Redo of PR#5345. Fixed spelling and typographical errors found by CodeSpell.

Signed-off-by: Shaun Case <warmsocks@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>
2021-12-20 21:14:10 -08:00 · 2021-12-20 21:14:10 -08:00 · 8b0ecbccf4
commit 8b0ecbccf4
parent 5479f5321a
78 changed files with 151 additions and 151 deletions
--- a/3rdparty/everest/README.md
+++ b/3rdparty/everest/README.md
@ -2,4 +2,4 @@ The files in this directory stem from [Project Everest](https://project-everest.

 This is a formally verified implementation of Curve25519-based handshakes. The C code is automatically derived from the (verified) [original implementation](https://github.com/project-everest/hacl-star/tree/master/code/curve25519) in the [F* language](https://github.com/fstarlang/fstar) by [KreMLin](https://github.com/fstarlang/kremlin). In addition to the improved safety and security of the implementation, it is also significantly faster than the default implementation of Curve25519 in mbedTLS.

-The caveat is that not all platforms are supported, although the version in `everest/library/legacy` should work on most systems. The main issue is that some platforms do not provide a 128-bit integer type and KreMLin therefore has to use additional (also verified) code to simulate them, resulting in less of a performance gain overall. Explictly supported platforms are currently `x86` and `x86_64` using gcc or clang, and Visual C (2010 and later).
+The caveat is that not all platforms are supported, although the version in `everest/library/legacy` should work on most systems. The main issue is that some platforms do not provide a 128-bit integer type and KreMLin therefore has to use additional (also verified) code to simulate them, resulting in less of a performance gain overall. Explicitly supported platforms are currently `x86` and `x86_64` using gcc or clang, and Visual C (2010 and later).
--- a/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 #     command but rather at the target level using the
 #     target_include_directories command. That way, it is easier to guarantee
 #     that targets are built using the proper list of include directories.
-#   + Use the PUBLIC and PRIVATE keywords to specifiy the scope of include
+#   + Use the PUBLIC and PRIVATE keywords to specify the scope of include
 #     directories. That way, a target linking to a library (using the
 #     target_link_librairies command) inherits from the library PUBLIC include
 #     directories and not from the PRIVATE ones.
--- a/26
+++ b/26
@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ Security
     applications calling mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() directly are affected:
     all calls inside the library were safe since this function is
     only called with |A| >= |B|. Reported by Guido Vranken in #4042.
-   * Fix an errorneous estimation for an internal buffer in
+   * Fix an erroneous estimation for an internal buffer in
     mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(). If MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is set to an odd
     value the function might fail to write a private RSA keys of the largest
     supported size.
@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ Security

 Bugfix
   * Fix use-after-scope error in programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c and ssl_server2.c
-   * Fix memory leak that occured when calling psa_close_key() on a
+   * Fix memory leak that occurred when calling psa_close_key() on a
     wrapped key with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C defined.
   * Fix an incorrect error code if an RSA private operation glitched.
   * Fix a memory leak in an error case in psa_generate_derived_key_internal().
@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@ Changes
     executable.
   * The ECP module, enabled by `MBEDTLS_ECP_C`, now depends on
     `MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C` or `MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C` for some side-channel
-     coutermeasures. If side channels are not a concern, this dependency can
+     countermeasures. If side channels are not a concern, this dependency can
     be avoided by enabling the new option `MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG`.
   * Align MSVC error flag with GCC and Clang. Contributed by Carlos Gomes
     Martinho. #3147
@ -1817,7 +1817,7 @@ New deprecations
     platform error.
   * All module specific generic hardware acceleration errors following the
     form MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_HW_ACCEL_FAILED that are deprecated and are replaced
-     by the equivalent plaform error.
+     by the equivalent platform error.
   * Deprecate the function mbedtls_mpi_is_prime() in favor of
     mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext() which allows specifying the number of
     Miller-Rabin rounds.
@ -2637,7 +2637,7 @@ Bugfix
     a negative MPI. Previously the result was always negative. Found by Guido
     Vranken.
   * Fix a numerical underflow leading to stack overflow in mpi_read_file()
-     that was triggered uppon reading an empty line. Found by Guido Vranken.
+     that was triggered upon reading an empty line. Found by Guido Vranken.

 Changes
   * Send fatal alerts in more cases. The previous behaviour was to skip
@ -2812,7 +2812,7 @@ Bugfix
   * Fix mbedtls_x509_get_sig() to update the ASN1 type in the mbedtls_x509_buf
     data structure until after error checks are successful. Found by
     subramanyam-c. #622
-   * Fix documentation and implementation missmatch for function arguments of
+   * Fix documentation and implementation mismatch for function arguments of
     mbedtls_gcm_finish(). Found by cmiatpaar. #602
   * Guarantee that P>Q at RSA key generation. Found by inestlerode. #558
   * Fix potential byte overread when verifying malformed SERVER_HELLO in
@ -2935,7 +2935,7 @@ Security
 Features
   * Experimental support for EC J-PAKE as defined in Thread 1.0.0.
     Disabled by default as the specification might still change.
-   * Added a key extraction callback to accees the master secret and key
+   * Added a key extraction callback to access the master secret and key
     block. (Potential uses include EAP-TLS and Thread.)

 Bugfix
@ -2970,7 +2970,7 @@ Security
     overflow of the hostname or session ticket. Found by Guido Vranken,
     Intelworks.
   * Fix potential double-free if mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() is called more than
-     once in the same handhake and mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() was used.
+     once in the same handshake and mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() was used.
     Found and patch provided by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Cannot be forced
     remotely.
   * Fix stack buffer overflow in pkcs12 decryption (used by
@ -3245,7 +3245,7 @@ Default behavior changes

 Requirement changes
   * The minimum MSVC version required is now 2010 (better C99 support).
-   * The NET layer now unconditionnaly relies on getaddrinfo() and select().
+   * The NET layer now unconditionally relies on getaddrinfo() and select().
   * Compiler is required to support C99 types such as long long and uint32_t.

 API changes from the 1.4 preview branch
@ -3458,7 +3458,7 @@ Bugfix
     are defined but not POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME (found by Stephane Di Vito).
   * Remove non-existent file from VS projects (found by Peter Vaskovic).
   * ssl_read() could return non-application data records on server while
-     renegotation was pending, and on client when a HelloRequest was received.
+     renegotiation was pending, and on client when a HelloRequest was received.
   * Server-initiated renegotiation would fail with non-blocking I/O if the
     write callback returned WANT_WRITE when requesting renegotiation.
   * ssl_close_notify() could send more than one message in some circumstances
@ -3942,7 +3942,7 @@ Bugfix
   * Don't print uninitialised buffer in ssl_mail_client (found by Marc Abel).
   * Fix net_accept() regarding non-blocking sockets (found by Luca Pesce).
   * ssl_read() could return non-application data records on server while
-     renegotation was pending, and on client when a HelloRequest was received.
+     renegotiation was pending, and on client when a HelloRequest was received.
   * Fix warnings from Clang's scan-build (contributed by Alfred Klomp).

 Changes
@ -4378,7 +4378,7 @@ Changes
     x509parse_crtfile(). With permissive parsing the parsing does not stop on
     encountering a parse-error. Beware that the meaning of return values has
     changed!
-   * All error codes are now negative. Even on mermory failures and IO errors.
+   * All error codes are now negative. Even on memory failures and IO errors.

 Bugfix
   * Fixed faulty HMAC-MD2 implementation. Found by dibac. (Closes
@ -4538,7 +4538,7 @@ Features
 Changes
   * Made Makefile cleaner
   * Removed dependency on rand() in rsa_pkcs1_encrypt().
-     Now using random fuction provided to function and
+     Now using random function provided to function and
     changed the prototype of rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(),
     rsa_init() and rsa_gen_key().
   * Some SSL defines were renamed in order to avoid
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ send an email to the security team at

 ## Security Incident Handling Process

-Our security process is detailled in our
+Our security process is detailed in our
 [security
 center](https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/security-center/).

--- a/configs/config-suite-b.h
+++ b/configs/config-suite-b.h
@ -104,7 +104,7 @@

 /*
 * Save RAM at the expense of interoperability: do this only if you control
- * both ends of the connection!  (See coments in "mbedtls/ssl.h".)
+ * both ends of the connection!  (See comments in "mbedtls/ssl.h".)
 * The minimum size here depends on the certificate chain used as well as the
 * typical size of records.
 */
--- a/docs/architecture/testing/psa-storage-format-testing.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/testing/psa-storage-format-testing.md
@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ If the way certain keys are stored changes, and we don't deliberately decide to

 ## Storage architecture overview

-The PSA subsystem provides storage on top of the PSA trusted storage interface. The state of the storage is a mapping from file identifer (a 64-bit number) to file content (a byte array). These files include:
+The PSA subsystem provides storage on top of the PSA trusted storage interface. The state of the storage is a mapping from file identifier (a 64-bit number) to file content (a byte array). These files include:

 * [Key files](#key-storage) (files containing one key's metadata and, except for some secure element keys, key material).
 * The [random generator injected seed or state file](#random-generator-state) (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID`).
--- a/include/mbedtls/aria.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/aria.h
@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT     0 /**< ARIA decryption. */

 #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE   16 /**< ARIA block size in bytes. */
-#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS  16 /**< Maxiumum number of rounds in ARIA. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS  16 /**< Maximum number of rounds in ARIA. */
 #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_KEYSIZE 32 /**< Maximum size of an ARIA key in bytes. */

 /** Bad input data. */
--- a/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_len( unsigned char **p,
 *              with the requested tag.
 * \return      #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA if the ASN.1 element
 *              would end beyond \p end.
- * \return      #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the length is unparseable.
+ * \return      #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the length is unparsable.
 */
 int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( unsigned char **p,
                          const unsigned char *end,
--- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@ -146,7 +146,7 @@
 #endif

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
-#error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequesites"
+#error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
 #endif

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
@ -334,11 +334,11 @@
 #endif

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
-#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE defined, but not all prerequesites"
+#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE defined, but not all prerequisites"
 #endif

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
-#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG defined, but not all prerequesites"
+#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG defined, but not all prerequisites"
 #endif

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM)
@ -792,12 +792,12 @@

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&   \
    !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
-#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC defined, but not all prerequsites"
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC defined, but not all prerequisites"
 #endif

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \
    !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
-#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET defined, but not all prerequsites"
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET defined, but not all prerequisites"
 #endif

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
--- a/include/mbedtls/debug.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/debug.h
@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ extern "C" {
 *          discarded.
 *          (Default value: 0 = No debug )
 *
- * \param threshold     theshold level of messages to filter on. Messages at a
+ * \param threshold     threshold level of messages to filter on. Messages at a
 *                      higher level will be discarded.
 *                          - Debug levels
 *                              - 0 No debug
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ typedef enum {
 * (KeyExchange) as defined by the Thread spec.
 *
 * In order to benefit from this symmetry, we choose a different naming
- * convetion from the Thread v1.0 spec. Correspondance is indicated in the
+ * convention from the Thread v1.0 spec. Correspondence is indicated in the
 * description as a pair C: client name, S: server name
 */
 typedef struct mbedtls_ecjpake_context
--- a/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h
@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
                    size_t len );

 /**
- * \brief               Initilisation of simpified HMAC_DRBG (never reseeds).
+ * \brief               Initialisation of simplified HMAC_DRBG (never reseeds).
 *
 * This function is meant for use in algorithms that need a pseudorandom
 * input such as deterministic ECDSA.
--- a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
@ -330,7 +330,7 @@
 //#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT

 /*
- * When replacing the elliptic curve module, pleace consider, that it is
+ * When replacing the elliptic curve module, please consider, that it is
 * implemented with two .c files:
 *      - ecp.c
 *      - ecp_curves.c
@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@
 * Enable support for RFC 7627: Session Hash and Extended Master Secret
 * Extension.
 *
- * This was introduced as "the proper fix" to the Triple Handshake familiy of
+ * This was introduced as "the proper fix" to the Triple Handshake family of
 * attacks, but it is recommended to always use it (even if you disable
 * renegotiation), since it actually fixes a more fundamental issue in the
 * original SSL/TLS design, and has implications beyond Triple Handshake.
@ -1442,7 +1442,7 @@
 * \note This option has no influence on the protection against the
 *       triple handshake attack. Even if it is disabled, Mbed TLS will
 *       still ensure that certificates do not change during renegotiation,
- *       for exaple by keeping a hash of the peer's certificate.
+ *       for example by keeping a hash of the peer's certificate.
 *
 * Comment this macro to disable storing the peer's certificate
 * after the handshake.
@ -2554,7 +2554,7 @@
 /**
 * \def MBEDTLS_PK_C
 *
- * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key layer.
+ * Enable the generic public (asymmetric) key layer.
 *
 * Module:  library/pk.c
 * Caller:  library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
@ -2572,7 +2572,7 @@
 /**
 * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
 *
- * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key parser.
+ * Enable the generic public (asymmetric) key parser.
 *
 * Module:  library/pkparse.c
 * Caller:  library/x509_crt.c
@ -2587,7 +2587,7 @@
 /**
 * \def MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
 *
- * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key writer.
+ * Enable the generic public (asymmetric) key writer.
 *
 * Module:  library/pkwrite.c
 * Caller:  library/x509write.c
--- a/include/mbedtls/private_access.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/private_access.h
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
 * \file private_access.h
 *
- * \brief Macro wrapper for struct's memebrs.
+ * \brief Macro wrapper for struct's members.
 */
 /*
 *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
--- a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
@ -74,7 +74,7 @@

