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mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.c
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 02f82bbfa9 Fix MSVC warning 
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
2022-10-13 13:32:02 +02:00

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/*
* PSA PAKE layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto
*/
/*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#include <psa/crypto.h>
#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h"
#include <mbedtls/ecjpake.h>
#include <mbedtls/psa_util.h>
#include <mbedtls/platform.h>
#include <mbedtls/error.h>
#include <string.h>
/*
* State sequence:
*
* psa_pake_setup()
* |
* |-- In any order:
* | | psa_pake_set_password_key()
* | | psa_pake_set_user()
* | | psa_pake_set_peer()
* | | psa_pake_set_role()
* |
* |--- In any order: (First round input before or after first round output)
* | |
* | |------ In Order
* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
* | |
* | |------ In Order:
* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
* |
* |--- In any order: (Second round input before or after second round output)
* | |
* | |------ In Order
* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
* | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
* | |
* | |------ In Order:
* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE)
* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC)
* | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF)
* |
* psa_pake_get_implicit_key()
* psa_pake_abort()
*/
enum psa_pake_step
{
PSA_PAKE_STEP_INVALID = 0,
PSA_PAKE_STEP_X1_X2 = 1,
PSA_PAKE_STEP_X2S = 2,
PSA_PAKE_STEP_DERIVE = 3,
};
enum psa_pake_state
{
PSA_PAKE_STATE_INVALID = 0,
PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP = 1,
PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY = 2,
PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X1_X2 = 3,
PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X2S = 4,
PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X1_X2 = 5,
PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X4S = 6,
};
/*
* The first PAKE step shares the same sequences of the second PAKE step
* but with a second set of KEY_SHARE/ZK_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF outputs/inputs.
* It's simpler to share the same sequences numbers of the first
* set of KEY_SHARE/ZK_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF outputs/inputs in both PAKE steps.
*
* State sequence with step, state & sequence enums:
* => Input & Output Step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_INVALID
* => state = PSA_PAKE_STATE_INVALID
* psa_pake_setup()
* => Input & Output Step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_X1_X2
* => state = PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP
* => sequence = PSA_PAKE_SEQ_INVALID
* |
* |--- In any order: (First round input before or after first round output)
* | | First call of psa_pake_output() or psa_pake_input() sets
* | | state = PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY
* | |
* | |------ In Order: => state = PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X1_X2
* | | | psa_pake_output() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE
* | | | psa_pake_output() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC
* | | | psa_pake_output() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF
* | | | psa_pake_output() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE
* | | | psa_pake_output() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC
* | | | psa_pake_output() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF
* | | | => state = PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY
* | | | => sequence = PSA_PAKE_SEQ_INVALID
* | | | => Output Step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_X2S
* | |
* | |------ In Order: => state = PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X1_X2
* | | | psa_pake_input() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE
* | | | psa_pake_input() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC
* | | | psa_pake_input() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF
* | | | psa_pake_input() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE
* | | | psa_pake_input() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC
* | | | psa_pake_input() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF
* | | | => state = PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY
* | | | => sequence = PSA_PAKE_SEQ_INVALID
* | | | => Output Step = PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X4S
* |
* |--- In any order: (Second round input before or after second round output)
* | |
* | |------ In Order: => state = PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X2S
* | | | psa_pake_output() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE
* | | | psa_pake_output() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC
* | | | psa_pake_output() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF
* | | | => state = PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY
* | | | => sequence = PSA_PAKE_SEQ_INVALID
* | | | => Output Step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_DERIVE
* | |
* | |------ In Order: => state = PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X4S
* | | | psa_pake_input() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE
* | | | psa_pake_input() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC
* | | | psa_pake_input() => sequence = PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF
* | | | => state = PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY
* | | | => sequence = PSA_PAKE_SEQ_INVALID
* | | | => Output Step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_DERIVE
* |
* psa_pake_get_implicit_key()
* => Input & Output Step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_INVALID
*/
enum psa_pake_sequence
{
PSA_PAKE_SEQ_INVALID = 0,
PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 1, /* also X2S & X4S KEY_SHARE */
PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 2, /* also X2S & X4S ZK_PUBLIC */
PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 3, /* also X2S & X4S ZK_PROOF */
PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 4,
PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 5,
PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 6,
PSA_PAKE_SEQ_END = 7,
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
static psa_status_t mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error( int ret )
{
switch( ret )
{
case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA:
case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA:
case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY:
case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED:
return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID );
case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
case MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED:
return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
default:
return( PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR );
}
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE)
psa_status_t psa_pake_setup( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite)
{
/* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */
if( operation->alg != PSA_ALG_NONE )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
if( cipher_suite == NULL ||
PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(cipher_suite->algorithm ) == 0 ||
( cipher_suite->type != PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC &&
cipher_suite->type != PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH ) ||
PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( cipher_suite->hash ) == 0 )
{
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
if( cipher_suite->algorithm == PSA_ALG_JPAKE )
{
if( cipher_suite->type != PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC ||
cipher_suite->family != PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ||
cipher_suite->bits != 256 ||
cipher_suite->hash != PSA_ALG_SHA_256 )
{
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
operation->alg = cipher_suite->algorithm;
mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &operation->ctx.ecjpake );
operation->state = PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP;
operation->sequence = PSA_PAKE_SEQ_INVALID;
operation->input_step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_X1_X2;
operation->output_step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_X1_X2;
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->buffer, MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE );
operation->buffer_length = 0;
operation->buffer_offset = 0;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
else
#endif
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t password )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
psa_key_type_t type;
psa_key_usage_t usage;
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ||
operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP )
{
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
status = psa_get_key_attributes( password, &attributes );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes );
usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes );
psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );
if( type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD &&
type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH )
{
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
if( ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED );
operation->password = password;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
const uint8_t *user_id,
size_t user_id_len )
{
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ||
operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP )
{
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
if( user_id_len == 0 || user_id == NULL )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
const uint8_t *peer_id,
size_t peer_id_len )
{
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ||
operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP )
{
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
if( peer_id_len == 0 || peer_id == NULL )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
psa_pake_role_t role )
{
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ||
operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP )
{
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
if( role != PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE &&
role != PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST &&
role != PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND &&
role != PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT &&
role != PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER )
{
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE )
{
if( role != PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT &&
role != PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER )
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
operation->role = role;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
else
#endif
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
static psa_status_t psa_pake_ecjpake_setup( psa_pake_operation_t *operation )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ecjpake_role role;
psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
if( operation->role == PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT )
role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT;
else if( operation->role == PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER )
role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER;
else
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
if( psa_is_valid_key_id( operation->password, 1 ) == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( operation->password, &slot );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &operation->ctx.ecjpake,
role,
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1,
slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes );
psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
slot = NULL;
if( ret != 0 )
return( mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error( ret ) );
operation->state = PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
#endif
static psa_status_t psa_pake_output_internal(
psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
psa_pake_step_t step,
uint8_t *output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *output_length )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t length;
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ||
operation->state == PSA_PAKE_STATE_INVALID )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
if( output == NULL || output_size == 0 || output_length == NULL )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
/*
* The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and MbedTLS JPAKE API have a different
* handling of output sequencing.
*
* The MbedTLS JPAKE API outputs the whole X1+X2 and X2S steps data
* at once, on the other side the PSA CRYPTO PAKE api requires
* the KEY_SHARE/ZP_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF parts of X1, X2 & X2S to be
* retrieved in sequence.
*
* In order to achieve API compatibility, the whole X1+X2 or X2S steps
* data is stored in an intermediate buffer at first step output call,
* and data is sliced down by parsing the ECPoint records in order
* to return the right parts on each step.
*/
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE )
{
if( step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE &&
step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC &&
step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
if( operation->state == PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP ) {
status = psa_pake_ecjpake_setup( operation );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
}
if( operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY &&
operation->state != PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X1_X2 &&
operation->state != PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X2S )
{
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
if( operation->state == PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY )
{
if( step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
switch( operation->output_step )
{
case PSA_PAKE_STEP_X1_X2:
operation->state = PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X1_X2;
break;
case PSA_PAKE_STEP_X2S:
operation->state = PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X2S;
break;
default:
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
operation->sequence = PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE;
}
/* Check if step matches current sequence */
switch( operation->sequence )
{
case PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE:
case PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE:
if( step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
break;
case PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC:
case PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC:
if( step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
break;
case PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF:
case PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF:
if( step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
break;
default:
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
/* Initialize & write round on KEY_SHARE sequences */
if( operation->state == PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X1_X2 &&
operation->sequence == PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &operation->ctx.ecjpake,
operation->buffer,
MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE,
&operation->buffer_length,
mbedtls_psa_get_random,
MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE );
if( ret != 0 )
return( mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error( ret ) );
operation->buffer_offset = 0;
}
else if( operation->state == PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X2S &&
operation->sequence == PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &operation->ctx.ecjpake,
operation->buffer,
MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE,
&operation->buffer_length,
mbedtls_psa_get_random,
MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE );
if( ret != 0 )
return( mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error( ret ) );
operation->buffer_offset = 0;
}
/*
* mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_xxx() outputs thing in the format
* defined by draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01 section 7. The summary is
* that the data for each step is prepended with a length byte, and
* then they're concatenated. Additionally, the server's second round
* output is prepended with a 3-bytes ECParameters structure.
*
* In PSA, we output each step separately, and don't prepend the
* output with a length byte, even less a curve identifier, as that
* information is already available.
*/
if( operation->state == PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X2S &&
operation->sequence == PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE &&
operation->role == PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER )
{
/* Skip ECParameters, with is 3 bytes (RFC 8422) */
operation->buffer_offset += 3;
}
/* Read the length byte then move past it to the data */
length = operation->buffer[operation->buffer_offset];
operation->buffer_offset += 1;
if( operation->buffer_offset + length > operation->buffer_length )
return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT );
if( output_size < length )
return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
memcpy( output,
operation->buffer + operation->buffer_offset,
length );
*output_length = length;
operation->buffer_offset += length;
/* Reset buffer after ZK_PROOF sequence */
if( ( operation->state == PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X1_X2 &&
operation->sequence == PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF ) ||
( operation->state == PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X2S &&
operation->sequence == PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF ) )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->buffer, MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE );
operation->buffer_length = 0;
operation->buffer_offset = 0;
operation->state = PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY;
operation->output_step++;
operation->sequence = PSA_PAKE_SEQ_INVALID;
}
else
operation->sequence++;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
else
#endif
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
psa_status_t psa_pake_output( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
psa_pake_step_t step,
uint8_t *output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *output_length )
{
psa_status_t status = psa_pake_output_internal(
operation, step, output, output_size, output_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
psa_pake_abort( operation );
return( status );
}
static psa_status_t psa_pake_input_internal(
psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
psa_pake_step_t step,
const uint8_t *input,
size_t input_length )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ||
operation->state == PSA_PAKE_STATE_INVALID )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
if( input == NULL || input_length == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
/*
* The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and MbedTLS JPAKE API have a different
* handling of input sequencing.
*
* The MbedTLS JPAKE API takes the whole X1+X2 or X4S steps data
* at once as input, on the other side the PSA CRYPTO PAKE api requires
* the KEY_SHARE/ZP_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF parts of X1, X2 & X4S to be
* given in sequence.
*
* In order to achieve API compatibility, each X1+X2 or X4S step data
* is stored sequentially in an intermediate buffer and given to the
* MbedTLS JPAKE API on the last step.
*
* This causes any input error to be only detected on the last step.
*/
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE )
{
if( step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE &&
step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC &&
step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
const psa_pake_primitive_t prim = PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(
PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256 );
if( input_length > (size_t) PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE( PSA_ALG_JPAKE, prim, step ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
if( operation->state == PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP )
{
status = psa_pake_ecjpake_setup( operation );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
}
if( operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY &&
operation->state != PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X1_X2 &&
operation->state != PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X4S )
{
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
if( operation->state == PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY )
{
if( step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
switch( operation->input_step )
{
case PSA_PAKE_STEP_X1_X2:
operation->state = PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X1_X2;
break;
case PSA_PAKE_STEP_X2S:
operation->state = PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X4S;
break;
default:
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
operation->sequence = PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE;
}
/* Check if step matches current sequence */
switch( operation->sequence )
{
case PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE:
case PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE:
if( step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
break;
case PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC:
case PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC:
if( step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
break;
case PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF:
case PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF:
if( step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
break;
default:
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
/*
* Copy input to local buffer and format it as the Mbed TLS API
* expects, i.e. as defined by draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01 section 7.
* The summary is that the data for each step is prepended with a
* length byte, and then they're concatenated. Additionally, the
* server's second round output is prepended with a 3-bytes
* ECParameters structure - which means we have to prepend that when
* we're a client.
*/
if( operation->state == PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X4S &&
operation->sequence == PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE &&
operation->role == PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT )
{
/* We only support secp256r1. */
/* This is the ECParameters structure defined by RFC 8422. */
unsigned char ecparameters[3] = {
3, /* named_curve */
0, 23 /* secp256r1 */
};
memcpy( operation->buffer + operation->buffer_length,
ecparameters, sizeof( ecparameters ) );
operation->buffer_length += sizeof( ecparameters );
}
/* Write the length byte */
operation->buffer[operation->buffer_length] = (uint8_t) input_length;
operation->buffer_length += 1;
/* Finally copy the data */
memcpy( operation->buffer + operation->buffer_length,
input, input_length );
operation->buffer_length += input_length;
/* Load buffer at each last round ZK_PROOF */
if( operation->state == PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X1_X2 &&
operation->sequence == PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &operation->ctx.ecjpake,
operation->buffer,
operation->buffer_length );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->buffer, MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE );
operation->buffer_length = 0;
if( ret != 0 )
return( mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error( ret ) );
}
else if( operation->state == PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X4S &&
operation->sequence == PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &operation->ctx.ecjpake,
operation->buffer,
operation->buffer_length );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->buffer, MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE );
operation->buffer_length = 0;
if( ret != 0 )
return( mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error( ret ) );
}
if( ( operation->state == PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X1_X2 &&
operation->sequence == PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF ) ||
( operation->state == PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X4S &&
operation->sequence == PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF ) )
{
operation->state = PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY;
operation->input_step++;
operation->sequence = PSA_PAKE_SEQ_INVALID;
}
else
operation->sequence++;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
else
#endif
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
psa_status_t psa_pake_input( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
psa_pake_step_t step,
const uint8_t *input,
size_t input_length )
{
psa_status_t status = psa_pake_input_internal(
operation, step, input, input_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
psa_pake_abort( operation );
return( status );
}
psa_status_t psa_pake_get_implicit_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_derivation_operation_t *output)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ||
operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY ||
operation->input_step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_DERIVE ||
operation->output_step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_DERIVE )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key( &operation->ctx.ecjpake,
operation->buffer,
MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE,
&operation->buffer_length,
mbedtls_psa_get_random,
MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE );
if( ret != 0)
{
psa_pake_abort( operation );
return( mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error( ret ) );
}
status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( output,
PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
operation->buffer,
operation->buffer_length );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->buffer, MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE );
psa_pake_abort( operation );
return( status );
}
else
#endif
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t * operation)
{
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE )
{
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE )
{
operation->input_step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_INVALID;
operation->output_step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_INVALID;
operation->password = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
operation->role = PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE;
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->buffer, MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE );
operation->buffer_length = 0;
operation->buffer_offset = 0;
mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &operation->ctx.ecjpake );
}
#endif
operation->alg = PSA_ALG_NONE;
operation->state = PSA_PAKE_STATE_INVALID;
operation->sequence = PSA_PAKE_SEQ_INVALID;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
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