This document explains the strategy that was used so far in starting the migration to PSA Crypto and mentions future perspectives and open questions. Goals ===== Several benefits are expected from migrating to PSA Crypto: G1. Use PSA Crypto drivers when available. G2. Allow isolation of long-term secrets (for example, private keys). G3. Allow isolation of short-term secrets (for example, TLS sesssion keys). G4. Have a clean, unified API for Crypto (retire the legacy API). G5. Code size: compile out our implementation when a driver is available. Currently, some parts of (G1) and (G2) are implemented when `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled. For (G2) to take effect, the application needs to be changed to use new APIs. Generally speaking, the numbering above doesn't mean that each goal requires the preceding ones to be completed, for example G2-G5 could be done in any order; however they all either depend on G1 or are just much more convenient if G1 is done before (note that this is not a dependency on G1 being complete, it's more like each bit of G2-G5 is helped by some speficic bit in G1). So, a solid intermediate goal would be to complete (G1) when `MBEDTLS_USA_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled - that is, all crypto operations in X.509 and TLS would be done via the PSA Crypto API. Compile-time options ==================== We currently have two compile-time options that are relevant to the migration: - `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C` - enabled by default, controls the presence of the PSA Crypto APIs. - `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` - disabled by default (enabled in "full" config), controls usage of PSA Crypto APIs to perform operations in X.509 and TLS (G1 above), as well as the availability of some new APIs (G2 above). The reasons why `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is optional and disabled by default are: - it's incompatible with `MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE`, `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` and `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER`; - to avoid a hard/default dependency of X509 and TLS and `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C`, mostly reasons of code size, and historically concerns about the maturity of the PSA code (which we might want to re-evaluate). The downside of this approach is that until we feel ready to make `MBDEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` non-optional (always enabled), we have to maintain two versions of some parts of the code: one using PSA, the other using the legacy APIs. However, see next section for strategies that can lower that cost. The rest of this section explains the reasons for the incompatibilities mentioned above. ### `MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE` Currently this option controls not only the presence of restartable APIs in the crypto library, but also their use in the TLS and X.509 layers. Since PSA Crypto does not support restartable operations, there's a clear conflict: the TLS and X.509 layers can't both use only PSA APIs and get restartable behaviour. Supporting this in PSA is on our roadmap (it's been requested). But it's way below generalizing support for `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` for “mainstream” use cases on our priority list. So in the medium term `MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE` is incompatible with `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`. Note: it is possible to make the options compatible at build time simply by deciding that when `USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled, then `MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE` cease to have any effect on X.509 and TLS: it simply controls the presence of the APIs in libmbedcrypto. (Or we could split `ECP_RESTARTABLE` into several options to achieve a similar effect.) This would allow people to use restartable ECC in non-TLS, non-X509 code (for example firmware verification) with a build that also uses PSA for TLS and X509), if there is an interest for that. ### `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` X509 and TLS code use `MBEDTLS_xxx` macros to decide whether an algorithm is supported. This doesn't make `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` incompatible with `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` per se, but it makes it incompatible with most useful uses of `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG`. The point of `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` is to be able to build a library with support for an algorithm through a PSA driver only, without building the software implementation of that algorithm. But then the TLS code would consider the algorithm unavailable. This is tracked in https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3674 and https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3677. But now that I look at it with fresh eyes, I don't think the approach we were planning to use would actually works. This needs more design effort. This is something we need to support eventually, and several partners want it. I don't know what the priority is for `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` between improving driver support and covering more of the protocol. It seems to me that it'll be less work overall to first implement a good architecture for `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` and then extend to more protocol featues, because implementing that architecture will require changes to the existing code and the less code there is at this point the better, whereas extending to more procotol features will require the same amount of work either way. ### `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER` When `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER` is enabled, the library is built for use with an RPC server that dispatches PSA crypto function calls from multiple clients. In such a build, all the `psa_xxx` functions that take would normally take a `psa_key_id_t` as argument instead take a structure containing both the key id and the client id. And so if e.g. a TLS function calls `psa_import_key`, it would have to pass this structure, not just the `psa_key_id_t` key id. A solution is to use `mbedtls_svc_key_id_t` throughout instead of `psa_key_id_t`, and use similar abstractions to define values. That's what we do in unit tests of PSA crypto itself to support both cases. That abstraction is more confusing to readers, so the less we use it the better. I don't think supporting TLS and an RPC interface in the same build is an important use case (I don't remember anyone requesting it). So I propose to ignore it in the design: we just don't intend to support it. Taking advantage of the existing abstractions layers - or not ============================================================= The Crypto library in Mbed TLS currently has 3 abstraction layers that offer algorithm-agnostic APIs for a class of algorithms: - MD for messages digests aka hashes (including HMAC) - Cipher for symmetric ciphers (included AEAD) - PK for asymmetric (aka public-key) cryptography (excluding key exchange) Note: key exchange (FFDH, ECDH) is not covered by an abstraction layer. These abstraction layers typically provide, in addition to the API for crypto operations, types and numerical identifiers for algorithms (for example `mbedtls_cipher_mode_t` and its values). The current strategy is to keep using those identifiers in most of the code, in particular in existing structures and public APIs, even when `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled. (This is not an issue for G1, G2, G3 above, and is only potentially relevant for G4.) The are multiple strategies that can be used regarding the place of those layers in the migration to PSA. Silently call to PSA from the abstraction layer ----------------------------------------------- - Provide a new definition (conditionally on `USE_PSA_CRYPTO`) of wrapper functions in the abstraction layer, that calls PSA instead of the legacy crypto API. - Upside: changes contained to a single place, no need to change TLS or X.509 code anywhere. - Downside: tricky to implement if the PSA implementation is currently done on top of that layer (dependency loop). This strategy is currently used for ECDSA signature verification in the PK layer, and could be extended to all operations in the PK layer. This strategy is not very well suited to the Cipher and MD layers, as the PSA implementation is currently done on top of those layers. Replace calls for each operation -------------------------------- - For every operation that's done through this layer in TLS or X.509, just replace function call with calls to PSA (conditionally on `USE_PSA_CRYPTO`) - Upside: conceptually simple, and if the PSA implementation is currently done on top of that layer, avoids concerns about dependency loops. - Downside: TLS/X.509 code has to be done for each operation. This strategy is currently used for the MD layer. (Currently only a subset of calling places, but could be extended to all of them.) Opt-in use of PSA from the abstraction layer -------------------------------------------- - Provide a new way to set up a context that causes operations on that context to be done via PSA. - Upside: changes mostly contained in one place, TLS/X.509 code only needs to be changed when setting up the context, but not when using it. In particular, no changes to/duplication of existing public APIs that expect a key to be passed as a context of this layer (eg, `mbedtls_pk_context`). - Upside: avoids dependency loop when PSA implemented on top of that layer. - Downside: when the context is typically set up by the application, requires changes in application code. There are two variants of this strategy: one where using the new setup function also allows for key isolation (the key is only held by PSA, supporting both G1 and G2 in that area), and one without isolation (the key is still stored outsde of PSA most of the time, supporting only G1). This strategy, with support for key isolation, is currently used for ECDSA signature generation in the PK layer - see `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()`. This allows use of PSA-held private ECDSA keys in TLS and X.509 with no change to the TLS/X.509 code, but a contained change in the application. If could be extended to other private key operations in the PK layer. This strategy, without key isolation, is also currently used in the Cipher layer - see `mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()`. This allows use of PSA for cipher operations in TLS with no change to the application code, and a contained change in TLS code. (It currently only supports a subset of ciphers, but could easily be extended to all of them.) Note: for private key operations in the PK layer, both the "silent" and the "opt-in" strategy can apply, and can complement each other, as one provides support for key isolation, but at the (unavoidable) code of change in application code, while the other requires no application change to get support for drivers, but fails to provide isolation support. Migrating away from the legacy API ================================== This section briefly introduces questions and possible plans towards G4, mainly as they relate to choices in previous stages. The role of the PK/Cipher/MD APIs in user migration --------------------------------------------------- We're currently taking advantage of the existing PK and Cipher layers in order to reduce the number of places where library code needs to be changed. It's only natural to consider using the same strategy (with the PK, MD and Cipher layers) for facilitating migration of application code. Note: a necessary first step for that would be to make sure PSA is no longer implemented of top of the concerned layers ### Zero-cost compatibility layer? The most favourable case is if we can have a zero-cost abstraction (no runtime, RAM usage or code size penalty), for example just a bunch of `#define`s, essentialy mapping `mbedtls_` APIs to their `psa_` equivalent. Unfortunately that's unlikely fully work. For example, the MD layer uses the same context type for hashes and HMACs, while the PSA API (rightfully) has distinct operation types. Similarly, the Cipher layer uses the same context type for unauthenticated and AEAD ciphers, which again the PSA API distinguishes. It is unclear how much value, if any, a zero-cost compatibility layer that's incomplete (for example, for MD covering only hashes, or for Cipher covering only AEAD) or differs significantly from the existing API (for example, introducing new context types) would provide to users. ### Low-cost compatibility layers? Another possibility is to keep most or all of the existing API for the PK, MD and Cipher layers, implemented on top of PSA, aiming for the lowest possible cost. For example, `mbedtls_md_context_t` would be defined as a (tagged) union of `psa_hash_operation_t` and `psa_mac_operation_t`, then `mbedtls_md_setup()` would initialize the correct part, and the rest of the functions be simple wrappers around PSA functions. This would vastly reduce the complexity of the layers compared to the existing (no need to dispatch through function pointers, just call the corresponding PSA API). Since this would still represent a non-zero cost, not only in terms of code size, but also in terms of maintainance (testing, etc.) this would probably be a temporary solution: for example keep the compatibility layers in 4.0 (and make them optional), but remove them in 5.0. Again, this provides the most value to users if we can manage to keep the existing API unchanged. Their might be conflcits between this goal and that of reducing the cost, and judgment calls may need to be made. Note: when it comes to holding public keys in the PK layer, depending on how the rest of the code is structured, it may be worth holding the key data in memory controlled by the PK layer as opposed to a PSA key slot, moving it to a slot only when needed (see current `ecdsa_verify_wrap` when `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is defined) For example, when parsing a large number, N, of X.509 certificates (for example the list of trusted roots), it might be undesirable to use N PSA key slots for their public keys as long as the certs are loaded. OTOH, this could also be addressed by merging the "X.509 parsing on-demand" (#2478), and then the public key data would be held as bytes in the X.509 CRT structure, and only moved to a PK context / PSA slot when it's actually used. Note: the PK layer actually consists of two relatively distinct parts: crypto operations, which will be covered by PSA, and parsing/writing (exporting) from/to various formats, which is currently not fully covered by the PSA Crypto API. ### Algorithm identifiers and other identifiers It should be easy to provide the user with a bunch of `#define`s for algorithm identifiers, for example `#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 PSA_ALG_SHA_256`; most of those would be in the MD, Cipher and PK compatibility layers mentioned above, but there might be some in other modules that may be worth considering, for example identifiers for elliptic curves. ### Lower layers Generally speaking, we would retire all of the low-level, non-generic modules, such as AES, SHA-256, RSA, DHM, ECDH, ECP, bignum, etc, without providing compatibility APIs for them. People would be encouraged to switch to the PSA API. (The compatiblity implementation of the existing PK, MD, Cipher APIs would mostly benefit people who already used those generic APis rather than the low-level, alg-specific ones.) ### APIs in TLS and X.509 Public APIs in TLS and X.509 may be affected by the migration in at least two ways: 1. APIs that rely on a legacy `mbedtls_` crypto type: for example `mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert()` to configure a (certificate and the associated) private key. Currently the private key is passed as a `mbedtls_pk_context` object, which would probably change to a `psa_key_id_t`. Since some users would probably still be using the compatibility PK layer, it would need a way to easily extract the PSA key ID from the PK context. 2. APIs the accept list of identifiers: for example `mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves()` taking a list of `mbedtls_ecp_group_id`s. This could be changed to accept a list of pairs (`psa_ecc_familiy_t`, size) but we should probably take this opportunity to move to a identifier independant from the underlying crypto implementation and use TLS-specific identifiers instead (based on IANA values or custom enums), as is currently done in the new `mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups()` API, see #4859). Testing ------- An question that needs careful consideration when we come around to removing the low-level crypto APIs and making PK, MD and Cipher optional compatibility layers is to be sure to preserve testing quality. A lot of the existing test cases use the low level crypto APIs; we would need to either keep using that API for tests, or manually migrated test to the PSA Crypto API. Perhaps a combination of both, perhaps evolving gradually over time.