Removes f_rng param from mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext

Commit removes the f_rng parameter from
the mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext
function. This is in preparation for
the removal of the mode parameter.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Daubney 2021-05-19 12:18:58 +01:00
parent 578e9abcbd
commit 9e65f791b5
5 changed files with 8 additions and 13 deletions

View file

@ -1080,9 +1080,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* \note The \p hash_id in the RSA context is ignored.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
* this is used for blinding and should be provided; see
* mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored.
* \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.
* \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
@ -1105,7 +1102,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,

View file

@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options,
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *ctx ),
NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash,
pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id,
pss_opts->expected_salt_len,

View file

@ -2147,7 +2147,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
*/
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
@ -2186,7 +2185,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf )
: mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, NULL, sig, buf );
: mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, NULL, NULL, sig, buf );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
@ -2312,7 +2311,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id
: md_alg;
return( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( ctx, NULL,
return( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( ctx,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
md_alg, hashlen, hash,
mgf1_hash_id,

View file

@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ void pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( int mod, data_t * input_N, data_t * input_E,
hash_len, hash_result,
result_str->x ) == result_simple );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( &ctx, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
msg_digest_id, hash_len, hash_result,
mgf_hash, salt_len,
result_str->x ) == result_full );

View file

@ -333,26 +333,26 @@ void rsa_invalid_param( )
buf ) );
TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( NULL, NULL,
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( NULL,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
0, sizeof( buf ),
buf,
0, 0,
buf ) );
TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( &ctx, NULL,
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( &ctx,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
0, sizeof( buf ),
NULL, 0, 0,
buf ) );
TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( &ctx, NULL,
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( &ctx,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
0, sizeof( buf ),
buf, 0, 0,
NULL ) );
TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( &ctx, NULL,
mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( &ctx,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1,
0, NULL,