Otherwise the error status can be PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE instead of the
expected PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED in some configurations. For example, the
RSA verification code currently checks the signature size first whenever
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY is enabled, and only gets into
algorithm-specific code if this passes, so it returns INVALID_SIGNATURE even
if the specific algorithm is not supported.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
They're redundant with the automatically generated test cases, but it's
useful to have them when debugging issues with the test code.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
This commit adds tests data for the encrypt setup function
to cover the case where there is insufficent memory when
trying to undertake the operation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit adds test data needed to test the case where driver
does not support selected algorithm but the library does.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
This commit adds a test called aead_encrypt_setup()
which tests that the relevant drivers get called the correct
amount of times when running the multipart AEAD encrypt
setup API.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
This implies that when both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3
are included in the build all the TLS 1.2 tests
using the default configuration now go through
a version negotiation on the client side.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
To be compatible with the other functions `mbedtls_psa_hkdf_extract` and
`mbedtls_psa_hkdf_expand` use hash algorithm for parameter.
Signed-off-by: Gabor Mezei <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
- parameter name in function description
- test_suite_ecp.data: add new line at the end of file
Signed-off-by: Przemek Stekiel <przemyslaw.stekiel@mobica.com>
The test suite test_suite_psa_crypto_op_fail now runs a large number
of automatically generated test cases which attempt to perform a
one-shot operation or to set up a multi-part operation with invalid
parameters. The following cases are fully covered (based on the
enumeration of valid algorithms and key types):
* An algorithm is not supported.
* The key type is not compatible with the algorithm (for operations
that use a key).
* The algorithm is not compatible for the operation.
Some test functions allow the library to return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
where the test code generator expects PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or vice
versa. This may be refined in the future.
Some corner cases with algorithms combining a key agreement with a key
derivation are not handled properly. This will be fixed in follow-up
commits.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Test that hash operation functions fail when given a hash algorithm
that is not supported or an algorithm that is not a hash.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
The new test suite psa_crypto_op_fail is intended for systematically
generated test cases that ensure that cryptographic operations with
invalid parameters fail as expected. I intend invalid parameters to
cover things like an invalid algorithm, an algorithm that is
incompatible with the operation, a key type that is incompatible with
the algorithm, etc.
This commit just creates the infrastructure. Subsequent commits will
add data generation and test code.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
CCM*-no-tag is currently available whenever CCM is, so declare
PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG whenever PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM is declared and vice
versa.
Fix dependencies of test cases that use PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: some were
using PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM and some had altogether wrong dependencies.
This commit does not touch library code. There is still no provision for
providing CCM support without CCM*-no-tag or vice versa.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
The PSA Crypto API uses 0 as the initial counter value, but the test vector
in RFC 7539 uses 1. So the unit tests here include an extra leading block.
The expected data for this leading block was calculated with Cryptodome.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import re
from Cryptodome.Cipher import ChaCha20
key = bytes.fromhex('000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f')
nonce = bytes.fromhex('000000000000004a00000000')
encrypt = lambda pt: ChaCha20.new(key=key, nonce=nonce).encrypt(pt)
# Cryptodome uses counter=0, like PSA Crypto. Prepend a 64-byte input block #0
# so that the plaintext from RFC 7539 starts exactly at block #1.
header = b'The RFC 7539 test vector uses counter=1, but PSA uses counter=0.'
assert(len(header) == 64)
sunscreen = b"Ladies and Gentlemen of the class of '99: If I could offer you only one tip for the future, sunscreen would be it."
plaintext = header + sunscreen
zeros = b'\x00' * len(plaintext)
keystream = encrypt(zeros)
ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext)
print('RFC 7539 §2.4.2')
print('Keystream:')
print(re.sub(r'(..)', r'\1:', keystream[64:].hex()))
print('Ciphertext Subscreen:')
print(re.sub(r'(..)', r'\1 ', ciphertext[64:].hex()))
print('')
print(f"""\
PSA symmetric decrypt: ChaCha20, RFC7539 keystream
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
# Keystream from RFC 7539 §2.4.2, with an extra 64-byte output block prepended
# because the test vector starts at counter=1 but our API starts at counter=0.
cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"{key.hex()}":"{nonce.hex()}":"{zeros.hex()}":"{keystream.hex()}"
PSA symmetric decrypt: ChaCha20, RFC7539 sunscreen
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
# Test vector from RFC 7539 §2.4.2, with an extra 64-byte block prepended
# because the test vector starts at counter=1 but our API starts at counter=0.
cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"{key.hex()}":"{nonce.hex()}":"{ciphertext.hex()}":"{plaintext.hex()}"
""")
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
* Remove expected_output_data: since asymmetric encryption is randomized,
it can't be useful.
