4581 lines
155 KiB
C
4581 lines
155 KiB
C
/*
|
||
* TLS server-side functions
|
||
*
|
||
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
|
||
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
|
||
*
|
||
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
|
||
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
|
||
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
|
||
*
|
||
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
|
||
*
|
||
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
|
||
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
|
||
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
|
||
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
|
||
* limitations under the License.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
#include "common.h"
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
|
||
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
|
||
#else
|
||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
|
||
#define mbedtls_free free
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
|
||
#include "ssl_misc.h"
|
||
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
|
||
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
|
||
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
|
||
#include "constant_time_internal.h"
|
||
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
|
||
|
||
#include <string.h>
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
|
||
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
|
||
#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
|
||
int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *info,
|
||
size_t ilen )
|
||
{
|
||
if( ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER )
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
||
|
||
mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id );
|
||
|
||
if( ( ssl->cli_id = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ilen ) ) == NULL )
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
|
||
|
||
memcpy( ssl->cli_id, info, ilen );
|
||
ssl->cli_id_len = ilen;
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write,
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check,
|
||
void *p_cookie )
|
||
{
|
||
conf->f_cookie_write = f_cookie_write;
|
||
conf->f_cookie_check = f_cookie_check;
|
||
conf->p_cookie = p_cookie;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
|
||
static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t len )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
size_t servername_list_size, hostname_len;
|
||
const unsigned char *p;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "parse ServerName extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
if( len < 2 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
servername_list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) );
|
||
if( servername_list_size + 2 != len )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
p = buf + 2;
|
||
while( servername_list_size > 2 )
|
||
{
|
||
hostname_len = ( ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2] );
|
||
if( hostname_len + 3 > servername_list_size )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME )
|
||
{
|
||
ssl->handshake->sni_name = p + 3;
|
||
ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = hostname_len;
|
||
if( ssl->conf->f_sni == NULL )
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl->conf->f_sni( ssl->conf->p_sni,
|
||
ssl, p + 3, hostname_len );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME );
|
||
}
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
servername_list_size -= hostname_len + 3;
|
||
p += hostname_len + 3;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( servername_list_size != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
|
||
static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf )
|
||
{
|
||
if( conf->f_psk != NULL )
|
||
return( 1 );
|
||
|
||
if( conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || conf->psk_identity == NULL )
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
|
||
if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 )
|
||
return( 1 );
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||
if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) )
|
||
return( 1 );
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||
static int ssl_use_opaque_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
/* If we've used a callback to select the PSK,
|
||
* the static configuration is irrelevant. */
|
||
|
||
if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) )
|
||
return( 1 );
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) )
|
||
return( 1 );
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t len )
|
||
{
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
||
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
|
||
{
|
||
/* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
|
||
if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len ||
|
||
buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len ||
|
||
mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
|
||
ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
||
{
|
||
if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Status of the implementation of signature-algorithms extension:
|
||
*
|
||
* Currently, we are only considering the signature-algorithm extension
|
||
* to pick a ciphersuite which allows us to send the ServerKeyExchange
|
||
* message with a signature-hash combination that the user allows.
|
||
*
|
||
* We do *not* check whether all certificates in our certificate
|
||
* chain are signed with an allowed signature-hash pair.
|
||
* This needs to be done at a later stage.
|
||
*
|
||
*/
|
||
static int ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t len )
|
||
{
|
||
size_t sig_alg_list_size;
|
||
|
||
const unsigned char *p;
|
||
const unsigned char *end = buf + len;
|
||
|
||
mbedtls_md_type_t md_cur;
|
||
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_cur;
|
||
|
||
if ( len < 2 ) {
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
sig_alg_list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) );
|
||
if( sig_alg_list_size + 2 != len ||
|
||
sig_alg_list_size % 2 != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Currently we only guarantee signing the ServerKeyExchange message according
|
||
* to the constraints specified in this extension (see above), so it suffices
|
||
* to remember only one suitable hash for each possible signature algorithm.
|
||
*
|
||
* This will change when we also consider certificate signatures,
|
||
* in which case we will need to remember the whole signature-hash
|
||
* pair list from the extension.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
for( p = buf + 2; p < end; p += 2 )
|
||
{
|
||
/* Silently ignore unknown signature or hash algorithms. */
|
||
|
||
if( ( sig_cur = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( p[1] ) ) == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext"
|
||
" unknown sig alg encoding %d", p[1] ) );
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Check if we support the hash the user proposes */
|
||
md_cur = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( p[0] );
|
||
if( md_cur == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:"
|
||
" unknown hash alg encoding %d", p[0] ) );
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(
|
||
ssl, MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ) ) )
|
||
{
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_cur, md_cur );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:"
|
||
" match sig %u and hash %u",
|
||
(unsigned) sig_cur, (unsigned) md_cur ) );
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: "
|
||
"hash alg %u not supported", (unsigned) md_cur ) );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
||
/*
|
||
* Function for parsing a supported groups (TLS 1.3) or supported elliptic
|
||
* curves (TLS 1.2) extension.
|
||
*
|
||
* The "extension_data" field of a supported groups extension contains a
|
||
* "NamedGroupList" value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446):
|
||
* enum {
|
||
* secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019),
|
||
* x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E),
|
||
* ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102),
|
||
* ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104),
|
||
* ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF),
|
||
* ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF),
|
||
* (0xFFFF)
|
||
* } NamedGroup;
|
||
* struct {
|
||
* NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>;
|
||
* } NamedGroupList;
|
||
*
|
||
* The "extension_data" field of a supported elliptic curves extension contains
|
||
* a "NamedCurveList" value (TLS 1.2 RFC 8422):
|
||
* enum {
|
||
* deprecated(1..22),
|
||
* secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25),
|
||
* x25519(29), x448(30),
|
||
* reserved (0xFE00..0xFEFF),
|
||
* deprecated(0xFF01..0xFF02),
|
||
* (0xFFFF)
|
||
* } NamedCurve;
|
||
* struct {
|
||
* NamedCurve named_curve_list<2..2^16-1>
|
||
* } NamedCurveList;
|
||
*
|
||
* The TLS 1.3 supported groups extension was defined to be a compatible
|
||
* generalization of the TLS 1.2 supported elliptic curves extension. They both
|
||
* share the same extension identifier.
|
||
*
|
||
* DHE groups are not supported yet.
|
||
*/
|
||
static int ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t len )
|
||
{
|
||
size_t list_size, our_size;
|
||
const unsigned char *p;
|
||
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info, **curves;
|
||
|
||
if ( len < 2 ) {
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) );
|
||
if( list_size + 2 != len ||
|
||
list_size % 2 != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Should never happen unless client duplicates the extension */
|
||
if( ssl->handshake->curves != NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory,
|
||
* and leave room for a final 0 */
|
||
our_size = list_size / 2 + 1;
|
||
if( our_size > MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX )
|
||
our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX;
|
||
|
||
if( ( curves = mbedtls_calloc( our_size, sizeof( *curves ) ) ) == NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ssl->handshake->curves = curves;
|
||
|
||
p = buf + 2;
|
||
while( list_size > 0 && our_size > 1 )
|
||
{
|
||
curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1] );
|
||
|
||
if( curve_info != NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
*curves++ = curve_info;
|
||
our_size--;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
list_size -= 2;
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t len )
|
||
{
|
||
size_t list_size;
|
||
const unsigned char *p;
|
||
|
||
if( len == 0 || (size_t)( buf[0] + 1 ) != len )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
list_size = buf[0];
|
||
|
||
p = buf + 1;
|
||
while( list_size > 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ||
|
||
p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED )
|
||
{
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
|
||
ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0];
|
||
#endif
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
||
mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
|
||
p[0] );
|
||
#endif
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) );
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
list_size--;
|
||
p++;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
|
||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
||
static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t len )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
|
||
if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) );
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
|
||
buf, len ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */
|
||
ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK;
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
||
static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t len )
|
||
{
|
||
if( len != 1 || buf[0] >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0];
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
||
static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t len )
|
||
{
|
||
size_t peer_cid_len;
|
||
|
||
/* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */
|
||
if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
|
||
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
|
||
*
|
||
* struct {
|
||
* opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
|
||
* } ConnectionId;
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
if( len < 1 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
peer_cid_len = *buf++;
|
||
len--;
|
||
|
||
if( len != peer_cid_len )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Ignore CID if the user has disabled its use. */
|
||
if( ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
|
||
{
|
||
/* Leave ssl->handshake->cid_in_use in its default
|
||
* value of MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Client sent CID extension, but CID disabled" ) );
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
|
||
ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len;
|
||
memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Client CID", buf, peer_cid_len );
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
||
static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t len )
|
||
{
|
||
if( len != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
((void) buf);
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED )
|
||
{
|
||
ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
||
static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t len )
|
||
{
|
||
if( len != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
((void) buf);
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED )
|
||
{
|
||
ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
||
static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t len )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_session session;
|
||
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session );
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL ||
|
||
ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */
|
||
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, len ) );
|
||
|
||
if( len == 0 )
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
||
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket rejected: renegotiating" ) );
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Failures are ok: just ignore the ticket and proceed.
