Remove padding parameters as mbedtls_rsa_init()
cannot return an error code when padding
parameters are invalid.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() now returns the error
code MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING when
padding parameters are invalid.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Some padding checks in rsa.c were
erroneously removed in a previous
commit and are restored in this
commit.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
This commit removes the RSA
constants MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC
and MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE because
they are now superfluous given
that the mode parameter has been
removed.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit removes the mode parameter
from the mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext
function. This change is propagated
throughout the codebase.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit removes the f_rng parameter from
the mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext
function. This is in preparation for
the removal of the mode parameter.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit removes p_rng parameter from the
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext function
in preparation for removal of the mode
parameter.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit removes the mode parameter
from the mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify
function and propagates the change
throughout the process.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit removes f_rng parameter from
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify function in
preparation of mode parameter removal.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit removes p_rng parameter from
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify function
as preparation for removing the mode
parameter.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit removes mode parameter from
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify and
propagates the change throughout the
codebase.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit performs removal of f_rng parameter
from mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify
function in preparation for removal of mode
parameter.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit removes p_rng from
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify function in
preparation of removal of mode parameter.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit removes mode parameter from
mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify and propagates the
change throughout the codebase.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit removes p_rng from mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify
since p_rng has no relevance following the removal
of f_rng from this function.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit removes f_rng parameter from
mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify as a prerequisite
to removing the mode parameter. f_rng no
longer has relevance in this function if
mode is removed.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit removes the mode param from
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign and propagates
the changes throughout the codebase.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit removes the mode parameter from
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign and
propagates the change throughout the
codebase.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit removes the mode parameter from
mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign and progagates the
change to all relevant parts of the codebase.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Removes mode parameter from
mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt and propagates
changes throughout the codebase.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Removal of mode parameter from
mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt. This commit
propagates the change to all relevant function calls
and tests.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Removal of the mode parameter from
mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt function. This change
is propagated throughout the codebase and to
relevant tests.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Remove mode param from mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt
and also modify and remove relevant tests.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Removing the mode parameter from the mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt
function. The change is progagated to all function calls, including in
test suite .function files. Additionally fully removing one test
where the wrong mode was being tested.
Signed-off-by: Tom Daubney <Thomas.Daubney@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
The mode parameter has been removed from the
mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt function. The change
has been progagated to all function calls,
including in test suite .function files.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Fix unused parameter warnings when MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS is not enabled.
A few issues were caught by check-names.sh namely:
- mbedtls_error_add was not capitalised.
- mbedtls_test_hook_error_add was being defined multiple times as the
definition was in a header.
Signed-off-by: Chris Jones <christopher.jones@arm.com>
The previous implementation of the error addition interface did not comply
with the invasive testing architecture guidelines. This commit fixes that
by:
- Renaming functions/macros/variables to follow the mbedtls_error_xxx or
mbedtls_test_hook_xxx convention.
- Making mbedtls_test_hook_error_add a global variable that can be set
by the testing code.
- Using a static inline function call, as opposed to macro, to keep
discrepancies between debug and production version to a minimum.
Signed-off-by: Chris Jones <christopher.jones@arm.com>
All occurences of manual error code addition/combination, in `rsa.c`, have
been replaced with the `MBEDTLS_ERR_ADD` macro.
Signed-off-by: Chris Jones <christopher.jones@arm.com>
Adds a macro (`MBEDTLS_ERR_ADD`) to add error codes together and check that the
result will not be corrupted. This additional check is only enabled during
testing when `MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS` is defined.
Also includes a reference usage example in `rsa.c` where two high-level error
codes could be incorrectly added together under the right conditions. This now
ensures that when this error occurs during testing it will be correctly
reported.
Signed-off-by: Chris Jones <christopher.jones@arm.com>
Rename both `rsa_internal.h` and `rsa_internal.c` to more descriptive
names: `rsa_alt_helpers.h` and `rsa_alt_helpers.c`.
Also re-orders `rsa_internal.c` to match the order in `rsa_internal.h`
Signed-off-by: Chris Jones <christopher.jones@arm.com>
Only move `rsa_internal.h` for now to test dependancies. Other internal
headers will be moved in following commits.
Signed-off-by: Chris Jones <christopher.jones@arm.com>
mbedtls_rsa_gen_key() was not freeing the RSA object, and specifically
not freeing the mutex, in some error cases.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
When MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled, RSA code protects the use of the
key with a mutex. mbedtls_rsa_free() frees this mutex by calling
mbedtls_mutex_free(). This does not match the usage of
mbedtls_mutex_free(), which in general can only be done once.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
- removed the check on saltlen > 0 and added tests
positive test cases for this.
- added negative test cases when even saltlen == 0
is not enough. This allowed to uncover an underflow bu
in the slen check (when olen-slen-2 is negative)
- fixed the saltlen check to avoid underflow
- added more test cases where saltlen is the maximum
possible value and one above the maximum possible value
(different hash, different key size)
Signed-off-by: Cédric Meuter <cedric.meuter@gmail.com>
mbedtls_rsa_private() could return the sum of two RSA error codes
instead of a valid error code in some rare circumstances:
* If rsa_prepare_blinding() returned MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED
(indicating a misbehaving or misconfigured RNG).
* If the comparison with the public value failed (typically indicating
a glitch attack).
Make sure not to add two high-level error codes.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
- all positibe test cases were sampled from the CAVP test suite
(SigGenPSS_186-2.txt, SigGenPSS_186-3.txt)
Only kept one representative for each triple (modlen, sha, saltlen)
- two extra test cases were added to cover the maximum salt length
(slen=olen-slen-2 and slen=(olen-slen-2)-1)
- in rsa.c, the salt intermediate buffer was too small to cover cases
where slen > hlen. So reworked the code to generate the salt in the
encoded message directly. This has the advantage to remove a memcpy
and a memset.
Signed-off-by: Cédric Meuter <cedric.meuter@gmail.com>
- Fixed code style.
- Clarified the documentation of what happens when saltlen is set to
MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY.
- Added range check on saltlen to reject out of range values.
(Code review done by @gilles-peskine-arm)
Signed-off-by: Cédric Meuter <cedric.meuter@gmail.com>
extension of mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() with an extra argument
'saltlen' which allows to inject the length of the salt to the function,
as opposed to the original function which internally computes the
maximum possible salt length. If MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY is passed
the function falls back to the the original behaviour. The original
function mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() can simply defer to it.
This allows to make some CAVP PSS generation tests that require the use
of a salt length which is smaller that the hash length.
Signed-off-by: Cédric Meuter <cedric.meuter@gmail.com>
Starting with commit 49e94e3, the do/while loop in
`rsa_prepare_blinding()` was changed to a `do...while(0)`, which
prevents retry from being effective and leaves dead code.
Restore the while condition to retry, and lift the calls to finish the
computation out of the while loop by by observing that they are
performed only when `mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod()` returns zero.
Signed-off-by: Peter Kolbus <peter.kolbus@garmin.com>
* development:
Update copyright notices to use Linux Foundation guidance
Undef ASSERT before defining it to ensure that no previous definition has sneaked in through included files.
Add ChangeLog entry for X.509 CN-type vulnerability
Improve documentation of cn in x509_crt_verify()
Fix comparison between different name types
Add test: DNS names should not match IP addresses
Remove obsolete buildbot reference in compat.sh
Fix misuse of printf in shell script
Fix added proxy command when IPv6 is used
Simplify test syntax
Fix logic error in setting client port
ssl-opt.sh: include test name in log files
ssl-opt.sh: remove old buildbot-specific condition
ssl-opt.sh: add proxy to all DTLS tests
Signed-off-by: Dan Handley <dan.handley@arm.com>
As a result, the copyright of contributors other than Arm is now
acknowledged, and the years of publishing are no longer tracked in the
source files.
Also remove the now-redundant lines declaring that the files are part of
MbedTLS.
This commit was generated using the following script:
# ========================
#!/bin/sh
# Find files
find '(' -path './.git' -o -path './3rdparty' ')' -prune -o -type f -print | xargs sed -bi '
# Replace copyright attribution line
s/Copyright.*Arm.*/Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors/I
# Remove redundant declaration and the preceding line
$!N
/This file is part of Mbed TLS/Id
P
D
'
# ========================
Signed-off-by: Bence Szépkúti <bence.szepkuti@arm.com>
* development: (55 commits)
Log change as bugfix
Add changelog entry
Clarify updates to the persistent state in storage
With multiple applicable transparent drivers, the order is unspecified
Minor clarifications
Give some examples of purpsoses of pure-software transparent driver
Fix typos
Add a link to the PSA API specification
Explain locations vs lifetimes
Initialize key pointer in ecdh to NULL
Add buffer zeroization when ecp_write_key fails
Simplified key slot deletion
Style fixes
Use arc4random_buf instead of rand on NetBSD
Apply review feedback
Update open question section about public key storage
Remove the paragraph about declaring application needs
Change driver persistent data to a callback interface
Rework and expand key management in opaque drivers
Fix typos and copypasta
...
In library source files, include "common.h", which takes care of
including "mbedtls/config.h" (or the alternative MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
and other things that are used throughout the library.
FROM=$'#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)\n#include "mbedtls/config.h"\n#else\n#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE\n#endif' perl -i -0777 -pe 's~\Q$ENV{FROM}~#include "common.h"~' library/*.c 3rdparty/*/library/*.c scripts/data_files/error.fmt scripts/data_files/version_features.fmt
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
inv_mod() already returns a specific error code if the value is not
invertible, so no need to check in advance that it is. Also, this is a
preparation for blinding the call to inv_mod(), which is made easier by
avoiding the redundancy (otherwise the call to gcd() would need to be blinded
too).
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Otherwise these values are recomputed in mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt, which
currently suffers from side channel issues in the computation of QP (see
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055). By loading the pre-computed values not
only is the side channel avoided, but runtime overhead of loading RSA keys
is reduced.
Discussion in https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/347
Enable handling of zero-length null output in PKCS1 v1.5 decryption.
Prevent undefined behavior by avoiding a memcpy() to zero-length null
output buffers.
In mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt and
mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt, if the input length is 0 (which
is unusual and mostly useless, but permitted) then it is fine for the
input pointer to be NULL. Don't return an error in this case.
When `input` is NULL, `memcpy( p, input, ilen )` has undefined behavior
even if `ilen` is zero. So skip the `memcpy` call in this case.
Likewise, in `mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt`, skip the `memcpy` call if
`*olen` is zero.
Resolve incompatibilties in the RSA module where changes made for
parameter validation prevent Mbed Crypto from working. Mbed Crypto
depends on being able to pass zero-length buffers that are NULL to RSA
encryption functions.
This reverts commit 2f660d047d.
Additional changes to temporarily enable running tests:
ssl_srv.c and test_suite_ecdh use mbedtls_ecp_group_load instead of
mbedtls_ecdh_setup
test_suite_ctr_drbg uses mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update instead of
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret
It should be valid to RSASSA-PSS sign a SHA-512 hash with a 1024-bit or
1032-bit RSA key, but with the salt size being always equal to the hash
size, this isn't possible: the key is too small.
To enable use of hashes that are relatively large compared to the key
size, allow reducing the salt size to no less than the hash size minus 2
bytes. We don't allow salt sizes smaller than the hash size minus 2
bytes because that too significantly changes the security guarantees the
library provides compared to the previous implementation which always
used a salt size equal to the hash size. The new calculated salt size
remains compliant with FIPS 186-4.
We also need to update the "hash too large" test, since we now reduce
the salt size when certain key sizes are used. We used to not support
1024-bit keys with SHA-512, but now we support this by reducing the salt
size to 62. Update the "hash too large" test to use a 1016-bit RSA key
with SHA-512, which still has too large of a hash because we will not
reduce the salt size further than 2 bytes shorter than the hash size.
The RSA private key used for the test was generated using "openssl
genrsa 1016" using OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre8.
$ openssl genrsa 1016
Generating RSA private key, 1016 bit long modulus (2 primes)
..............++++++
....++++++
e is 65537 (0x010001)
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
This commit removes all the static occurrencies of the function
mbedtls_zeroize() in each of the individual .c modules. Instead the
function has been moved to utils.h that is included in each of the
modules.
The specification requires that P and Q are not too close. The specification
also requires that you generate a P and stick with it, generating new Qs until
you have found a pair that works. In practice, it turns out that sometimes a
particular P results in it being very unlikely a Q can be found matching all
the constraints. So we keep the original behavior where a new P and Q are
generated every round.