 /*
 * The above constants may be used even if the RSA module is compile out,
- * eg for alternative (PKCS#11) RSA implemenations in the PK layers.
+ * eg for alternative (PKCS#11) RSA implementations in the PK layers.
 */

 #ifdef __cplusplus
@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
 *
 * \note           Blinding is used if and only if a PRNG is provided.
 *
- * \note           If blinding is used, both the base of exponentation
+ * \note           If blinding is used, both the base of exponentiation
 *                 and the exponent are blinded, providing protection
 *                 against some side-channel attacks.
 *
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@ -2130,7 +2130,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */

 /**
- * \brief          Set the Maximum Tranport Unit (MTU).
+ * \brief          Set the Maximum Transport Unit (MTU).
 *                 Special value: 0 means unset (no limit).
 *                 This represents the maximum size of a datagram payload
 *                 handled by the transport layer (usually UDP) as determined
@ -3454,7 +3454,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
 *                 Both sides: limits the set of curves accepted for use in
 *                 ECDHE and in the peer's end-entity certificate.
 *
- * \deprecated     Superseeded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups().
+ * \deprecated     Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups().
 *
 * \note           This has no influence on which curves are allowed inside the
 *                 certificate chains, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile()
@ -3725,7 +3725,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 * \param protos   Pointer to a NULL-terminated list of supported protocols,
 *                 in decreasing preference order. The pointer to the list is
 *                 recorded by the library for later reference as required, so
- *                 the lifetime of the table must be atleast as long as the
+ *                 the lifetime of the table must be at least as long as the
 *                 lifetime of the SSL configuration structure.
 *
 * \return         0 on success, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
@ -3739,7 +3739,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **prot
 *
 * \param ssl      SSL context
 *
- * \return         Protcol name, or NULL if no protocol was negotiated.
+ * \return         Protocol name, or NULL if no protocol was negotiated.
 */
 const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
@ -3822,7 +3822,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                         unsigned char *mki_value,
                                         uint16_t mki_len );
 /**
- * \brief                  Get the negotiated DTLS-SRTP informations:
+ * \brief                  Get the negotiated DTLS-SRTP information:
 *                         Protection profile and MKI value.
 *
 * \warning                This function must be called after the handshake is
@ -3830,7 +3830,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 *                         not be trusted or acted upon before the handshake completes.
 *
 * \param ssl              The SSL context to query.
- * \param dtls_srtp_info   The negotiated DTLS-SRTP informations:
+ * \param dtls_srtp_info   The negotiated DTLS-SRTP information:
 *                         - Protection profile in use.
 *                         A direct mapping of the iana defined value for protection
 *                         profile on an uint16_t.
@ -4053,7 +4053,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets
 *                 initiated by peer
 *                 (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED)
 *
- * \warning        It is recommended to always disable renegotation unless you
+ * \warning        It is recommended to always disable renegotiation unless you
 *                 know you need it and you know what you're doing. In the
 *                 past, there have been several issues associated with
 *                 renegotiation or a poor understanding of its properties.
@ -4116,7 +4116,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_
 *                 scenario.
 *
 * \note           With DTLS and server-initiated renegotiation, the
- *                 HelloRequest is retransmited every time mbedtls_ssl_read() times
+ *                 HelloRequest is retransmitted every time mbedtls_ssl_read() times
 *                 out or receives Application Data, until:
 *                 - max_records records have beens seen, if it is >= 0, or
 *                 - the number of retransmits that would happen during an
@ -4775,7 +4775,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 * \return         \c 0 if successful.
 * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small.
 * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed
- *                 while reseting the context.
+ *                 while resetting the context.
 * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a handshake is in
 *                 progress, or there is pending data for reading or sending,
 *                 or the connection does not use DTLS 1.2 with an AEAD
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h
@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx,
 * \brief          Set expiration delay for cookies
 *                 (Default MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT)
 *
- * \param ctx      Cookie contex
+ * \param ctx      Cookie context
 * \param delay    Delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies
 *                 issued in the meantime.
 *                 0 to disable expiration (NOT recommended)
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx );
 void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx );

 /**
- * \brief           Set the verion for a Certificate
+ * \brief           Set the version for a Certificate
 *                  Default: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3
 *
 * \param ctx       CRT context to use
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h
@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
 *                  private key used to sign the CSR when writing it)
 *
 * \param ctx       CSR context to use
- * \param key       Asymetric key to include
+ * \param key       Asymmetric key to include
 */
 void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key );

--- a/include/psa/crypto.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto.h
@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
 * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating
 * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update().
 *
- * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
 * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
 * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort().
 *
@ -1073,7 +1073,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
 * compares the calculated hash with the expected hash passed as a
 * parameter to this function.
 *
- * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
 * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
 * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort().
 *
@ -1458,7 +1458,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
 * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating
 * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update().
 *
- * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
 * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
 * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort().
 *
@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
 * compares the calculated MAC with the expected MAC passed as a
 * parameter to this function.
 *
- * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
 * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
 * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort().
 *
@ -1971,7 +1971,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
 * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to
 * psa_cipher_update().
 *
- * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
 * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
 * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort().
 *
@ -2638,7 +2638,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
 *   preceding calls to psa_aead_update().
 * - \p tag contains the authentication tag.
 *
- * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
 * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
 * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
 *
@ -2728,7 +2728,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
 * plaintext and reports success. If the authentication tag is not correct,
 * this function returns #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE.
 *
- * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
 * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
 * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
 *
@ -3026,7 +3026,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
- *         The calculation was perfomed successfully, but the passed
+ *         The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
 *         signature is not a valid signature.
 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
 * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
@ -3050,7 +3050,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_verify_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
 /**
 * \brief Encrypt a short message with a public key.
 *
- * \param key                   Identifer of the key to use for the operation.
+ * \param key                   Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
 *                              It must be a public key or an asymmetric key
 *                              pair. It must allow the usage
 *                              #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.
--- a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed,
 * length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes (leading zeroes
 * are not stripped).
 *
- * Determinstic DSA key derivation with psa_generate_derived_key follows
+ * Deterministic DSA key derivation with psa_generate_derived_key follows
 * FIPS 186-4 &sect;B.1.2: interpret the byte string as integer
 * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range
 * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain
@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ typedef uint32_t psa_pake_primitive_t;
 */
 #define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF                  ((psa_pake_step_t)0x03)

