10:57:21 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned int hlen;
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-11-28 15:57:52 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Parameters sanity checks
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ilen = ctx->len;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof(buf)) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-28 11:14:24 +02:00
|
|
|
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (hlen == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-11-28 15:57:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-11 12:08:18 +01:00
|
|
|
// checking for integer underflow
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (2 * hlen + 2 > ilen) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-02-11 12:08:18 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-11-28 15:57:52 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* RSA operation
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf);
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
2017-03-23 14:37:37 +01:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-11-28 15:57:52 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2013-11-29 12:49:44 +01:00
|
|
|
* Unmask data and generate lHash
|
2013-11-28 15:57:52 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = mgf_mask(buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1,
|
2023-07-13 12:42:41 +02:00
|
|
|
(mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0 ||
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
/* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */
|
|
|
|
(ret = mgf_mask(buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen,
|
2023-07-13 12:42:41 +02:00
|
|
|
(mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) {
|
2017-06-28 12:46:46 +02:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-06-28 12:46:46 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Generate lHash */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = compute_hash((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id,
|
|
|
|
label, label_len, lhash);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
2017-06-28 12:46:46 +02:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-28 12:46:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-11-28 15:57:52 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2013-11-29 12:49:44 +01:00
|
|
|
* Check contents, in "constant-time"
|
2013-11-28 15:57:52 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
p = buf;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-09-18 19:46:19 +02:00
|
|
|
bad = mbedtls_ct_bool(*p++); /* First byte must be 0 */
|
2013-11-28 15:57:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p += hlen; /* Skip seed */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check lHash */
|
2023-09-18 19:46:19 +02:00
|
|
|
bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_memcmp(lhash, p, hlen)));
|
2023-09-18 19:35:03 +02:00
|
|
|
p += hlen;
|
2013-11-29 12:49:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer
|
|
|
|
* (minus one, for the 01 byte) */
|
|
|
|
pad_len = 0;
|
2023-09-20 20:06:02 +02:00
|
|
|
in_padding = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++) {
|
2023-09-20 20:06:02 +02:00
|
|
|
in_padding = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(p[i], 0));
|
|
|
|
pad_len += mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(in_padding, 1);
|
2013-11-29 12:49:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-11-29 12:49:44 +01:00
|
|
|
p += pad_len;
|
2023-09-18 19:46:19 +02:00
|
|
|
bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(*p++, 0x01));
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-11-29 12:49:44 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not
|
|
|
|
* (eg, no data is copied if it was not correct). This meets the
|
|
|
|
* recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between
|
|
|
|
* the different error conditions.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-09-18 19:46:19 +02:00
|
|
|
if (bad != MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) {
|
2017-03-23 14:37:37 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ilen - (p - buf) > output_max_len) {
|
2017-03-23 14:37:37 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
*olen = ilen - (p - buf);
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (*olen != 0) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(output, p, *olen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-03-23 14:37:37 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-23 14:37:37 +01:00
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(lhash, sizeof(lhash));
|
2017-03-23 14:37:37 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
2021-09-26 15:20:48 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
|
|
size_t *olen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *input,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *output,
|
|
|
|
size_t output_max_len)
|
2021-09-26 15:20:48 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
|
|
size_t ilen;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ilen = ctx->len;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-09-26 15:20:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof(buf)) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-09-26 15:20:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf);
|
2021-09-26 15:20:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
2021-09-26 15:20:48 +02:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-09-26 15:20:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(buf, ilen,
|
|
|
|
output, output_max_len, olen);
|
2021-09-26 15:20:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-23 14:37:37 +01:00
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
|
2017-03-23 14:37:37 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
* Do an RSA operation, then remove the message padding
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
|
|
size_t *olen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *input,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *output,
|
|
|
|
size_t output_max_len)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
switch (ctx->padding) {
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, olen,
|
|
|
|
input, output, output_max_len);
|
2013-08-30 12:06:24 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0,
|
|
|
|
olen, input, output,
|
|
|
|
output_max_len);
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
|
|
int saltlen,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *sig)
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
size_t olen;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p = sig;
|
2020-04-30 11:57:04 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *salt = NULL;
|
2018-09-07 20:12:36 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0;
|
2019-11-22 14:21:35 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
2011-04-24 10:57:21 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t msb;
|
2022-07-15 12:49:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
|
2022-08-05 16:49:56 +02:00
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-05-21 12:50:39 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (f_rng == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
olen = ctx->len;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Gather length of hash to sign */
|
2023-03-28 11:14:24 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t exp_hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg);
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (exp_hashlen == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hashlen != exp_hashlen) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-28 11:14:24 +02:00
|
|
|
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (hlen == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY) {
|
|
|
|
/* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size.
|
|
|
|
* Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length
|
|
|
|
* according to FIPS 185-4 §5.5 (e) and common practice. If there is not
|
|
|
|
* enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is
|
|
|
|
* that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at most
|
|
|
|
* the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017
|
|
|
|
* (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */
|
2020-04-21 12:49:11 +02:00
|
|
|
min_slen = hlen - 2;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (olen < hlen + min_slen + 2) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
} else if (olen >= hlen + hlen + 2) {
|
2020-04-21 12:49:11 +02:00
|
|
|
slen = hlen;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2020-04-21 12:49:11 +02:00
|
|
|
slen = olen - hlen - 2;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if ((saltlen < 0) || (saltlen + hlen + 2 > olen)) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2020-04-25 09:24:11 +02:00
|
|
|
slen = (size_t) saltlen;
|
2020-04-21 12:49:11 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
memset(sig, 0, olen);
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
|
2018-09-07 20:12:36 +02:00
|
|
|
p += olen - hlen - slen - 2;
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
*p++ = 0x01;
|
2020-04-30 11:57:04 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Generate salt of length slen in place in the encoded message */
|
|
|
|
salt = p;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = f_rng(p_rng, salt, slen)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-04-30 11:57:04 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
p += slen;
|
2012-11-14 13:39:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Generate H = Hash( M' ) */
|
2023-07-13 12:42:41 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = hash_mprime(hash, hashlen, salt, slen, p, (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (msb % 8 == 0) {
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
offset = 1;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = mgf_mask(sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen,
|
2023-07-13 12:42:41 +02:00
|
|
|
(mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-01-03 11:08:31 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
|
|
|
|
sig[0] &= 0xFF >> (olen * 8 - msb);
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
p += hlen;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0xBC;
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig);
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-04-21 12:49:11 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2020-04-25 11:30:45 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function with
|
|
|
|
* the option to pass in the salt length.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
|
|
int saltlen,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *sig)
|
2020-04-25 11:30:45 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
|
|
|
|
hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig);
|
2020-04-25 11:30:45 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-21 12:49:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *sig)
|
2020-04-21 12:49:11 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
|
|
|
|
hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig);
|
2020-04-21 12:49:11 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN function
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Construct a PKCS v1.5 encoding of a hashed message
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This is used both for signature generation and verification.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Parameters:
|
|
|
|
* - md_alg: Identifies the hash algorithm used to generate the given hash;
|
2017-09-27 18:09:00 +02:00
|
|
|
* MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if raw data is signed.
|
2021-06-22 18:39:53 +02:00
|
|
|
* - hashlen: Length of hash. Must match md_alg if that's not NONE.
|
2017-09-27 18:09:00 +02:00
|
|
|
* - hash: Buffer containing the hashed message or the raw data.
|
|
|
|
* - dst_len: Length of the encoded message.
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
* - dst: Buffer to hold the encoded message.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Assumptions:
|
2021-06-22 18:39:53 +02:00
|
|
|
* - hash has size hashlen.
|
2017-09-27 18:09:00 +02:00
|
|
|
* - dst points to a buffer of size at least dst_len.
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
*
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
|
|
size_t dst_len,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *dst)
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t oid_size = 0;
|
2017-09-27 18:09:00 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t nb_pad = dst_len;
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *p = dst;
|
|
|
|
const char *oid = NULL;
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Are we signing hashed or raw data? */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
|
2023-03-28 11:14:24 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned char md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg);
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (md_size == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md(md_alg, &oid, &oid_size) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (hashlen != md_size) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Double-check that 8 + hashlen + oid_size can be used as a
|
|
|
|
* 1-byte ASN.1 length encoding and that there's no overflow. */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (8 + hashlen + oid_size >= 0x80 ||
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
10 + hashlen < hashlen ||
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
10 + hashlen + oid_size < 10 + hashlen) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Static bounds check:
|
|
|
|
* - Need 10 bytes for five tag-length pairs.
|
|
|
|
* (Insist on 1-byte length encodings to protect against variants of
|
|
|
|
* Bleichenbacher's forgery attack against lax PKCS#1v1.5 verification)
|
|
|
|
* - Need hashlen bytes for hash
|
|
|
|
* - Need oid_size bytes for hash alg OID.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (nb_pad < 10 + hashlen + oid_size) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
nb_pad -= 10 + hashlen + oid_size;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (nb_pad < hashlen) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
nb_pad -= hashlen;
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-04-07 22:00:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-27 18:10:03 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Need space for signature header and padding delimiter (3 bytes),
|
|
|
|
* and 8 bytes for the minimal padding */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (nb_pad < 3 + 8) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
nb_pad -= 3;
|
2013-04-07 22:00:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Now nb_pad is the amount of memory to be filled
|
2017-09-27 18:10:03 +02:00
|
|
|
* with padding, and at least 8 bytes long. */
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Write signature header and padding */
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
memset(p, 0xFF, nb_pad);
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
p += nb_pad;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Are we signing raw data? */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p, hash, hashlen);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2013-04-07 22:00:46 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Signing hashed data, add corresponding ASN.1 structure
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
|
|
|
|
* digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
|
|
|
|
* digest Digest }
|
|
|
|
* DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
|
|
|
|
* Digest ::= OCTET STRING
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Schematic:
|
|
|
|
* TAG-SEQ + LEN [ TAG-SEQ + LEN [ TAG-OID + LEN [ OID ]
|
|
|
|
* TAG-NULL + LEN [ NULL ] ]
|
|
|
|
* TAG-OCTET + LEN [ HASH ] ]
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char) (0x08 + oid_size + hashlen);
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char) (0x04 + oid_size);
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
|
2018-01-15 16:27:56 +01:00
|
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char) oid_size;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
memcpy(p, oid, oid_size);
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
p += oid_size;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
|
2018-01-15 16:27:56 +01:00
|
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char) hashlen;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
memcpy(p, hash, hashlen);
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
p += hashlen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Just a sanity-check, should be automatic
|
|
|
|
* after the initial bounds check. */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (p != dst + dst_len) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dst, dst_len);
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *sig)
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-22 14:21:35 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
|
2022-08-05 16:49:56 +02:00
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-05-21 12:50:39 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-09-03 20:03:15 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
* Prepare PKCS1-v1.5 encoding (padding and hash identifier)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(md_alg, hashlen, hash,
|
|
|
|
ctx->len, sig)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Private key operation
|
|
|
|
*
|
2015-09-03 20:03:15 +02:00
|
|
|
* In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a
|
|
|
|
* temporary buffer and check it before returning it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-09-06 13:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
sig_try = mbedtls_calloc(1, ctx->len);
|
|
|
|
if (sig_try == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-01-01 22:42:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
verif = mbedtls_calloc(1, ctx->len);
|
|
|
|
if (verif == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_free(sig_try);
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
|
2016-01-01 22:42:47 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-03 20:03:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig_try, verif));
|
2015-09-03 20:03:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(verif, sig, ctx->len) != 0) {
|
2015-09-03 20:03:15 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
memcpy(sig, sig_try, ctx->len);
|
2015-09-03 20:03:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
2023-07-17 16:17:40 +02:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(sig_try, ctx->len);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(verif, ctx->len);
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
memset(sig, '!', ctx->len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
* Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *sig)
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
|
2022-08-05 16:49:56 +02:00
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
switch (ctx->padding) {
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng,
|
|
|
|
md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig);
|
2013-08-30 12:06:24 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
|
|
|
|
hashlen, hash, sig);
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id,
|
|
|
|
int expected_salt_len,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *sig)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-22 14:21:35 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t siglen;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
2017-10-17 19:02:13 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *hash_start;
|
2023-03-28 11:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned char result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
|
2011-04-24 10:57:21 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned int hlen;
|
2017-10-17 19:02:13 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t observed_salt_len, msb;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 };
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
|
2022-08-05 16:49:56 +02:00
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
siglen = ctx->len;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof(buf)) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, buf);
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = buf;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Gather length of hash to sign */
|
2023-03-28 11:14:24 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t exp_hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg);
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (exp_hashlen == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-04-07 22:00:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (hashlen != exp_hashlen) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-28 11:14:24 +02:00
|
|
|
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(mgf1_hash_id);
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (hlen == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (buf[0] >> (8 - siglen * 8 + msb)) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-10-19 15:23:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (msb % 8 == 0) {
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
siglen -= 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-08 15:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (siglen < hlen + 2) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-10-18 19:03:42 +02:00
|
|
|
hash_start = p + siglen - hlen - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = mgf_mask(p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, mgf1_hash_id);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-25 14:58:48 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
buf[0] &= 0xFF >> (siglen * 8 - msb);
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
while (p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0) {
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
p++;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-01-03 10:50:31 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (*p++ != 0x01) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-17 19:02:13 +02:00
|
|
|
observed_salt_len = hash_start - p;
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY &&
|
|
|
|
observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
|
2014-06-03 11:44:06 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Generate H = Hash( M' )
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = hash_mprime(hash, hashlen, p, observed_salt_len,
|
|
|
|
result, mgf1_hash_id);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-28 12:46:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (memcmp(hash_start, result, hlen) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-03 11:44:06 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *sig)
|
2014-06-03 11:44:06 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
|
2022-08-05 16:49:56 +02:00
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mgf1_hash_id = (ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id
|
2014-06-03 11:44:06 +02:00
|
|
|
: md_alg;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(ctx,
|
|
|
|
md_alg, hashlen, hash,
|
|
|
|
mgf1_hash_id,
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY,
|
|
|
|
sig);
|
2014-06-03 11:44:06 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *sig)
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-09-06 13:39:49 +02:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t sig_len;
|
2017-09-06 13:39:49 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *encoded_expected = NULL;
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
|
2022-08-05 16:49:56 +02:00
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sig_len = ctx->len;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-06 13:39:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Prepare expected PKCS1 v1.5 encoding of hash.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((encoded = mbedtls_calloc(1, sig_len)) == NULL ||
|
|
|
|
(encoded_expected = mbedtls_calloc(1, sig_len)) == NULL) {
|
2017-09-06 13:39:49 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig_len,
|
|
|
|
encoded_expected)) != 0) {
|
2017-09-06 13:39:49 +02:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-09-06 13:39:49 +02:00
|
|
|
* Apply RSA primitive to get what should be PKCS1 encoded hash.
|
2016-03-01 22:19:12 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, encoded);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
2017-09-06 13:39:49 +02:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-04-07 22:00:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-09-06 13:39:49 +02:00
|
|
|
* Compare
|
2013-04-07 22:00:46 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(encoded, encoded_expected,
|
|
|
|
sig_len)) != 0) {
|
2017-09-06 13:39:49 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-04-07 22:00:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-06 13:39:49 +02:00
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
2013-04-07 22:00:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (encoded != NULL) {
|
2023-07-17 16:17:40 +02:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(encoded, sig_len);
|
2017-09-06 13:39:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-04-07 22:00:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (encoded_expected != NULL) {
|
2023-07-17 16:17:40 +02:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(encoded_expected, sig_len);
|
2017-09-06 13:39:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-04-07 22:00:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Do an RSA operation and check the message digest
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *sig)
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
|
2022-08-05 16:49:56 +02:00
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
switch (ctx->padding) {
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(ctx, md_alg,
|
|
|
|
hashlen, hash, sig);
|
2013-08-30 12:06:24 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(ctx, md_alg,
|
|
|
|
hashlen, hash, sig);
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
|
2013-02-28 17:21:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-14 13:39:57 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Copy the components of an RSA key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_copy(mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src)
|
2013-08-14 13:39:57 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-22 14:21:35 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
2013-08-14 13:39:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dst->len = src->len;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->N, &src->N));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->E, &src->E));
|
2013-08-14 13:39:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->D, &src->D));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->P, &src->P));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Q, &src->Q));
|
2017-08-23 08:00:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->DP, &src->DP));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->DQ, &src->DQ));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->QP, &src->QP));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RP, &src->RP));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RQ, &src->RQ));
|
2017-08-23 08:00:22 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RN, &src->RN));
|
2013-08-14 13:39:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Vi, &src->Vi));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Vf, &src->Vf));
|
2013-09-10 13:29:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-14 13:39:57 +02:00
|
|
|
dst->padding = src->padding;
|
2014-03-25 15:58:35 +01:00
|
|
|
dst->hash_id = src->hash_id;
|
2013-08-14 13:39:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_rsa_free(dst);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-08-14 13:39:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2013-08-14 13:39:57 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Free the components of an RSA key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
void mbedtls_rsa_free(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-01-31 14:20:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vi);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vf);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RN);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->D);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Q);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->P);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->E);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->N);
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-23 08:00:22 +02:00
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RQ);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RP);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->QP);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->DQ);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->DP);
|
2017-08-23 08:00:22 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
|
2021-02-01 17:57:41 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Free the mutex, but only if it hasn't been freed already. */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->ver != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex);
|
2021-02-01 17:57:41 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->ver = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-09-29 14:58:17 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-23 17:24:51 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-07 00:04:16 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define KEY_LEN 128
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_N "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \
|
|
|
|
"8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \
|
|
|
|
"DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \
|
|
|
|
"7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \
|
|
|
|
"93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \
|
|
|
|
"1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \
|
|
|
|
"EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \
|
|
|
|
"5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_E "10001"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_D "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \
|
|
|
|
"66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \
|
|
|
|
"91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \
|
|
|
|
"AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \
|
|
|
|
"DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \
|
|
|
|
"CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \
|
|
|
|
"AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \
|
|
|
|
"071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_P "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \
|
|
|
|
"2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \
|
|
|
|
"FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \
|
|
|
|
"C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_Q "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \
|
|
|
|
"E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \
|
|
|
|
"910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \
|
|
|
|
"8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define PT_LEN 24
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_PT "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \
|
|
|
|
"\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD"
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static int myrand(void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len)
|
2010-07-18 11:00:25 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-08-03 17:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
|
2011-11-27 22:07:34 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rng_state != NULL) {
|
2010-07-18 11:00:25 +02:00
|
|
|
rng_state = NULL;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-07-18 11:00:25 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
|
2011-11-27 22:07:34 +01:00
|
|
|
output[i] = rand();
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-04-30 16:02:38 +02:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rng_state != NULL) {
|
2014-04-30 16:02:38 +02:00
|
|
|
rng_state = NULL;
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-04-30 16:02:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
arc4random_buf(output, len);
|
2020-08-03 17:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* !OpenBSD && !NetBSD */
|
2013-08-30 12:06:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2010-07-18 11:00:25 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
|
2010-07-18 11:00:25 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Checkup routine
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose)
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-04-17 12:42:41 +02:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
2011-04-24 10:57:21 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t len;
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_rsa_context rsa;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN];
|
2023-03-16 10:58:19 +01:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
|
2011-05-26 15:16:06 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned char sha1sum[20];
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-22 14:52:43 +02:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi K;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa);
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_N));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_P));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_Q));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_D));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_E));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K));
|
2017-08-22 14:52:43 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_complete(&rsa));
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf(" RSA key validation: ");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&rsa) != 0 ||
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(&rsa) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-03 16:09:31 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 encryption : ");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
memcpy(rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN);
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL,
|
|
|
|
PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext,
|
|
|
|
rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-03 16:09:31 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : ");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL,
|
|
|
|
&len, rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(rsa_decrypted)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-03 16:09:31 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (memcmp(rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-03 16:09:31 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-08-07 10:46:54 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-16 10:58:19 +01:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf(" PKCS#1 data sign : ");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-03-07 00:04:16 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1),
|
|
|
|
rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum) != 0) {
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-28 12:46:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2017-06-28 12:46:46 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&rsa, myrand, NULL,
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20,
|
|
|
|
sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-03 16:09:31 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: ");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20,
|
|
|
|
sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-03 16:09:31 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2023-03-16 10:58:19 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_printf("\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-08-07 10:46:54 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-04-17 12:42:41 +02:00
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#else /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
|
2013-09-15 17:42:50 +02:00
|
|
|
((void) verbose);
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
|
2023-01-11 14:50:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
|
2009-01-03 22:22:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 12:49:31 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
|