/** * Constant-time functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ /* * The following functions are implemented without using comparison operators, as those * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. */ #include "common.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #include "bignum_core.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) #include "ssl_misc.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) #include "constant_time_invasive.h" #endif #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, \ psa_to_ssl_errors, \ psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls) #endif /* * Define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS where assembly is present to * perform fast unaligned access to volatile data. * * This is needed because mbedtls_get_unaligned_uintXX etc don't support volatile * memory accesses. * * Some of these definitions could be moved into alignment.h but for now they are * only used here. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) #if ((defined(__arm__) || defined(__thumb__) || defined(__thumb2__)) && \ (UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffful)) || defined(__aarch64__) /* We check pointer sizes to avoid issues with them not matching register size requirements */ #define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS #endif #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS) static inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(volatile const unsigned char *p) { /* This is UB, even where it's safe: * return *((volatile uint32_t*)p); * so instead the same thing is expressed in assembly below. */ uint32_t r; #if defined(__arm__) || defined(__thumb__) || defined(__thumb2__) asm volatile ("ldr %0, [%1]" : "=r" (r) : "r" (p) :); #elif defined(__aarch64__) asm volatile ("ldr %w0, [%1]" : "=r" (r) : MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT(p) :); #endif return r; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS */ int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t n) { size_t i = 0; /* * `A` and `B` are cast to volatile to ensure that the compiler * generates code that always fully reads both buffers. * Otherwise it could generate a test to exit early if `diff` has all * bits set early in the loop. */ volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; uint32_t diff = 0; #if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS) for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(A + i); uint32_t y = mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(B + i); diff |= x ^ y; } #endif for (; i < n; i++) { /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff. * This avoids IAR compiler warning: * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */ unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i]; diff |= x ^ y; } return (int) diff; } unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(unsigned value) { /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ #if defined(_MSC_VER) #pragma warning( push ) #pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) #endif return -((value | -value) >> (sizeof(value) * 8 - 1)); #if defined(_MSC_VER) #pragma warning( pop ) #endif } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask(size_t value) { /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ #if defined(_MSC_VER) #pragma warning( push ) #pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) #endif return -((value | -value) >> (sizeof(value) * 8 - 1)); #if defined(_MSC_VER) #pragma warning( pop ) #endif } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask(mbedtls_mpi_uint value) { /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ #if defined(_MSC_VER) #pragma warning( push ) #pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) #endif return -((value | -value) >> (sizeof(value) * 8 - 1)); #if defined(_MSC_VER) #pragma warning( pop ) #endif } #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) /** Constant-flow mask generation for "less than" comparison: * - if \p x < \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 * * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches * with bit operations using masks. * * \param x The first value to analyze. * \param y The second value to analyze. * * \return All-bits-one if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise zero. */ static size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt(size_t x, size_t y) { /* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */ const size_t sub = x - y; /* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */ const size_t sub1 = sub >> (sizeof(sub) * 8 - 1); /* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */ const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask(sub1); return mask; } size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(size_t x, size_t y) { return ~mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt(x, y); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) /* Return 0xff if low <= c <= high, 0 otherwise. * * Constant flow with respect to c. */ MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(unsigned char low, unsigned char high, unsigned char c) { /* low_mask is: 0 if low <= c, 0x...ff if low > c */ unsigned low_mask = ((unsigned) c - low) >> 8; /* high_mask is: 0 if c <= high, 0x...ff if c > high */ unsigned high_mask = ((unsigned) high - c) >> 8; return ~(low_mask | high_mask) & 0xff; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(size_t x, size_t y) { /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */ const size_t diff = x ^ y; /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ #if defined(_MSC_VER) #pragma warning( push ) #pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) #endif /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */ const size_t diff_msb = (diff | (size_t) -diff); #if defined(_MSC_VER) #pragma warning( pop ) #endif /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */ const unsigned diff1 = diff_msb >> (sizeof(diff_msb) * 8 - 1); return 1 ^ diff1; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) /** Constant-flow "greater than" comparison: * return x > y * * This is equivalent to \p x > \p y, but is likely to be compiled * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. * * \param x The first value to analyze. * \param y The second value to analyze. * * \return 1 if \p x greater than \p y, otherwise 0. */ static unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_gt(size_t x, size_t y) { /* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (y - x). */ return (y - x) >> (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 1); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt(const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, const