-/** The type of the data strucure for PAKE cipher suites.
+/** The type of the data structure for PAKE cipher suites.
 *
 * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
 * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
--- a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ static inline void psa_set_key_type( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
    }
    else
    {
-        /* Call the bigger function to free the old domain paramteres.
+        /* Call the bigger function to free the old domain parameters.
         * Ignore any errors which may arise due to type requiring
         * non-default domain parameters, since this function can't
         * report errors. */
--- a/include/psa/crypto_values.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_values.h
@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@
 * with a random per-message secret number (*k*).
 *
 * The representation of the signature as a byte string consists of
- * the concatentation of the signature values *r* and *s*. Each of
+ * the concatenation of the signature values *r* and *s*. Each of
 * *r* and *s* is encoded as an *N*-octet string, where *N* is the length
 * of the base point of the curve in octets. Each value is represented
 * in big-endian order (most significant octet first).
--- a/library/aes.c
+++ b/library/aes.c
@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ typedef unsigned char mbedtls_be128[16];
 *
 * This function multiplies a field element by x in the polynomial field
 * representation. It uses 64-bit word operations to gain speed but compensates
- * for machine endianess and hence works correctly on both big and little
+ * for machine endianness and hence works correctly on both big and little
 * endian machines.
 */
 static void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( unsigned char r[16],
@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx,
        unsigned char *prev_output = output - 16;

        /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block to our output for each
-         * byte of cyphertext we won't steal. At the same time, copy the
+         * byte of ciphertext we won't steal. At the same time, copy the
         * remainder of the input for this final round (since the loop bounds
         * are the same). */
        for( i = 0; i < leftover; i++ )
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@ -2278,7 +2278,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B
         * TA-TB is even so the division by 2 has an integer result.
         * Invariant (I) is preserved since any odd divisor of both TA and TB
         * also divides |TA-TB|/2, and any odd divisor of both TA and |TA-TB|/2
-         * also divides TB, and any odd divisior of both TB and |TA-TB|/2 also
+         * also divides TB, and any odd divisor of both TB and |TA-TB|/2 also
         * divides TA.
         */
        if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &TA, &TB ) >= 0 )
--- a/library/constant_time.c
+++ b/library/constant_time.c
@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ cleanup:
 /*
 * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information
 * about whether the swap was made or not.
- * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which whould lead to
+ * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which would lead to
 * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards.
 */
 int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X,
--- a/library/ecjpake.c
+++ b/library/ecjpake.c
@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ cleanup:

 /*
 * Read a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList (7.4.2.3) and check proofs
- * Ouputs: verified peer public keys Xa, Xb
+ * Outputs: verified peer public keys Xa, Xb
 */
 static int ecjpake_kkpp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info,
                              const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
--- a/library/ecp.c
+++ b/library/ecp.c
@ -1267,7 +1267,7 @@ cleanup:
 * For curves in short Weierstrass form, we do all the internal operations in
 * Jacobian coordinates.
 *
- * For multiplication, we'll use a comb method with coutermeasueres against
+ * For multiplication, we'll use a comb method with countermeasures against
 * SPA, hence timing attacks.
 */

@ -2231,7 +2231,7 @@ static unsigned char ecp_pick_window_size( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
 * This function is mainly responsible for administrative work:
 * - managing the restart context if enabled
 * - managing the table of precomputed points (passed between the below two
- *   functions): allocation, computation, ownership tranfer, freeing.
+ *   functions): allocation, computation, ownership transfer, freeing.
 *
 * It delegates the actual arithmetic work to:
 *      ecp_precompute_comb() and ecp_mul_comb_with_precomp()
@ -2365,7 +2365,7 @@ cleanup:
 /*
 * For Montgomery curves, we do all the internal arithmetic in projective
 * coordinates. Import/export of points uses only the x coordinates, which is
- * internaly represented as X / Z.
+ * internally represented as X / Z.
 *
 * For scalar multiplication, we'll use a Montgomery ladder.
 */
@ -2519,7 +2519,7 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
    MPI_ECP_LSET( &R->Z, 0 );
    mbedtls_mpi_free( &R->Y );

-    /* RP.X might be sligtly larger than P, so reduce it */
+    /* RP.X might be slightly larger than P, so reduce it */
    MOD_ADD( &RP.X );

    /* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */
--- a/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c
+++ b/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c
@ -561,8 +561,8 @@ static void *buffer_alloc_calloc_mutexed( size_t n, size_t size )

 static void buffer_alloc_free_mutexed( void *ptr )
 {
-    /* We have to good option here, but corrupting the heap seems
-     * worse than loosing memory. */
+    /* We have no good option here, but corrupting the heap seems
+     * worse than losing memory. */
    if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &heap.mutex ) )
        return;
    buffer_alloc_free( ptr );
--- a/library/pkparse.c
+++ b/library/pkparse.c
@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ static int pk_use_ecparams( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *g
    }

    /*
-     * grp may already be initilialized; if so, make sure IDs match
+     * grp may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match
     */
    if( grp->id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE && grp->id != grp_id )
        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT );
@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
       goto cleanup;

 #else
-    /* Verify existance of the CRT params */
+    /* Verify existence of the CRT params */
    if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
        ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
        ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 )
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
        goto error;
    }

-    /* Enforce that the usage policy permits the requested algortihm. */
+    /* Enforce that the usage policy permits the requested algorithm. */
    if( alg != 0 )
    {
        status = psa_key_policy_permits( &slot->attr.policy,
--- a/library/psa_crypto_aead.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_aead.h
@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update(
 *   preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_aead_update().
 * - \p tag contains the authentication tag.
 *
- * Whether or not this function returns successfuly, the PSA core subsequently
+ * Whether or not this function returns successfully, the PSA core subsequently
 * calls mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() to deactivate the operation.
 *
 * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
--- a/library/psa_crypto_hash.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_hash.h
@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update(
 * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating
 * the inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_hash_update().
 *
- * When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
 * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
 * state and must be aborted by calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort().
 *
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@ -848,10 +848,10 @@ cleanup:
 * the more bits of the key can be recovered. See [3].
 *
 * Collecting n collisions with m bit long blinding value requires 2^(m-m/n)
- * observations on avarage.
+ * observations on average.
 *
 * For example with 28 byte blinding to achieve 2 collisions the adversary has
- * to make 2^112 observations on avarage.
+ * to make 2^112 observations on average.
 *
 * (With the currently (as of 2017 April) known best algorithms breaking 2048
 * bit RSA requires approximately as much time as trying out 2^112 random keys.
--- a/library/ssl_cookie.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cookie.c
@ -62,7 +62,7 @@