|
||
*/
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse( ssl->conf->p_ticket, &session,
|
||
buf, len ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session );
|
||
|
||
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC )
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket is not authentic" ) );
|
||
else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED )
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket is expired" ) );
|
||
else
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse", ret );
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to
|
||
* inform them we're accepting the ticket (RFC 5077 section 3.4)
|
||
*/
|
||
session.id_len = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
|
||
memcpy( &session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.id_len );
|
||
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate );
|
||
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
|
||
|
||
/* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */
|
||
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from ticket" ) );
|
||
|
||
ssl->handshake->resume = 1;
|
||
|
||
/* Don't send a new ticket after all, this one is OK */
|
||
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
||
static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
|
||
{
|
||
size_t list_len, cur_len, ours_len;
|
||
const unsigned char *theirs, *start, *end;
|
||
const char **ours;
|
||
|
||
/* If ALPN not configured, just ignore the extension */
|
||
if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
|
||
*
|
||
* struct {
|
||
* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
|
||
* } ProtocolNameList;
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */
|
||
if( len < 4 )
|
||
{
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1];
|
||
if( list_len != len - 2 )
|
||
{
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Validate peer's list (lengths)
|
||
*/
|
||
start = buf + 2;
|
||
end = buf + len;
|
||
for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len )
|
||
{
|
||
cur_len = *theirs++;
|
||
|
||
/* Current identifier must fit in list */
|
||
if( cur_len > (size_t)( end - theirs ) )
|
||
{
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */
|
||
if( cur_len == 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Use our order of preference
|
||
*/
|
||
for( ours = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *ours != NULL; ours++ )
|
||
{
|
||
ours_len = strlen( *ours );
|
||
for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len )
|
||
{
|
||
cur_len = *theirs++;
|
||
|
||
if( cur_len == ours_len &&
|
||
memcmp( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
ssl->alpn_chosen = *ours;
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* If we get there, no match was found */
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
|
||
static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t len )
|
||
{
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile client_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
|
||
size_t i,j;
|
||
size_t profile_length;
|
||
uint16_t mki_length;
|
||
/*! 2 bytes for profile length and 1 byte for mki len */
|
||
const size_t size_of_lengths = 3;
|
||
|
||
/* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */
|
||
if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) ||
|
||
( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) ||
|
||
( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) )
|
||
{
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* RFC5764 section 4.1.1
|
||
* uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2];
|
||
*
|
||
* struct {
|
||
* SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles;
|
||
* opaque srtp_mki<0..255>;
|
||
* } UseSRTPData;
|
||
|
||
* SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>;
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Min length is 5: at least one protection profile(2 bytes)
|
||
* and length(2 bytes) + srtp_mki length(1 byte)
|
||
* Check here that we have at least 2 bytes of protection profiles length
|
||
* and one of srtp_mki length
|
||
*/
|
||
if( len < size_of_lengths )
|
||
{
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
|
||
|
||
/* first 2 bytes are protection profile length(in bytes) */
|
||
profile_length = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1];
|
||
buf += 2;
|
||
|
||
/* The profile length cannot be bigger than input buffer size - lengths fields */
|
||
if( profile_length > len - size_of_lengths ||
|
||
profile_length % 2 != 0 ) /* profiles are 2 bytes long, so the length must be even */
|
||
{
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
/*
|
||
* parse the extension list values are defined in
|
||
* http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml
|
||
*/
|
||
for( j = 0; j < profile_length; j += 2 )
|
||
{
|
||
uint16_t protection_profile_value = buf[j] << 8 | buf[j + 1];
|
||
client_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( protection_profile_value );
|
||
|
||
if( client_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found srtp profile: %s",
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
|
||
client_protection ) ) );
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
/* check if suggested profile is in our list */
|
||
for( i = 0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++)
|
||
{
|
||
if( client_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i] )
|
||
{
|
||
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i];
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "selected srtp profile: %s",
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
|
||
client_protection ) ) );
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET )
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
buf += profile_length; /* buf points to the mki length */
|
||
mki_length = *buf;
|
||
buf++;
|
||
|
||
if( mki_length > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH ||
|
||
mki_length + profile_length + size_of_lengths != len )
|
||
{
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Parse the mki only if present and mki is supported locally */
|
||
if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED &&
|
||
mki_length > 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_length;
|
||
|
||
memcpy( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, buf, mki_length );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "using mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value,
|
||
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Auxiliary functions for ServerHello parsing and related actions
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
||
/*
|
||
* Return 0 if the given key uses one of the acceptable curves, -1 otherwise
|
||
*/
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
|
||
static int ssl_check_key_curve( mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
|
||
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves )
|
||
{
|
||
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **crv = curves;
|
||
mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id;
|
||
|
||
while( *crv != NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
if( (*crv)->grp_id == grp_id )
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
crv++;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return( -1 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Try picking a certificate for this ciphersuite,
|
||
* return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
|
||
*/
|
||
static int ssl_pick_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * ciphersuite_info )
|
||
{
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list, *fallback = NULL;
|
||
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg =
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
|
||
uint32_t flags;
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
|
||
if( ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL )
|
||
list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert;
|
||
else
|
||
#endif
|
||
list = ssl->conf->key_cert;
|
||
|
||
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite requires certificate" ) );
|
||
|
||
if( list == NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server has no certificate" ) );
|
||
return( -1 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
for( cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next )
|
||
{
|
||
flags = 0;
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate",
|
||
cur->cert );
|
||
|
||
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &cur->cert->pk, pk_alg ) )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: key type" ) );
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on
|
||
* keyUsage or other extensions.
|
||
*
|
||
* It also allows the user to provision different certificates for
|
||
* different uses based on keyUsage, eg if they want to avoid signing
|
||
* and decrypting with the same RSA key.
|
||
*/
|
||
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( cur->cert, ciphersuite_info,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &flags ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: "
|
||
"(extended) key usage extension" ) );
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
|
||
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA &&
|
||
ssl_check_key_curve( &cur->cert->pk, ssl->handshake->curves ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: elliptic curve" ) );
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
/* If we get there, we got a winner */
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( cur == NULL )
|
||
cur = fallback;
|
||
|
||
/* Do not update ssl->handshake->key_cert unless there is a match */
|
||
if( cur != NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
ssl->handshake->key_cert = cur;
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "selected certificate chain, certificate",
|
||
ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert );
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return( -1 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Check if a given ciphersuite is suitable for use with our config/keys/etc
|
||
* Sets ciphersuite_info only if the suite matches.
|
||
*/
|
||
static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id,
|
||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **ciphersuite_info )
|
||
{
|
||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info;
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
|
||
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( suite_id );
|
||
if( suite_info == NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)",
|
||
(unsigned int) suite_id, suite_info->name ) );
|
||
|
||
if( suite_info->min_minor_ver > ssl->minor_ver ||
|
||
suite_info->max_minor_ver < ssl->minor_ver )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: version" ) );
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
||
if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE &&
|
||
( ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK ) == 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake "
|
||
"not configured or ext missing" ) );
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
|
||
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( suite_info ) &&
|
||
( ssl->handshake->curves == NULL ||
|
||
ssl->handshake->curves[0] == NULL ) )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: "
|
||
"no common elliptic curve" ) );
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
|
||
/* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't
|
||
* have one, skip it now rather than failing later */
|
||
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) &&
|
||
ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key" ) );
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
|
||
/* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether
|
||
* a suitable hash algorithm is present. */
|
||
sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( suite_info );
|
||
if( sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE &&
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_type ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm "
|
||
"for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type ) );
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
|
||
/*
|
||
* Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a
|
||
* certificate/key of a particular type:
|
||
* - select the appropriate certificate if we have one, or
|
||
* - try the next ciphersuite if we don't
|
||
* This must be done last since we modify the key_cert list.
