mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
Paul Elliott 8860021abc Fix false claim of variables used unitialised
GCC with TSan + O3 causes an error where it claims key_len and iv_len
may be used uninitialised. This is, as far as I can tell incorrect (the
only way it could not be set is in the error case, and then it is not
used), however the simplest option seemed to be just to fix it.

Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
2023-12-18 14:49:34 +00:00

1885 lines
63 KiB
C

/*
* TLS 1.3 key schedule
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
*/
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#include "ssl_misc.h"
#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h"
#include "ssl_tls13_invasive.h"
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "md_psa.h"
/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many
* arguments in each translating place. */
static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status)
{
return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors,
ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors),
psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls);
}
#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(name, string) \
.name = string,
struct mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels =
{
/* This seems to work in C, despite the string literal being one
* character too long due to the 0-termination. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST
};
#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL
/*
* This function creates a HkdfLabel structure used in the TLS 1.3 key schedule.
*
* The HkdfLabel is specified in RFC 8446 as follows:
*
* struct HkdfLabel {
* uint16 length; // Length of expanded key material
* opaque label<7..255>; // Always prefixed by "tls13 "
* opaque context<0..255>; // Usually a communication transcript hash
* };
*
* Parameters:
* - desired_length: Length of expanded key material
* Even though the standard allows expansion to up to
* 2**16 Bytes, TLS 1.3 never uses expansion to more than
* 255 Bytes, so we require `desired_length` to be at most
* 255. This allows us to save a few Bytes of code by
* hardcoding the writing of the high bytes.
* - (label, label_len): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix
* The label length MUST be less than or equal to
* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN
* It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this.
* All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3
* can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN().
* - (ctx, ctx_len): context + context length
* The context length MUST be less than or equal to
* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN
* It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this.
* - dst: Target buffer for HkdfLabel structure,
* This MUST be a writable buffer of size
* at least SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN Bytes.
* - dst_len: Pointer at which to store the actual length of
* the HkdfLabel structure on success.
*/
static const char tls13_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 ";
#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(label_len, context_len) \
(2 /* expansion length */ \
+ 1 /* label length */ \
+ label_len \
+ 1 /* context length */ \
+ context_len)
#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN \
SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( \
sizeof(tls13_label_prefix) + \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN, \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN)
static void ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label(
size_t desired_length,
const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len,
unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len)
{
size_t total_label_len =
sizeof(tls13_label_prefix) + label_len;
size_t total_hkdf_lbl_len =
SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(total_label_len, ctx_len);
unsigned char *p = dst;
/* Add the size of the expanded key material.
* We're hardcoding the high byte to 0 here assuming that we never use
* TLS 1.3 HKDF key expansion to more than 255 Bytes. */
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN > 255
#error "The implementation of ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \
value of MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN"
#endif
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(desired_length);
/* Add label incl. prefix */
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(total_label_len);
memcpy(p, tls13_label_prefix, sizeof(tls13_label_prefix));
p += sizeof(tls13_label_prefix);
memcpy(p, label, label_len);
p += label_len;
/* Add context value */
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ctx_len);
if (ctx_len != 0) {
memcpy(p, ctx, ctx_len);
}
/* Return total length to the caller. */
*dst_len = total_hkdf_lbl_len;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label(
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len,
const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len,
unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len)
{
unsigned char hkdf_label[SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN];
size_t hkdf_label_len = 0;
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation =
PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
if (label_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
/* Should never happen since this is an internal
* function, and we know statically which labels
* are allowed. */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (ctx_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN) {
/* Should not happen, as above. */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (buf_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN) {
/* Should not happen, as above. */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label(buf_len,
label, label_len,
ctx, ctx_len,
hkdf_label,
&hkdf_label_len);
status = psa_key_derivation_setup(&operation, PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg));
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto cleanup;
}
status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation,
PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
secret,
secret_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto cleanup;
}
status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation,
PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO,
hkdf_label,
hkdf_label_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto cleanup;
}
status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&operation,
buf,
buf_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
abort_status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&operation);
status = (status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len);
return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
}
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key(
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len,
unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label(
hash_alg,
secret, secret_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(key),
NULL, 0,
key, key_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label(
hash_alg,
secret, secret_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(iv),
NULL, 0,
iv, iv_len);
return ret;
}
/*
* The traffic keying material is generated from the following inputs:
*
* - One secret value per sender.
