This commit introduces the public macro MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH,
which evaluates to an upper bound for the key lengths of all enabled
ciphers, in Bytes.
This is analogous to the already existing macros MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH
and MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, which provide upper bounds for the IV
and block length, respectively.
For now, MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH is 32 Bytes by default, and 64 in case
XTS is enabled. This is a strict overapproximation for some restricted
configurations. Ideally, the upper bound should be calculated exactly
and automatically from the list of enabled ciphers. The same applies
to the existing macros MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
though, and is left for future work.
Signed-off-by: Hanno Becker <hanno.becker@arm.com>
The test function mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct did not initialize ret in test
code. If there was a bug in library code whereby the library function
mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct() did not set ret when it should, we might have
missed it if ret happened to contain the expected value. So initialize
ret to a value that we never expect.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
GCC up to 4.x defaults to C89. On our CI, we run the arm-none-eabi-gcc
version from Ubuntu 16.04 on Travis, and that's 4.9, so the gcc-arm
builds started failing on Travis when we introduced a C99 construct in
the configurations that we test on arm on Travis. Other builds, and
Jenkins CI, are not affected because they use GCC 5.x or newer.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
If test_fail is called multiple times in the same test case, report
the location of the first failure, not the last one.
With this change, you no longer need to take care in tests that use
auxiliary functions not to fail in the main function if the auxiliary
function has failed.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Return a name that more clearly returns nonzero=true=good, 0=bad. We'd
normally expect check_xxx to return 0=pass, nonzero=fail so
check_parity was a bad name.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
An early draft of the PSA crypto specification required multipart
operations to keep working after destroying the key. This is no longer
the case: instead, now, operations are guaranteed to fail. Mbed TLS
does not comply yet, and still allows the operation to keep going.
Stop testing Mbed TLS's non-compliant behavior.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Rely on Asan to detect a potential buffer overflow, instead of doing a
manual check. This makes the code simpler and Asan can detect
underflows as well as overflows.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
In the cleanup code for persistent_key_load_key_from_storage(), we
only attempt to reopen the key so that it will be deleted if it exists
at that point. It's intentional that we do nothing if psa_open_key()
fails here.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
If any of the TEST_ASSERT()s that are before the call to
mbedtls_pk_warp_as_opaque() failed, when reaching the exit label
psa_destroy_key() would be called with an uninitialized argument.
Found by Clang.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
I might be wrong, but lcc's optimizer is curious about this,
and I am too: shouldn't we free allocated stuff correctly
before exiting `dh_genprime` in this certain point of code?
Signed-off-by: makise-homura <akemi_homura@kurisa.ch>
Replace server2.crt with server2-sha256.crt which, as the name implies, is
just the SHA-256 version of the same certificate.
Replace server1.crt with cert_sha256.crt which, as the name doesn't imply, is
associated with the same key and just have a slightly different Subject Name,
which doesn't matter in this instance.
The other certificates used in this script (server5.crt and server6.crt) are
already signed with SHA-256.
This change is motivated by the fact that recent versions of GnuTLS (or older
versions with the Debian patches) reject SHA-1 in certificates by default, as
they should. There are options to still accept it (%VERIFY_ALLOW_BROKEN and
%VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_WITH_SHA1) but:
- they're not available in all versions that reject SHA-1-signed certs;
- moving to SHA-2 just seems cleaner anyway.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Recent GnuTLS packages on Ubuntu 16.04 have them disabled.
From /usr/share/doc/libgnutls30/changelog.Debian.gz:
gnutls28 (3.4.10-4ubuntu1.5) xenial-security; urgency=medium
* SECURITY UPDATE: Lucky-13 issues
[...]
- debian/patches/CVE-2018-1084x-4.patch: hmac-sha384 and sha256
ciphersuites were removed from defaults in lib/gnutls_priority.c,
tests/priorities.c.
Since we do want to test the ciphersuites, explicitly re-enable them in the
server's priority string. (This is a no-op with versions of GnuTLS where those
are already enabled by default.)
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Update copyright notices to newly added files since merge of original
PR #3546 "Update copyright notices to use Linux Foundation guidance".
Generated using the same script.
Signed-off-by: Dan Handley <dan.handley@arm.com>
