Use a plausible input size with asymmetric verification
Otherwise the error status can be PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE instead of the expected PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED in some configurations. For example, the RSA verification code currently checks the signature size first whenever PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY is enabled, and only gets into algorithm-specific code if this passes, so it returns INVALID_SIGNATURE even if the specific algorithm is not supported. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
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1 changed files with 11 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -240,10 +240,20 @@ void sign_fail( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
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output, sizeof( output ), &length ) );
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if( ! private_only )
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{
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/* Determine a plausible signature size to avoid an INVALID_SIGNATURE
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* error based on this. */
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PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key_id, &attributes ) );
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size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
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size_t output_length = sizeof( output );
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if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( key_type ) )
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output_length = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( key_bits );
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else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( key_type ) )
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output_length = 2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( key_bits );
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TEST_ASSERT( output_length <= sizeof( output ) );
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TEST_STATUS( expected_status,
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psa_verify_hash( key_id, alg,
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input, sizeof( input ),
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output, sizeof( output ) ) );
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output, output_length ) );
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}
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exit:
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