|
||
*/
|
||
if( ssl_pick_cert( ssl, suite_info ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: "
|
||
"no suitable certificate" ) );
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
*ciphersuite_info = suite_info;
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during
|
||
ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is
|
||
not talking SSL/TLS at all and would not understand our alert. */
|
||
static int ssl_parse_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret, got_common_suite;
|
||
size_t i, j;
|
||
size_t ciph_offset, comp_offset, ext_offset;
|
||
size_t msg_len, ciph_len, sess_len, comp_len, ext_len;
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||
size_t cookie_offset, cookie_len;
|
||
#endif
|
||
unsigned char *buf, *p, *ext;
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
||
int renegotiation_info_seen = 0;
|
||
#endif
|
||
int handshake_failure = 0;
|
||
const int *ciphersuites;
|
||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
|
||
int major, minor;
|
||
|
||
/* If there is no signature-algorithm extension present,
|
||
* we need to fall back to the default values for allowed
|
||
* signature-hash pairs. */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
|
||
int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello" ) );
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
|
||
read_record_header:
|
||
#endif
|
||
/*
|
||
* If renegotiating, then the input was read with mbedtls_ssl_read_record(),
|
||
* otherwise read it ourselves manually in order to support SSLv2
|
||
* ClientHello, which doesn't use the same record layer format.
|
||
*/
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
||
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
|
||
#endif
|
||
{
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, 5 ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
/* No alert on a read error. */
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
buf = ssl->in_hdr;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* TLS Client Hello
|
||
*
|
||
* Record layer:
|
||
* 0 . 0 message type
|
||
* 1 . 2 protocol version
|
||
* 3 . 11 DTLS: epoch + record sequence number
|
||
* 3 . 4 message length
|
||
*/
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, message type: %d",
|
||
buf[0] ) );
|
||
|
||
if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, message len.: %d",
|
||
( ssl->in_len[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_len[1] ) );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, protocol version: [%d:%d]",
|
||
buf[1], buf[2] ) );
|
||
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major, &minor, ssl->conf->transport, buf + 1 );
|
||
|
||
/* According to RFC 5246 Appendix E.1, the version here is typically
|
||
* "{03,00}, the lowest version number supported by the client, [or] the
|
||
* value of ClientHello.client_version", so the only meaningful check here
|
||
* is the major version shouldn't be less than 3 */
|
||
if( major < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* For DTLS if this is the initial handshake, remember the client sequence
|
||
* number to use it in our next message (RFC 6347 4.2.1) */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
||
&& ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE
|
||
#endif
|
||
)
|
||
{
|
||
/* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */
|
||
if( ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
memcpy( &ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], ssl->in_ctr + 2,
|
||
sizeof( ssl->cur_out_ctr ) - 2 );
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
|
||
if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record, discarding" ) );
|
||
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
|
||
ssl->in_left = 0;
|
||
goto read_record_header;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* No MAC to check yet, so we can update right now */
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl );
|
||
#endif
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
||
|
||
msg_len = ( ssl->in_len[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_len[1];
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
||
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
|
||
{
|
||
/* Set by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */
|
||
msg_len = ssl->in_hslen;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif
|
||
{
|
||
if( msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl,
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) + msg_len ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
|
||
ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl );
|
||
else
|
||
#endif
|
||
ssl->in_left = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
buf = ssl->in_msg;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record contents", buf, msg_len );
|
||
|
||
ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, buf, msg_len );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Handshake layer:
|
||
* 0 . 0 handshake type
|
||
* 1 . 3 handshake length
|
||
* 4 . 5 DTLS only: message seqence number
|
||
* 6 . 8 DTLS only: fragment offset
|
||
* 9 . 11 DTLS only: fragment length
|
||
*/
|
||
if( msg_len < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, handshake type: %d", buf[0] ) );
|
||
|
||
if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, handshake len.: %d",
|
||
( buf[1] << 16 ) | ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3] ) );
|
||
|
||
/* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */
|
||
if( buf[1] != 0 ||
|
||
msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ( ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3] ) )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
|
||
{
|
||
/*
|
||
* Copy the client's handshake message_seq on initial handshakes,
|
||
* check sequence number on renego.
|
||
*/
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
||
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
|
||
{
|
||
/* This couldn't be done in ssl_prepare_handshake_record() */
|
||
unsigned int cli_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) |
|
||
ssl->in_msg[5];
|
||
|
||
if( cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message_seq: "
|
||
"%u (expected %u)", cli_msg_seq,
|
||
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq++;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif
|
||
{
|
||
unsigned int cli_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) |
|
||
ssl->in_msg[5];
|
||
ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq;
|
||
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq + 1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure
|
||
* fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length
|
||
*/
|
||
if( ssl->in_msg[6] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[7] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[8] != 0 ||
|
||
memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 1, ssl->in_msg + 9, 3 ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ClientHello fragmentation not supported" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
||
|
||
buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
|
||
msg_len -= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* ClientHello layer:
|
||
* 0 . 1 protocol version
|
||
* 2 . 33 random bytes (starting with 4 bytes of Unix time)
|
||
* 34 . 35 session id length (1 byte)
|
||
* 35 . 34+x session id
|
||
* 35+x . 35+x DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte)
|
||
* 36+x . .. DTLS only: cookie
|
||
* .. . .. ciphersuite list length (2 bytes)
|
||
* .. . .. ciphersuite list
|
||
* .. . .. compression alg. list length (1 byte)
|
||
* .. . .. compression alg. list
|
||
* .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes, optional)
|
||
* .. . .. extensions (optional)
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions omitted) is
|
||
* 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can
|
||
* read at least up to session id length without worrying.
|
||
*/
|
||
if( msg_len < 38 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Check and save the protocol version
|
||
*/
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, version", buf, 2 );
|
||
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver,
|
||
ssl->conf->transport, buf );
|
||
ssl->session_negotiate->minor_ver = ssl->minor_ver;
|
||
|
||
if( ( ssl->major_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) ||
|
||
( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server only supports TLS 1.2" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Save client random (inc. Unix time)
|
||
*/
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 );
|
||
|
||
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32 );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Check the session ID length and save session ID
|
||
*/
|
||
sess_len = buf[34];
|
||
|
||
if( sess_len > sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) ||
|
||
sess_len + 34 + 2 > msg_len ) /* 2 for cipherlist length field */
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len );
|
||
|
||
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len;
|
||
memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0,
|
||
sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) );
|
||
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35,
|
||
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Check the cookie length and content
|
||
*/
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
|
||
{
|
||
cookie_offset = 35 + sess_len;
|
||
cookie_len = buf[cookie_offset];
|
||
|
||
if( cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, cookie",
|
||
buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len );
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
|
||
if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check != NULL
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
||
&& ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE
|
||
#endif
|
||
)
|
||
{
|
||
if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check( ssl->conf->p_cookie,
|
||
buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len,
|
||
ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification failed" ) );
|
||
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification passed" ) );
|
||
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
|
||
{
|
||
/* We know we didn't send a cookie, so it should be empty */
|
||
if( cookie_len != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
/* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification skipped" ) );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Check the ciphersuitelist length (will be parsed later)
|
||
*/
|
||
ciph_offset = cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
||
ciph_offset = 35 + sess_len;
|
||
|
||
ciph_len = ( buf[ciph_offset + 0] << 8 )
|
||
| ( buf[ciph_offset + 1] );
|
||
|
||
if( ciph_len < 2 ||
|
||
ciph_len + 2 + ciph_offset + 1 > msg_len || /* 1 for comp. alg. len */
|
||
( ciph_len % 2 ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist",
|
||
buf + ciph_offset + 2, ciph_len );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Check the compression algorithms length and pick one
|
||
*/
|
||
comp_offset = ciph_offset + 2 + ciph_len;
|
||
|
||
comp_len = buf[comp_offset];
|
||
|
||
if( comp_len < 1 ||
|
||
comp_len > 16 ||
|
||
comp_len + comp_offset + 1 > msg_len )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, compression",
|
||
buf + comp_offset + 1, comp_len );
|
||
|
||
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL;
|
||
/* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
|
||
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL;
|
||
#endif
|
||
/*
|
||
* Check the extension length
|
||
*/
|
||
ext_offset = comp_offset + 1 + comp_len;
|
||
if( msg_len > ext_offset )
|
||
{
|
||
if( msg_len < ext_offset + 2 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ext_len = ( buf[ext_offset + 0] << 8 )
|
||
| ( buf[ext_offset + 1] );
|
||
|
||
if( msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
ext_len = 0;
|
||
|
||
ext = buf + ext_offset + 2;
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello extensions", ext, ext_len );
|
||
|
||
while( ext_len != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
unsigned int ext_id;
|
||
unsigned int ext_size;
|
||
if ( ext_len < 4 ) {
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
ext_id = ( ( ext[0] << 8 ) | ( ext[1] ) );
|
||
ext_size = ( ( ext[2] << 8 ) | ( ext[3] ) );
|
||
|
||
if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
switch( ext_id )
|
||
{
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
|
||
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ServerName extension" ) );
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_servername_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
break;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
|
||
|
||
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found renegotiation extension" ) );
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
||
renegotiation_info_seen = 1;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
|
||
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found signature_algorithms extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
|
||
sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1;
|
||
break;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
||
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported elliptic curves extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported point formats extension" ) );
|
||
ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT;
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
break;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
|
||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
||
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ecjpake kkpp extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
break;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
||
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found max fragment length extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
break;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
||
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
break;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
||
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt then mac extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
break;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
||
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found extended master secret extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
break;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
||
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found session ticket extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
break;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
||
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
break;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
|
||
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found use_srtp extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
break;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
|
||
|
||
default:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)",
|
||
ext_id ) );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ext_len -= 4 + ext_size;
|
||
ext += 4 + ext_size;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client
|
||
* hasn't provided any preferred signature-hash combinations.
|
||
*/
|
||
if( sig_hash_alg_ext_present == 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
uint16_t sig_algs[] = { MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1) };
|
||
mbedtls_md_type_t md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
|
||
for( i = 0; i < sizeof( sig_algs ) / sizeof( sig_algs[0] ) ; i++ )
|
||
{
|
||
if( mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, sig_algs[ i ] ) )
|
||
md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs,
|
||
md_default );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
|
||
*/
|
||
for( i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 )
|
||
{
|
||
if( p[0] == 0 && p[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO " ) );
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
||
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV "
|
||
"during renegotiation" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif
|
||
ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Renegotiation security checks
|
||
*/
|
||
if( ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
|
||
ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) );
|
||
handshake_failure = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
||
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
|
||
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
|
||
renegotiation_info_seen == 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) );
|
||
handshake_failure = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
|
||
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
|
||
ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) );
|
||
handshake_failure = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
|
||
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
|
||
renegotiation_info_seen == 1 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) );
|
||
handshake_failure = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
||
|
||
if( handshake_failure == 1 )
|
||
{
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Server certification selection (after processing TLS extensions)
|
||
*/
|
||
if( ssl->conf->f_cert_cb && ( ret = ssl->conf->f_cert_cb( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_cert_cb", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
|
||
ssl->handshake->sni_name = NULL;
|
||
ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = 0;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Search for a matching ciphersuite
|
||
* (At the end because we need information from the EC-based extensions
|
||
* and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension
|
||
* or certificate from server certificate selection callback.)
|
||
*/
|
||
got_common_suite = 0;
|
||
ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list;
|
||
ciphersuite_info = NULL;
|
||
|
||
if (ssl->conf->respect_cli_pref == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT)
|
||
{
|
||
for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 )
|
||
for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ )
|
||
{
|
||
if( MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i] )
|
||
continue;
|
||
|
||
got_common_suite = 1;
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match( ssl, ciphersuites[i],
|
||
&ciphersuite_info ) ) != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info != NULL )
|
||
goto have_ciphersuite;
|
||
}
|
||
} else {
|
||
for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ )
|
||
for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 )
|
||
{
|
||
if( MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i] )
|
||
continue;
|
||
|
||
got_common_suite = 1;
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match( ssl, ciphersuites[i],
|
||
&ciphersuite_info ) ) != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info != NULL )
|
||
goto have_ciphersuite;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( got_common_suite )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got ciphersuites in common, "
|
||
"but none of them usable" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no ciphersuites in common" ) );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
have_ciphersuite:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name ) );
|
||
|
||
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i];
|
||
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
|
||
|
||
ssl->state++;
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl );
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
/* Debugging-only output for testsuite */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
|
||
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( ciphersuite_info );
|
||
if( sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
|
||
{
|
||
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs,
|
||
sig_alg );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %d",
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( md_alg ) ) );
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no hash algorithm for signature algorithm "
|
||
"%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg ) );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client hello" ) );
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
||
static void ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t *olen )
|
||
{
|
||
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
||
size_t ext_len;
|
||
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
|
||
|
||
*olen = 0;
|
||
|
||
/* Skip writing the extension if we don't want to use it or if
|
||
* the client hasn't offered it. */
|
||
if( ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
|
||
return;
|
||
|
||
/* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
|
||
* which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */
|
||
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding CID extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
|
||
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
|
||
*
|
||
* struct {
|
||
* opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
|
||
* } ConnectionId;
|
||
*/
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1;
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
|
||
*p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len;
|
||
memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len );
|
||
|
||
*olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
||
static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t *olen )
|
||
{
|
||
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL;
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||
psa_key_type_t key_type;
|
||
psa_algorithm_t alg;
|
||
size_t key_bits;
|
||
#else
|
||
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = NULL;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension
|
||
* from a client and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption
|
||
* with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an
|
||
* encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client."
|
||
*/
|
||
if( ( suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
|
||
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) == NULL ||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||
( mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa( suite->cipher, 0, &alg,
|
||
&key_type, &key_bits ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) ||
|
||
alg != PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING )
|
||
#else
|
||
( cipher = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( suite->cipher ) ) == NULL ||
|
||
cipher->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
||
{
|
||
ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED )
|
||
{
|
||
*olen = 0;
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
|
||
*p++ = 0x00;
|
||
*p++ = 0x00;
|
||
|
||
*olen = 4;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
||
static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t *olen )
|
||
{
|
||
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED )
|
||
{
|
||
*olen = 0;
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding extended master secret "
|
||
"extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
|
||
*p++ = 0x00;
|
||
*p++ = 0x00;
|
||
|
||
*olen = 4;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
||
static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t *olen )
|
||
{
|
||
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket == 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
*olen = 0;
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding session ticket extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
|
||
*p++ = 0x00;
|
||
*p++ = 0x00;
|
||
|
||
*olen = 4;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
||
|
||
static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t *olen )
|
||
{
|
||
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION )
|
||
{
|
||
*olen = 0;
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
||
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
|
||
{
|
||
*p++ = 0x00;
|
||
*p++ = ( ssl->verify_data_len * 2 + 1 ) & 0xFF;
|
||
*p++ = ssl->verify_data_len * 2 & 0xFF;
|
||
|
||
memcpy( p, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len );
|
||
p += ssl->verify_data_len;
|
||
memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len );
|
||
p += ssl->verify_data_len;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
||
{
|
||
*p++ = 0x00;
|
||
*p++ = 0x01;
|
||
*p++ = 0x00;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
*olen = p - buf;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
||
static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t *olen )
|
||
{
|
||
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE )
|
||
{
|
||
*olen = 0;
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
|
||
*p++ = 0x00;
|
||
*p++ = 1;
|
||
|
||
*p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code;
|
||
|
||
*olen = 5;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
||
static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t *olen )
|
||
{
|
||
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
||
((void) ssl);
|
||
|
||
if( ( ssl->handshake->cli_exts &
|
||
MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT ) == 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
*olen = 0;
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, supported_point_formats extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
|
||
*p++ = 0x00;
|
||
*p++ = 2;
|
||
|
||
*p++ = 1;
|
||
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
|
||
|
||
*olen = 6;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
||
static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t *olen )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
||
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
|
||
size_t kkpp_len;
|
||
|
||
*olen = 0;
|
||
|
||
/* Skip costly computation if not needed */
|
||
if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange !=
|
||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
|
||
return;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
if( end - p < 4 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
|
||
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
|
||
p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
|
||
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret );
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( kkpp_len, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
|
||
*olen = kkpp_len + 4;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN )
|
||
static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
|
||
{
|
||
if( ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
*olen = 0;
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding alpn extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* 0 . 1 ext identifier
|
||
* 2 . 3 ext length
|
||
* 4 . 5 protocol list length
|
||
* 6 . 6 protocol name length
|
||
* 7 . 7+n protocol name
|
||
*/
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, buf, 0);
|
||
|
||
*olen = 7 + strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 4, buf, 2 );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 6, buf, 4 );
|
||
|
||
buf[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *olen - 7 );
|
||
|
||
memcpy( buf + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, *olen - 7 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||
