Setbuf() is currently not guarded by MBEDTLS_FS_IO, nor can it easily be
so. Raised a seperate issue to cover this, and removed the mention of
MBEDTLS_FS_IO from the Changelog.
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
* Security: we're improving a countermeasure.
* Requirement change: the library will no longer compile on a platform
without setbuf().
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
After opening a file containing sensitive data, call mbedtls_setbuf() to
disable buffering. This way, we don't expose sensitive data to a memory
disclosure vulnerability in a buffer outside our control.
This commit adds a call to mbedtls_setbuf() after each call to fopen(),
but only in sample programs that were calling mbedtls_platform_zeroize().
Don't bother protecting stdio buffers in programs where application buffers
weren't protected.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
After opening a file containing sensitive data, call mbedtls_setbuf() to
disable buffering. This way, we don't expose sensitive data to a memory
disclosure vulnerability in a buffer outside our control.
This commit adds a call to mbedtls_setbuf() after each call to fopen(),
except:
* In ctr_drbg.c, in load_file(), because this is only used for DH parameters
and they are not confidential data.
* In psa_its_file.c, in psa_its_remove(), because the file is only opened
to check its existence, we don't read data from it.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Add a platform function mbedtls_setbuf(), defaulting to setbuf().
The intent is to allow disabling stdio buffering when reading or writing
files with sensitive data, because this exposes the sensitive data to a
subsequent memory disclosure vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
In Certificate message parsing tests with
invalid vector lengths, add checks that the
parsing failed on the expected overread check.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Fix an issue whereby a variable was used to check the size of incoming
TLS records against the configured maximum prior to it being set to the
right value.
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
This is an external function, so in the absence of link-time
optimisation (LTO) the compiler can't know anything about it and has to
call it the number of times it's called in the source code.
This only matters for pk_ec, but change pk_rsa as well for the sake of
uniformity.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Trusting the caller to perform the appropriate check is both risky, and
a bit user-unfriendly. Returning NULL on error seems both safer
(dereferencing a NULL pointer is more likely to result in a clean crash,
while mis-casting a pointer might have deeper, less predictable
consequences) and friendlier (the caller can just check the return
value for NULL, which is a common idiom).
Only add that as an additional way of using the function, for the sake
of backwards compatibility. Calls where we know the type of the context
for sure (for example because we just set it up) were legal and safe, so
they should remain legal without checking the result for NULL, which
would be redundant.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
The previous wording "ensure it holds an XXX" context did not mean
anything without looking at the source.
Looking at the source, the criterion is:
- for mbedtls_pk_rsa(), that the info structure uses rsa_alloc_wrap;
- for mbedtls_pk_ec(), that it uses eckey_alloc_wrap or
ecdsa_alloc_wrap, since mbedtls_ecdsa_context is a typedef for
mbedtls_ecp_keypair. (Note that our test code uses mbedtls_pk_ec() on
contexts of type MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA.)
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
The issue was fixed while adding support for static ECDH with Opaque
keys: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/5624
This is just adding the ChangeLog entry for that fix.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Those are adaptations of the already existing
TLS 1.2 tests. It is not really possible to just
remove the TLS 1.2 dependency of the existing tests
because of the following:
. in TLS 1.3 the ciphersuite selection on server
side is not related to the server certificate
. for tests involving OpenSSL the OpenSSL command line
as to be adapted to TLS 1.3
. server authentication is mandatory in TLS 1.3
. a key with KeyEncipherment and not DigitalSignature
usage is never acceptable
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Add one RSA PSS signature algorithm to the
test list of signature algorithms. This allows
certificate chains exposing an RSA key with
signatures using SHA-1 to be used in tests
where an TLS 1.3 handshake is performed.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Fix a null pointer dereference when performing some operations on zero
represented with 0 limbs: mbedtls_mpi_mod_int() dividing by 2, or
mbedtls_mpi_write_string() in base 2.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