Attacks against RSA exist for small D. [Wiener] established this for
D < N^0.25. [Boneh] suggests the bound should be N^0.5.
Multiple possible values of D might exist for the same set of E, P, Q. The
attack works when there exists any possible D that is small. To make sure that
the generated key is not susceptible to attack, we need to make sure we have
found the smallest possible D, and then check that D is big enough. The
Carmichael function λ of p*q is lcm(p-1, q-1), so we can apply Carmichael's
theorem to show that D = d mod λ(n) is the smallest.
[Wiener] Michael J. Wiener, "Cryptanalysis of Short RSA Secret Exponents"
[Boneh] Dan Boneh and Glenn Durfee, "Cryptanalysis of RSA with Private Key d Less than N^0.292"
Conflict resolution:
* ChangeLog
* tests/data_files/Makefile: concurrent additions, order irrelevant
* tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf: concurrent additions, order irrelevant
* tests/scripts/all.sh: one comment change conflicted with a code
addition. In addition some of the additions in the
iotssl-1381-x509-verify-refactor-restricted branch need support for
keep-going mode, this will be added in a subsequent commit.
Found by running:
CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE="Check"
tests/scripts/depend-pkalgs.pl
(Also tested with same command but CC=gcc)
Another PR will address improving all.sh and/or the depend-xxx.pl scripts
themselves to catch this kind of thing.
The _ext suffix suggests "new arguments", but the new functions have
the same arguments. Use _ret instead, to convey that the difference is
that the new functions return a value.
Conflict resolution:
* ChangeLog: put the new entries in their rightful place.
* library/x509write_crt.c: the change in development was whitespace
only, so use the one from the iotssl-1251 feature branch.
This commit adds some explicit downcasts from `size_t` to `uint8_t` in
the RSASSA signature encoding function `rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode`.
The truncation is safe as it has been checked beforehand that the
respective values are in the range of a `uint8_t`.
1) `mbedtls_rsa_import_raw` used an uninitialized return
value when it was called without any input parameters.
While not sensible, this is allowed and should be a
succeeding no-op.
2) The MPI test for prime generation missed a return value
check for a call to `mbedtls_mpi_shift_r`. This is neither
critical nor new but should be fixed.
3) Both the RSA keygeneration example program and the
RSA test suites contained code initializing an RSA context
after a potentially failing call to CTR DRBG initialization,
leaving the corresponding RSA context free call in the
cleanup section of the respective function orphaned.
While this defect existed before, Coverity picked up on
it again because of newly introduced MPI's that were
also wrongly initialized only after the call to CTR DRBG
init. The commit fixes both the old and the new issue
by moving the initializtion of both the RSA context and
all MPI's prior to the first potentially failing call.
The function `mbedtls_rsa_complete` is supposed to guarantee that
RSA operations will complete without failure. In contrast, it does
not ensure consistency of parameters, which is the task of the
checking functions `rsa_check_pubkey` and `rsa_check_privkey`.
Previously, the maximum allowed size of the RSA modulus was checked
in `mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey`. However, exceeding this size would lead
to failure of some RSA operations, hence this check belongs to
`mbedtls_rsa_complete` rather than `mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey`.
This commit moves it accordingly.
Remove a check introduced in the previous buffer overflow fix with keys of
size 8N+1 which the subsequent fix for buffer start calculations made
redundant.
Added a changelog entry for the buffer start calculation fix.
For a key of size 8N+1, check that the first byte after applying the
public key operation is 0 (it could have been 1 instead). The code was
incorrectly doing a no-op check instead, which led to invalid
signatures being accepted. Not a security flaw, since you would need the
private key to craft such an invalid signature, but a bug nonetheless.
The check introduced by the previous security fix was off by one. It
fixed the buffer overflow but was not compliant with the definition of
PSS which technically led to accepting some invalid signatures (but
not signatures made without the private key).
Fix buffer overflow in RSA-PSS signature verification when the hash is
too large for the key size. Found by Seth Terashima, Qualcomm.
Added a non-regression test and a positive test with the smallest
permitted key size for a SHA-512 hash.
This commit splits off the RSA helper functions into separate headers and
compilation units to have a clearer separation of the public RSA interface,
intended to be used by end-users, and the helper functions which are publicly
provided only for the benefit of designers of alternative RSA implementations.