* The decryption check needs the private exponent, not the public exponent.
* Use PSA macro for the expected ciphertext buffer size.
* Move RSA sanity checks to their own function for clarity.
* For RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5, check that the result of the private key operation
has the form 0x00 0x02 ... 0x00 M where M is the plaintext.
* For OAEP, check that the result of the private key operation starts with
0x00. The rest is the result of masking which it would be possible to
check here, but not worth the trouble of implementing.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Add a call to `mbedtls_md_starts()` in the `mbedtls_md_process()`
test, as it violates the API usage. Fixes#2227.
Signed-off-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
The X509write x509_csr_check reference file depends on
mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand being used to match the pre-generated data.
This calls x509_crt_verifycsr() like in x509_csr_check_opaque() when
MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is defined.
Notably using PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA() in ecdsa_sign_wrap() makes
this test run without these changes.
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <narmstrong@baylibre.com>
The pk_rsa_encrypt_test_vec() reference vector is calculated while using
mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand rng source, but since the RNG souce can't
be controlled when USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled we can't get the same
result.
The pk_rsa_encrypt_test_vec() fails when switching to mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand
as rng source.
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <narmstrong@baylibre.com>
The test is based on the AEAD multi-part test, re-using the
design on aead_multipart_internal_func() to test differnet
sequence of psa_mac_update() for MAC update or verify.
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <narmstrong@baylibre.com>
Extend mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert() to reset handshake cert list
if cert provided is null. Previously, mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert()
only provided a way to append to the handshake certificate list,
without providing a way to replace the handshake certificate list.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Strauss <gstrauss@gluelogic.com>
Make `PSA symetric decrypt: CCM*-no-tag, input too short (15 bytes)`
depend on MBEDTLS_CCM_C otherwise the multi-part test fails on
the missing CCM* instead on the input length validity for CCM*.
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <narmstrong@baylibre.com>
Encryption is not deterministic and can not be verified by a know-answer test.
Encryption is already verified via encrypt-decrypt test.
Signed-off-by: Przemyslaw Stekiel <przemyslaw.stekiel@mobica.com>
Add accessors to mbedtls_ssl_context: user data, version
ABI-API-checking fails which was expected as this PR adds a new field in mbedtls_ssl_context and mbedtls_ssl_config.
Testing the hash length in this context is not applicable because there is no way
to specify it when calling mbedtls_psa_hkdf_extract.
Change to test invalid `alg` parameter.
Signed-off-by: Gabor Mezei <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
The user data is typically a pointer to a data structure or a handle which
may no longer be valid after the session is restored. If the user data needs
to be preserved, let the application do it. This way, it is a conscious
decision for the application to save/restore either the pointer/handle
itself or the object it refers to.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
This commit alters the relevant .data files
such that the new function name change of check_iv
to iv_len_validity is relfected there.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Commit changes name of check_iv to
iv_len_validity as this seems to better describe
its functionality.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Duplicate a test case but with a different expected error
due to error translation to and from PSA.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
Currently all cases were negative, so the block that exercised
mbedtls_pem_get_der() would never be reached.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
When working with block cipher modes like GCM(PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER),
aead_multipart_internal_func() should calculate the offset in output buffer
based on output_length, not using the offset of the input buffer(part_offset).
Signed-off-by: Mircea Udrea <mircea.udrea@silexinsight.com>
The implementation was silently overwriting the IV length to 12
even though the caller passed a different value.
Change the behavior to signal that a different length is not supported.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
The implementation was silently overwriting the IV length to 12
even though the caller passed a different value.
Change the behavior to signal that a different length is not supported.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
psa_aead_encrypt_setup() and psa_aead_decrypt_setup() were returning
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, while the same failed checks were producing
PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if they happened in psa_aead_encrypt() or
psa_aead_decrypt().
The PSA Crypto API 1.1 spec will specify PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
in the case that the supplied algorithm is not an AEAD one.
Also move these shared checks to a helper function, to reduce code
duplication and ensure that the functions remain in sync.
Signed-off-by: Bence Szépkúti <bence.szepkuti@arm.com>
Fix library references, tests and programs.
Testing is performed in the already present all.sh test.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
Extend PSA AEAD testing by adding CCM and ChaChaPoly.
Add more combinations of functions to test the API.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
Expected output generated by OpenSSL (see below) apart from the case
where both password and salt are either NULL or zero length, as OpenSSL
does not support this. For these test cases we have had to use our own
output as that which is expected. Code to generate test cases is as
follows:
#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <string.h>
int Keygen_Uni( const char * test_name, unsigned char *pass, int
passlen, unsigned char *salt,
int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n,
unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD
*md_type )
{
size_t index;
printf( "%s\n", test_name );
int ret = PKCS12_key_gen_uni( pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, id, iter,
n, out, md_type );
if( ret != 1 )
{
printf( "Key generation returned %d\n", ret );
}
else
{
for( index = 0; index < n; ++index )
{
printf( "%02x", out[index] );
}
printf( "\n" );
}
printf( "\n" );
}
int main(void)
{
unsigned char out_buf[48];
unsigned char pass[64];
int pass_len;
unsigned char salt[64];
int salt_len;
/* If ID=1, then the pseudorandom bits being produced are to be used
as key material for performing encryption or decryption.
If ID=2, then the pseudorandom bits being produced are to be
used as an IV (Initial Value) for encryption or decryption.
If ID=3, then the pseudorandom bits being produced are
to be used as an integrity key for MACing.
*/
int id = 1;
int iter = 3;
memset( out_buf, 0, sizeof( out_buf ) );
memset( pass, 0, sizeof( pass ) );
memset( salt, 0, sizeof( salt ) );
Keygen_Uni( "Zero length pass and salt", pass, 0, salt, 0, id, iter,
sizeof(out_buf),
out_buf, EVP_md5( ) );
memset( out_buf, 0, sizeof( out_buf ) );
Keygen_Uni( "NULL pass and salt", NULL, 0, NULL, 0, id, iter,
sizeof(out_buf),
out_buf, EVP_md5( ) );
memset( out_buf, 0, sizeof( out_buf ) );
salt[0] = 0x01;
salt[1] = 0x23;
salt[2] = 0x45;
salt[3] = 0x67;
salt[4] = 0x89;
salt[5] = 0xab;
salt[6] = 0xcd;
salt[7] = 0xef;
Keygen_Uni( "Zero length pass", pass, 0, salt, 8, id, iter,
sizeof(out_buf),
out_buf, EVP_md5( ) );
memset( out_buf, 0, sizeof( out_buf ) );
Keygen_Uni( "NULL pass", NULL, 0, salt, 8, id, iter, sizeof(out_buf),
out_buf, EVP_md5( ) );
memset( out_buf, 0, sizeof( out_buf ) );
memset( salt, 0, sizeof( salt ) );
pass[0] = 0x01;
pass[1] = 0x23;
pass[2] = 0x45;
pass[3] = 0x67;
pass[4] = 0x89;
pass[5] = 0xab;
pass[6] = 0xcd;
pass[7] = 0xef;
Keygen_Uni( "Zero length salt", pass, 8, salt, 0, id, iter,
sizeof(out_buf),
out_buf, EVP_md5( ) );
memset( out_buf, 0, sizeof( out_buf ) );
Keygen_Uni( "NULL salt", pass, 8, NULL, 0, id, iter, sizeof(out_buf),
out_buf, EVP_md5( ) );
memset( out_buf, 0, sizeof( out_buf ) );
salt[0] = 0x01;
salt[1] = 0x23;
salt[2] = 0x45;
salt[3] = 0x67;
salt[4] = 0x89;
salt[5] = 0xab;
salt[6] = 0xcd;
salt[7] = 0xef;
Keygen_Uni( "Valid pass and salt", pass, 8, salt, 8, id, iter,
sizeof(out_buf),
out_buf, EVP_md5( ) );
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
Can't call mbedtls_cipher_free(&invalid_ctx) in cleanup if
mbedtls_cipher_init(&invalid_ctx) hasn't been called.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
As we have now a minimal viable implementation of TLS 1.3,
let's remove EXPERIMENTAL from the config option enabling
it.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Add dependencies on built-in hash of signature/
signature verification and asymmetric
encryption/decryption tests. The dependency is
not added for tests based on SHA-256 as SHA-256
is always present when PSA is involved (necessary
to the PSA core) and that way most of PSA signature
/verification tests are still run when PSA hash
operations are accelerated.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Add non regression test for invalid usage of
the output buffer in psa_cipher_encrypt().
The output buffer should not be used to pass
the IV to the driver as a local attacker could
be able to control the used IV.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Add non regression test for invalid usage of
the output buffer in psa_cipher_generate_iv().
The output buffer should not be used to pass
the IV to the driver as a local attacker could
be able to control the used IV.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Under gcc11(+) both message and received would cause errors for
potentially being used uninitialised. We fixed many of these issues in
another PR, but this one is only seen under certain configs.
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