static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
unsigned char *buf,
|
||
size_t *olen )
|
||
{
|
||
size_t mki_len = 0, ext_len = 0;
|
||
uint16_t profile_value = 0;
|
||
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
|
||
|
||
*olen = 0;
|
||
|
||
if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) ||
|
||
( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) )
|
||
{
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" ) );
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED )
|
||
{
|
||
mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* The extension total size is 9 bytes :
|
||
* - 2 bytes for the extension tag
|
||
* - 2 bytes for the total size
|
||
* - 2 bytes for the protection profile length
|
||
* - 2 bytes for the protection profile
|
||
* - 1 byte for the mki length
|
||
* + the actual mki length
|
||
* Check we have enough room in the output buffer */
|
||
if( (size_t)( end - buf ) < mki_len + 9 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* extension */
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, buf, 0 );
|
||
/*
|
||
* total length 5 and mki value: only one profile(2 bytes)
|
||
* and length(2 bytes) and srtp_mki )
|
||
*/
|
||
ext_len = 5 + mki_len;
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, buf, 2 );
|
||
|
||
/* protection profile length: 2 */
|
||
buf[4] = 0x00;
|
||
buf[5] = 0x02;
|
||
profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(
|
||
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile );
|
||
if( profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( profile_value, buf, 6 );
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "use_srtp extension invalid profile" ) );
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
buf[8] = mki_len & 0xFF;
|
||
memcpy( &buf[9], ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len );
|
||
|
||
*olen = 9 + mki_len;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
|
||
static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4;
|
||
unsigned char *cookie_len_byte;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write hello verify request" ) );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* struct {
|
||
* ProtocolVersion server_version;
|
||
* opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>;
|
||
* } HelloVerifyRequest;
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/* The RFC is not clear on this point, but sending the actual negotiated
|
||
* version looks like the most interoperable thing to do. */
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
|
||
ssl->conf->transport, p );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server version", p, 2 );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
|
||
/* If we get here, f_cookie_check is not null */
|
||
if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inconsistent cookie callbacks" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Skip length byte until we know the length */
|
||
cookie_len_byte = p++;
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_cookie_write( ssl->conf->p_cookie,
|
||
&p, ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN,
|
||
ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_cookie_write", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
*cookie_len_byte = (unsigned char)( p - ( cookie_len_byte + 1 ) );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie sent", cookie_len_byte + 1, *cookie_len_byte );
|
||
|
||
ssl->out_msglen = p - ssl->out_msg;
|
||
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
|
||
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
|
||
|
||
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT;
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
|
||
( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write hello verify request" ) );
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
|
||
|
||
static void ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret;
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_session session_tmp;
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_session * const session = ssl->session_negotiate;
|
||
|
||
/* Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init().
|
||
* It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). */
|
||
if( ssl->handshake->resume == 1 )
|
||
return;
|
||
if( session->id_len == 0 )
|
||
return;
|
||
if( ssl->conf->f_get_cache == NULL )
|
||
return;
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
||
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
|
||
return;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session_tmp );
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl->conf->f_get_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache,
|
||
session->id,
|
||
session->id_len,
|
||
&session_tmp );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
goto exit;
|
||
|
||
if( session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite ||
|
||
session->compression != session_tmp.compression )
|
||
{
|
||
/* Mismatch between cached and negotiated session */
|
||
goto exit;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Move semantics */
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( session );
|
||
*session = session_tmp;
|
||
memset( &session_tmp, 0, sizeof( session_tmp ) );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from cache" ) );
|
||
ssl->handshake->resume = 1;
|
||
|
||
exit:
|
||
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session_tmp );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
|
||
mbedtls_time_t t;
|
||
#endif
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n;
|
||
unsigned char *buf, *p;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello" ) );
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
|
||
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
|
||
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "client hello was not authenticated" ) );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) );
|
||
|
||
return( ssl_write_hello_verify_request( ssl ) );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no RNG provided") );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* 0 . 0 handshake type
|
||
* 1 . 3 handshake length
|
||
* 4 . 5 protocol version
|
||
* 6 . 9 UNIX time()
|
||
* 10 . 37 random bytes
|
||
*/
|
||
buf = ssl->out_msg;
|
||
p = buf + 4;
|
||
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
|
||
ssl->conf->transport, p );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]",
|
||
buf[4], buf[5] ) );
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
|
||
t = mbedtls_time( NULL );
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( t, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 4;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG,
|
||
(long long) t ) );
|
||
#else
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
|
||
p += 4;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28 ) ) != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
|
||
p += 28;
|
||
|
||
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32 );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32 );
|
||
|
||
ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption( ssl );
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
/*
|
||
* New session, create a new session id,
|
||
* unless we're about to issue a session ticket
|
||
*/
|
||
ssl->state++;
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
|
||
ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL );
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
||
if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 0;
|
||
memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, 32 );
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
||
{
|
||
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32;
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->session_negotiate->id,
|
||
n ) ) != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
/*
|
||
* Resuming a session
|
||
*/
|
||
n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
|
||
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* 38 . 38 session id length
|
||
* 39 . 38+n session id
|
||
* 39+n . 40+n chosen ciphersuite
|
||
* 41+n . 41+n chosen compression alg.
|
||
* 42+n . 43+n extensions length
|
||
* 44+n . 43+n+m extensions
|
||
*/
|
||
*p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
|
||
memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len );
|
||
p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed",
|
||
ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->session_negotiate->compression );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s",
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X",
|
||
(unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->compression ) );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* First write extensions, then the total length
|
||
*/
|
||
ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
||
ext_len += olen;
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
||
ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
||
ext_len += olen;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
||
ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
||
ext_len += olen;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
||
ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
||
ext_len += olen;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
||
ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
||
ext_len += olen;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
||
ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
||
ext_len += olen;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
||
if ( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) )
|
||
{
|
||
ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
||
ext_len += olen;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
||
ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
||
ext_len += olen;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
||
ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
||
ext_len += olen;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
|
||
ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
||
ext_len += olen;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
|
||
ext_len ) );
|
||
|
||
if( ext_len > 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 2 + ext_len;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ssl->out_msglen = p - buf;
|
||
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
|
||
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO;
|
||
|
||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) );
|
||
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
|
||
static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
||
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) );
|
||
|
||
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) );
|
||
ssl->state++;
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
|
||
static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
|
||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
||
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
||
uint16_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */
|
||
size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */
|
||
unsigned char *buf, *p;
|
||
const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
|
||
const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
|
||
int authmode;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) );
|
||
|
||
ssl->state++;
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
|
||
if( ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET )
|
||
authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode;
|
||
else
|
||
#endif
|
||
authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
|
||
|
||
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ||
|
||
authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) );
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* 0 . 0 handshake type
|
||
* 1 . 3 handshake length
|
||
* 4 . 4 cert type count
|
||
* 5 .. m-1 cert types
|
||
* m .. m+1 sig alg length (TLS 1.2 only)
|
||
* m+1 .. n-1 SignatureAndHashAlgorithms (TLS 1.2 only)
|
||
* n .. n+1 length of all DNs
|
||
* n+2 .. n+3 length of DN 1
|
||
* n+4 .. ... Distinguished Name #1
|
||
* ... .. ... length of DN 2, etc.
|
||
*/
|
||
buf = ssl->out_msg;
|
||
p = buf + 4;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Supported certificate types
|
||
*
|
||
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
|
||
* enum { (255) } ClientCertificateType;
|
||
*/
|
||
ct_len = 0;
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
|
||
p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN;
|
||
#endif
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
|
||
p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
p[0] = (unsigned char) ct_len++;
|
||
p += ct_len;
|
||
|
||
sa_len = 0;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2)
|
||
*
|
||
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
|
||
*
|
||
* struct {
|
||
* HashAlgorithm hash;
|
||
* SignatureAlgorithm signature;
|
||
* } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
|
||
*
|
||
* enum { (255) } HashAlgorithm;
|
||
* enum { (255) } SignatureAlgorithm;
|
||
*/
|
||
const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs( ssl );
|
||
if( sig_alg == NULL )
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
|
||
|
||
for( ; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++ )
|
||
{
|
||
unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *sig_alg );
|
||
|
||
if( mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( ssl, hash ) )
|
||
continue;
|
||
if( ! mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported( ssl, *sig_alg ) )
|
||
continue;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *sig_alg, p, sa_len );
|
||
sa_len += 2;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( sa_len, p, 0 );
|
||
sa_len += 2;
|
||
p += sa_len;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
|
||
* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
|
||
*/
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
|
||
total_dn_size = 0;
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->conf->cert_req_ca_list == MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED )
|
||
{
|
||
/* NOTE: If trusted certificates are provisioned
|
||
* via a CA callback (configured through
|
||
* `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the
|
||
* CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
|
||
if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL )
|
||
crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
|
||
else
|
||
#endif
|
||
crt = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
|
||
|
||
while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
/* It follows from RFC 5280 A.1 that this length
|
||
* can be represented in at most 11 bits. */
|
||
dn_size = (uint16_t) crt->subject_raw.len;
|
||
|
||
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + (size_t) dn_size )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) );
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( dn_size, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
memcpy( p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size );
|
||
p += dn_size;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size );
|
||
|
||
total_dn_size += 2 + dn_size;
|
||
crt = crt->next;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ssl->out_msglen = p - buf;
|
||
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
|
||
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( total_dn_size, ssl->out_msg, 4 + ct_len + sa_len );
|
||
|
||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate request" ) );
|
||
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
||
static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
|
||
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
||
mbedtls_pk_ec( *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) ),
|
||
MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_get_params" ), ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||
|
||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
|
||
static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
size_t *signature_len )
|
||
{
|
||
/* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the
|
||
* signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange
|
||
* after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange.
|
||
* ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing
|
||
* ssl->out_msglen. */
|
||
unsigned char *sig_start = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2;
|
||
size_t sig_max_len = ( ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
|
||
- sig_start );
|
||
int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume( ssl,
|
||
sig_start, signature_len, sig_max_len );
|
||
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS )
|
||
{
|
||
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0;
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( ssl, NULL );
|
||
}
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) &&
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */
|
||
|
||
/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message, up to and including
|
||
* calculating the signature if any, but excluding formatting the
|
||
* signature and sending the message. */
|
||
static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
size_t *signature_len )
|
||
{
|
||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
||
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED)
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
|
||
unsigned char *dig_signed = NULL;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
(void) ciphersuite_info; /* unused in some configurations */
|
||
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
|
||
(void) signature_len;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
|
||
size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - ( ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf );
|
||
#else
|
||
size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - ( ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf );
|
||
#endif
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
*
|
||
* Part 1: Provide key exchange parameters for chosen ciphersuite.
|
||
*
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* - ECJPAKE key exchanges
|
||
*/
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
size_t len = 0;
|
||
|
||
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(
|
||
&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
|
||
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, &len,
|
||
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ssl->out_msglen += len;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* For (EC)DHE key exchanges with PSK, parameters are prefixed by support
|
||
* identity hint (RFC 4279, Sec. 3). Until someone needs this feature,
|
||
* we use empty support identity hints here.
|
||
**/
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
|
||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
|
||
{
|
||
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00;
|
||
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
|
||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* - DHE key exchanges
|
||
*/
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED)
|
||
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
size_t len = 0;
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no DH parameters set" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Ephemeral DH parameters:
|
||
*
|
||
* struct {
|
||
* opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>;
|
||
* opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>;
|
||
* opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
|
||
* } ServerDHParams;
|
||
*/
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_set_group( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
|
||
&ssl->conf->dhm_P,
|
||
&ssl->conf->dhm_G ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_set_group", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params(
|
||
&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
|
||
(int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx ),
|
||
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, &len,
|
||
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_params", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
|
||
dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
ssl->out_msglen += len;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* - ECDHE key exchanges
|
||
*/
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED)
|
||
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
||
{
|
||
/*
|
||
* Ephemeral ECDH parameters:
|
||
*
|
||
* struct {
|
||
* ECParameters curve_params;
|
||
* ECPoint public;
|
||
* } ServerECDHParams;
|
||
*/
|
||
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curve = NULL;
|
||
const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups( ssl );
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
size_t len = 0;
|
||
|
||
/* Match our preference list against the offered curves */
|
||
if( group_list == NULL )
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
|
||
for( ; *group_list != 0; group_list++ )
|
||
for( curve = ssl->handshake->curves; *curve != NULL; curve++ )
|
||
if( (*curve)->tls_id == *group_list )
|
||
goto curve_matching_done;
|
||
|
||
curve_matching_done:
|
||
if( curve == NULL || *curve == NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no matching curve for ECDHE" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDHE curve: %s", (*curve)->name ) );
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
|
||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
|
||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
|
||
{
|
||
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
|
||
psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
|
||
size_t ecdh_bits = 0;
|
||
uint8_t *p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
|
||
const size_t header_size = 4; // curve_type(1), namedcurve(2),
|
||
// data length(1)
|
||
const size_t data_length_size = 1;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation." ) );
|
||
|
||
/* Convert EC group to PSA key type. */
|
||
handshake->ecdh_psa_type = mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group(
|
||
(*curve)->tls_id, &ecdh_bits );
|
||
|
||
if( handshake->ecdh_psa_type == 0 || ecdh_bits > 0xffff )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Invalid ecc group parse." ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
}
|
||
handshake->ecdh_bits = (uint16_t) ecdh_bits;
|
||
|
||
key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
|
||
psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
|
||
psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH );
|
||
psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type );
|
||
psa_set_key_bits( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* ECParameters curve_params
|
||
*
|
||
* First byte is curve_type, always named_curve
|
||
*/
|
||
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value
|
||
*/
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( (*curve)->tls_id, p, 0 );
|
||
p += 2;
|
||
|
||
/* Generate ECDH private key. */
|
||
status = psa_generate_key( &key_attributes,
|
||
&handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
|
||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||
{
|
||
ret = psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_generate_key", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* ECPoint public
|
||
*
|
||
* First byte is data length.
|
||
* It will be filled later. p holds now the data length location.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA.
|
||
* Make one byte space for the length.
|
||
*/
|
||
unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + data_length_size;
|
||
|
||
size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t)( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
|
||
- ( own_pubkey - ssl->out_msg ) );
|
||
|
||
status = psa_export_public_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
|
||
own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len,
|
||
&len );
|
||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||
{
|
||
ret = psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_export_public_key", ret );
|
||
(void) psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
|
||
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Store the length of the exported public key. */
|
||
*p = (uint8_t) len;
|
||
|
||
/* Determine full message length. */
|
||
len += header_size;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
||
{
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
||
(*curve)->grp_id ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(
|
||
&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &len,
|
||
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen,
|
||
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_params", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
|
||
dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
ssl->out_msglen += len;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
||
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
*
|
||
* Part 2: For key exchanges involving the server signing the
|
||
* exchange parameters, compute and add the signature here.
|
||
*
|
||
*/
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
|
||
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
||
{
|
||
size_t dig_signed_len = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed;
|
||
size_t hashlen = 0;
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||
unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
|
||
#else
|
||
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
|
||
#endif
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* 2.1: Choose hash algorithm:
|
||
* For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension
|
||
* to choose appropriate hash.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
|
||
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg =
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
|
||
|
||
/* For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension
|
||
* (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */
|
||
if( sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ||
|
||
( md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs,
|
||
sig_alg ) ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
||
/* (... because we choose a cipher suite
|
||
* only if there is a matching hash.) */
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pick hash algorithm %u for signing", (unsigned) md_alg ) );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed
|
||
*/
|
||
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
|
||
{
|
||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, &hashlen,
|
||
dig_signed,
|
||
dig_signed_len,
|
||
md_alg );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* 2.3: Compute and add the signature
|
||
*/
|
||
/*
|
||
* We need to specify signature and hash algorithm explicitly through
|
||
* a prefix to the signature.
|
||
*
|
||
* struct {
|
||
* HashAlgorithm hash;
|
||
* SignatureAlgorithm signature;
|
||
* } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
|
||
*
|
||
* struct {
|
||
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm;
|
||
* opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
|
||
* } DigitallySigned;
|
||
*
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( md_alg );
|
||
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( sig_alg );
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
|
||
if( ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
ret = ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start( ssl,
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ),
|
||
md_alg, hash, hashlen );
|
||
switch( ret )
|
||
{
|
||
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH:
|
||
/* act as if f_async_sign was null */
|
||
break;
|
||
case 0:
|
||
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
|
||
return( ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( ssl, signature_len ) );
|
||
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS:
|
||
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS );
|
||
default:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_async_sign_start", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
|
||
|
||
if( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) == NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the
|
||
* signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange
|
||
* after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange.
|
||
* ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing
|
||
* ssl->out_msglen. */
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ),
|
||
md_alg, hash, hashlen,
|
||
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2,
|
||
out_buf_len - ssl->out_msglen - 2,
|
||
signature_len,
|
||
ssl->conf->f_rng,
|
||
ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message and send it. For ciphersuites
|
||
* that do not include a ServerKeyExchange message, do nothing. Either
|
||
* way, if successful, move on to the next step in the SSL state
|
||
* machine. */
|
||
static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
size_t signature_len = 0;
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED)
|
||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
||
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server key exchange" ) );
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED)
|
||
/* Extract static ECDH parameters and abort if ServerKeyExchange
|
||
* is not needed. */
|
||
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
||
{
|
||
/* For suites involving ECDH, extract DH parameters
|
||
* from certificate at this point. */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED)
|
||
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
||
{
|
||
ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
/* Key exchanges not involving ephemeral keys don't use
|
||
* ServerKeyExchange, so end here. */
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write server key exchange" ) );
|
||
ssl->state++;
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
|
||
/* If we have already prepared the message and there is an ongoing
|
||
* signature operation, resume signing. */
|
||
if( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "resuming signature operation" ) );
|
||
ret = ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( ssl, &signature_len );
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) &&
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */
|
||
{
|
||
/* ServerKeyExchange is needed. Prepare the message. */
|
||
ret = ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( ssl, &signature_len );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
/* If we're starting to write a new message, set ssl->out_msglen
|
||
* to 0. But if we're resuming after an asynchronous message,
|
||
* out_msglen is the amount of data written so far and mst be
|
||
* preserved. */
|
||
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS )
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server key exchange (pending)" ) );
|
||
else
|
||
ssl->out_msglen = 0;
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* If there is a signature, write its length.
|
||
* ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange already wrote the signature
|
||
* itself at its proper place in the output buffer. */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
|
||
if( signature_len != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( signature_len );
|
||
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( signature_len );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "my signature",
|
||
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
|
||
signature_len );
|
||
|
||
/* Skip over the already-written signature */
|
||
ssl->out_msglen += signature_len;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
/* Add header and send. */
|
||
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
|
||
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
|
||
|
||
ssl->state++;
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server key exchange" ) );
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static int ssl_write_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello done" ) );
|
||
|
||
ssl->out_msglen = 4;
|
||
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
|
||
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE;
|
||
|
||
ssl->state++;
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl );
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
|
||
( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello done" ) );
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
||
static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p,
|
||
const unsigned char *end )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
|
||
size_t n;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P
|
||
*/
|
||
if( *p + 2 > end )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1];
|
||
*p += 2;
|
||
|
||
if( *p + n > end )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
*p += n;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY );
|
||
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
|
||
static int ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
unsigned char *peer_pms,
|
||
size_t *peer_pmslen,
|
||
size_t peer_pmssize )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume( ssl,
|
||
peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize );
|
||
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS )
|
||
{
|
||
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0;
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( ssl, NULL );
|
||
}
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
|
||
|
||
static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *p,
|
||
const unsigned char *end,
|
||
unsigned char *peer_pms,
|
||
size_t *peer_pmslen,
|
||
size_t peer_pmssize )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl );
|
||
mbedtls_pk_context *public_key = &mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl )->pk;
|
||
size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len( public_key );
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
|
||
/* If we have already started decoding the message and there is an ongoing
|
||
* decryption operation, resume signing. */
|
||
if( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "resuming decryption operation" ) );
|
||
return( ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( ssl,
|
||
peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize ) );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key
|
||
*/
|
||
if ( p + 2 > end ) {
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
if( *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( len ) ||
|
||
*p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ) )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( p + len != end )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Decrypt the premaster secret
|
||
*/
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
|
||
if( ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
ret = ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start( ssl,
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ),
|
||
p, len );
|
||
switch( ret )
|
||
{
|
||
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH:
|
||
/* act as if f_async_decrypt_start was null */
|
||
break;
|
||
case 0:
|
||
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
|
||
return( ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( ssl,
|
||
peer_pms,
|
||
peer_pmslen,
|
||
peer_pmssize ) );
|
||
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS:
|
||
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS );
|
||
default:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_async_decrypt_start", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
|
||
|
||
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no RSA private key" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt( private_key, p, len,
|
||
peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize,
|
||
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||
const unsigned char *p,
|
||
const unsigned char *end,
|
||
size_t pms_offset )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
|
||
unsigned char ver[2];
|
||
unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48];
|
||
unsigned char mask;
|
||
size_t i, peer_pmslen;
|
||
unsigned int diff;
|
||
|
||
/* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than
|
||
* 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't
|
||
* matter in the end because diff will be nonzero in that case due to
|
||
* ret being nonzero, and we only care whether diff is 0.
|
||
* But do initialize peer_pms and peer_pmslen for robustness anyway. This
|
||
* also makes memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory,
|
||
* even if it's an unsigned char). */
|
||
peer_pms[0] = peer_pms[1] = ~0;
|
||
peer_pmslen = 0;
|
||
|
||
ret = ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end,
|
||
peer_pms,
|
||
&peer_pmslen,
|
||
sizeof( peer_pms ) );
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
|
||
if ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS )
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
|
||
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
|
||
ssl->conf->transport, ver );
|
||
|
||
/* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid
|
||
* padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type
|
||
* attacks. */
|
||
diff = (unsigned int) ret;
|
||
diff |= peer_pmslen ^ 48;
|
||
diff |= peer_pms[0] ^ ver[0];
|
||
diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1];
|
||
|
||
/* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */
|
||
mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( diff );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
|
||
* must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a
|
||
* bad_record_mac later in the handshake.
|
||
* To protect against timing-based variants of the attack, we must
|
||
* not have any branch that depends on whether the decryption was
|
||
* successful. In particular, always generate the fake premaster secret,
|
||
* regardless of whether it will ultimately influence the output or not.
|
||
*/
|
||
ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof( fake_pms ) );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
/* It's ok to abort on an RNG failure, since this does not reveal
|
||
* anything about the RSA decryption. */
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
|
||
if( diff != 0 )
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
if( sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) < pms_offset ||
|
||
sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) - pms_offset < 48 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
|
||
|
||
/* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without
|
||
* data-dependent branches. */
|
||
for( i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++ )
|
||
pms[i] = ( mask & fake_pms[i] ) | ( (~mask) & peer_pms[i] );
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
|
||
static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p,
|
||
const unsigned char *end )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = 0;
|
||
uint16_t n;
|
||
|
||
if( ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no pre-shared key" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Receive client pre-shared key identity name
|
||
*/
|
||
if( end - *p < 2 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1];
|
||
*p += 2;
|
||
|
||
if( n == 0 || n > end - *p )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
if( ssl->conf->f_psk( ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, *p, n ) != 0 )
|
||
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
/* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear,
|
||
* but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */
|
||
if( n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ||
|
||
mbedtls_ct_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Unknown PSK identity", *p, n );
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
*p += n;
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
|
||
unsigned char *p, *end;
|
||
|
||
ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client key exchange" ) );
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) && \
|
||
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) )
|
||
if( ( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
|
||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA ) &&
|
||
( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) )
|
||
{
|
||
/* We've already read a record and there is an asynchronous
|
||
* operation in progress to decrypt it. So skip reading the
|
||
* record. */
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "will resume decryption of previously-read record" ) );
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
|
||
end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA )
|
||
{
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_dh_public" ), ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( p != end )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
|
||
ssl->handshake->premaster,
|
||
MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE,
|
||
&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
|
||
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K );
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
|
||
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) )
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
|
||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
|
||
{
|
||
size_t data_len = (size_t)( *p++ );
|
||
size_t buf_len = (size_t)( end - p );
|
||
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Read the peer's public key." ) );
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least 1 for data)
|
||
*/
|
||
if( buf_len < 2 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Invalid buffer length" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Invalid data length" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Store peer's ECDH public key. */
|
||
memcpy( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, p, data_len );
|
||
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len = data_len;
|
||
|
||
/* Compute ECDH shared secret. */
|
||
status = psa_raw_key_agreement(
|
||
PSA_ALG_ECDH, handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
|
||
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len,
|
||
handshake->premaster, sizeof( handshake->premaster ),
|
||
&handshake->pmslen );
|
||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||
{
|
||
ret = psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_raw_key_agreement", ret );
|
||
(void) psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
|
||
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
|
||
|
||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||
{
|
||
ret = psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status );
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_destroy_key", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
|
||
( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
|
||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
|
||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
|
||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
|
||
{
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
||
p, end - p) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
||
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP );
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
||
&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
|
||
ssl->handshake->premaster,
|
||
MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE,
|
||
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
||
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z );
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
|
||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK )
|
||
{
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( p != end )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||
/* For opaque PSKs, we perform the PSK-to-MS derivation atomatically
|
||
* and skip the intermediate PMS. */
|
||
if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) );
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl,
|
||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
|
||
{
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
|
||
if ( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
/* There is an asynchronous operation in progress to
|
||
* decrypt the encrypted premaster secret, so skip
|
||
* directly to resuming this operation. */
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "PSK identity already parsed" ) );
|
||
/* Update p to skip the PSK identity. ssl_parse_encrypted_pms
|
||
* won't actually use it, but maintain p anyway for robustness. */
|
||
p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len + 2;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */
|
||
if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 2 ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_encrypted_pms" ), ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl,
|
||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
|
||
{
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_dh_public" ), ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */
|
||
if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
if( p != end )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl,
|
||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
|
||
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
|
||
{
|
||
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
uint8_t ecpoint_len;
|
||
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret );
|
||
psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
|
||
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */
|
||
ecpoint_len = *(p++);
|
||
if( (size_t)( end - *p ) < ecpoint_len ) {
|
||
psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
|
||
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ecpoint_len > sizeof( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey ) ) {
|
||
psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
|
||
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
memcpy( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, p, ecpoint_len );
|
||
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len;
|
||
p += ecpoint_len;
|
||
|
||
/* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows:
|
||
 * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation
|
||
 * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation
|
||
 * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK
|
||
 * - the PSK itself
|
||
 */
|
||
unsigned char *psm = ssl->handshake->premaster;
|
||
unsigned char *psm_end = psm + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster );
|
||
size_t zlen = 0;
|
||
|
||
/* Compute ECDH shared secret. */
|
||
status = psa_raw_key_agreement( PSA_ALG_ECDH,
|
||
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
|
||
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey,
|
||
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len,
|
||
psm + 2,
|
||
psm_end - ( psm + 2 ),
|
||
&zlen );
|
||
|
||
destruction_status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
|
||
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
|
||
|
||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||
return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status ) );
|
||
else if( destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||
return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( destruction_status ) );
|
||
|
||
/* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( zlen, psm, 0 );
|
||
psm += 2 + zlen;
|
||
|
||
/* opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; */
|
||
if( psm_end - psm < 2 )
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
||
|
||
const unsigned char *psk = NULL;
|
||
size_t psk_len = 0;
|
||
|
||
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( ssl, &psk, &psk_len )
|
||
== MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED )
|
||
/*
|
||
* This should never happen because the existence of a PSK is always
|
||
* checked before calling this function
|
||
*/
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||
|
||
/* Write the PSK length as uint16 */
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( psk_len, psm, 0 );
|
||
psm += 2;
|
||
|
||
if( psm_end < psm || (size_t)( psm_end - psm ) < psk_len )
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
||
|
||
/* Write the PSK itself */
|
||
memcpy( psm, psk, psk_len );
|
||
psm += psk_len;
|
||
|
||
ssl->handshake->pmslen = psm - ssl->handshake->premaster;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
|
||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
|
||
{
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
||
p, end - p ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */
|
||
if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
||
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP );
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl,
|
||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
|
||
{
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 0 ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_parse_encrypted_pms_secret" ), ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
||
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
|
||
{
|
||
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
|
||
p, end - p );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
|
||
ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
|
||
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
|
||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ssl->state++;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client key exchange" ) );
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
|
||
static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
||
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) );
|
||
|
||
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) );
|
||
ssl->state++;
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
|
||
static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
|
||
size_t i, sig_len;
|
||
unsigned char hash[48];
|
||
unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
|
||
size_t hashlen;
|
||
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg;
|
||
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
|
||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
||
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
||
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) );
|
||
|
||
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) );
|
||
ssl->state++;
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
||
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) );
|
||
ssl->state++;
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
||
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) );
|
||
ssl->state++;
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
||
|
||
/* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */
|
||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */ );
|
||
if( 0 != ret )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_read_record" ), ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ssl->state++;
|
||
|
||
/* Process the message contents */
|
||
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
|
||
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
|
||
|
||
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
||
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
|
||
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
||
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
|
||
{
|
||
/* Should never happen */
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* struct {
|
||
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only
|
||
* opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
|
||
* } DigitallySigned;
|
||
*/
|
||
if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Hash
|
||
*/
|
||
md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( ssl->in_msg[i] );
|
||
|
||
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( ssl, ssl->in_msg[i] ) )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg"
|
||
" for verify message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1)
|
||
if( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg )
|
||
hash_start += 16;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
/* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
|
||
hashlen = 0;
|
||
|
||
i++;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Signature
|
||
*/
|
||
if( ( pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( ssl->in_msg[i] ) )
|
||
== MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg"
|
||
" for verify message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg
|
||
*/
|
||
if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sig_alg doesn't match cert key" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
i++;
|
||
|
||
if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
sig_len = ( ssl->in_msg[i] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[i+1];
|
||
i += 2;
|
||
|
||
if( i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Calculate hash and verify signature */
|
||
{
|
||
size_t dummy_hlen;
|
||
ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( peer_pk,
|
||
md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
|
||
ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl );
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate verify" ) );
|
||
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
||
static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||
size_t tlen;
|
||
uint32_t lifetime;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write new session ticket" ) );
|
||
|
||
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
|
||
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* struct {
|
||
* uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
|
||
* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
|
||
* } NewSessionTicket;
|
||
*
|
||
* 4 . 7 ticket_lifetime_hint (0 = unspecified)
|
||
* 8 . 9 ticket_len (n)
|
||
* 10 . 9+n ticket content
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write( ssl->conf->p_ticket,
|
||
ssl->session_negotiate,
|
||
ssl->out_msg + 10,
|
||
ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN,
|
||
&tlen, &lifetime ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write", ret );
|
||
tlen = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( lifetime, ssl->out_msg, 4 );
|
||
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( tlen, ssl->out_msg, 8 );
|
||
ssl->out_msglen = 10 + tlen;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Morally equivalent to updating ssl->state, but NewSessionTicket and
|
||
* ChangeCipherSpec share the same state.
|
||
*/
|
||
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
|
||
|
||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
||
{
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write new session ticket" ) );
|
||
|
||
return( 0 );
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* SSL handshake -- server side -- single step
|
||
*/
|
||
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||
{
|
||
int ret = 0;
|
||
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "server state: %d", ssl->state ) );
|
||
|
||
switch( ssl->state )
|
||
{
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:
|
||
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* <== ClientHello
|
||
*/
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_client_hello( ssl );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT:
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED );
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* ==> ServerHello
|
||
* Certificate
|
||
* ( ServerKeyExchange )
|
||
* ( CertificateRequest )
|
||
* ServerHelloDone
|
||
*/
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
|
||
ret = ssl_write_server_hello( ssl );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
|
||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( ssl );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
|
||
ret = ssl_write_server_key_exchange( ssl );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
|
||
ret = ssl_write_certificate_request( ssl );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
|
||
ret = ssl_write_server_hello_done( ssl );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* <== ( Certificate/Alert )
|
||
* ClientKeyExchange
|
||
* ( CertificateVerify )
|
||
* ChangeCipherSpec
|
||
* Finished
|
||
*/
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
|
||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( ssl );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( ssl );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
|
||
ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify( ssl );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:
|
||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( ssl );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* ==> ( NewSessionTicket )
|
||
* ChangeCipherSpec
|
||
* Finished
|
||
*/
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
||
if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 )
|
||
ret = ssl_write_new_session_ticket( ssl );
|
||
else
|
||
#endif
|
||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:
|
||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( ssl );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) );
|
||
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP;
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:
|
||
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( ssl );
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
default:
|
||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) );
|
||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return( ret );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order )
|
||
{
|
||
conf->respect_cli_pref = order;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|