- Removed dependency on rand() in rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(). Now using random fuction provided to context

- Expanded ssl_client2 arguments for more flexibility
 - rsa_check_private() now supports PKCS1v2 keys as well
 - Fixed deadlock in rsa_pkcs1_encrypt() on failing random generator
This commit is contained in:
Paul Bakker 2010-07-18 08:29:32 +00:00
parent 6796839695
commit b572adf5e6
3 changed files with 31 additions and 8 deletions

View file

@ -8,10 +8,16 @@ Features
Changes
* Made Makefile cleaner
* Removed dependency on rand() in rsa_pkcs1_encrypt().
Now using random fuction provided to context
* Expanded ssl_client2 arguments for more flexibility
Bug fixes
* Fixed CMake out of source build for tests (found by
kkert)
* rsa_check_private() now supports PKCS1v2 keys as well
* Fixed deadlock in rsa_pkcs1_encrypt() on failing random
generator
= Version 0.13.1 released on 2010-03-24
Bug fixes

View file

@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED -0x0450
#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED -0x0460
#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE -0x0470
#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED -0x0480
/*
* PKCS#1 constants

View file

@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int rsa_check_pubkey( const rsa_context *ctx )
int rsa_check_privkey( const rsa_context *ctx )
{
int ret;
mpi PQ, DE, P1, Q1, H, I, G;
mpi PQ, DE, P1, Q1, H, I, G, G2, L1, L2;
if( ( ret = rsa_check_pubkey( ctx ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
@ -164,27 +164,35 @@ int rsa_check_privkey( const rsa_context *ctx )
if( !ctx->P.p || !ctx->Q.p || !ctx->D.p )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
mpi_init( &PQ, &DE, &P1, &Q1, &H, &I, &G, NULL );
mpi_init( &PQ, &DE, &P1, &Q1, &H, &I, &G, &G2, &L1, &L2, NULL );
MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &PQ, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &DE, &ctx->D, &ctx->E ) );
MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &P1, &Q1 ) );
MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &I, &DE, &H ) );
MPI_CHK( mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->E, &H ) );
MPI_CHK( mpi_gcd( &G2, &P1, &Q1 ) );
MPI_CHK( mpi_div_mpi( &L1, &L2, &H, &G2 ) );
MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &I, &DE, &L1 ) );
/*
* Check for a valid PKCS1v2 private key
*/
if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &PQ, &ctx->N ) == 0 &&
mpi_cmp_int( &L2, 0 ) == 0 &&
mpi_cmp_int( &I, 1 ) == 0 &&
mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) == 0 )
{
mpi_free( &G, &I, &H, &Q1, &P1, &DE, &PQ, NULL );
mpi_free( &G, &I, &H, &Q1, &P1, &DE, &PQ, &G2, &L1, &L2, NULL );
return( 0 );
}
cleanup:
mpi_free( &G, &I, &H, &Q1, &P1, &DE, &PQ, NULL );
mpi_free( &G, &I, &H, &Q1, &P1, &DE, &PQ, &G2, &L1, &L2, NULL );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED | ret );
}
@ -298,7 +306,7 @@ int rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
{
case RSA_PKCS_V15:
if( ilen < 0 || olen < ilen + 11 )
if( ilen < 0 || olen < ilen + 11 || ctx->f_rng == NULL )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen;
@ -308,9 +316,17 @@ int rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
while( nb_pad-- > 0 )
{
int rng_dl = 100;
do {
*p = (unsigned char) rand();
} while( *p == 0 );
*p = (unsigned char) ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng );
} while( *p == 0 && --rng_dl );
// Check if RNG failed to generate data
//
if( rng_dl == 0 )
return POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED;
p++;
}
*p++ = 0;