 /*
 * Cookies are formed of a 4-bytes timestamp (or serial number) and
- * an HMAC of timestemp and client ID.
+ * an HMAC of timestamp and client ID.
 */
 #define COOKIE_LEN      ( 4 + COOKIE_HMAC_LEN )

--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@ -1234,7 +1234,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
                               add_data, add_data_len );

        /* Because of the check above, we know that there are
-         * explicit_iv_len Bytes preceeding data, and taglen
+         * explicit_iv_len Bytes preceding data, and taglen
         * bytes following data + data_len. This justifies
         * the debug message and the invocation of
         * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() below. */
@ -2404,7 +2404,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned hs_type,
                                     unsigned char **buf, size_t *buf_len )
 {
    /*
-     * Reserve 4 bytes for hanshake header. ( Section 4,RFC 8446 )
+     * Reserve 4 bytes for handshake header. ( Section 4,RFC 8446 )
     *    ...
     *    HandshakeType msg_type;
     *    uint24 length;
--- a/library/ssl_ticket.c
+++ b/library/ssl_ticket.c
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
 #include <string.h>

 /*
- * Initialze context
+ * Initialize context
 */
 void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx )
 {
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@ -4017,7 +4017,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 }

 /*
- * Initialze mbedtls_ssl_config
+ * Initialize mbedtls_ssl_config
 */
 void mbedtls_ssl_config_init( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf )
 {
@ -6614,7 +6614,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
    ssl->handshake = NULL;

    /*
-     * Free the previous transform and swith in the current one
+     * Free the previous transform and switch in the current one
     */
    if( ssl->transform )
    {
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
@ -2276,7 +2276,7 @@ start_processing:
                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
        }
-    } /* FALLTROUGH */
+    } /* FALLTHROUGH */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) ||                       \
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ read_record_header:
     * Handshake layer:
     *     0  .   0   handshake type
     *     1  .   3   handshake length
-     *     4  .   5   DTLS only: message seqence number
+     *     4  .   5   DTLS only: message sequence number
     *     6  .   8   DTLS only: fragment offset
     *     9  .  11   DTLS only: fragment length
     */
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
    transform->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3;

    /* We add the true record content type (1 Byte) to the plaintext and
-     * then pad to the configured granularity. The mimimum length of the
+     * then pad to the configured granularity. The minimum length of the
     * type-extended and padded plaintext is therefore the padding
     * granularity. */
    transform->minlen =
@ -1425,7 +1425,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(
    hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac );
    hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );

-    /* Compute current handshake transcript. It's the caller's responsiblity
+    /* Compute current handshake transcript. It's the caller's responsibility
     * to call this at the right time, that is, after the ServerFinished. */

    ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( ssl, md_type,
--- a/programs/fuzz/README.md
+++ b/programs/fuzz/README.md
@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ make
 Finally, you can run the targets like `./test/fuzz/fuzz_client`.


-Corpus generation for network trafic targets
+Corpus generation for network traffic targets
 ------

-These targets use network trafic as inputs :
+These targets use network traffic as inputs :
 * client : simulates a client against (fuzzed) server traffic
 * server : simulates a server against (fuzzed) client traffic
 * dtls_client
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ They also use the last bytes as configuration options.

 To generate corpus for these targets, you can do the following, not fully automated steps :
 * Build mbedtls programs ssl_server2 and ssl_client2
-* Run them one against the other with `reproducible` option turned on while capturing trafic into test.pcap
+* Run them one against the other with `reproducible` option turned on while capturing traffic into test.pcap
 * Extract tcp payloads, for instance with tshark : `tshark -Tfields -e tcp.dstport -e tcp.payload -r test.pcap > test.txt`
 * Run a dummy python script to output either client or server corpus file like `python dummy.py test.txt > test.cor`
 * Finally, you can add the options by appending the last bytes to the file test.cor
--- a/programs/fuzz/onefile.c
+++ b/programs/fuzz/onefile.c
@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
        return 2;
    }

-    //lauch fuzzer
+    //launch fuzzer
    LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(Data, Size);
    free(Data);
    fclose(fp);
--- a/programs/ssl/mini_client.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/mini_client.c
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
 * dominate memory usage in small configurations. For the sake of simplicity,
 * only a Unix version is implemented.
 *
- * Warning: we are breaking some of the abtractions from the NET layer here.
+ * Warning: we are breaking some of the abstractions from the NET layer here.
 * This is not a good example for general use. This programs has the specific
 * goal of minimizing use of the libc functions on full-blown OSes.
 */
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ struct options
    int transport;              /* TLS or DTLS?                             */
    uint32_t hs_to_min;         /* Initial value of DTLS handshake timer    */
    uint32_t hs_to_max;         /* Max value of DTLS handshake timer        */
-    int dtls_mtu;               /* UDP Maximum tranport unit for DTLS       */
+    int dtls_mtu;               /* UDP Maximum transport unit for DTLS       */
    int fallback;               /* is this a fallback connection?           */
    int dgram_packing;          /* allow/forbid datagram packing            */
    int extended_ms;            /* negotiate extended master secret?        */
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ struct options
    int anti_replay;            /* Use anti-replay for DTLS? -1 for default */
    uint32_t hs_to_min;         /* Initial value of DTLS handshake timer    */
    uint32_t hs_to_max;         /* Max value of DTLS handshake timer        */
-    int dtls_mtu;               /* UDP Maximum tranport unit for DTLS       */
+    int dtls_mtu;               /* UDP Maximum transport unit for DTLS       */
    int dgram_packing;          /* allow/forbid datagram packing            */
    int badmac_limit;           /* Limit of records with bad MAC            */
    int eap_tls;                /* derive EAP-TLS keying material?          */
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.h
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.h
@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ int ca_callback( void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt const *child,

 /*
 * Test recv/send functions that make sure each try returns
- * WANT_READ/WANT_WRITE at least once before sucesseding
+ * WANT_READ/WANT_WRITE at least once before succeeding
 */
 int delayed_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len );
 int delayed_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len );
--- a/programs/test/benchmark.c
+++ b/programs/test/benchmark.c
@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ do {                                                                    \
 *
 * This computes the maximum length of a title +3, because we appends "/s" and
 * want at least one space. (If the value is too small, the only consequence
- * is poor alignement.) */
+ * is poor alignment.) */
 #define TITLE_SPACE 17

 #define MEMORY_MEASURE_INIT                                             \
--- a/programs/test/udp_proxy.c
+++ b/programs/test/udp_proxy.c
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- *  UDP proxy: emulate an unreliable UDP connexion for DTLS testing
+ *  UDP proxy: emulate an unreliable UDP connection for DTLS testing
 *
 *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
 *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
--- a/programs/test/zeroize.c
+++ b/programs/test/zeroize.c
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ int main( int argc, char** argv )

    if( argc != 2 )
    {
-        mbedtls_printf( "This program takes exactly 1 agument\n" );
+        mbedtls_printf( "This program takes exactly 1 argument\n" );
        usage();
        mbedtls_exit( exit_code );
    }
--- a/scripts/code_size_compare.py
+++ b/scripts/code_size_compare.py
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ class CodeSizeComparison:
        """
        old_revision: revision to compare against
        new_revision:
-        result_dir: directory for comparision result
+        result_dir: directory for comparison result
        """
        self.repo_path = "."
        self.result_dir = os.path.abspath(result_dir)
@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ class CodeSizeComparison:
                                     + "-" + self.new_rev + ".csv"), "w")

        res_file.write("file_name, this_size, old_size, change, change %\n")
-        print("Generating comparision results.")
+        print("Generating comparison results.")

        old_ds = {}
        for line in old_file.readlines()[1:]:
@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ def main():
    parser.add_argument(
        "-n", "--new-rev", type=str, default=None,
        help="new revision for comparison, default is the current work \
-              directory, including uncommited changes."
+              directory, including uncommitted changes."
    )
    comp_args = parser.parse_args()

--- a/scripts/config.py
+++ b/scripts/config.py
@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ class ConfigFile(Config):
        value = setting.value
        if value is None:
            value = ''
-        # Normally the whitespace to separte the symbol name from the
+        # Normally the whitespace to separate the symbol name from the
        # value is part of middle, and there's no whitespace for a symbol
        # with no value. But if a symbol has been changed from having a
        # value to not having one, the whitespace is wrong, so fix it.
--- a/scripts/generate_ssl_debug_helpers.py
+++ b/scripts/generate_ssl_debug_helpers.py
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ def preprocess_c_source_code(source, *classes):
    """
        Simple preprocessor for C source code.

-        Only processses condition directives without expanding them.
+        Only processes condition directives without expanding them.
        Yield object according to the classes input. Most match firstly

        If the directive pair does not match , raise CondDirectiveNotMatch.
--- a/tests/data_files/Readme-x509.txt
+++ b/tests/data_files/Readme-x509.txt
@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ List of certificates:
    _int-ca.crt: S7 + I1
    _int-ca_ca2.crt: S7 + I1 + 2
    _all_space.crt: S7 + I1 both with misplaced spaces (invalid PEM)
-    _pem_space.crt: S7 with misplace space (invalid PEM) + I1
-    _trailing_space.crt: S7 + I1 both with trainling space (valid PEM)
+    _pem_space.crt: S7 with misplaced space (invalid PEM) + I1
+    _trailing_space.crt: S7 + I1 both with trailing space (valid PEM)
    _spurious_int-ca.crt: S7 + I2(spurious) + I1
 - server8*.crt: I2 R L: RSA signed by EC signed by RSA (P1 for _int-ca2)
 - server9*.crt: 1 R C* L P1*: signed using RSASSA-PSS
--- a/tests/data_files/base64/def_b64_too_big_1.txt
+++ b/tests/data_files/base64/def_b64_too_big_1.txt
@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-// Context with added '1234' at the begining to simulate too much data in the base64 code
+// Context with added '1234' at the beginning to simulate too much data in the base64 code
 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
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ General options:
     --no-force         Refuse to overwrite modified files (default).
     --no-keep-going    Stop at the first error (default).
     --no-memory        No additional memory tests (default).
-     --no-quiet         Print full ouput from components.
+     --no-quiet         Print full output from components.
     --out-of-source-dir=<path>  Directory used for CMake out-of-source build tests.
     --outcome-file=<path>  File where test outcomes are written (not done if
                            empty; default: \$MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE).
--- a/tests/scripts/check_files.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/check_files.py
@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ class ShebangIssueTracker(FileIssueTracker):
    # Allow either /bin/sh, /bin/bash, or /usr/bin/env.
    # Allow at most one argument (this is a Linux limitation).
    # For sh and bash, the argument if present must be options.
-    # For env, the argument must be the base name of the interpeter.
+    # For env, the argument must be the base name of the interpreter.
    _shebang_re = re.compile(rb'^#! ?(?:/bin/(bash|sh)(?: -[^\n ]*)?'
                             rb'|/usr/bin/env ([^\n /]+))$')
    _extensions = {
--- a/tests/scripts/check_names.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/check_names.py
@ -813,7 +813,7 @@ class NameChecker():

    def check_for_typos(self):
        """
-        Perform a check that all words in the soure code beginning with MBED are
+        Perform a check that all words in the source code beginning with MBED are
        either defined as macros, or as enum constants.
        Assumes parse_names_in_source() was called before this.

--- a/tests/scripts/depends-hashes.pl
+++ b/tests/scripts/depends-hashes.pl
@ -46,12 +46,12 @@ my $config_h = 'include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h';

 # as many SSL options depend on specific hashes,
 # and SSL is not in the test suites anyways,
-# disable it to avoid dependcies issues
+# disable it to avoid dependencies issues
 my $ssl_sed_cmd = 's/^#define \(MBEDTLS_SSL.*\)/\1/p';
 my @ssl = split( /\s+/, `sed -n -e '$ssl_sed_cmd' $config_h` );

 # Each element of this array holds list of configuration options that
-# should be tested together. Certain options depend on eachother and
+# should be tested together. Certain options depend on each other and
 # separating them would generate invalid configurations.
 my @hash_configs = (
    ['unset MBEDTLS_MD5_C'],
--- a/tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py
@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ class StorageFormatV0(StorageFormat):
    def gather_key_types_for_sign_alg(self) -> Dict[str, List[str]]:
        # pylint: disable=too-many-locals
        """Match possible key types for sign algorithms."""
-        # To create a valid combinaton both the algorithms and key types
+        # To create a valid combination both the algorithms and key types
        # must be filtered. Pair them with keywords created from its names.
        incompatible_alg_keyword = frozenset(['RAW', 'ANY', 'PURE'])
        incompatible_key_type_keywords = frozenset(['MONTGOMERY'])
@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ class StorageFormatV0(StorageFormat):
                    if re.match(pattern, keyword):
                        alg_keywords.remove(keyword)
                        alg_keywords.add(replace)
-            # Filter out incompatible algortihms
+            # Filter out incompatible algorithms
            if not alg_keywords.isdisjoint(incompatible_alg_keyword):
                continue

@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ class StorageFormatV0(StorageFormat):
                # Generate keywords from the of the key type
                key_type_keywords = set(key_type.translate(translation_table).split(sep='_')[3:])