mbedtls_mpi_uint y) { mbedtls_mpi_uint ret; mbedtls_mpi_uint cond; /* * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different. */ cond = (x ^ y); /* * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x> (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * 8 - 1); return (unsigned) ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(unsigned condition, unsigned if1, unsigned if0) { unsigned mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(condition); return (mask & if1) | (~mask & if0); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign(size_t n, mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, unsigned char condition) { size_t i; /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ #if defined(_MSC_VER) #pragma warning( push ) #pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) #endif /* all-bits 1 if condition is 1, all-bits 0 if condition is 0 */ const mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = -condition; #if defined(_MSC_VER) #pragma warning( pop ) #endif for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { dest[i] = (src[i] & mask) | (dest[i] & ~mask); } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(unsigned char value) { unsigned char digit = 0; /* For each range of values, if value is in that range, mask digit with * the corresponding value. Since value can only be in a single range, * only at most one masking will change digit. */ digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(0, 25, value) & ('A' + value); digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(26, 51, value) & ('a' + value - 26); digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(52, 61, value) & ('0' + value - 52); digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(62, 62, value) & '+'; digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(63, 63, value) & '/'; return digit; } signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(unsigned char c) { unsigned char val = 0; /* For each range of digits, if c is in that range, mask val with * the corresponding value. Since c can only be in a single range, * only at most one masking will change val. Set val to one plus * the desired value so that it stays 0 if c is in none of the ranges. */ val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('A', 'Z', c) & (c - 'A' + 0 + 1); val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('a', 'z', c) & (c - 'a' + 26 + 1); val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('0', '9', c) & (c - '0' + 52 + 1); val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('+', '+', c) & (c - '+' + 62 + 1); val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('/', '/', c) & (c - '/' + 63 + 1); /* At this point, val is 0 if c is an invalid digit and v+1 if c is * a digit with the value v. */ return val - 1; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) /** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer. * * `mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally * equivalent to * ``` * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset); * memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset); * ``` * but it strives to use a memory access pattern (and thus total timing) * that does not depend on \p offset. This timing independence comes at * the expense of performance. * * \param start Pointer to the start of the buffer. * \param total Total size of the buffer. * \param offset Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes. */ static void mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(void *start, size_t total, size_t offset) { volatile unsigned char *buf = start; size_t i, n; if (total == 0) { return; } for (i = 0; i < total; i++) { unsigned no_op = mbedtls_ct_size_gt(total - offset, i); /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and * zero out the last byte. */ for (n = 0; n < total - 1; n++) { unsigned char current = buf[n]; unsigned char next = buf[n+1]; buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(no_op, current, next); } buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(no_op, buf[total-1], 0); } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq(unsigned char *dest, const unsigned char *src, size_t len, size_t c1, size_t c2) { /* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */ const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(c1, c2); /* dest[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dest[i] */ size_t i = 0; #if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) const uint32_t mask32 = (uint32_t) mbedtls_ct_size_mask(equal); const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mask32 & 0xff; for (; (i + 4) <= len; i += 4) { uint32_t a = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(src + i) & mask32; uint32_t b = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(dest + i) & ~mask32; mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(dest + i, a | b); } #else const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_mask(equal); #endif /* MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS */ for (; i < len; i++) { dest[i] = (src[i] & mask) | (dest[i] & ~mask); } } void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(unsigned char *dest, const unsigned char *src, size_t offset, size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max, size_t len) { size_t offsetval; for (offsetval = offset_min; offsetval <= offset_max; offsetval++) { mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq(dest, src + offsetval, len, offsetval, offset); } } #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) #define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_384) #elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) #define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) #else /* See check_config.h */ #define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1) #endif int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t mac_alg, const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret, size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len, unsigned char *output) { /* * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses psa_hash_clone() * extension in order to get constant-flow behaviour. * * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2). * * We'll first compute ikey/okey, then inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by * hashing up to minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up * to maxlen finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the * correct result. * * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. */ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(mac_alg); const size_t block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(hash_alg); unsigned char key_buf[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH]; const size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; size_t hash_length; unsigned char aux_out[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; psa_hash_operation_t aux_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; size_t offset; psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t mac_key_length; size_t i; #define PSA_CHK(func_call) \ do { \ status = (func_call); \ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) \ goto cleanup; \ } while (0) /* Export MAC key * We assume key length is always exactly the output size * which is never more than the block size, thus we use block_size * as the key buffer size. */ PSA_CHK(psa_export_key(key, key_buf, block_size, &mac_key_length)); /* Calculate ikey */ for (i = 0; i < mac_key_length; i++) { key_buf[i] = (unsigned char) (key_buf[i] ^ 0x36); } for (; i < block_size; ++i) { key_buf[i] = 0x36; } PSA_CHK(psa_hash_setup(&operation, hash_alg)); /* Now compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) */ PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, key_buf, block_size)); PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, add_data, add_data_len)); PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, data, min_data_len)); /* Fill the hash buffer in advance with something that is * not a valid hash (barring an attack on the hash and * deliberately-crafted input), in case the caller doesn't * check the return status properly. */ memset(output, '!', hash_size); /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ for (offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++) { PSA_CHK(psa_hash_clone(&operation, &aux_operation)); PSA_CHK(psa_hash_finish(&aux_operation, aux_out, PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE, &hash_length)); /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq(output, aux_out, hash_size, offset, data_len_secret); if (offset < max_data_len) { PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, data + offset, 1)); } } /* Abort current operation to prepare for final operation */ PSA_CHK(psa_hash_abort(&operation)); /* Calculate okey */ for (i = 0; i < mac_key_length; i++) { key_buf[i] = (unsigned char) ((key_buf[i] ^ 0x36) ^ 0x5C); } for (; i < block_size; ++i) { key_buf[i] = 0x5C; } /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ PSA_CHK(psa_hash_setup(&operation, hash_alg)); PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, key_buf, block_size)); PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, output, hash_size)); PSA_CHK(psa_hash_finish(&operation, output, hash_size, &hash_length)); #undef PSA_CHK cleanup: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_buf, MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(aux_out, PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE); psa_hash_abort(&operation); psa_hash_abort(&aux_operation); return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); } #undef MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH #else int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret, size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len, unsigned char *output) { /* * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone() * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour. * * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx. * * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result. * * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. */ const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type(ctx->md_info); /* TLS 1.2 only supports SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5, * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */ const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64; const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx; const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size; const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_info); unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; mbedtls_md_context_t aux; size_t offset; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_md_init(&aux); #define MD_CHK(func_call) \ do { \ ret = (func_call); \ if (ret != 0) \ goto cleanup; \ } while (0) MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_setup(&aux, ctx->md_info, 0)); /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed, * so we can start directly with the message */ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, add_data, add_data_len)); MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, data, min_data_len)); /* Fill the hash buffer in advance with something that is * not a valid hash (barring an attack on the hash and * deliberately-crafted input), in case the caller doesn't * check the return status properly. */ memset(output, '!', hash_size); /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ for (offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++) { MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_clone(&aux, ctx)); MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(&aux, aux_out)); /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq(output, aux_out, hash_size, offset, data_len_secret); if (offset < max_data_len) { MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, data + offset, 1)); } } /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, aux_out)); /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)); MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, okey, block_size)); MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, output, hash_size)); MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, output)); /* Done, get ready for next time */ MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(ctx)); #undef MD_CHK cleanup: mbedtls_md_free(&aux); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) #define MPI_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA) /* * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information * about whether the assignment was made or not. * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.) */ #if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_ARM64) && (_MSC_FULL_VER < 193131103) /* * MSVC miscompiles this function if it's inlined prior to Visual Studio 2022 version 17.1. See: * https://developercommunity.visualstudio.com/t/c-compiler-miscompiles-part-of-mbedtls-library-on/1646989 */ __declspec(noinline) #endif int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char assign) { int ret = 0; MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */ mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask(assign); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n)); X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(assign, Y->s, X->s); mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, assign); for (size_t i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++) { X->p[i] &= ~limb_mask; } cleanup: return ret; } /* * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information * about whether the swap was made or not. * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which would lead to * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards. */ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char swap) { int ret = 0; int s; MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); if (X == Y) { return 0; } MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Y, X->n)); s = X->s; X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(swap, Y->s, X->s); Y->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(swap, s, Y->s); mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(X->p, Y->p, X->n, swap); cleanup: return ret; } /* * Compare unsigned values in constant time */ unsigned mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, size_t limbs) { unsigned ret, cond, done; /* The value of any of these variables is either 0 or 1 for the rest of * their scope. */ ret = cond = done = 0; for (size_t i = limbs; i > 0; i--) { /* * If B[i - 1] < A[i - 1] then A < B is false and the result must * remain 0. * * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and * the fact that we are done and continue looping. */ cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt(B[i - 1], A[i - 1]); done |= cond; /* * If A[i - 1] < B[i - 1] then A < B is true. * * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and * the fact that we are done and continue looping. */ cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt(A[i - 1], B[i - 1]); ret |= cond & (1 - done); done |= cond; } /* * If all the limbs were equal, then the numbers are equal, A < B is false * and leaving the result 0 is correct. */ return ret; } /* * Compare signed values in constant time */ int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned *ret) { size_t i; /* The value of any of these variables is either 0 or 1 at all times. */ unsigned cond, done, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative; MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); MPI_VALIDATE_RET(ret != NULL); if (X->n != Y->n) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } /* * Set sign_N to 1 if N >= 0, 0 if N < 0. * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0. */ X_is_negative = (X->s & 2) >> 1; Y_is_negative = (Y->s & 2) >> 1; /* * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger. * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0). */ cond = (X_is_negative ^ Y_is_negative); *ret = cond & X_is_negative; /* * This is a constant-time function. We might have the result, but we still * need to go through the loop. Record if we have the result already. */ done = cond; for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) { /* * If Y->p[i - 1] < X->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both * X and Y are negative. * * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and * the fact that we are done and continue looping. */ cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt(Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1]); *ret |= cond & (1 - done) & X_is_negative; done |= cond; /* * If X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both * X and Y are positive. * * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and * the fact that we are done and continue looping. */ cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt(X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1]); *ret |= cond & (1 - done) & (1 - X_is_negative); done |= cond; } return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len, size_t *olen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i, plaintext_max_size; /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise * this would open the execution of the function to * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared * branch predictor). */ size_t pad_count = 0; unsigned bad = 0; unsigned char pad_done = 0; size_t plaintext_size = 0; unsigned output_too_large; plaintext_max_size = (output_max_len > ilen - 11) ? ilen - 11 : output_max_len; /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */ bad |= input[0]; /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */ bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */ for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) { pad_done |= ((input[i] | (unsigned char) -input[i]) >> 7) ^ 1; pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char) -pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; } /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */ bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if(pad_done, 0, 1); /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */ bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_gt(8, pad_count); /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */ plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, (unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3)); /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */ output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_size_gt(plaintext_size, plaintext_max_size); /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return: * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0). * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer. * - 0 if the padding is correct. */ ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if( bad, -MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING, mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large, -MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE, 0)); /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer. * We need to copy the same amount of data * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or * through memory or cache access patterns. */ bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(bad | output_too_large); for (i = 11; i < ilen; i++) { input[i] &= ~bad; } /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size. * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */ plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, (unsigned) plaintext_size); /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive * information. */ mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size); /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other * secrets. */ if (output_max_len != 0) { memcpy(output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size); } /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */ *olen = plaintext_size; return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */