2ec9892f24
Rename test macros `ASSERT_COMPARE()`, `ASSERT_ALLOC()` and `ASSERT_ALLOC_WEAK()`
251 lines
8.1 KiB
C
251 lines
8.1 KiB
C
/* BEGIN_HEADER */
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <psa/crypto.h>
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#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
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#include "entropy_poll.h"
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/* Calculating the minimum allowed entropy size in bytes */
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#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE MAX(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, \
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MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY)
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#include <psa_crypto_its.h>
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/* Check the entropy seed file.
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*
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* \param expected_size Expected size in bytes.
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* If 0, the file must not exist.
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*
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* \retval 1 Either \p expected_size is nonzero and
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* the entropy seed file exists and has exactly this size,
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* or \p expected_size is zero and the file does not exist.
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* \retval 0 Either \p expected_size is nonzero but
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* the entropy seed file does not exist or has a different size,
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* or \p expected_size is zero but the file exists.
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* In this case, the test case is marked as failed.
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*
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* \note We enforce that the seed is in a specific ITS file.
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* This must not change, otherwise we break backward compatibility if
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* the library is upgraded on a device with an existing seed.
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*/
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int check_random_seed_file(size_t expected_size)
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{
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/* The value of the random seed UID must not change. Otherwise that would
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* break upgrades of the library on devices that already contain a seed
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* file. If this test assertion fails, you've presumably broken backward
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* compatibility! */
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TEST_EQUAL(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID, 0xFFFFFF52);
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struct psa_storage_info_t info = { 0, 0 };
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psa_status_t status = psa_its_get_info(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID,
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&info);
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if (expected_size == 0) {
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TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST);
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} else {
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TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_SUCCESS);
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TEST_EQUAL(info.size, expected_size);
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}
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return 1;
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exit:
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return 0;
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}
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/* Remove the entropy seed file.
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*
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* See check_random_seed_file() regarding abstraction boundaries.
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*/
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psa_status_t remove_seed_file(void)
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{
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return psa_its_remove(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID);
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */
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/* END_HEADER */
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/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
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void external_rng_failure_generate()
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{
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psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
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psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE);
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psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, 128);
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mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
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uint8_t output[1];
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PSA_ASSERT(psa_crypto_init());
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PSA_ASSERT(psa_generate_random(output, sizeof(output)));
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PSA_ASSERT(psa_generate_key(&attributes, &key));
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PSA_ASSERT(psa_destroy_key(key));
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mbedtls_test_disable_insecure_external_rng();
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TEST_EQUAL(PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY,
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psa_generate_random(output, sizeof(output)));
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TEST_EQUAL(PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY,
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psa_generate_key(&attributes, &key));
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exit:
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psa_destroy_key(key);
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PSA_DONE();
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}
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/* END_CASE */
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/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
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void external_rng_failure_sign(int key_type, data_t *key_data, int alg,
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int input_size_arg)
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{
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/* This test case is only expected to pass if the signature mechanism
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* requires randomness, either because it is a randomized signature
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* or because the implementation uses blinding. */
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psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
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psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key_type);
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psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH);
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psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg);
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mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
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size_t input_size = input_size_arg;
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uint8_t *input = NULL;
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uint8_t *signature = NULL;
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size_t signature_size = PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE;
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size_t signature_length;
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TEST_CALLOC(input, input_size);
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TEST_CALLOC(signature, signature_size);
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PSA_ASSERT(psa_crypto_init());
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PSA_ASSERT(psa_import_key(&attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
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&key));
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PSA_ASSERT(psa_sign_hash(key, alg,
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input, input_size,
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signature, signature_size,
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&signature_length));
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PSA_ASSERT(psa_destroy_key(key));
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mbedtls_test_disable_insecure_external_rng();
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/* Import the key again, because for RSA Mbed TLS caches blinding values
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* in the key object and this could perturb the test. */
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PSA_ASSERT(psa_import_key(&attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
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&key));
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TEST_EQUAL(PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY,
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psa_sign_hash(key, alg,
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input, input_size,
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signature, signature_size,
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&signature_length));
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PSA_ASSERT(psa_destroy_key(key));
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exit:
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psa_destroy_key(key);
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PSA_DONE();
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mbedtls_free(input);
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mbedtls_free(signature);
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}
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/* END_CASE */
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/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */
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void validate_entropy_seed_injection(int seed_length_a,
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int expected_status_a,
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int seed_length_b,
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int expected_status_b)
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{
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psa_status_t status;
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uint8_t output[32] = { 0 };
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uint8_t zeros[32] = { 0 };
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uint8_t *seed = NULL;
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int i;
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int seed_size;
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if (seed_length_a > seed_length_b) {
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seed_size = seed_length_a;
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} else {
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seed_size = seed_length_b;
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}
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TEST_CALLOC(seed, seed_size);
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/* fill seed with some data */
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for (i = 0; i < seed_size; ++i) {
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seed[i] = i;
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}
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status = remove_seed_file();
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TEST_ASSERT((status == PSA_SUCCESS) ||
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(status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST));
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if (!check_random_seed_file(0)) {
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goto exit;
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}
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status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(seed, seed_length_a);
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TEST_EQUAL(status, expected_status_a);
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if (!check_random_seed_file(expected_status_a == PSA_SUCCESS ? seed_length_a :
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0)) {
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goto exit;
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}
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status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(seed, seed_length_b);
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TEST_EQUAL(status, expected_status_b);
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if (!check_random_seed_file(expected_status_a == PSA_SUCCESS ? seed_length_a :
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expected_status_b == PSA_SUCCESS ? seed_length_b :
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0)) {
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goto exit;
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}
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PSA_ASSERT(psa_crypto_init());
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PSA_ASSERT(psa_generate_random(output,
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sizeof(output)));
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TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(output, zeros, sizeof(output)) != 0);
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exit:
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mbedtls_free(seed);
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PSA_DONE();
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mbedtls_test_inject_entropy_restore();
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}
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/* END_CASE */
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/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */
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void run_entropy_inject_with_crypto_init()
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{
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psa_status_t status;
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size_t i;
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uint8_t seed[MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE] = { 0 };
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/* fill seed with some data */
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for (i = 0; i < sizeof(seed); ++i) {
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seed[i] = i;
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}
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status = remove_seed_file();
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TEST_ASSERT((status == PSA_SUCCESS) ||
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(status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST));
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if (!check_random_seed_file(0)) {
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goto exit;
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}
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status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(seed, sizeof(seed));
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PSA_ASSERT(status);
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TEST_ASSERT(check_random_seed_file(sizeof(seed)));
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status = remove_seed_file();
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TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_SUCCESS);
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if (!check_random_seed_file(0)) {
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goto exit;
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}
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status = psa_crypto_init();
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TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY);
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status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(seed, sizeof(seed));
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PSA_ASSERT(status);
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if (!check_random_seed_file(sizeof(seed))) {
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goto exit;
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}
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status = psa_crypto_init();
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PSA_ASSERT(status);
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PSA_DONE();
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/* The seed is written by nv_seed callback functions therefore the injection will fail */
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status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(seed, sizeof(seed));
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TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED);
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exit:
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PSA_DONE();
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mbedtls_test_inject_entropy_restore();
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}
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/* END_CASE */
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