* - A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated
* - The desired lengths of key and IV.
*
* The expansion itself is based on HKDF:
*
* [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "key", "", key_length )
* [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "iv" , "", iv_length )
*
* [sender] denotes the sending side and the Secret value is provided
* by the function caller. Note that we generate server and client side
* keys in a single function call.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
const unsigned char *client_secret,
const unsigned char *server_secret, size_t secret_len,
size_t key_len, size_t iv_len,
mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys)
{
int ret = 0;
ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key(
hash_alg, client_secret, secret_len,
keys->client_write_key, key_len,
keys->client_write_iv, iv_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key(
hash_alg, server_secret, secret_len,
keys->server_write_key, key_len,
keys->server_write_iv, iv_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
keys->key_len = key_len;
keys->iv_len = iv_len;
return 0;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret(
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len,
const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len,
int ctx_hashed,
unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dstbuf_len)
{
int ret;
unsigned char hashed_context[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
if (ctx_hashed == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED) {
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, ctx, ctx_len, hashed_context,
PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg), &ctx_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
return ret;
}
} else {
if (ctx_len > sizeof(hashed_context)) {
/* This should never happen since this function is internal
* and the code sets `ctx_hashed` correctly.
* Let's double-check nonetheless to not run at the risk
* of getting a stack overflow. */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
memcpy(hashed_context, ctx, ctx_len);
}
return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg,
secret, secret_len,
label, label_len,
hashed_context, ctx_len,
dstbuf, dstbuf_len);
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
const unsigned char *secret_old,
const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
unsigned char *secret_new)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t hlen;
unsigned char tmp_secret[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 };
const unsigned char all_zeroes_input[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 };
const unsigned char *l_input = NULL;
size_t l_input_len;
psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation =
PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
hlen = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
/* For non-initial runs, call Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "")
* on the old secret. */
if (secret_old != NULL) {
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret(
hash_alg,
secret_old, hlen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(derived),
NULL, 0, /* context */
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED,
tmp_secret, hlen);
if (ret != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
}
ret = 0;
if (input != NULL && input_len != 0) {
l_input = input;
l_input_len = input_len;
} else {
l_input = all_zeroes_input;
l_input_len = hlen;
}
status = psa_key_derivation_setup(&operation,
PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg));
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto cleanup;
}
status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation,
PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT,
tmp_secret,
hlen);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto cleanup;
}
status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation,
PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
l_input, l_input_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto cleanup;
}
status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&operation,
secret_new,
PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg));
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
abort_status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&operation);
status = (status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status);
ret = (ret == 0 ? PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) : ret);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret));
return ret;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets(
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
unsigned char const *early_secret,
unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len,
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets *derived)
{
int ret;
size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
/* We should never call this function with an unknown hash,
* but add an assertion anyway. */
if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/*
* 0
* |
* v
* PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret
* |
* +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c e traffic", ClientHello)
* | = client_early_traffic_secret
* |
* +-----> Derive-Secret(., "e exp master", ClientHello)
* | = early_exporter_master_secret
* v
*/
/* Create client_early_traffic_secret */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret(
hash_alg,
early_secret, hash_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_e_traffic),
transcript, transcript_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED,
derived->client_early_traffic_secret,
hash_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
/* Create early exporter */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret(
hash_alg,
early_secret, hash_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(e_exp_master),
transcript, transcript_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED,
derived->early_exporter_master_secret,
hash_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
unsigned char const *handshake_secret,
unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len,
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *derived)
{
int ret;
size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
/* We should never call this function with an unknown hash,
* but add an assertion anyway. */
if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/*
*
* Handshake Secret
* |
* +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic",
* | ClientHello...ServerHello )
* | = client_handshake_traffic_secret
* |
* +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic",
* | ClientHello...ServerHello )
* | = server_handshake_traffic_secret
*
*/
/*
* Compute client_handshake_traffic_secret with
* Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", ClientHello...ServerHello )
