If we enabled AES_DECRYPT_ALT and either AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT or
AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY, this means RSb and RTx are not needed.
This commit extends how we guard RSb and RTx for the combinations of
these configurations.
Signed-off-by: Yanray Wang <yanray.wang@arm.com>
If MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT is enabled, but decryption is
still requested in some incompatible modes, we return an error of
FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE as additional indication.
Signed-off-by: Yanray Wang <yanray.wang@arm.com>
This changes local variable name RCON to round_constants.
RCON being definition in xc32 compiler headers for some PIC32 register.
Without this change, mynewt project for PIC32 platform fails to build due to
macro redefinition.
This does not changes behavior of library in any way.
Signed-off-by: Jerzy Kasenberg <jerzy.kasenberg@codecoup.pl>
In PSA headers include psa/build_info.h instead
of mbedtls/build_info.h. In Mbed TLS, both are
equivalent but not in TF-PSA-Crypto where
psa/build_info.h is the correct one.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
GCC warns about comparing uint8_t to a size that may be >255.
Strangely, casting the uint8_t to a size_t in the comparison expression
doesn't avoid the warning. So change the type of the variable.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
On a parsing error in TLS, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, not a
crypto error code.
On error paths, emit a level-1 debug message. Report the offending sizes.
Downgrade an informational message's level to 3.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
In client-side code with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, use the buffer size to
validate what is written in handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey. The previous code
was correct, but a little fragile to misconfiguration or maintenance.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Fix a buffer overflow in TLS 1.2 ClientKeyExchange parsing. When
MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the length of the public key in an ECDH
or ECDHE key exchange was not validated. This could result in an overflow of
handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, overwriting further data in the handshake
structure or further on the heap.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Fix a buffer overflow in TLS 1.3 ServerHello and ClientHello parsing. The
length of the public key in an ECDH- or FFDH-based key exchange was not
validated. This could result in an overflow of handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey,
overwriting further data in the handshake structure or further on the heap.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>