-                # Remove ambigious keywords
+                # Remove ambiguous keywords
                for keyword1, keyword2 in exclusive_keywords.items():
                    if keyword1 in key_type_keywords:
                        key_type_keywords.remove(keyword2)
@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ class StorageFormatV0(StorageFormat):
        """Generate test keys for usage flag extensions."""
        # Generate a key type and algorithm pair for each extendable usage
        # flag to generate a valid key for exercising. The key is generated
-        # without usage extension to check the extension compatiblity.
+        # without usage extension to check the extension compatibility.
        alg_with_keys = self.gather_key_types_for_sign_alg()

        for usage in sorted(StorageKey.IMPLICIT_USAGE_FLAGS, key=str):
--- a/tests/scripts/recursion.pl
+++ b/tests/scripts/recursion.pl
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 # (Multiple recursion where a() calls b() which calls a() not covered.)
 #
 # When the recursion depth might depend on data controlled by the attacker in
-# an unbounded way, those functions should use interation instead.
+# an unbounded way, those functions should use iteration instead.
 #
 # Typical usage: scripts/recursion.pl library/*.c
 #
--- a/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Run the PSA Cryto API compliance test suite.
+"""Run the PSA Crypto API compliance test suite.
 Clone the repo and check out the commit specified by PSA_ARCH_TEST_REPO and PSA_ARCH_TEST_REF,
 then complie and run the test suite. The clone is stored at <Mbed TLS root>/psa-arch-tests.
 Known defects in either the test suite or mbedtls - identified by their test number - are ignored,
--- a/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c
+++ b/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c
@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static int exercise_cipher_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
                                    sizeof( decrypted ) - part_length,
                                    &part_length );
        /* For a stream cipher, all inputs are valid. For a block cipher,
-         * if the input is some aribtrary data rather than an actual
+         * if the input is some arbitrary data rather than an actual
         ciphertext, a padding error is likely.  */
        if( maybe_invalid_padding )
            TEST_ASSERT( status == PSA_SUCCESS ||
@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ int mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
        return( 0 );

    if( alg == 0 )
-        ok = 1; /* If no algorihm, do nothing (used for raw data "keys"). */
+        ok = 1; /* If no algorithm, do nothing (used for raw data "keys"). */
    else if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) )
        ok = exercise_mac_key( key, usage, alg );
    else if( PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) )
--- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
@ -4580,7 +4580,7 @@ run_test    "Renegotiation: DTLS, gnutls server, client-initiated" \
            -C "error" \
            -s "Extra-header:"

-# Test for the "secure renegotation" extension only (no actual renegotiation)
+# Test for the "secure renegotiation" extension only (no actual renegotiation)

 requires_gnutls
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
@ -5317,7 +5317,7 @@ run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client max_int chain, server required"
            -s "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
            -S "X509 - A fatal error occurred"

-# Tests for certificate selection based on SHA verson
+# Tests for certificate selection based on SHA version

 requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
 run_test    "Certificate hash: client TLS 1.2 -> SHA-2" \
@ -9068,7 +9068,7 @@ run_test    "DTLS fragmenting: gnutls server, DTLS 1.2" \
 # certificate obtained from the server. Here, however, it
 # connects to 127.0.0.1 while our test certificates use 'localhost'
 # as the server name in the certificate. This will make the
-# certifiate validation fail, but passing --insecure makes
+# certificate validation fail, but passing --insecure makes
 # GnuTLS continue the connection nonetheless.
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
--- a/tests/suites/host_test.function
+++ b/tests/suites/host_test.function
@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ int execute_tests( int argc , const char ** argv )
    FILE *file;
    char buf[5000];
    char *params[50];
-    /* Store for proccessed integer params. */
+    /* Store for processed integer params. */
    int32_t int_params[50];
    void *pointer;
 #if defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__))
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.function
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /* BEGIN_HEADER */
 #include "mbedtls/aria.h"

-/* Maxium size of data used by test vectors
+/* Maximum size of data used by test vectors
 * WARNING: to be adapted if and when adding larger test cases */
 #define ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE  160

--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"41047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779
 ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: no second point data
 read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"41047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b0104":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA

-ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: unknow second point format
+ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: unknown second point format
 read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"41047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b410509f85b3d20ebd7885ce464c08d056d6428fe4dd9287aa365f131f4360ff386d846898bc4b41583c2a5197f65d78742746c12a5ec0a4ffe2f270a750a1d8fb516":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE

 ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: nothing after second point
@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"4104190a07700ffa4be6ae1d79ee0f06aeb544cd5
 ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: no second point data
 read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"4104190a07700ffa4be6ae1d79ee0f06aeb544cd5addaabedf70f8623321332c54f355f0fbfec783ed359e5d0bf7377a0fc4ea7ace473c9c112b41ccd41ac56a56124104360a1cea33fce641156458e0a4eac219e96831e6aebc88b3f3752f93a0281d1bf1fb106051db9694a8d6e862a5ef1324a3d9e27894f1ee4f7c59199965a8dd4a2091847d2d22df3ee55faa2a3fb33fd2d1e055a07a7c61ecfb8d80ec00c2c9eb1241047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b0104":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA

-ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: unknow second point format
+ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: unknown second point format
 read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE

 ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: nothing after second point
@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ read_round_two_srv:"410469d54ee85e90ce3f1246742de507e939e81d1dc1c5cb988b58c310c9
 ECJPAKE round two server: no data
 read_round_two_srv:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA

-ECJPAKE round two server: length of forst point too small
+ECJPAKE round two server: length of first point too small
 read_round_two_srv:"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA

 ECJPAKE round two server: length of first point too big
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ void mbedtls_md_process(  )
    /*
     * Very minimal testing of mbedtls_md_process, just make sure the various
     * xxx_process_wrap() function pointers are valid. (Testing that they
-     * indeed do the right thing whould require messing with the internal
+     * indeed do the right thing would require messing with the internal
     * state of the underlying mbedtls_md/sha context.)
     *
     * Also tests that mbedtls_md_list() only returns valid MDs.
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_net.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_net.function
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 *                      On success, it refers to the opened file (\p wanted_fd).
 * \param wanted_fd     The desired file descriptor.
 *
- * \return              \c 0 on succes, a negative error code on error.
+ * \return              \c 0 on success, a negative error code on error.
 */
 static int open_file_on_fd( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, int wanted_fd )
 {
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@ void pk_rsa_alt(  )
    memset( ciph, 0, sizeof ciph );
    memset( test, 0, sizeof test );

-    /* Initiliaze PK RSA context with random key */
+    /* Initialize PK RSA context with random key */
    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &rsa,
                              mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == 0 );
    TEST_ASSERT( pk_genkey( &rsa, RSA_KEY_SIZE ) == 0 );
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
@ -2259,7 +2259,7 @@ PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-CBC-nopad, input too short (5 bytes)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 cipher_decrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee223":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

-PSA symetric decrypt: CCM*-no-tag, input too short (15 bytes)
+PSA symmetric decrypt: CCM*-no-tag, input too short (15 bytes)
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:MBEDTLS_AES_C
 cipher_decrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"5a8aa485c316e9":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ void import_large_key( int type_arg, int byte_size_arg,
    size_t n;

    /* Skip the test case if the target running the test cannot
-     * accomodate large keys due to heap size constraints */
+     * accommodate large keys due to heap size constraints */
    ASSERT_ALLOC_WEAK( buffer, buffer_size );
    memset( buffer, 'K', byte_size );

@ -1198,7 +1198,7 @@ void key_attributes_init( )
    /* Test each valid way of initializing the object, except for `= {0}`, as
     * Clang 5 complains when `-Wmissing-field-initializers` is used, even
     * though it's OK by the C standard. We could test for this, but we'd need
-     * to supress the Clang warning for the test. */
+     * to suppress the Clang warning for the test. */
    psa_key_attributes_t func = psa_key_attributes_init( );
    psa_key_attributes_t init = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
    psa_key_attributes_t zero;
@ -1989,7 +1989,7 @@ void hash_operation_init( )
    /* Test each valid way of initializing the object, except for `= {0}`, as
     * Clang 5 complains when `-Wmissing-field-initializers` is used, even
     * though it's OK by the C standard. We could test for this, but we'd need
-     * to supress the Clang warning for the test. */
+     * to suppress the Clang warning for the test. */
    psa_hash_operation_t func = psa_hash_operation_init( );
    psa_hash_operation_t init = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
    psa_hash_operation_t zero;
@ -2518,7 +2518,7 @@ void mac_operation_init( )
    /* Test each valid way of initializing the object, except for `= {0}`, as
     * Clang 5 complains when `-Wmissing-field-initializers` is used, even
     * though it's OK by the C standard. We could test for this, but we'd need
-     * to supress the Clang warning for the test. */
+     * to suppress the Clang warning for the test. */
    psa_mac_operation_t func = psa_mac_operation_init( );
    psa_mac_operation_t init = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
    psa_mac_operation_t zero;
@ -2941,7 +2941,7 @@ void cipher_operation_init( )
    /* Test each valid way of initializing the object, except for `= {0}`, as
     * Clang 5 complains when `-Wmissing-field-initializers` is used, even
     * though it's OK by the C standard. We could test for this, but we'd need
-     * to supress the Clang warning for the test. */
+     * to suppress the Clang warning for the test. */
    psa_cipher_operation_t func = psa_cipher_operation_init( );
    psa_cipher_operation_t init = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
    psa_cipher_operation_t zero;
@ -5964,7 +5964,7 @@ void sign_hash_deterministic( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
    PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
    key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );

-    /* Allocate a buffer which has the size advertized by the
+    /* Allocate a buffer which has the size advertised by the
     * library. */
    signature_size = PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type,
                                                      key_bits, alg );
@ -6063,7 +6063,7 @@ void sign_verify_hash( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
    PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
    key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );

-    /* Allocate a buffer which has the size advertized by the
+    /* Allocate a buffer which has the size advertised by the
     * library. */
    signature_size = PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type,
                                                      key_bits, alg );
@ -6697,7 +6697,7 @@ void key_derivation_init( )
    /* Test each valid way of initializing the object, except for `= {0}`, as
     * Clang 5 complains when `-Wmissing-field-initializers` is used, even
     * though it's OK by the C standard. We could test for this, but we'd need
-     * to supress the Clang warning for the test. */
+     * to suppress the Clang warning for the test. */
    size_t capacity;
    psa_key_derivation_operation_t func = psa_key_derivation_operation_init( );
    psa_key_derivation_operation_t init = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
@ -7617,7 +7617,7 @@ void key_agreement_capacity( int alg_arg,
                                                    NULL, 0 ) );
    }

-    /* Test the advertized capacity. */
+    /* Test the advertised capacity. */
    PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_get_capacity(
                    &operation, &actual_capacity ) );
    TEST_EQUAL( actual_capacity, (size_t) expected_capacity_arg );
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function
@ -995,7 +995,7 @@ void cipher_entry_points( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
    /*
     * Test encrypt failure
     * First test that if we don't force a driver error, encryption is
-     * successfull, then force driver error.
+     * successful, then force driver error.
     */
    status = psa_cipher_encrypt(
        key, alg, input->x, input->len,
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.data
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ external_rng_failure_generate:
 # randomization for (e.g.) blinding. An external implementation could use
 # its own randomness source which is not affected by the forced failure of
 # the RNG driver.
-# Key types and non-randomized auxilary algorithms (in practice, hashes) can
+# Key types and non-randomized auxiliary algorithms (in practice, hashes) can
 # use an external implementation.
 PSA external RNG failure: randomized ECDSA
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.function
@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ void persistent_slot_lifecycle( int lifetime_arg, int owner_id_arg, int id_arg,
        case INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING:
        case INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING_WITH_SHUTDOWN:
            /*
-             * Test that the key handle and identifier are now not refering to an
+             * Test that the key handle and identifier are now not referring to an
             * existing key.
             */
            TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_attributes( handle, &read_attributes ),
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ test_multiple_psks_opaque:1
 Attempt to register multiple PSKs, incl. opaque PSK, #2
 test_multiple_psks_opaque:2

-Test calback buffer sanity
+Test callback buffer sanity
 test_callback_buffer_sanity:

 Callback buffer test: Exercise simple write/read
@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340000abcd12340001abcd12340003":"abcd12350000":0
 SSL DTLS replay: delayed
 ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340000abcd12340001abcd12340003":"abcd12340002":0

-SSL DTLS replay: lastest replayed
+SSL DTLS replay: latest replayed
 ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340000abcd12340001abcd12340003":"abcd12340003":-1

 SSL DTLS replay: older replayed
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@ -2229,7 +2229,7 @@ void perform_handshake( handshake_test_options* options )

        /* After calling mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate for the client all renegotiation
         * should happen inside this function. However in this test, we cannot
-         * perform simultaneous communication betwen client and server so this
+         * perform simultaneous communication between client and server so this
         * function will return waiting error on the socket. All rest of
         * renegotiation should happen during data exchanging */
        ret = mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( &(client.ssl) );
@ -2321,7 +2321,7 @@ void test_callback_buffer_sanity()
    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( NULL, NULL, 0 ) == -1 );

    /* Make sure calling put and get on a buffer that hasn't been set up results
-     * in eror. */
+     * in error. */
    mbedtls_test_buffer_init( &buf );

    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, input, sizeof( input ) ) == -1 );
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-Check compiletime library version
+Check compile time library version
 check_compiletime_version:"3.1.0"

 Check runtime library version