*/
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret(
hash_alg,
handshake_secret, hash_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_hs_traffic),
transcript, transcript_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED,
derived->client_handshake_traffic_secret,
hash_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
/*
* Compute server_handshake_traffic_secret with
* Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", ClientHello...ServerHello )
*/
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret(
hash_alg,
handshake_secret, hash_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(s_hs_traffic),
transcript, transcript_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED,
derived->server_handshake_traffic_secret,
hash_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets(
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
unsigned char const *application_secret,
unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len,
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived)
{
int ret;
size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
/* We should never call this function with an unknown hash,
* but add an assertion anyway. */
if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* Generate {client,server}_application_traffic_secret_0
*
* Master Secret
* |
* +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c ap traffic",
* | ClientHello...server Finished )
* | = client_application_traffic_secret_0
* |
* +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s ap traffic",
* | ClientHello...Server Finished )
* | = server_application_traffic_secret_0
* |
* +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "exp master",
* | ClientHello...server Finished)
* | = exporter_master_secret
*
*/
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret(
hash_alg,
application_secret, hash_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_ap_traffic),
transcript, transcript_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED,
derived->client_application_traffic_secret_N,
hash_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret(
hash_alg,
application_secret, hash_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(s_ap_traffic),
transcript, transcript_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED,
derived->server_application_traffic_secret_N,
hash_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret(
hash_alg,
application_secret, hash_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(exp_master),
transcript, transcript_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED,
derived->exporter_master_secret,
hash_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
/* Generate resumption_master_secret for use with the ticket exchange.
*
* This is not integrated with mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets()
* because it uses the transcript hash up to and including ClientFinished. */
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_resumption_master_secret(
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
unsigned char const *application_secret,
unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len,
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived)
{
int ret;
size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
/* We should never call this function with an unknown hash,
* but add an assertion anyway. */
if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret(
hash_alg,
application_secret, hash_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(res_master),
transcript, transcript_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED,
derived->resumption_master_secret,
hash_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* \brief Transition into application stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule.
*
* The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine
* with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and
* this function represents the Handshake -> Application transition.
*
* In the handshake stage, ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys()
* can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule
* stage \c Handshake.
*
* \returns \c 0 on success.
* \returns A negative error code on failure.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
psa_algorithm_t const hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(
(mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
/*
* Compute MasterSecret
*/
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(
hash_alg,
handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake,
NULL, 0,
handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret);
return ret;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(
4, "Master secret",
handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app, PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg));
return 0;
}
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
unsigned char const *base_key,
unsigned char const *transcript,
unsigned char *dst,
size_t *dst_len)
{
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
unsigned char finished_key[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE];
int ret;
psa_algorithm_t alg;
/* We should never call this function with an unknown hash,
* but add an assertion anyway. */
if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* TLS 1.3 Finished message
*
* struct {
* opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
* } Finished;
*
* verify_data =
* HMAC( finished_key,
* Hash( Handshake Context +
* Certificate* +
* CertificateVerify* )
* )
*
* finished_key =
* HKDF-Expand-Label( BaseKey, "finished", "", Hash.length )
*/
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label(
hash_alg, base_key, hash_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(finished),
NULL, 0,
finished_key, hash_len);
if (ret != 0) {
goto exit;
}
alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg);
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE);
psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg);
psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC);
status = psa_import_key(&attributes, finished_key, hash_len, &key);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
goto exit;
}
status = psa_mac_compute(key, alg, transcript, hash_len,
dst, hash_len, dst_len);
ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
exit:
status = psa_destroy_key(key);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(finished_key, sizeof(finished_key));
return ret;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *dst,
size_t dst_len,
size_t *actual_len,
int from)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
size_t transcript_len;
unsigned char *base_key = NULL;
size_t base_key_len = 0;
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *tls13_hs_secrets =
&ssl->handshake->tls13_hs_secrets;
