Merge branch 'development' into more-aes-checks

Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Dave Rodgman 2023-10-12 16:17:10 +01:00 committed by GitHub
commit 4b779bef9e
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
162 changed files with 3274 additions and 1631 deletions

View file

@ -1,10 +1,2 @@
execute_process(COMMAND ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/config.py -f ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h get MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED RESULT_VARIABLE everest_result)
execute_process(COMMAND ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/config.py -f ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h get MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED RESULT_VARIABLE p256m_result)
if(${everest_result} EQUAL 0)
add_subdirectory(everest)
endif()
if(${p256m_result} EQUAL 0)
add_subdirectory(p256-m)
endif()
add_subdirectory(everest)
add_subdirectory(p256-m)

View file

@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
add_library(everest
set(everest_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}everest")
add_library(${everest_target}
library/everest.c
library/x25519.c
library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.c)
target_include_directories(everest
target_include_directories(${everest_target}
PUBLIC $<BUILD_INTERFACE:${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include>
$<BUILD_INTERFACE:${MBEDTLS_DIR}/include>
$<INSTALL_INTERFACE:include>
@ -11,6 +13,19 @@ target_include_directories(everest
include/everest/kremlib
${MBEDTLS_DIR}/library/)
# Pass-through MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE and MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE
# This must be duplicated from library/CMakeLists.txt because
# everest is not directly linked against any mbedtls targets
# so does not inherit the compile definitions.
if(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
target_compile_definitions(${everest_target}
PUBLIC MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE}")
endif()
if(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE)
target_compile_definitions(${everest_target}
PUBLIC MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE}")
endif()
if(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS)
install(DIRECTORY include/everest
@ -21,7 +36,7 @@ if(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS)
endif(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS)
install(TARGETS everest
install(TARGETS ${everest_target}
EXPORT MbedTLSTargets
DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ)

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@ -1,14 +1,29 @@
add_library(p256m
set(p256m_target ${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}p256m)
add_library(${p256m_target}
p256-m_driver_entrypoints.c
p256-m/p256-m.c)
target_include_directories(p256m
target_include_directories(${p256m_target}
PUBLIC $<BUILD_INTERFACE:${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}>
$<BUILD_INTERFACE:${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/p256-m>
$<BUILD_INTERFACE:${MBEDTLS_DIR}/include>
$<INSTALL_INTERFACE:include>
PRIVATE ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/library/)
# Pass-through MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE and MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE
# This must be duplicated from library/CMakeLists.txt because
# p256m is not directly linked against any mbedtls targets
# so does not inherit the compile definitions.
if(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
target_compile_definitions(${p256m_target}
PUBLIC MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE}")
endif()
if(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE)
target_compile_definitions(${p256m_target}
PUBLIC MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE}")
endif()
if(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS)
install(DIRECTORY :${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}
@ -19,7 +34,7 @@ if(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS)
endif(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS)
install(TARGETS p256m
install(TARGETS ${p256m_target}
EXPORT MbedTLSTargets
DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ)

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@ -106,6 +106,6 @@ The following branches are currently maintained:
- [`development`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/)
- [`mbedtls-2.28`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.28)
maintained until at least the end of 2024, see
<https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.3>.
<https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.5>.
Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch.

View file

@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ if(NOT DISABLE_PACKAGE_CONFIG_AND_INSTALL)
write_basic_package_version_file(
"cmake/MbedTLSConfigVersion.cmake"
COMPATIBILITY SameMajorVersion
VERSION 3.4.1)
VERSION 3.5.0)
install(
FILES "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/cmake/MbedTLSConfig.cmake"

288
ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,5 +1,293 @@
Mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
= Mbed TLS 3.5.0 branch released 2023-10-05
API changes
* Mbed TLS 3.4 introduced support for omitting the built-in implementation
of ECDSA and/or EC J-PAKE when those are provided by a driver. However,
their was a flaw in the logic checking if the built-in implementation, in
that if failed to check if all the relevant curves were supported by the
accelerator. As a result, it was possible to declare no curves as
accelerated and still have the built-in implementation compiled out.
Starting with this release, it is necessary to declare which curves are
accelerated (using MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_xxx macros), or they will be
considered not accelerated, and the built-in implementation of the curves
and any algorithm possible using them will be included in the build.
* Add new millisecond time type `mbedtls_ms_time_t` and `mbedtls_ms_time()`
function, needed for TLS 1.3 ticket lifetimes. Alternative implementations
can be created using an ALT interface.
Requirement changes
* Officially require Python 3.8 now that earlier versions are out of support.
* Minimum required Windows version is now Windows Vista, or
Windows Server 2008.
New deprecations
* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR and
MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR, where xxx is either ECC or RSA,
are now being deprecated in favor of PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy and
MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy. Here yyy can be: BASIC,
IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE. The goal is to have a finer detail about
the capabilities of the PSA side for either key.
* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX is deprecated in favor of
MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH (if you intended what the name suggests:
maximum size of any supported block cipher) or the new name
MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE (if you intended the actual semantics:
maximum size of a block cipher supported by the CMAC module).
* mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2() and mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe() functions are now
deprecated in favor of mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext() and
mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext() as they offer more security by checking
for overflow of the output buffer and reporting the actual length
of the output.
Features
* All modules that use hashes or HMAC can now take advantage of PSA Crypto
drivers when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is enabled and psa_crypto_init() has
been called. Previously (in 3.3), this was restricted to a few modules,
and only in builds where MBEDTLS_MD_C was disabled; in particular the
entropy module was not covered which meant an external RNG had to be
provided - these limitations are lifted in this version. A new set of
feature macros, MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_xxx, has been introduced that can be used
to check for availability of hash algorithms, regardless of whether
they're provided by a built-in implementation, a driver or both. See
docs/driver-only-builds.md.
* When a PSA driver for ECDH is present, it is now possible to disable
MBEDTLS_ECDH_C in the build in order to save code size. For TLS 1.2
key exchanges based on ECDH(E) to work, this requires
MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. Restartable/interruptible ECDHE operations in
TLS 1.2 (ECDHE-ECDSA key exchange) are not supported in those builds yet,
as PSA does not have an API for restartable ECDH yet.
* When all of ECDH, ECDSA and EC J-PAKE are either disabled or provided by
a driver, it is possible to disable MBEDTLS_ECP_C (and MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
if not required by another module) and still get support for ECC keys and
algorithms in PSA, with some limitations. See docs/driver-only-builds.txt
for details.
* Add parsing of directoryName subtype for subjectAltName extension in
x509 certificates.
* Add support for server-side TLS version negotiation. If both TLS 1.2 and
TLS 1.3 protocols are enabled, the TLS server now selects TLS 1.2 or
TLS 1.3 depending on the capabilities and preferences of TLS clients.
Fixes #6867.
* X.509 hostname verification now supports IPAddress Subject Alternate Names.
* Add support for reading and writing X25519 and X448
public and private keys in RFC 8410 format using the existing PK APIs.
* When parsing X.509 certificates, support the extensions
SignatureKeyIdentifier and AuthorityKeyIdentifier.
* Don't include the PSA dispatch functions for PAKEs (psa_pake_setup() etc)
if no PAKE algorithms are requested
* Add support for the FFDH algorithm and DH key types in PSA, with
parameters from RFC 7919. This includes a built-in implementation based
on MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, and a driver dispatch layer enabling alternative
implementations of FFDH through the driver entry points.
* It is now possible to generate certificates with SubjectAltNames.
Currently supported subtypes: DnsName, UniformResourceIdentifier,
IP address, OtherName, and DirectoryName, as defined in RFC 5280.
See mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_alternative_name for
more information.
* X.509 hostname verification now partially supports URI Subject Alternate
Names. Only exact matching, without any normalization procedures
described in 7.4 of RFC5280, will result in a positive URI verification.
* Add function mbedtls_oid_from_numeric_string() to parse an OID from a
string to a DER-encoded mbedtls_asn1_buf.
* Add SHA-3 family hash functions.
* Add support to restrict AES to 128-bit keys in order to save code size.
A new configuration option, MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH, can be
used to enable this feature.
* AES performance improvements. Uplift varies by platform,
toolchain, optimisation flags and mode.
Aarch64, gcc -Os and CCM, GCM and XTS benefit the most.
On Aarch64, uplift is typically around 20 - 110%.
When compiling with gcc -Os on Aarch64, AES-XTS improves
by 4.5x.
* Add support for PBKDF2-HMAC through the PSA API.
* New symbols PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy and
MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy (where xxx is either ECC, RSA
or DH) were introduced in order to have finer accuracy in defining the
PSA capabilities for each key. These capabilities, named yyy above, can be
any of: BASIC, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE.
- DERIVE is only available for ECC keys, not for RSA or DH ones.
- implementations are free to enable more than what it was strictly
requested. For example BASIC internally enables IMPORT and EXPORT
(useful for testing purposes), but this might change in the future.
* Add support for FFDH key exchange in TLS 1.3.
This is automatically enabled as soon as PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH
and the ephemeral or psk-ephemeral key exchange mode are enabled.
By default, all groups are offered; the list of groups can be
configured using the existing API function mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups().
* Improve mbedtls_x509_time performance and reduce memory use.
* Reduce syscalls to time() during certificate verification.
* Allow MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE and MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE to be set by
setting the CMake variable of the same name at configuration time.
* Add getter (mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_timeout()) to access
`mbedtls_ssl_cache_context.timeout`.
* Add getter (mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname()) to access
`mbedtls_ssl_context.hostname`.
* Add getter (mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_endpoint()) to access
`mbedtls_ssl_config.endpoint`.
* Support for "opaque" (PSA-held) ECC keys in the PK module has been
extended: it is now possible to use mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(),
mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(), mbedtls_pk_check_pair(), and
mbedtls_pk_verify() with opaque ECC keys (provided the PSA attributes
allow it).
* The documentation of mbedtls_ecp_group now describes the optimized
representation of A for some curves. Fixes #8045.
* Add a possibility to generate CSR's with RCF822 and directoryName subtype
of subjectAltName extension in x509 certificates.
* Add support for PBKDF2-CMAC through the PSA API.
* New configuration option MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY introduced. When
using CPU-accelerated AES (e.g., Arm Crypto Extensions), this option
disables the plain C implementation and the run-time detection for the
CPU feature, which reduces code size and avoids the vulnerability of the
plain C implementation.
* Accept arbitrary AttributeType and AttributeValue in certificate
Distinguished Names using RFC 4514 syntax.
* Applications using ECC over secp256r1 through the PSA API can use a
new implementation with a much smaller footprint, but some minor
usage restrictions. See the documentation of the new configuration
option MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED for details.
Security
* Fix a case where potentially sensitive information held in memory would not
be completely zeroized during TLS 1.2 handshake, in both server and client
configurations.
* In configurations with ARIA or Camellia but not AES, the value of
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX was 8, rather than 16 as the name might
suggest. This did not affect any library code, because this macro was
only used in relation with CMAC which does not support these ciphers.
This may affect application code that uses this macro.
* Developers using mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2() or mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe() should
review the size of the output buffer passed to this function, and note
that the output after decryption may include CBC padding. Consider moving
to the new functions mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext() or mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext()
which checks for overflow of the output buffer and reports the actual
length of the output.
* Improve padding calculations in CBC decryption, NIST key unwrapping and
RSA OAEP decryption. With the previous implementation, some compilers
(notably recent versions of Clang and IAR) could produce non-constant
time code, which could allow a padding oracle attack if the attacker
has access to precise timing measurements.
* Updates to constant-time C code so that compilers are less likely to use
conditional instructions, which can have an observable difference in
timing. (Clang has been seen to do this.) Also introduce assembly
implementations for 32- and 64-bit Arm and for x86 and x86-64, which are
guaranteed not to use conditional instructions.
* Fix definition of MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, which was too
small when MBEDTLS_SHA384_C was defined and MBEDTLS_SHA512_C was
undefined. Mbed TLS itself was unaffected by this, but user code
which used MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE could be affected. The only
release containing this bug was Mbed TLS 3.4.0.
* Fix a buffer overread when parsing short TLS application data records in
null-cipher cipher suites. Credit to OSS-Fuzz.
* Fix a remotely exploitable heap buffer overflow in TLS handshake parsing.
In TLS 1.3, all configurations are affected except PSK-only ones, and
both clients and servers are affected.
In TLS 1.2, the affected configurations are those with
MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and ECDH enabled but DHM and RSA disabled,
and only servers are affected, not clients.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz.
Bugfix
* Fix proper sizing for PSA_EXPORT_[KEY_PAIR/PUBLIC_KEY]_MAX_SIZE and
PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE buffers when at least one accelerated EC is bigger
than all built-in ones and RSA is disabled.
Resolves #6622.
* Add missing md.h includes to some of the external programs from
the programs directory. Without this, even though the configuration
was sufficient for a particular program to work, it would only print
a message that one of the required defines is missing.
* Fix declaration of mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable() function
in the ecdsa.h header file. There was a build warning when the
configuration macro MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT was defined.
Resolves #7407.
* Fix an error when MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT is defined but not
MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT, causing ecdsa verify to fail. Fixes #7498.
* Fix missing PSA initialization in sample programs when
MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled.
* Fix the J-PAKE driver interface for user and peer to accept any values
(previously accepted values were limited to "client" or "server").
* Fix clang and armclang compilation error when targeting certain Arm
M-class CPUs (Cortex-M0, Cortex-M0+, Cortex-M1, Cortex-M23,
SecurCore SC000). Fixes #1077.
* Fix "unterminated '#pragma clang attribute push'" in sha256/sha512.c when
built with MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT but don't have a
way to detect the crypto extensions required. A warning is still issued.
* Fixed an issue that caused compile errors when using CMake and the IAR
toolchain.
* Fix very high stack usage in SSL debug code. Reported by Maximilian
Gerhardt in #7804.
* Fix a compilation failure in the constant_time module when
building for arm64_32 (e.g., for watchos). Reported by Paulo
Coutinho in #7787.
* Fix crypt_and_hash decryption fail when used with a stream cipher
mode of operation due to the input not being multiple of block size.
Resolves #7417.
* Fix a bug in which mbedtls_x509_string_to_names() would return success
when given a invalid name string if it did not contain '=' or ','.
* Fix compilation warnings in aes.c, which prevented the
example TF-M configuration in configs/ from building cleanly:
tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h with
crypto_config_profile_medium.h.
* In TLS 1.3, fix handshake failure when a client in its ClientHello
proposes an handshake based on PSK only key exchange mode or at least
one of the key exchange modes using ephemeral keys to a server that
supports only the PSK key exchange mode.
* Fix CCM* with no tag being not supported in a build with CCM as the only
symmetric encryption algorithm and the PSA configuration enabled.
* Fix the build with MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY. Fixes #7516.
* Fix a compilation error on some platforms when including mbedtls/ssl.h
with all TLS support disabled. Fixes #6628.
* Fix x509 certificate generation to conform to RFC 5480 / RFC 5758 when
using ECC key. The certificate was rejected by some crypto frameworks.
Fixes #2924.
* Fix a potential corruption of the passed-in IV when mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc()
is called with zero length and padlock is not enabled.
* Fix compile failure due to empty enum in cipher_wrap.c, when building
with a very minimal configuration. Fixes #7625.
* Fix some cases where mbedtls_mpi_mod_exp, RSA key construction or ECDSA
signature can silently return an incorrect result in low memory conditions.
* Don't try to include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE when
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled.
* Fix IAR compiler warnings.
* Fix an issue when parsing an otherName subject alternative name into a
mbedtls_x509_san_other_name struct. The type-id of the otherName was not
copied to the struct. This meant that the struct had incomplete
information about the otherName SAN and contained uninitialized memory.
* Fix the detection of HardwareModuleName otherName SANs. These were being
detected by comparing the wrong field and the check was erroneously
inverted.
* Fix a build error in some configurations with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG
enabled, where some low-level modules required by requested PSA crypto
features were not getting automatically enabled. Fixes #7420.
* Fix undefined symbols in some builds using TLS 1.3 with a custom
configuration file.
* Fix log level for the got supported group message. Fixes #6765
* Functions in the ssl_cache module now return a negative MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx
error code on failure. Before, they returned 1 to indicate failure in
some cases involving a missing entry or a full cache.
* mbedtls_pk_parse_key() now rejects trailing garbage in encrypted keys.
* Fix the build with CMake when Everest or P256-m is enabled through
a user configuration file or the compiler command line. Fixes #8165.
Changes
* Enable Arm / Thumb bignum assembly for most Arm platforms when
compiling with gcc, clang or armclang and -O0.
* Enforce minimum RSA key size when generating a key
to avoid accidental misuse.
* Use heap memory to allocate DER encoded RSA private key.
This reduces stack usage significantly for RSA signature
operations when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined.
* Update Windows code to use BCryptGenRandom and wcslen, and
ensure that conversions between size_t, ULONG, and int are
always done safely. Original contribution by Kevin Kane #635, #730
followed by Simon Butcher #1453.
* Users integrating their own PSA drivers should be aware that
the file library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c has been renamed
to psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c.
* When using CBC with the cipher module, the requirement to call
mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode() is now enforced. Previously, omitting
this call accidentally applied a default padding mode chosen at compile
time.
= Mbed TLS 3.4.1 branch released 2023-08-04
Bugfix

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@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
New deprecations
* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR and
MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR, where xxx is either ECC or RSA,
are now being deprecated in favor of PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy and
MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy. Here yyy can be: BASIC,
IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE. The goal is to have a finer detail about
the capabilities of the PSA side for either key.
Features
* New symbols PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy and
MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy (where xxx is either ECC, RSA
or DH) were introduced in order to have finer accuracy in defining the
PSA capabilities for each key. These capabilities, named yyy above, can be
any of: BASIC, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE.
- DERIVE is only available for ECC keys, not for RSA or DH ones.
- implementations are free to enable more than what it was strictly
requested. For example BASIC internally enables IMPORT and EXPORT
(useful for testing purposes), but this might change in the future.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Features
* When parsing X.509 certificates, support the extensions
SignatureKeyIdentifier and AuthorityKeyIdentifier.

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@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
Features
* Add support to restrict AES to 128-bit keys in order to save code size.
A new configuration option, MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH, can be
used to enable this feature.

View file

@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
Features
* New configuration option MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY introduced. When
using CPU-accelerated AES (e.g., Arm Crypto Extensions), this option
disables the plain C implementation and the run-time detection for the
CPU feature, which reduces code size and avoids the vulnerability of the
plain C implementation.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Features
* Add parsing of directoryName subtype for subjectAltName extension in
x509 certificates.

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@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
Features
* Add getter (mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_timeout()) to access
`mbedtls_ssl_cache_context.timeout`.
* Add getter (mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname()) to access
`mbedtls_ssl_context.hostname`.
* Add getter (mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_endpoint()) to access
`mbedtls_ssl_config.endpoint`.

View file

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
API changes
* Add new millisecond time type `mbedtls_ms_time_t` and `mbedtls_ms_time()`
function, needed for TLS 1.3 ticket lifetimes. Alternative implementations
can be created using an ALT interface.

View file

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Add missing md.h includes to some of the external programs from
the programs directory. Without this, even though the configuration
was sufficient for a particular program to work, it would only print
a message that one of the required defines is missing.

View file

@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
Features
* Add support for PBKDF2-CMAC through the PSA API.

View file

@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
Features
* Add support for PBKDF2-HMAC through the PSA API.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Features
* Don't include the PSA dispatch functions for PAKEs (psa_pake_setup() etc)
if no PAKE algorithms are requested

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Features
* Add a possibility to generate CSR's with RCF822 and directoryName subtype
of subjectAltName extension in x509 certificates.

View file

@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
Features
* It is now possible to generate certificates with SubjectAltNames.
Currently supported subtypes: DnsName, UniformResourceIdentifier,
IP address, OtherName, and DirectoryName, as defined in RFC 5280.
See mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_alternative_name for
more information.

View file

@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
Features
* AES performance improvements. Uplift varies by platform,
toolchain, optimisation flags and mode.
Aarch64, gcc -Os and CCM, GCM and XTS benefit the most.
On Aarch64, uplift is typically around 20 - 110%.
When compiling with gcc -Os on Aarch64, AES-XTS improves
by 4.5x.

View file

@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix clang and armclang compilation error when targeting certain Arm
M-class CPUs (Cortex-M0, Cortex-M0+, Cortex-M1, Cortex-M23,
SecurCore SC000). Fixes #1077.
Changes
* Enable Arm / Thumb bignum assembly for most Arm platforms when
compiling with gcc, clang or armclang and -O0.

View file

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
Features
* X.509 hostname verification now partially supports URI Subject Alternate
Names. Only exact matching, without any normalization procedures
described in 7.4 of RFC5280, will result in a positive URI verification.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fixed an issue that caused compile errors when using CMake and the IAR
toolchain.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Features
* Allow MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE and MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE to be set by
setting the CMake variable of the same name at configuration time.

View file

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix a build error in some configurations with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG
enabled, where some low-level modules required by requested PSA crypto
features were not getting automatically enabled. Fixes #7420.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Features
* Add a driver dispatch layer for FFDH keys, enabling alternative
implementations of FFDH through the driver entry points.

View file

@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
Features
* When a PSA driver for ECDH is present, it is now possible to disable
MBEDTLS_ECDH_C in the build in order to save code size. For TLS 1.2
key exchanges based on ECDH(E) to work, this requires
MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. Restartable/interruptible ECDHE operations in
TLS 1.2 (ECDHE-ECDSA key exchange) are not supported in those builds yet,
as PSA does not have an API for restartable ECDH yet.
* When all of ECDH, ECDSA and EC J-PAKE are either disabled or provided by
a driver, it is possible to disable MBEDTLS_ECP_C (and MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
if not required by another module) and still get support for ECC keys and
algorithms in PSA, with some limitations. See docs/driver-only-builds.txt
for details.
API changes
* Mbed TLS 3.4 introduced support for omitting the built-in implementation
of ECDSA and/or EC J-PAKE when those are provided by a driver. However,
their was a flaw in the logic checking if the built-in implementation, in
that if failed to check if all the relevant curves were supported by the
accelerator. As a result, it was possible to declare no curves as
accelerated and still have the built-in implementation compiled out.
Starting with this release, it is necessary to declare which curves are
accelerated (using MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_xxx macros), or they will be
considered not accelerated, and the built-in implementation of the curves
and any algorithm possible using them will be included in the build.

View file

@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
Features
* All modules that use hashes or HMAC can now take advantage of PSA Crypto
drivers when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is enabled and psa_crypto_init() has
been called. Previously (in 3.3), this was restricted to a few modules,
and only in builds where MBEDTLS_MD_C was disabled; in particular the
entropy module was not covered which meant an external RNG had to be
provided - these limitations are lifted in this version. A new set of
feature macros, MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_xxx, has been introduced that can be used
to check for availability of hash algorithms, regardless of whether
they're provided by a built-in implementation, a driver or both. See
docs/driver-only-builds.md.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix the J-PAKE driver interface for user and peer to accept any values
(previously accepted values were limited to "client" or "server").

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Changes
* Enforce minimum RSA key size when generating a key
to avoid accidental misuse.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Features
* Accept arbitrary AttributeType and AttributeValue in certificate
Distinguished Names using RFC 4514 syntax.

View file

@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
Features
* Support for "opaque" (PSA-held) ECC keys in the PK module has been
extended: it is now possible to use mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(),
mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(), mbedtls_pk_check_pair(), and
mbedtls_pk_verify() with opaque ECC keys (provided the PSA attributes
allow it).

View file

@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
Features
* Add support for FFDH key exchange in TLS 1.3.
This is automatically enabled as soon as PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH
and the ephemeral or psk-ephemeral key exchange mode are enabled.
By default, all groups are offered; the list of groups can be
configured using the existing API function mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups().

View file

@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Bugfix
* Fix accidental omission of MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX in 3rdparty modules
in CMake.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix some cases where mbedtls_mpi_mod_exp, RSA key construction or ECDSA
signature can silently return an incorrect result in low memory conditions.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix a potential corruption of the passed-in IV when mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc()
is called with zero length and padlock is not enabled.

View file

@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Bugfix
* Fix the build with CMake when Everest or P256-m is enabled through
a user configuration file or the compiler command line. Fixes #8165.

View file

@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Bugfix
* Fix compilation error in C++ programs when MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C is
disabled.

View file

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix crypt_and_hash decryption fail when used with a stream cipher
mode of operation due to the input not being multiple of block size.
Resolves #7417.

View file

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix declaration of mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable() function
in the ecdsa.h header file. There was a build warning when the
configuration macro MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT was defined.
Resolves #7407.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix compile failure due to empty enum in cipher_wrap.c, when building
with a very minimal configuration. Fixes #7625.

View file

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* In TLS 1.3, fix handshake failure when a client in its ClientHello
proposes an handshake based on PSK only key exchange mode or at least
one of the key exchange modes using ephemeral keys to a server that
supports only the PSK key exchange mode.

View file

@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix IAR compiler warnings.

View file

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix a compilation failure in the constant_time module when
building for arm64_32 (e.g., for watchos). Reported by Paulo
Coutinho in #7787.

View file

@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix log level for the got supported group message. Fixes #6765

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix a bug in which mbedtls_x509_string_to_names() would return success
when given a invalid name string if it did not contain '=' or ','.

View file

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix compilation warnings in aes.c, which prevented the
example TF-M configuration in configs/ from building cleanly:
tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h with
crypto_config_profile_medium.h.

View file

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
Security
* Fix a case where potentially sensitive information held in memory would not
be completely zeroized during TLS 1.2 handshake, in both server and client
configurations.

View file

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix "unterminated '#pragma clang attribute push'" in sha256/sha512.c when
built with MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT but don't have a
way to detect the crypto extensions required. A warning is still issued.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Features
* The documentation of mbedtls_ecp_group now describes the optimized
representation of A for some curves. Fixes #8045.

View file

@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix an issue when parsing an otherName subject alternative name into a
mbedtls_x509_san_other_name struct. The type-id of the otherName was not
copied to the struct. This meant that the struct had incomplete
information about the otherName SAN and contained uninitialized memory.
* Fix the detection of HardwareModuleName otherName SANs. These were being
detected by comparing the wrong field and the check was erroneously
inverted.

View file

@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix the build with MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY. Fixes #7516.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix an error when MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT is defined but not
MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT, causing ecdsa verify to fail. Fixes #7498.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Features
* Improve mbedtls_x509_time performance and reduce memory use.
* Reduce syscalls to time() during certificate verification.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix CCM* with no tag being not supported in a build with CCM as the only
symmetric encryption algorithm and the PSA configuration enabled.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Features
* Add function mbedtls_oid_from_numeric_string() to parse an OID from a
string to a DER-encoded mbedtls_asn1_buf.

View file

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
Features
* Applications using ECC over secp256r1 through the PSA API can use a
new implementation with a much smaller footprint, but some minor
usage restrictions. See the documentation of the new configuration
option MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED for details.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix missing PSA initialization in sample programs when
MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Don't try to include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE when
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled.

View file

@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
Requirement changes
* Officially require Python 3.8 now that earlier versions are out of support.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Features
* Add support for reading and writing X25519 and X448
public and private keys in RFC 8410 format using the existing PK APIs.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Features
* Add SHA-3 family hash functions.

View file

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix proper sizing for PSA_EXPORT_[KEY_PAIR/PUBLIC_KEY]_MAX_SIZE and
PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE buffers when at least one accelerated EC is bigger
than all built-in ones and RSA is disabled.
Resolves #6622.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix very high stack usage in SSL debug code. Reported by Maximilian
Gerhardt in #7804.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix a compilation error on some platforms when including mbedtls/ssl.h
with all TLS support disabled. Fixes #6628.

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix undefined symbols in some builds using TLS 1.3 with a custom
configuration file.

View file

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
Features
* Add support for server-side TLS version negotiation. If both TLS 1.2 and
TLS 1.3 protocols are enabled, the TLS server now selects TLS 1.2 or
TLS 1.3 depending on the capabilities and preferences of TLS clients.
Fixes #6867.

View file

@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
Requirement changes
* Minimum required Windows version is now Windows Vista, or
Windows Server 2008.
Changes
* Update Windows code to use BCryptGenRandom and wcslen, and
ensure that conversions between size_t, ULONG, and int are
always done safely. Original contribution by Kevin Kane #635, #730
followed by Simon Butcher #1453.

View file

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
Changes
* Use heap memory to allocate DER encoded RSA private key.
This reduces stack usage significantly for RSA signature
operations when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined.

View file

@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
Features
* X.509 hostname verification now supports IPAddress Subject Alternate Names.

View file

@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
Bugfix
* Fix x509 certificate generation to conform to RFC 5480 / RFC 5758 when
using ECC key. The certificate was rejected by some crypto frameworks.
Fixes #2924.

View file

@ -135,3 +135,12 @@ Guide](docs/architecture/alternative-implementations.md) for more information.
- Use cryptographic mechanisms that are not based on block ciphers. In
particular, for authenticated encryption, use ChaCha20/Poly1305 instead of
block cipher modes. For random generation, use HMAC\_DRBG instead of CTR\_DRBG.
#### Everest
The HACL* implementation of X25519 taken from the Everest project only protects
against remote timing attacks. (See their [Security
Policy](https://github.com/hacl-star/hacl-star/blob/main/SECURITY.md).)
The Everest variant is only used when `MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED`
configuration option is defined. This option is off by default.

View file

@ -67,16 +67,32 @@ In the medium to long term, performing a slow or blocking operation (for example
We may want to go directly to a more sophisticated approach because when a system works with a global lock, it's typically hard to get rid of it to get more fine-grained concurrency.
### Key destruction short-term requirements
#### Summary of guarantees in the short term
When `psa_destroy_key` returns:
1. The key identifier doesn't exist. Rationale: this is a functional requirement for persistent keys: the caller can immediately create a new key with the same identifier.
2. The resources from the key have been freed. Rationale: in a low-resource condition, this may be necessary for the caller to re-create a similar key, which should be possible.
3. The call must not block indefinitely, and in particular cannot wait for an event that is triggered by application code such as calling an abort function. Rationale: this may not strictly be a functional requirement, but it is an expectation `psa_destroy_key` does not block forever due to another thread, which could potentially be another process on a multi-process system. In particular, it is only acceptable for `psa_destroy_key` to block, when waiting for another thread to complete a PSA Cryptography API call that it had already started.
When `psa_destroy_key` is called on a key that is in use, guarantee 2. might be violated. (This is consistent with the requirement [“Correctness out of the box”](#correctness-out-of-the-box), as destroying a key while it's in use is undefined behavior.)
### Key destruction long-term requirements
As noted above in [“Correctness out of the box”](#correctness-out-of-the-box), when a key is destroyed, it's ok if `psa_destroy_key` allows copies of the key to live until ongoing operations using the key return. In the long term, it would be good to guarantee that `psa_destroy_key` wipes all copies of the key material.
The [PSA Crypto API specification](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/api/keys/management.html#key-destruction) mandates that implementations make a best effort to ensure that the key material cannot be recovered. In the long term, it would be good to guarantee that `psa_destroy_key` wipes all copies of the key material.
#### Summary of guarantees when `psa_destroy_key` returns
#### Summary of guarantees in the long term
* The key identifier doesn't exist. Rationale: this is a functional requirement for persistent keys: the caller can immediately create a new key with the same identifier.
* The resources from the key have been freed. Rationale: in a low-resource condition, this may be necessary for the caller to re-create a similar key, which should be possible.
* The call must not block indefinitely, and in particular cannot wait for an event that is triggered by application code such as calling an abort function. Rationale: this may not strictly be a functional requirement, but it is an expectation `psa_destroy_key` does not block forever due to another thread, which could potentially be another process on a multi-process system.
* In the long term, no copy of the key material exists. Rationale: this is a security requirement. We do not have this requirement yet, but we need to document this as a security weakness, and we would like to become compliant.
When `psa_destroy_key` returns:
1. The key identifier doesn't exist. Rationale: this is a functional requirement for persistent keys: the caller can immediately create a new key with the same identifier.
2. The resources from the key have been freed. Rationale: in a low-resource condition, this may be necessary for the caller to re-create a similar key, which should be possible.
3. The call must not block indefinitely, and in particular cannot wait for an event that is triggered by application code such as calling an abort function. Rationale: this may not strictly be a functional requirement, but it is an expectation `psa_destroy_key` does not block forever due to another thread, which could potentially be another process on a multi-process system. In particular, it is only acceptable for `psa_destroy_key` to block, when waiting for another thread to complete a PSA Cryptography API call that it had already started.
4. No copy of the key material exists. Rationale: this is a security requirement. We do not have this requirement yet, but we need to document this as a security weakness, and we would like to satisfy this security requirement in the future.
As opposed to the short term requirements, all the above guarantees hold even if `psa_destroy_key` is called on a key that is in use.
## Resources to protect

View file

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
*/
/**
* @mainpage Mbed TLS v3.4.1 API Documentation
* @mainpage Mbed TLS v3.5.0 API Documentation
*
* This documentation describes the internal structure of Mbed TLS. It was
* automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in

View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
PROJECT_NAME = "Mbed TLS v3.4.1"
PROJECT_NAME = "Mbed TLS v3.5.0"
OUTPUT_DIRECTORY = ../apidoc/
FULL_PATH_NAMES = NO
OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C = YES

View file

@ -644,10 +644,10 @@ void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *name);
/** \} name Functions to parse ASN.1 data structures */
/** \} addtogroup asn1_module */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
#endif /* asn1.h */

View file

@ -37,17 +37,17 @@
* Major, Minor, Patchlevel
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 3
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 4
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 1
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 5
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 0
/**
* The single version number has the following structure:
* MMNNPP00
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x03040100
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "3.4.1"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 3.4.1"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x03050000
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "3.5.0"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 3.5.0"
/* Macros for build-time platform detection */

View file

@ -852,7 +852,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
* \brief This function sets the padding mode, for cipher modes
* that use padding.
*
* The default passing mode is PKCS7 padding.
*
* \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and
* bound to a cipher information structure.

View file

@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
*
* The Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) Mode for
* Authentication is defined in <em>RFC-4493: The AES-CMAC Algorithm</em>.
* It is supported with AES and DES.
*/
/*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
@ -38,12 +39,30 @@ extern "C" {
#define MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
#define MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE 8
/* We don't support Camellia or ARIA in this module */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX 16 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of AES. */
#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 16 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of AES. */
#else
#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX 8 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of 3DES. */
#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 8 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of 3DES. */
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/** The longest block supported by the cipher module.
*
* \deprecated
* For the maximum block size of a cipher supported by the CMAC module,
* use #MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE.
* For the maximum block size of a cipher supported by the cipher module,
* use #MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH.
*/
/* Before Mbed TLS 3.5, this was the maximum block size supported by the CMAC
* module, so it didn't take Camellia or ARIA into account. Since the name
* of the macro doesn't even convey "CMAC", this was misleading. Now the size
* is sufficient for any cipher, but the name is defined in cmac.h for
* backward compatibility. */
#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT)
/**
@ -51,11 +70,11 @@ extern "C" {
*/
struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t {
/** The internal state of the CMAC algorithm. */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
/** Unprocessed data - either data that was not block aligned and is still
* pending processing, or the final block. */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_block)[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_block)[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
/** The length of data pending processing. */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_len);

View file

@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT
#endif
/* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED is introduced in MbedTLS version 3.5, while
/* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED is introduced in Mbed TLS version 3.5, while
* in previous version compressed points were automatically supported as long
* as PK_PARSE_C and ECP_C were enabled. As a consequence, for backward
* compatibility, we auto-enable PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED when these conditions
@ -184,4 +184,12 @@
#define MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA || MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
/* Historically pkparse did not check the CBC padding when decrypting
* a key. This was a bug, which is now fixed. As a consequence, pkparse
* now needs PKCS7 padding support, but existing configurations might not
* enable it, so we enable it here. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H */

View file

@ -52,10 +52,30 @@ extern "C" {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/**
* \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption)
* for cipher-based and mbedtls_md-based PBE's
*
* \note When encrypting, #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 must
* be enabled at compile time.
*
* \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a
* future version of the library.
* Please use mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext() instead.
*
* \warning When decrypting:
* - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is enabled at compile
* time, this function validates the CBC padding and returns
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH if the padding is
* invalid. Note that this can help active adversaries
* attempting to brute-forcing the password. Note also that
* there is no guarantee that an invalid password will be
* detected (the chances of a valid padding with a random
* password are about 1/255).
* - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is disabled at compile
* time, this function does not validate the CBC padding.
*
* \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12 PbeParams structure
* \param mode either #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or
* #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT
@ -64,17 +84,78 @@ extern "C" {
* \param pwd Latin1-encoded password used. This may only be \c NULL when
* \p pwdlen is 0. No null terminator should be used.
* \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0)
* \param input the input data
* \param data the input data
* \param len data length
* \param output the output buffer
* \param output Output buffer.
* On success, it contains the encrypted or decrypted data,
* possibly followed by the CBC padding.
* On failure, the content is indeterminate.
* For decryption, there must be enough room for \p len
* bytes.
* For encryption, there must be enough room for
* \p len + 1 bytes, rounded up to the block size of
* the block cipher identified by \p pbe_params.
*
* \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code
*/
int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
const unsigned char *input, size_t len,
unsigned char *output);
int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
const unsigned char *data, size_t len,
unsigned char *output);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
/**
* \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption)
* for cipher-based and mbedtls_md-based PBE's
*
*
* \warning When decrypting:
* - This function validates the CBC padding and returns
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH if the padding is
* invalid. Note that this can help active adversaries
* attempting to brute-forcing the password. Note also that
* there is no guarantee that an invalid password will be
* detected (the chances of a valid padding with a random
* password are about 1/255).
*
* \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12 PbeParams structure
* \param mode either #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or
* #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT
* \param cipher_type the cipher used
* \param md_type the mbedtls_md used
* \param pwd Latin1-encoded password used. This may only be \c NULL when
* \p pwdlen is 0. No null terminator should be used.
* \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0)
* \param data the input data
* \param len data length
* \param output Output buffer.
* On success, it contains the encrypted or decrypted data,
* possibly followed by the CBC padding.
* On failure, the content is indeterminate.
* For decryption, there must be enough room for \p len
* bytes.
* For encryption, there must be enough room for
* \p len + 1 bytes, rounded up to the block size of
* the block cipher identified by \p pbe_params.
* \param output_size size of output buffer.
* This must be big enough to accommodate for output plus
* padding data.
* \param output_len On success, length of actual data written to the output buffer.
*
* \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code
*/
int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
const unsigned char *data, size_t len,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
size_t *output_len);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */

View file

@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H
#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
@ -50,23 +51,95 @@ extern "C" {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/**
* \brief PKCS#5 PBES2 function
*
* \note When encrypting, #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 must
* be enabled at compile time.
*
* \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a
* future version of the library.
* Please use mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext() instead.
*
* \warning When decrypting:
* - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is enabled at compile
* time, this function validates the CBC padding and returns
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH if the padding is
* invalid. Note that this can help active adversaries
* attempting to brute-forcing the password. Note also that
* there is no guarantee that an invalid password will be
* detected (the chances of a valid padding with a random
* password are about 1/255).
* - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is disabled at compile
* time, this function does not validate the CBC padding.
*
* \param pbe_params the ASN.1 algorithm parameters
* \param mode either MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT or MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT
* \param mode either #MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT or #MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT
* \param pwd password to use when generating key
* \param pwdlen length of password
* \param data data to process
* \param datalen length of data
* \param output output buffer
* \param output Output buffer.
* On success, it contains the encrypted or decrypted data,
* possibly followed by the CBC padding.
* On failure, the content is indeterminate.
* For decryption, there must be enough room for \p datalen
* bytes.
* For encryption, there must be enough room for
* \p datalen + 1 bytes, rounded up to the block size of
* the block cipher identified by \p pbe_params.
*
* \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails.
*/
int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
unsigned char *output);
int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
unsigned char *output);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
/**
* \brief PKCS#5 PBES2 function
*
* \warning When decrypting:
* - This function validates the CBC padding and returns
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH if the padding is
* invalid. Note that this can help active adversaries
* attempting to brute-forcing the password. Note also that
* there is no guarantee that an invalid password will be
* detected (the chances of a valid padding with a random
* password are about 1/255).
*
* \param pbe_params the ASN.1 algorithm parameters
* \param mode either #MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT or #MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT
* \param pwd password to use when generating key
* \param pwdlen length of password
* \param data data to process
* \param datalen length of data
* \param output Output buffer.
* On success, it contains the decrypted data.
* On failure, the content is indetermidate.
* For decryption, there must be enough room for \p datalen
* bytes.
* For encryption, there must be enough room for
* \p datalen + 1 bytes, rounded up to the block size of
* the block cipher identified by \p pbe_params.
* \param output_size size of output buffer.
* This must be big enough to accommodate for output plus
* padding data.
* \param output_len On success, length of actual data written to the output buffer.
*
* \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if parsing or decryption fails.
*/
int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
size_t *output_len);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */

View file

@ -53,8 +53,10 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_sha256_context {
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */
uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */
uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is224); /*!< Determines which function to use:
0: Use SHA-256, or 1: Use SHA-224. */
#endif
}
mbedtls_sha256_context;

View file

@ -35,10 +35,10 @@
#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
/*
* Include the build-time configuration information file. Here, we do not
* Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not
* include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which
* is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the
* PSA cryptography repository which has a different build system and
* TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and
* configuration.
*/
#include "psa/build_info.h"

View file

@ -41,10 +41,10 @@
#define PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H
/*
* Include the build-time configuration information file. Here, we do not
* Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not
* include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which
* is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the
* PSA cryptography repository which has a different build system and
* TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and
* configuration.
*/
#include "psa/build_info.h"

View file

@ -66,9 +66,14 @@
extern "C" {
#endif
/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it
* in each of its header files. */
#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
/*
* Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not
* include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which
* is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the
* TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and
* configuration.
*/
#include "psa/build_info.h"
/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the primitive
* algorithms. */

View file

@ -33,8 +33,15 @@
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H
/* Make sure the Mbed TLS configuration is visible. */
#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
/*
* Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not
* include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which
* is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the
* TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and
* configuration.
*/
#include "psa/build_info.h"
/* Define the MBEDTLS_PRIVATE macro. */
#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"

View file

@ -268,17 +268,20 @@ if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
${mbedtls_static_target})
endif()
set(p256m_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}p256m")
set(everest_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}everest")
if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_library(${mbedcrypto_static_target} STATIC ${src_crypto})
set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedcrypto)
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs})
if(TARGET everest)
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC everest)
if(TARGET ${everest_target})
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${everest_target})
endif()
if(TARGET p256m)
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC p256m)
if(TARGET ${p256m_target})
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${p256m_target})
endif()
add_library(${mbedx509_static_target} STATIC ${src_x509})
@ -293,23 +296,23 @@ endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR})
add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto})
set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.4.1 SOVERSION 14)
set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.0 SOVERSION 15)
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs})
if(TARGET everest)
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC everest)
if(TARGET ${everest_target})
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${everest_target})
endif()
if(TARGET p256m)
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC p256m)
if(TARGET ${p256m_target})
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${p256m_target})
endif()
add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509})
set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.4.1 SOVERSION 5)
set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.0 SOVERSION 6)
target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target})
add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls})
set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.4.1 SOVERSION 19)
set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.0 SOVERSION 20)
target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target})
endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)

View file

@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ LOCAL_CFLAGS += -fPIC -fpic
endif
endif
SOEXT_TLS?=so.19
SOEXT_X509?=so.5
SOEXT_CRYPTO?=so.14
SOEXT_TLS?=so.20
SOEXT_X509?=so.6
SOEXT_CRYPTO?=so.15
# Set AR_DASH= (empty string) to use an ar implementation that does not accept
# the - prefix for command line options (e.g. llvm-ar)

View file

@ -34,23 +34,15 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
#error "MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
#if !((defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C)) || \
(defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)) || \
(defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)))
#error "MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM)
#error "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
@ -339,7 +331,7 @@ MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT3[256] = { RT };
/*
* Round constants
*/
MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RCON[10] =
MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t round_constants[10] =
{
0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008,
0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080,
@ -370,7 +362,7 @@ MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT3[256];
/*
* Round constants
*/
MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RCON[10];
MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t round_constants[10];
/*
* Tables generation code
@ -401,7 +393,7 @@ MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static void aes_gen_tables(void)
* calculate the round constants
*/
for (i = 0, x = 1; i < 10; i++) {
RCON[i] = x;
round_constants[i] = x;
x = XTIME(x);
}
@ -625,7 +617,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
case 10:
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 10; i++, RK += 4) {
RK[4] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^
RK[4] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^
((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[3])]) ^
((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[3])] << 8) ^
((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[3])] << 16) ^
@ -641,7 +633,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
case 12:
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 8; i++, RK += 6) {
RK[6] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^
RK[6] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^
((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[5])]) ^
((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[5])] << 8) ^
((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[5])] << 16) ^
@ -658,7 +650,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
case 14:
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 7; i++, RK += 8) {
RK[8] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^
RK[8] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^
((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[7])]) ^
((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[7])] << 8) ^
((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[7])] << 16) ^

View file

@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(const mbedtls_mpi *X,
* That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it
* is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0).
*/
different_sign = mbedtls_ct_bool_xor(X_is_negative, Y_is_negative); // true if different sign
different_sign = mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(X_is_negative, Y_is_negative); // true if different sign
result = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(different_sign, X_is_negative);
/*
@ -131,15 +131,17 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi *X,
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n));
mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool(assign);
{
mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool(assign);
X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_assign, Y->s, X->s);
X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_assign, Y->s, X->s);
mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, do_assign);
mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, do_assign);
mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_not_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool_not(do_assign);
for (size_t i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++) {
X->p[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(do_not_assign, X->p[i]);
mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_not_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool_not(do_assign);
for (size_t i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++) {
X->p[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(do_not_assign, X->p[i]);
}
}
cleanup:
@ -386,7 +388,7 @@ static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sint_abs(mbedtls_mpi_sint z)
/* Convert x to a sign, i.e. to 1, if x is positive, or -1, if x is negative.
* This looks awkward but generates smaller code than (x < 0 ? -1 : 1) */
#define TO_SIGN(x) ((((mbedtls_mpi_uint) x) >> (biL - 1)) * -2 + 1)
#define TO_SIGN(x) ((mbedtls_mpi_sint) (((mbedtls_mpi_uint) x) >> (biL - 1)) * -2 + 1)
/*
* Set value from integer

View file

@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include <string.h>
@ -532,13 +533,8 @@ static int mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags(const unsigned char *tag1,
const unsigned char *tag2,
size_t tag_len)
{
unsigned char i;
int diff;
/* Check tag in "constant-time" */
for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) {
diff |= tag1[i] ^ tag2[i];
}
int diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag1, tag2, tag_len);
if (diff != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED;

View file

@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include <string.h>
@ -310,7 +311,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char check_tag[16];
size_t i;
int diff;
if ((ret = chachapoly_crypt_and_tag(ctx,
@ -320,9 +320,7 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
}
/* Check tag in "constant-time" */
for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < sizeof(check_tag); i++) {
diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i];
}
diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, sizeof(check_tag));
if (diff != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output, length);

View file

@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include "constant_time_internal.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -268,17 +269,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setup(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
/*
* Ignore possible errors caused by a cipher mode that doesn't use padding
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
(void) mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7);
#else
(void) mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE);
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */
return 0;
}
@ -848,7 +838,7 @@ static int get_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
size_t *data_len)
{
size_t i, pad_idx;
unsigned char padding_len, bad = 0;
unsigned char padding_len;
if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@ -857,18 +847,19 @@ static int get_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
padding_len = input[input_len - 1];
*data_len = input_len - padding_len;
/* Avoid logical || since it results in a branch */
bad |= padding_len > input_len;
bad |= padding_len == 0;
mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padding_len, input_len);
bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(padding_len, 0));
/* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len,
* so pick input_len, which is usually 8 or 16 (one block) */
pad_idx = input_len - padding_len;
for (i = 0; i < input_len; i++) {
bad |= (input[i] ^ padding_len) * (i >= pad_idx);
mbedtls_ct_condition_t in_padding = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, pad_idx);
mbedtls_ct_condition_t different = mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i], padding_len);
bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, different));
}
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING * (bad != 0);
return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */
@ -891,24 +882,28 @@ static void add_one_and_zeros_padding(unsigned char *output,
static int get_one_and_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
size_t *data_len)
{
size_t i;
unsigned char done = 0, prev_done, bad;
if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
bad = 0x80;
mbedtls_ct_condition_t in_padding = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE;
mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE;
*data_len = 0;
for (i = input_len; i > 0; i--) {
prev_done = done;
done |= (input[i - 1] != 0);
*data_len |= (i - 1) * (done != prev_done);
bad ^= input[i - 1] * (done != prev_done);
for (ptrdiff_t i = (ptrdiff_t) (input_len) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_bool(input[i]);
mbedtls_ct_condition_t hit_first_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(is_nonzero, in_padding);
*data_len = mbedtls_ct_size_if(hit_first_nonzero, i, *data_len);
bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_if(hit_first_nonzero, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i], 0x80), bad);
in_padding = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(is_nonzero));
}
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING * (bad != 0);
return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */
@ -932,7 +927,8 @@ static int get_zeros_and_len_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
size_t *data_len)
{
size_t i, pad_idx;
unsigned char padding_len, bad = 0;
unsigned char padding_len;
mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad;
if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@ -942,16 +938,19 @@ static int get_zeros_and_len_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
*data_len = input_len - padding_len;
/* Avoid logical || since it results in a branch */
bad |= padding_len > input_len;
bad |= padding_len == 0;
bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padding_len, input_len);
bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(padding_len, 0));
/* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len */
pad_idx = input_len - padding_len;
for (i = 0; i < input_len - 1; i++) {
bad |= input[i] * (i >= pad_idx);
mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_padding = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, pad_idx);
mbedtls_ct_condition_t nonzero_pad_byte;
nonzero_pad_byte = mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(is_padding, mbedtls_ct_bool(input[i]));
bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, nonzero_pad_byte);
}
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING * (bad != 0);
return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */
@ -962,18 +961,14 @@ static int get_zeros_and_len_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
static void add_zeros_padding(unsigned char *output,
size_t output_len, size_t data_len)
{
size_t i;
for (i = data_len; i < output_len; i++) {
output[i] = 0x00;
}
memset(output + data_len, 0, output_len - data_len);
}
static int get_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
size_t *data_len)
{
size_t i;
unsigned char done = 0, prev_done;
mbedtls_ct_condition_t done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE, prev_done;
if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@ -982,8 +977,8 @@ static int get_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
*data_len = 0;
for (i = input_len; i > 0; i--) {
prev_done = done;
done |= (input[i-1] != 0);
*data_len |= i * (done != prev_done);
done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(done, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i-1], 0));
*data_len = mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(done, prev_done), i, *data_len);
}
return 0;
@ -1027,6 +1022,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
*olen = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
/* CBC mode requires padding so we make sure a call to
* mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode has been done successfully. */
if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
if (ctx->get_padding == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
}
#endif
if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||

View file

@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int cmac_generate_subkeys(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
unsigned char *K1, unsigned char *K2)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char L[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
unsigned char L[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
size_t olen, block_size;
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(L, sizeof(L));
@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ exit:
* We can't use the padding option from the cipher layer, as it only works for
* CBC and we use ECB mode, and anyway we need to XOR K1 or K2 in addition.
*/
static void cmac_pad(unsigned char padded_block[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX],
static void cmac_pad(unsigned char padded_block[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE],
size_t padded_block_len,
const unsigned char *last_block,
size_t last_block_len)
@ -283,9 +283,9 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
{
mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx;
unsigned char *state, *last_block;
unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
unsigned char M_last[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char M_last[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t olen, block_size;
@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ exit:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block,
sizeof(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(state, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(state, MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE);
return ret;
}
@ -750,8 +750,8 @@ static int cmac_test_subkeys(int verbose,
int i, ret = 0;
mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx;
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type);
if (cipher_info == NULL) {
@ -845,7 +845,7 @@ static int cmac_test_wth_cipher(int verbose,
{
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
int i, ret = 0;
unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX];
unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type);
if (cipher_info == NULL) {

View file

@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "common.h"
@ -120,9 +121,56 @@ int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a,
diff |= x ^ y;
}
#if (INT_MAX < INT32_MAX)
/* We don't support int smaller than 32-bits, but if someone tried to build
* with this configuration, there is a risk that, for differing data, the
* only bits set in diff are in the top 16-bits, and would be lost by a
* simple cast from uint32 to int.
* This would have significant security implications, so protect against it. */
#error "mbedtls_ct_memcmp() requires minimum 32-bit ints"
#else
/* The bit-twiddling ensures that when we cast uint32_t to int, we are casting
* a value that is in the range 0..INT_MAX - a value larger than this would
* result in implementation defined behaviour.
*
* This ensures that the value returned by the function is non-zero iff
* diff is non-zero.
*/
return (int) ((diff & 0xffff) | (diff >> 16));
#endif
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
int mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(const void *a,
const void *b,
size_t n,
size_t skip_head,
size_t skip_tail)
{
unsigned int diff = 0;
volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
size_t valid_end = n - skip_tail;
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
unsigned int d = x ^ y;
mbedtls_ct_condition_t valid = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, skip_head),
mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(i, valid_end));
diff |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(valid, d);
}
/* Since we go byte-by-byte, the only bits set will be in the bottom 8 bits, so the
* cast from uint to int is safe. */
return (int) diff;
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
void mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(void *start, size_t total, size_t offset)

View file

@ -429,7 +429,6 @@ static inline unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(unsigned char low,
return (unsigned char) (~(low_mask | high_mask)) & to;
}
/* ============================================================================
* Everything below here is trivial wrapper functions
*/
@ -448,6 +447,14 @@ static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
return (unsigned) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0);
}
static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1,
mbedtls_ct_condition_t if0)
{
return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1,
(mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0);
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
@ -471,6 +478,12 @@ static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t conditio
return (unsigned) (condition & if1);
}
static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1)
{
return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (condition & if1);
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
@ -481,6 +494,23 @@ static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_conditio
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1, int if0)
{
/* Coverting int -> uint -> int here is safe, because we require if1 and if0 to be
* in the range -32767..0, and we require 32-bit int and uint types.
*
* This means that (0 <= -if0 < INT_MAX), so negating if0 is safe, and similarly for
* converting back to int.
*/
return -((int) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) (-if1),
(mbedtls_ct_uint_t) (-if0)));
}
static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1)
{
return -((int) (condition & (-if1)));
}
static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
mbedtls_ct_uint_t y)
{
@ -505,8 +535,8 @@ static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_le(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
return ~mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(x, y);
}
static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_xor(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x,
mbedtls_ct_condition_t y)
static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x,
mbedtls_ct_condition_t y)
{
return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (x ^ y);
}

View file

@ -194,11 +194,11 @@ static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_le(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
mbedtls_ct_uint_t y);
/** Boolean "xor" operation.
/** Boolean not-equals operation.
*
* Functionally equivalent to:
*
* \p x ^ \p y
* \p x != \p y
*
* \param x The first value to analyze.
* \param y The second value to analyze.
@ -206,11 +206,11 @@ static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_le(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
* \note This is more efficient than mbedtls_ct_uint_ne if both arguments are
* mbedtls_ct_condition_t.
*
* \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x ^ \p y,
* \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x != \p y,
* otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
*/
static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_xor(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x,
mbedtls_ct_condition_t y);
static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x,
mbedtls_ct_condition_t y);
/** Boolean "and" operation.
*
@ -291,6 +291,22 @@ static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
unsigned if1,
unsigned if0);
/** Choose between two mbedtls_ct_condition_t values.
*
* Functionally equivalent to:
*
* condition ? if1 : if0.
*
* \param condition Condition to test.
* \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
* \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
*
* \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0.
*/
static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1,
mbedtls_ct_condition_t if0);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
/** Choose between two mbedtls_mpi_uint values.
@ -327,6 +343,23 @@ static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t con
*/
static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, unsigned if1);
/** Choose between an mbedtls_ct_condition_t and 0.
*
* Functionally equivalent to:
*
* condition ? if1 : 0.
*
* Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_bool_if(condition, if1, 0) but
* results in smaller code size.
*
* \param condition Condition to test.
* \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
*
* \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0.
*/
static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1);
/** Choose between a size_t value and 0.
*
* Functionally equivalent to:
@ -378,6 +411,35 @@ static inline unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(unsigned char low,
unsigned char c,
unsigned char t);
/** Choose between two error values. The values must be in the range [-32767..0].
*
* Functionally equivalent to:
*
* condition ? if1 : if0.
*
* \param condition Condition to test.
* \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
* \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
*
* \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1, int if0);
/** Choose between an error value and 0. The error value must be in the range [-32767..0].
*
* Functionally equivalent to:
*
* condition ? if1 : 0.
*
* Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_error_if(condition, if1, 0) but
* results in smaller code size.
*
* \param condition Condition to test.
* \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
*
* \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1);
/* ============================================================================
* Block memory operations
@ -492,6 +554,37 @@ void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(unsigned char *dest,
size_t n);
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
/** Constant-time buffer comparison without branches.
*
* Similar to mbedtls_ct_memcmp, except that the result only depends on part of
* the input data - differences in the head or tail are ignored. Functionally equivalent to:
*
* memcmp(a + skip_head, b + skip_head, size - skip_head - skip_tail)
*
* Time taken depends on \p n, but not on \p skip_head or \p skip_tail .
*
* Behaviour is undefined if ( \p skip_head + \p skip_tail) > \p n.
*
* \param a Secret. Pointer to the first buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL.
* \param b Secret. Pointer to the second buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL.
* \param n The number of bytes to examine (total size of the buffers).
* \param skip_head Secret. The number of bytes to treat as non-significant at the start of the buffer.
* These bytes will still be read.
* \param skip_tail Secret. The number of bytes to treat as non-significant at the end of the buffer.
* These bytes will still be read.
*
* \return Zero if the contents of the two buffers are the same, otherwise non-zero.
*/
int mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(const void *a,
const void *b,
size_t n,
size_t skip_head,
size_t skip_tail);
#endif
/* Include the implementation of static inline functions above. */
#include "constant_time_impl.h"

View file

@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include <string.h>
@ -601,7 +602,6 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char check_tag[16];
size_t i;
int diff;
if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, length,
@ -611,9 +611,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
}
/* Check tag in "constant-time" */
for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) {
diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i];
}
diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, tag_len);
if (diff != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output, length);

View file

@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include "constant_time_internal.h"
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -333,9 +334,9 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len, size_t out_size)
{
int ret = 0;
size_t i, olen;
size_t olen;
unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH];
unsigned char diff, bad_padding = 0;
int diff;
*out_len = 0;
if (out_size < in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH) {
@ -420,19 +421,15 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
* larger than 8, because of the type wrap around.
*/
padlen = in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - Plen;
if (padlen > 7) {
padlen &= 7;
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED;
}
ret = mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padlen, 7),
MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED, ret);
padlen &= 7;
/* Check padding in "constant-time" */
for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; i++) {
if (i >= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - padlen) {
diff |= output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + i];
} else {
bad_padding |= output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + i];
}
}
const uint8_t zero[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH] = { 0 };
diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(
&output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH], zero,
KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - padlen, 0);
if (diff != 0) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED;
@ -454,7 +451,6 @@ cleanup:
*out_len = 0;
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&bad_padding, sizeof(bad_padding));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&diff, sizeof(diff));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(A, sizeof(A));

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