The TLS server code only support TLS 1.2 thus simplify
the check of the version proposed by the client.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
ssl_tls12_client.c contains only TLS 1.2 specific
code thus remove some checks on the minor version
version being MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3. No aim
for completeness, ssl_parse_server_hello() is not
reworked here for example.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
In ssl_tls.c, move mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md() under the
"if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)" pre-processor directive
as it is specific to TLS 1.2.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
ssl_set_handshake_prfs() is TLS 1.2 specific and only called
from TLS 1.2 only code thus no need to pass the TLS minor
version of the currebt session.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
In TLS 1.3, a PSA ECDH private key may be created
even if MBEDTLS_SSL_USA_PSA_CRYPTO is disabled. We
must destroy this key if still referenced by an
handshake context when we free such context.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
In case of TLS 1.3 and hybrid TLS 1.2/1.3, propose
PKCS1 v1.5 signatures with SHA_384/512 not only
SHA_256. There is no point in not proposing them
if they are available.
In TLS 1.3 those could be useful for certificate
signature verification.
In hybrid TLS 1.2/1.3 this allows to propose for
TLS 1.2 the same set of signature algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
This has although the benefit of getting rid of a
potential integer overflow (though very unlikely
and probably harmless).
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Rename ssl_cli.c and ssl_srv.c to reflect the fact
that they are TLS 1.2 specific now. Align there new
names with the TLS 1.3 ones.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Add all of the group pairs for hrr cases
Re-order some parameters
Change-Id: Id7e131d1ed4279bbd586613800df7bd87dfa4c54
Signed-off-by: XiaokangQian <xiaokang.qian@arm.com>
Encrypt-Then-Mac (ETM) is supported in Mbed TLS TLS
1.2 server only for the CBC cipher mode thus make it
clear in the SSL context.
The previous code was ok as long as the check of
the ETM status was done only in the case of the CBC
cipher mode but fragile as #5573 revealed.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Change run title
Remove dedicate ciphersuite and sig alg
Update test cases
Change-Id: Ic0e9adf56062e744f7bafbc6bb562baeaafd89f0
Signed-off-by: XiaokangQian <xiaokang.qian@arm.com>
Integrate two options into one
Use one dedicate cipher suite TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Use on dedicate signature algorithm ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
Change-Id: Icbe39b985e1942edc4b1e37ce3352eed4f316ab7
Signed-off-by: XiaokangQian <xiaokang.qian@arm.com>
Remove state MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO cause no early data
Change code styles and comments
Fix cookie write issues
Signed-off-by: XiaokangQian <xiaokang.qian@arm.com>