mbedtls_md_type_t const md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(
(mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data"));
if (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) {
base_key = tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret;
base_key_len = sizeof(tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret);
} else {
base_key = tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret;
base_key_len = sizeof(tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret);
}
if (dst_len < hash_len) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
goto exit;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type,
transcript, sizeof(transcript),
&transcript_len);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", ret);
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "handshake hash", transcript, transcript_len);
ret = ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(hash_alg, base_key,
transcript, dst, actual_len);
if (ret != 0) {
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "verify_data for finished message", dst, hash_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data"));
exit:
/* Erase handshake secrets */
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(base_key, base_key_len);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript));
return ret;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
unsigned char const *psk, size_t psk_len,
int psk_type,
unsigned char const *transcript,
unsigned char *result)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned char binder_key[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char early_secret[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE];
size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
size_t actual_len;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */
((void) ssl);
#endif
/* We should never call this function with an unknown hash,
* but add an assertion anyway. */
if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/*
* 0
* |
* v
* PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret
* |
* +-----> Derive-Secret(., "ext binder" | "res binder", "")
* | = binder_key
* v
*/
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(hash_alg,
NULL, /* Old secret */
psk, psk_len, /* Input */
early_secret);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret);
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder",
early_secret, hash_len);
if (psk_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION) {
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret(
hash_alg,
early_secret, hash_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(res_binder),
NULL, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED,
binder_key, hash_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Derive Early Secret with 'res binder'"));
} else {
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret(
hash_alg,
early_secret, hash_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(ext_binder),
NULL, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED,
binder_key, hash_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Derive Early Secret with 'ext binder'"));
}
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret", ret);
goto exit;
}
/*
* The binding_value is computed in the same way as the Finished message
* but with the BaseKey being the binder_key.
*/
ret = ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(hash_alg, binder_key, transcript,
result, &actual_len);
if (ret != 0) {
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "psk binder", result, actual_len);
exit:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(early_secret, sizeof(early_secret));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(binder_key, sizeof(binder_key));
return ret;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
int endpoint, int ciphersuite,
mbedtls_ssl_key_set const *traffic_keys,
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl /* DEBUG ONLY */)
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
int ret;
mbedtls_cipher_info_t const *cipher_info;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
unsigned char const *key_enc;
unsigned char const *iv_enc;
unsigned char const *key_dec;
unsigned char const *iv_dec;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_key_type_t key_type;
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_algorithm_t alg;
size_t key_bits;
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */
(void) ssl;
#endif
ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite);
if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ciphersuite info for %d not found",
ciphersuite));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(ciphersuite_info->cipher);
if (cipher_info == NULL) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher info for %u not found",
ciphersuite_info->cipher));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
/*
* Setup cipher contexts in target transform
*/
if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
cipher_info)) != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret);
return ret;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
cipher_info)) != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret);
return ret;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) {
key_enc = traffic_keys->server_write_key;
key_dec = traffic_keys->client_write_key;
iv_enc = traffic_keys->server_write_iv;
iv_dec = traffic_keys->client_write_iv;
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) {
key_enc = traffic_keys->client_write_key;
key_dec = traffic_keys->server_write_key;
iv_enc = traffic_keys->client_write_iv;
iv_dec = traffic_keys->server_write_iv;
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
{
/* should not happen */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
memcpy(transform->iv_enc, iv_enc, traffic_keys->iv_len);
memcpy(transform->iv_dec, iv_dec, traffic_keys->iv_len);
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
key_enc, (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info),
MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret);
return ret;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
key_dec, (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info),
MBEDTLS_DECRYPT)) != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret);
return ret;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/*
* Setup other fields in SSL transform
*/
if ((ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG) != 0) {
transform->taglen = 8;
} else {
transform->taglen = 16;
}
transform->ivlen = traffic_keys->iv_len;
transform->maclen = 0;
transform->fixed_ivlen = transform->ivlen;
transform->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3;
/* We add the true record content type (1 Byte) to the plaintext and
* then pad to the configured granularity. The minimum length of the
* type-extended and padded plaintext is therefore the padding
* granularity. */
transform->minlen =
transform->taglen + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/*
* Setup psa keys and alg
*/
if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher,
transform->taglen,
&alg,
&key_type,
&key_bits)) != PSA_SUCCESS) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
1, "mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status));
return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
}
transform->psa_alg = alg;
if (alg != MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER) {
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT);
psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg);
psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key_type);
if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
key_enc,
PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits),
&transform->psa_key_enc)) != PSA_SUCCESS) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
1, "psa_import_key", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status));
return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
}
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT);
if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
key_dec,
PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits),
&transform->psa_key_dec)) != PSA_SUCCESS) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
1, "psa_import_key", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status));
return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
return 0;
}
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info,
size_t *key_len, size_t *iv_len)
{
psa_key_type_t key_type;
psa_algorithm_t alg;
size_t taglen;
size_t key_bits;
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if (ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG) {
taglen = 8;
} else {
taglen = 16;
}
status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher, taglen,
&alg, &key_type, &key_bits);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
}
*key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits);
/* TLS 1.3 only have AEAD ciphers, IV length is unconditionally 12 bytes */
*iv_len = 12;
return 0;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
/*
* ssl_tls13_generate_early_key() generates the key necessary for protecting
* the early application data and handshake messages as described in section 7
* of RFC 8446.
*
* NOTE: Only one key is generated, the key for the traffic from the client to
* the server. The TLS 1.3 specification does not define a secret and thus
* a key for server early traffic.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_generate_early_key(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type;
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg;
size_t hash_len;
unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
size_t transcript_len;
size_t key_len = 0;
size_t iv_len = 0;
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets tls13_early_secrets;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
handshake->ciphersuite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_generate_early_key"));
ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(ciphersuite_info, &key_len, &iv_len);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac;
hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac);
hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type,
transcript,
sizeof(transcript),
&transcript_len);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1,
"mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript",
ret);
goto cleanup;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets(
hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early,
transcript, transcript_len, &tls13_early_secrets);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(
4, "Client early traffic secret",
tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret, hash_len);
/*
* Export client handshake traffic secret
*/
if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) {
ssl->f_export_keys(
ssl->p_export_keys,
MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET,
tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret,
hash_len,
handshake->randbytes,
handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */);
}
ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key(
hash_alg,
tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret,
hash_len, traffic_keys->client_write_key, key_len,
traffic_keys->client_write_iv, iv_len);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
traffic_keys->key_len = key_len;
traffic_keys->iv_len = iv_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client early write_key",
traffic_keys->client_write_key,
traffic_keys->key_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client early write_iv",
traffic_keys->client_write_iv,
traffic_keys->iv_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_generate_early_key"));
cleanup:
/* Erase early secrets and transcript */
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(
&tls13_early_secrets, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript));
return ret;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys;
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata = NULL;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
/* Next evolution in key schedule: Establish early_data secret and
* key material. */
ret = ssl_tls13_generate_early_key(ssl, &traffic_keys);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_generate_early_key",
ret);
goto cleanup;
}
transform_earlydata = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform));
if (transform_earlydata == NULL) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(
transform_earlydata,
ssl->conf->endpoint,
handshake->ciphersuite_info->id,
&traffic_keys,
ssl);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
handshake->transform_earlydata = transform_earlydata;
cleanup:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys));
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_free(transform_earlydata);
}
return ret;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
unsigned char *psk = NULL;
size_t psk_len = 0;
if (handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher suite info not found"));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) {
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk",
ret);
return ret;
}
}
#endif
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(hash_alg, NULL, psk, psk_len,
handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
mbedtls_free((void *) psk);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret);
return ret;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early",
handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early,
PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg));
return 0;
}
/**
* \brief Compute TLS 1.3 handshake traffic keys.
*
* ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys() generates keys necessary for
* protecting the handshake messages, as described in Section 7 of
* RFC 8446.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in
* key schedule stage \c Handshake, see
* ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake().
* \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the handshake traffic
* keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized.
*
* \returns \c 0 on success.
* \returns A negative error code on failure.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type;
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg;
size_t hash_len;
unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
size_t transcript_len;
size_t key_len = 0;
size_t iv_len = 0;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
handshake->ciphersuite_info;
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *tls13_hs_secrets =
&handshake->tls13_hs_secrets;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys"));
ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(ciphersuite_info, &key_len, &iv_len);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret);
return ret;
}
md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac;
hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac);
hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type,
transcript,
sizeof(transcript),
&transcript_len);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1,
"mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript",
ret);
return ret;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(
hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake,
transcript, transcript_len, tls13_hs_secrets);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets",
ret);
return ret;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Client handshake traffic secret",
tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret,
hash_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Server handshake traffic secret",
tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret,
hash_len);
/*
* Export client handshake traffic secret
*/
if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) {
ssl->f_export_keys(
ssl->p_export_keys,
MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret,
hash_len,
handshake->randbytes,
handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */);
ssl->f_export_keys(
ssl->p_export_keys,
MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret,
hash_len,
handshake->randbytes,
handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */);
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(
hash_alg,
tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret,
tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret,
hash_len, key_len, iv_len, traffic_keys);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys", ret);
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client_handshake write_key",
traffic_keys->client_write_key,
traffic_keys->key_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server_handshake write_key",
traffic_keys->server_write_key,
traffic_keys->key_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client_handshake write_iv",
traffic_keys->client_write_iv,
traffic_keys->iv_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server_handshake write_iv",
traffic_keys->server_write_iv,
traffic_keys->iv_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys"));
exit:
return ret;
}
/**
* \brief Transition into handshake stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule.
*
* The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine
* with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and
* this function represents the Early -> Handshake transition.
*
* In the handshake stage, ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys()
* can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule
* stage \c Early.
*
* \returns \c 0 on success.
* \returns A negative error code on failure.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
psa_algorithm_t const hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(
(mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
unsigned char *shared_secret = NULL;
size_t shared_secret_len = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
/*
* Compute ECDHE secret used to compute the handshake secret from which
* client_handshake_traffic_secret and server_handshake_traffic_secret
* are derived in the handshake secret derivation stage.
*/
if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral(ssl)) {
if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(handshake->offered_group_id) ||
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(handshake->offered_group_id)) {
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
psa_algorithm_t alg =
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(handshake->offered_group_id) ?
PSA_ALG_ECDH : PSA_ALG_FFDH;
/* Compute ECDH shared secret. */
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
status = psa_get_key_attributes(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey,
&key_attributes);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
}
shared_secret_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(
psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes));
shared_secret = mbedtls_calloc(1, shared_secret_len);
if (shared_secret == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
}
status = psa_raw_key_agreement(
alg, handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey,
handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len,
shared_secret, shared_secret_len, &shared_secret_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_raw_key_agreement", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */
} else {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Group not supported."));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */
/*
* Compute the Handshake Secret
*/
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(
hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early,
shared_secret, shared_secret_len,
handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Handshake secret",
handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake,
PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg));
cleanup:
if (shared_secret != NULL) {
mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(shared_secret, shared_secret_len);
}
return ret;
}
/**
* \brief Compute TLS 1.3 application traffic keys.
*
* ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys() generates application traffic
* keys, since any record following a 1-RTT Finished message MUST be
* encrypted under the application traffic key.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in
* key schedule stage \c Application, see
* ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application().
* \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the application traffic
* keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized.
*
* \returns \c 0 on success.
* \returns A negative error code on failure.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
/* Address at which to store the application secrets */
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets * const app_secrets =
&ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets;
/* Holding the transcript up to and including the ServerFinished */
unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
size_t transcript_len;
/* Variables relating to the hash for the chosen ciphersuite. */
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type;
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg;
size_t hash_len;
/* Variables relating to the cipher for the chosen ciphersuite. */
size_t key_len = 0, iv_len = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> derive application traffic keys"));
/* Extract basic information about hash and ciphersuite */
ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(handshake->ciphersuite_info,
&key_len, &iv_len);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
/* Compute current handshake transcript. It's the caller's responsibility
* to call this at the right time, that is, after the ServerFinished. */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type,
transcript, sizeof(transcript),
&transcript_len);
if (ret != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
/* Compute application secrets from master secret and transcript hash. */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets(
hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app,
transcript, transcript_len, app_secrets);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
/* Derive first epoch of IV + Key for application traffic. */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(
hash_alg,
app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N,
app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N,
hash_len, key_len, iv_len, traffic_keys);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Client application traffic secret",
app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N,
hash_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Server application traffic secret",
app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N,
hash_len);
/*
* Export client/server application traffic secret 0
*/
if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) {
ssl->f_export_keys(
ssl->p_export_keys,
MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N, hash_len,
handshake->randbytes,
handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: this should be replaced by
a new constant for TLS 1.3! */);
ssl->f_export_keys(
ssl->p_export_keys,
MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N, hash_len,
handshake->randbytes,
handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: this should be replaced by
a new constant for TLS 1.3! */);
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client application_write_key:",
traffic_keys->client_write_key, key_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server application write key",
traffic_keys->server_write_key, key_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client application write IV",
traffic_keys->client_write_iv, iv_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server application write IV",
traffic_keys->server_write_iv, iv_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= derive application traffic keys"));
cleanup:
/* randbytes is not used again */
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->handshake->randbytes,
sizeof(ssl->handshake->randbytes));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript));
return ret;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys;
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake = NULL;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
/* Compute handshake secret */
ret = ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(ssl);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_master_secret", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
/* Next evolution in key schedule: Establish handshake secret and
* key material. */
ret = ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(ssl, &traffic_keys);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys",
ret);
goto cleanup;
}
transform_handshake = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform));
if (transform_handshake == NULL) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(
transform_handshake,
ssl->conf->endpoint,
handshake->ciphersuite_info->id,
&traffic_keys,
ssl);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
handshake->transform_handshake = transform_handshake;
cleanup:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys));
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_free(transform_handshake);
}
return ret;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
size_t transcript_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret"));
md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type,
transcript, sizeof(transcript),
&transcript_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_resumption_master_secret(
mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type),
handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app,
transcript, transcript_len,
&ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
/* Erase master secrets */
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&handshake->tls13_master_secrets,
sizeof(handshake->tls13_master_secrets));
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(
4, "Resumption master secret",
ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret,
PSA_HASH_LENGTH(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type)));
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret"));
return 0;
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys;
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_application = NULL;
ret = ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(ssl);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1,
"ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
ret = ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(ssl, &traffic_keys);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1,
"ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
transform_application =
mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform));
if (transform_application == NULL) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(
transform_application,
ssl->conf->endpoint,
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id,
&traffic_keys,
ssl);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
ssl->transform_application = transform_application;
cleanup:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys));
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_free(transform_application);
}
return ret;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **psk,
size_t *psk_len)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
*psk_len = 0;
*psk = NULL;
if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
status = psa_get_key_attributes(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque, &key_attributes);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
}
*psk_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes));
*psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, *psk_len);
if (*psk == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
}
status = psa_export_key(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque,
(uint8_t *) *psk, *psk_len, psk_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
mbedtls_free((void *) *psk);
*psk = NULL;
return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
}
return 0;
#else
*psk = ssl->handshake->psk;
*psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len;
if (*psk == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */