/* * TLS server-side functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include "ssl_misc.h" #include "mbedtls/debug.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include "hash_info.h" #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, \ psa_to_ssl_errors, \ psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) #include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *info, size_t ilen) { if (ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id); if ((ssl->cli_id = mbedtls_calloc(1, ilen)) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } memcpy(ssl->cli_id, info, ilen); ssl->cli_id_len = ilen; return 0; } void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write, mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check, void *p_cookie) { conf->f_cookie_write = f_cookie_write; conf->f_cookie_check = f_cookie_check; conf->p_cookie = p_cookie; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) { if (conf->f_psk != NULL) { return 1; } if (conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || conf->psk_identity == NULL) { return 0; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { return 1; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { return 1; } return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */ if (len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len || buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len || mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching renegotiation info")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ { if (len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-zero length renegotiation info")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; } return 0; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) /* * Function for parsing a supported groups (TLS 1.3) or supported elliptic * curves (TLS 1.2) extension. * * The "extension_data" field of a supported groups extension contains a * "NamedGroupList" value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446): * enum { * secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019), * x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E), * ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102), * ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104), * ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF), * ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF), * (0xFFFF) * } NamedGroup; * struct { * NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>; * } NamedGroupList; * * The "extension_data" field of a supported elliptic curves extension contains * a "NamedCurveList" value (TLS 1.2 RFC 8422): * enum { * deprecated(1..22), * secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25), * x25519(29), x448(30), * reserved (0xFE00..0xFEFF), * deprecated(0xFF01..0xFF02), * (0xFFFF) * } NamedCurve; * struct { * NamedCurve named_curve_list<2..2^16-1> * } NamedCurveList; * * The TLS 1.3 supported groups extension was defined to be a compatible * generalization of the TLS 1.2 supported elliptic curves extension. They both * share the same extension identifier. * * DHE groups are not supported yet. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { size_t list_size, our_size; const unsigned char *p; uint16_t *curves_tls_id; if (len < 2) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } list_size = ((buf[0] << 8) | (buf[1])); if (list_size + 2 != len || list_size % 2 != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* Should never happen unless client duplicates the extension */ if (ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id != NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } /* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory, * and leave room for a final 0 */ our_size = list_size / 2 + 1; if (our_size > MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX) { our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX; } if ((curves_tls_id = mbedtls_calloc(our_size, sizeof(*curves_tls_id))) == NULL) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id = curves_tls_id; p = buf + 2; while (list_size > 0 && our_size > 1) { uint16_t curr_tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); if (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(curr_tls_id) != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { *curves_tls_id++ = curr_tls_id; our_size--; } list_size -= 2; p += 2; } return 0; } MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { size_t list_size; const unsigned char *p; if (len == 0 || (size_t) (buf[0] + 1) != len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } list_size = buf[0]; p = buf + 1; while (list_size > 0) { if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ (defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)) ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; #endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && ( MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ) */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, p[0]); #endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("point format selected: %d", p[0])); return 0; } list_size--; p++; } return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if (ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1) #else if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip ecjpake kkpp extension")); return 0; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, buf, len, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE)) != 0) { psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round one", ret); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return ret; } #else if ((ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, buf, len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */ ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK; return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { if (len != 1 || buf[0] >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0]; return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { size_t peer_cid_len; /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */ if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } /* * struct { * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; * } ConnectionId; */ if (len < 1) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } peer_cid_len = *buf++; len--; if (len != peer_cid_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* Ignore CID if the user has disabled its use. */ if (ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) { /* Leave ssl->handshake->cid_in_use in its default * value of MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Client sent CID extension, but CID disabled")); return 0; } if (peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len; memcpy(ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use of CID extension negotiated")); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Client CID", buf, peer_cid_len); return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { if (len != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ((void) buf); if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) { ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; } return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { if (len != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ((void) buf); if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) { ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; } return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ssl_session session; mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session); if (ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL || ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL) { return 0; } /* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */ ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, len)); if (len == 0) { return 0; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket rejected: renegotiating")); return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ /* * Failures are ok: just ignore the ticket and proceed. */ if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse(ssl->conf->p_ticket, &session, buf, len)) != 0) { mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session); if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is not authentic")); } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is expired")); } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse", ret); } return 0; } /* * Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to * inform them we're accepting the ticket (RFC 5077 section 3.4) */ session.id_len = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; memcpy(&session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.id_len); mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate); memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); /* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("session successfully restored from ticket")); ssl->handshake->resume = 1; /* Don't send a new ticket after all, this one is OK */ ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile client_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; size_t i, j; size_t profile_length; uint16_t mki_length; /*! 2 bytes for profile length and 1 byte for mki len */ const size_t size_of_lengths = 3; /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */ if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL) || (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0)) { return 0; } /* RFC5764 section 4.1.1 * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; * * struct { * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; * } UseSRTPData; * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; */ /* * Min length is 5: at least one protection profile(2 bytes) * and length(2 bytes) + srtp_mki length(1 byte) * Check here that we have at least 2 bytes of protection profiles length * and one of srtp_mki length */ if (len < size_of_lengths) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; /* first 2 bytes are protection profile length(in bytes) */ profile_length = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1]; buf += 2; /* The profile length cannot be bigger than input buffer size - lengths fields */ if (profile_length > len - size_of_lengths || profile_length % 2 != 0) { /* profiles are 2 bytes long, so the length must be even */ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* * parse the extension list values are defined in * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml */ for (j = 0; j < profile_length; j += 2) { uint16_t protection_profile_value = buf[j] << 8 | buf[j + 1]; client_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(protection_profile_value); if (client_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found srtp profile: %s", mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( client_protection))); } else { continue; } /* check if suggested profile is in our list */ for (i = 0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) { if (client_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]) { ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected srtp profile: %s", mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( client_protection))); break; } } if (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { break; } } buf += profile_length; /* buf points to the mki length */ mki_length = *buf; buf++; if (mki_length > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH || mki_length + profile_length + size_of_lengths != len) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* Parse the mki only if present and mki is supported locally */ if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED && mki_length > 0) { ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_length; memcpy(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, buf, mki_length); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "using mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len); } return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ /* * Auxiliary functions for ServerHello parsing and related actions */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /* * Return 0 if the given key uses one of the acceptable curves, -1 otherwise */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_check_key_curve(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, uint16_t *curves_tls_id) { uint16_t *curr_tls_id = curves_tls_id; mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk)->grp.id; mbedtls_ecp_group_id curr_grp_id; while (*curr_tls_id != 0) { curr_grp_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id); if (curr_grp_id == grp_id) { return 0; } curr_tls_id++; } return -1; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ /* * Try picking a certificate for this ciphersuite, * return 0 on success and -1 on failure. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info) { mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list; #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) psa_algorithm_t pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(ciphersuite_info); psa_key_usage_t pk_usage = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(ciphersuite_info); #else mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ uint32_t flags; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) if (ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL) { list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert; } else #endif list = ssl->conf->key_cert; int pk_alg_is_none = 0; #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) pk_alg_is_none = (pk_alg == PSA_ALG_NONE); #else pk_alg_is_none = (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if (pk_alg_is_none) { return 0; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite requires certificate")); if (list == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server has no certificate")); return -1; } for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { flags = 0; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate", cur->cert); int key_type_matches = 0; #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) key_type_matches = ((ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL || ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL || mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage)) && mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg, pk_usage)); #else key_type_matches = ( mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage)); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ #else key_type_matches = mbedtls_pk_can_do(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if (!key_type_matches) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: key type")); continue; } /* * This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on * keyUsage or other extensions. * * It also allows the user to provision different certificates for * different uses based on keyUsage, eg if they want to avoid signing * and decrypting with the same RSA key. */ if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(cur->cert, ciphersuite_info, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &flags) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: " "(extended) key usage extension")); continue; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && ssl_check_key_curve(&cur->cert->pk, ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: elliptic curve")); continue; } #endif /* If we get there, we got a winner */ break; } /* Do not update ssl->handshake->key_cert unless there is a match */ if (cur != NULL) { ssl->handshake->key_cert = cur; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "selected certificate chain, certificate", ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert); return 0; } return -1; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ /* * Check if a given ciphersuite is suitable for use with our config/keys/etc * Sets ciphersuite_info only if the suite matches. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **ciphersuite_info) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type; #endif suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(suite_id); if (suite_info == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", (unsigned int) suite_id, suite_info->name)); if (suite_info->min_tls_version > ssl->tls_version || suite_info->max_tls_version < ssl->tls_version) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: version")); return 0; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && (ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK) == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake " "not configured or ext missing")); return 0; } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite_info) && (ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id == NULL || ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id[0] == 0)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: " "no common elliptic curve")); return 0; } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) /* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't * have one, skip it now rather than failing later */ if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(suite_info) && ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(ssl->conf) == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key")); return 0; } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /* * Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a * certificate/key of a particular type: * - select the appropriate certificate if we have one, or * - try the next ciphersuite if we don't * This must be done last since we modify the key_cert list. */ if (ssl_pick_cert(ssl, suite_info) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: " "no suitable certificate")); return 0; } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */ sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(suite_info); if (sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_type)) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm " "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type)); return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ *ciphersuite_info = suite_info; return 0; } /* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is not talking SSL/TLS at all and would not understand our alert. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret, got_common_suite; size_t i, j; size_t ciph_offset, comp_offset, ext_offset; size_t msg_len, ciph_len, sess_len, comp_len, ext_len; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) size_t cookie_offset, cookie_len; #endif unsigned char *buf, *p, *ext; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) int renegotiation_info_seen = 0; #endif int handshake_failure = 0; const int *ciphersuites; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; /* If there is no signature-algorithm extension present, * we need to fall back to the default values for allowed * signature-hash pairs. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0; #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client hello")); int renegotiating; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) read_record_header: #endif /* * If renegotiating, then the input was read with mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), * otherwise read it ourselves manually in order to support SSLv2 * ClientHello, which doesn't use the same record layer format. */ renegotiating = 0; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) renegotiating = (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE); #endif if (!renegotiating) { if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, 5)) != 0) { /* No alert on a read error. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); return ret; } } buf = ssl->in_hdr; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl)); /* * TLS Client Hello * * Record layer: * 0 . 0 message type * 1 . 2 protocol version * 3 . 11 DTLS: epoch + record sequence number * 3 . 4 message length */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, message type: %d", buf[0])); if (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, message len.: %d", (ssl->in_len[0] << 8) | ssl->in_len[1])); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, protocol version: [%d:%d]", buf[1], buf[2])); /* For DTLS if this is the initial handshake, remember the client sequence * number to use it in our next message (RFC 6347 4.2.1) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE #endif ) { /* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */ if (ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } memcpy(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], ssl->in_ctr + 2, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - 2); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) if (mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(ssl) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("replayed record, discarding")); ssl->next_record_offset = 0; ssl->in_left = 0; goto read_record_header; } /* No MAC to check yet, so we can update right now */ mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(ssl); #endif } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ msg_len = (ssl->in_len[0] << 8) | ssl->in_len[1]; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { /* Set by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */ msg_len = ssl->in_hslen; } else #endif { if (msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl) + msg_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); return ret; } /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl); } else #endif ssl->in_left = 0; } buf = ssl->in_msg; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record contents", buf, msg_len); ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len); if (0 != ret) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); return ret; } /* * Handshake layer: * 0 . 0 handshake type * 1 . 3 handshake length * 4 . 5 DTLS only: message sequence number * 6 . 8 DTLS only: fragment offset * 9 . 11 DTLS only: fragment length */ if (msg_len < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake type: %d", buf[0])); if (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } { size_t handshake_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(buf, 1); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake len.: %u", (unsigned) handshake_len)); /* The record layer has a record size limit of 2^14 - 1 and * fragmentation is not supported, so buf[1] should be zero. */ if (buf[1] != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != 0", (unsigned) buf[1])); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */ if (msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + handshake_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != %u + %u", (unsigned) msg_len, (unsigned) mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), (unsigned) handshake_len)); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { /* * Copy the client's handshake message_seq on initial handshakes, * check sequence number on renego. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { /* This couldn't be done in ssl_prepare_handshake_record() */ unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (ssl->in_msg[4] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[5]; if (cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message_seq: " "%u (expected %u)", cli_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq)); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq++; } else #endif { unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (ssl->in_msg[4] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[5]; ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq; ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq + 1; } { /* * For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure * fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length */ size_t fragment_offset, fragment_length, length; fragment_offset = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 6); fragment_length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 9); length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 1); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ("fragment_offset=%u fragment_length=%u length=%u", (unsigned) fragment_offset, (unsigned) fragment_length, (unsigned) length)); if (fragment_offset != 0 || length != fragment_length) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ClientHello fragmentation not supported")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); msg_len -= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); /* * ClientHello layer: * 0 . 1 protocol version * 2 . 33 random bytes (starting with 4 bytes of Unix time) * 34 . 35 session id length (1 byte) * 35 . 34+x session id * 35+x . 35+x DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) * 36+x . .. DTLS only: cookie * .. . .. ciphersuite list length (2 bytes) * .. . .. ciphersuite list * .. . .. compression alg. list length (1 byte) * .. . .. compression alg. list * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes, optional) * .. . .. extensions (optional) */ /* * Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions omitted) is * 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can * read at least up to session id length without worrying. */ if (msg_len < 38) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* * Check and save the protocol version */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, version", buf, 2); ssl->tls_version = mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf, ssl->conf->transport); ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version; if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server only supports TLS 1.2")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; } /* * Save client random (inc. Unix time) */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32); memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32); /* * Check the session ID length and save session ID */ sess_len = buf[34]; if (sess_len > sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id) || sess_len + 34 + 2 > msg_len) { /* 2 for cipherlist length field */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len); ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len; memset(ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id)); memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); /* * Check the cookie length and content */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { cookie_offset = 35 + sess_len; cookie_len = buf[cookie_offset]; if (cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie", buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_check != NULL #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE #endif ) { if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_check(ssl->conf->p_cookie, buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len, ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification failed")); ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result = 1; } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification passed")); ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result = 0; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ { /* We know we didn't send a cookie, so it should be empty */ if (cookie_len != 0) { /* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification skipped")); } /* * Check the ciphersuitelist length (will be parsed later) */ ciph_offset = cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len; } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ ciph_offset = 35 + sess_len; ciph_len = (buf[ciph_offset + 0] << 8) | (buf[ciph_offset + 1]); if (ciph_len < 2 || ciph_len + 2 + ciph_offset + 1 > msg_len || /* 1 for comp. alg. len */ (ciph_len % 2) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", buf + ciph_offset + 2, ciph_len); /* * Check the compression algorithm's length. * The list contents are ignored because implementing * MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL is mandatory and is the only * option supported by Mbed TLS. */ comp_offset = ciph_offset + 2 + ciph_len; comp_len = buf[comp_offset]; if (comp_len < 1 || comp_len > 16 || comp_len + comp_offset + 1 > msg_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, compression", buf + comp_offset + 1, comp_len); /* * Check the extension length */ ext_offset = comp_offset + 1 + comp_len; if (msg_len > ext_offset) { if (msg_len < ext_offset + 2) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ext_len = (buf[ext_offset + 0] << 8) | (buf[ext_offset + 1]); if (msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } } else { ext_len = 0; } ext = buf + ext_offset + 2; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello extensions", ext, ext_len); while (ext_len != 0) { unsigned int ext_id; unsigned int ext_size; if (ext_len < 4) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ext_id = ((ext[0] << 8) | (ext[1])); ext_size = ((ext[2] << 8) | (ext[3])); if (ext_size + 4 > ext_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } switch (ext_id) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ServerName extension")); ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext + 4 + ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found renegotiation extension")); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) renegotiation_info_seen = 1; #endif ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } break; #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found signature_algorithms extension")); ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext + 4 + ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1; break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported elliptic curves extension")); ret = ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } break; case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported point formats extension")); ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT; ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ecjpake kkpp extension")); ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found max fragment length extension")); ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found CID extension")); ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found encrypt then mac extension")); ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found extended master secret extension")); ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found session ticket extension")); ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension")); ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext + 4 + ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found use_srtp extension")); ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ default: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id)); } ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; ext += 4 + ext_size; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* * Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client * hasn't provided any preferred signature-hash combinations. */ if (!sig_hash_alg_ext_present) { uint16_t *received_sig_algs = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; const uint16_t default_sig_algs[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1), #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1), #endif MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE }; MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(default_sig_algs) / sizeof(default_sig_algs[0]) <= MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE, "default_sig_algs is too big"); memcpy(received_sig_algs, default_sig_algs, sizeof(default_sig_algs)); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ /* * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ for (i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2) { if (p[0] == 0 && p[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ")); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " "during renegotiation")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } #endif ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; break; } } /* * Renegotiation security checks */ if (ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake")); handshake_failure = 1; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && renegotiation_info_seen == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)")); handshake_failure = 1; } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation not allowed")); handshake_failure = 1; } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && renegotiation_info_seen == 1) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)")); handshake_failure = 1; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ if (handshake_failure == 1) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } /* * Server certification selection (after processing TLS extensions) */ if (ssl->conf->f_cert_cb && (ret = ssl->conf->f_cert_cb(ssl)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cert_cb", ret); return ret; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) ssl->handshake->sni_name = NULL; ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = 0; #endif /* * Search for a matching ciphersuite * (At the end because we need information from the EC-based extensions * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension * or certificate from server certificate selection callback.) */ got_common_suite = 0; ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list; ciphersuite_info = NULL; if (ssl->conf->respect_cli_pref == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT) { for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) { for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) { continue; } got_common_suite = 1; if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { return ret; } if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { goto have_ciphersuite; } } } } else { for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) { if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) { continue; } got_common_suite = 1; if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { return ret; } if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { goto have_ciphersuite; } } } } if (got_common_suite) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got ciphersuites in common, " "but none of them usable")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no ciphersuites in common")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } have_ciphersuite: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name)); ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; ssl->state++; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl); } #endif /* Debugging-only output for testsuite */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(ciphersuite_info); if (sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { unsigned int sig_hash = mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg)); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %u", sig_hash)); } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no hash algorithm for signature algorithm " "%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg)); } #endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client hello")); return 0; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) static void ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen) { unsigned char *p = buf; size_t ext_len; const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; *olen = 0; /* Skip writing the extension if we don't want to use it or if * the client hasn't offered it. */ if (ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) { return; } /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */ if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < (unsigned) (ssl->own_cid_len + 5)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small")); return; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding CID extension")); /* * struct { * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; * } ConnectionId; */ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0); p += 2; ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1; MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0); p += 2; *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len; memcpy(p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len); *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen) { unsigned char *p = buf; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL; /* * RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension * from a client and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption * with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an * encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client." */ suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); if (suite == NULL) { ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; } else { mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac, suite); if (ssl_mode != MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; } } if (ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) { *olen = 0; return; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension")); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0); p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; *olen = 4; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen) { unsigned char *p = buf; if (ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED) { *olen = 0; return; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding extended master secret " "extension")); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0); p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; *olen = 4; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen) { unsigned char *p = buf; if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket == 0) { *olen = 0; return; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding session ticket extension")); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0); p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; *olen = 4; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen) { unsigned char *p = buf; if (ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION) { *olen = 0; return; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, secure renegotiation extension")); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0); p += 2; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = (ssl->verify_data_len * 2 + 1) & 0xFF; *p++ = ssl->verify_data_len * 2 & 0xFF; memcpy(p, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len); p += ssl->verify_data_len; memcpy(p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len); p += ssl->verify_data_len; } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ { *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x01; *p++ = 0x00; } *olen = p - buf; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen) { unsigned char *p = buf; if (ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE) { *olen = 0; return; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, max_fragment_length extension")); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0); p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 1; *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code; *olen = 5; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen) { unsigned char *p = buf; ((void) ssl); if ((ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT) == 0) { *olen = 0; return; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, supported_point_formats extension")); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0); p += 2; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 2; *p++ = 1; *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; *olen = 6; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; size_t kkpp_len; *olen = 0; /* Skip costly computation if not needed */ if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { return; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension")); if (end - p < 4) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small")); return; } MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0); p += 2; #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE); if (ret != 0) { psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); return; } #else ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret); return; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(kkpp_len, p, 0); p += 2; *olen = kkpp_len + 4; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen) { size_t mki_len = 0, ext_len = 0; uint16_t profile_value = 0; const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; *olen = 0; if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET)) { return; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding use_srtp extension")); if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED) { mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; } /* The extension total size is 9 bytes : * - 2 bytes for the extension tag * - 2 bytes for the total size * - 2 bytes for the protection profile length * - 2 bytes for the protection profile * - 1 byte for the mki length * + the actual mki length * Check we have enough room in the output buffer */ if ((size_t) (end - buf) < mki_len + 9) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small")); return; } /* extension */ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, buf, 0); /* * total length 5 and mki value: only one profile(2 bytes) * and length(2 bytes) and srtp_mki ) */ ext_len = 5 + mki_len; MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, buf, 2); /* protection profile length: 2 */ buf[4] = 0x00; buf[5] = 0x02; profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile); if (profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(profile_value, buf, 6); } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("use_srtp extension invalid profile")); return; } buf[8] = mki_len & 0xFF; memcpy(&buf[9], ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len); *olen = 9 + mki_len; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4; unsigned char *cookie_len_byte; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write hello verify request")); /* * struct { * ProtocolVersion server_version; * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; * } HelloVerifyRequest; */ /* The RFC is not clear on this point, but sending the actual negotiated * version looks like the most interoperable thing to do. */ mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->tls_version); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server version", p, 2); p += 2; /* If we get here, f_cookie_check is not null */ if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("inconsistent cookie callbacks")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } /* Skip length byte until we know the length */ cookie_len_byte = p++; if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_cookie_write(ssl->conf->p_cookie, &p, ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN, ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cookie_write", ret); return ret; } *cookie_len_byte = (unsigned char) (p - (cookie_len_byte + 1)); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie sent", cookie_len_byte + 1, *cookie_len_byte); ssl->out_msglen = p - ssl->out_msg; ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT; if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); return ret; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write hello verify request")); return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ static void ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret; mbedtls_ssl_session session_tmp; mbedtls_ssl_session * const session = ssl->session_negotiate; /* Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init(). * It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). */ if (ssl->handshake->resume == 1) { return; } if (session->id_len == 0) { return; } if (ssl->conf->f_get_cache == NULL) { return; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { return; } #endif mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session_tmp); ret = ssl->conf->f_get_cache(ssl->conf->p_cache, session->id, session->id_len, &session_tmp); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } if (session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite) { /* Mismatch between cached and negotiated session */ goto exit; } /* Move semantics */ mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session); *session = session_tmp; memset(&session_tmp, 0, sizeof(session_tmp)); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("session successfully restored from cache")); ssl->handshake->resume = 1; exit: mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session_tmp); } MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) mbedtls_time_t t; #endif int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n; unsigned char *buf, *p; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello")); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("client hello was not authenticated")); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello")); return ssl_write_hello_verify_request(ssl); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG; } /* * 0 . 0 handshake type * 1 . 3 handshake length * 4 . 5 protocol version * 6 . 9 UNIX time() * 10 . 37 random bytes */ buf = ssl->out_msg; p = buf + 4; mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->tls_version); p += 2; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]", buf[4], buf[5])); #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) t = mbedtls_time(NULL); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(t, p, 0); p += 4; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, (long long) t)); #else if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4)) != 0) { return ret; } p += 4; #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28)) != 0) { return ret; } p += 28; memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32); ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(ssl); if (ssl->handshake->resume == 0) { /* * New session, create a new session id, * unless we're about to issue a session ticket */ ssl->state++; #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) { ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 0; memset(ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, 32); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ { ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32; if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->session_negotiate->id, n)) != 0) { return ret; } } } else { /* * Resuming a session */ n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret); return ret; } } /* * 38 . 38 session id length * 39 . 38+n session id * 39+n . 40+n chosen ciphersuite * 41+n . 41+n chosen compression alg. * 42+n . 43+n extensions length * 44+n . 43+n+m extensions */ *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; memcpy(p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n)); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("%s session has been resumed", ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no")); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, p, 0); p += 2; *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite))); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X", (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL)); /* * First write extensions, then the total length */ ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); if (suite != NULL && mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite)) { ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) unsigned char *end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 4; if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen)) != 0) { return ret; } ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; #endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ext_len)); if (ext_len > 0) { MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0); p += 2 + ext_len; } ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO; ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello")); return ret; } #if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request")); if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request")); ssl->state++; return 0; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } #else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; uint16_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */ size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */ unsigned char *buf, *p; const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; int authmode; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request")); ssl->state++; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) if (ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET) { authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode; } else #endif authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info) || authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request")); return 0; } /* * 0 . 0 handshake type * 1 . 3 handshake length * 4 . 4 cert type count * 5 .. m-1 cert types * m .. m+1 sig alg length (TLS 1.2 only) * m+1 .. n-1 SignatureAndHashAlgorithms (TLS 1.2 only) * n .. n+1 length of all DNs * n+2 .. n+3 length of DN 1 * n+4 .. ... Distinguished Name #1 * ... .. ... length of DN 2, etc. */ buf = ssl->out_msg; p = buf + 4; /* * Supported certificate types * * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>; * enum { (255) } ClientCertificateType; */ ct_len = 0; #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN; #endif p[0] = (unsigned char) ct_len++; p += ct_len; sa_len = 0; /* * Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2) * * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; * * struct { * HashAlgorithm hash; * SignatureAlgorithm signature; * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; * * enum { (255) } HashAlgorithm; * enum { (255) } SignatureAlgorithm; */ const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl); if (sig_alg == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; } for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*sig_alg); if (mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, hash)) { continue; } if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, *sig_alg)) { continue; } /* Write elements at offsets starting from 1 (offset 0 is for the * length). Thus the offset of each element is the length of the * partial list including that element. */ sa_len += 2; MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*sig_alg, p, sa_len); } /* Fill in list length. */ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sa_len, p, 0); sa_len += 2; p += sa_len; /* * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; */ p += 2; total_dn_size = 0; if (ssl->conf->cert_req_ca_list == MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED) { /* NOTE: If trusted certificates are provisioned * via a CA callback (configured through * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the * CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) if (ssl->handshake->dn_hints != NULL) { crt = ssl->handshake->dn_hints; } else #endif if (ssl->conf->dn_hints != NULL) { crt = ssl->conf->dn_hints; } else #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) { crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; } else #endif crt = ssl->conf->ca_chain; while (crt != NULL && crt->version != 0) { /* It follows from RFC 5280 A.1 that this length * can be represented in at most 11 bits. */ dn_size = (uint16_t) crt->subject_raw.len; if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < 2 + (size_t) dn_size) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("skipping CAs: buffer too short")); break; } MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(dn_size, p, 0); p += 2; memcpy(p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size); p += dn_size; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size); total_dn_size += 2 + dn_size; crt = crt->next; } } ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(total_dn_size, ssl->out_msg, 4 + ct_len + sa_len); ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate request")); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; uint16_t tls_id = 0; psa_ecc_family_t ecc_family; size_t key_len; mbedtls_pk_context *pk; mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key; pk = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); if (pk == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk)) { case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = *((mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *) pk->pk_ctx); /* Key should not be destroyed in the TLS library */ ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey_is_external = 1; status = psa_get_key_attributes(ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, &key_attributes); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); } ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_type = psa_get_key_type(&key_attributes); ssl->handshake->ecdh_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes); psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attributes); ret = 0; break; case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: key = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk); if (key == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(key->grp.id); if (tls_id == 0) { /* This elliptic curve is not supported */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } /* If the above conversion to TLS ID was fine, then also this one will be, so there is no need to check the return value here */ mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &ecc_family, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_bits); ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ecc_family); key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_type)); psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, ssl->handshake->ecdh_bits); key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key->grp.pbits); ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key(key, buf, key_len); if (ret != 0) { goto cleanup; } status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, buf, key_len, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); goto cleanup; } ret = 0; break; default: ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } cleanup: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); return ret; } #elif defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); if (private_key == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no server private key")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; } if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server key not ECDH capable")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, mbedtls_pk_ec(*mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl)), MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_get_params"), ret); return ret; } return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t *signature_len) { /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange. * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing * ssl->out_msglen. */ unsigned char *sig_start = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2; size_t sig_max_len = (ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - sig_start); int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume(ssl, sig_start, signature_len, sig_max_len); if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) { ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0; mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(ssl, NULL); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret); return ret; } #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ /* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message, up to and including * calculating the signature if any, but excluding formatting the * signature and sending the message. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t *signature_len) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) unsigned char *dig_signed = NULL; #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ (void) ciphersuite_info; /* unused in some configurations */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) (void) signature_len; #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); #else size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); #endif #endif ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */ /* * * Part 1: Provide key exchange parameters for chosen ciphersuite. * */ /* * - ECJPAKE key exchanges */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) unsigned char *out_p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; unsigned char *end_p = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen; size_t output_offset = 0; size_t output_len = 0; /* * The first 3 bytes are: * [0] MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE * [1, 2] elliptic curve's TLS ID * * However since we only support secp256r1 for now, we hardcode its * TLS ID here */ uint16_t tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1); if (tls_id == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } *out_p = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tls_id, out_p, 1); output_offset += 3; ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, out_p + output_offset, end_p - out_p - output_offset, &output_len, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO); if (ret != 0) { psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); return ret; } output_offset += output_len; ssl->out_msglen += output_offset; #else size_t len = 0; ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, &len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret); return ret; } ssl->out_msglen += len; #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ /* * For (EC)DHE key exchanges with PSK, parameters are prefixed by support * identity hint (RFC 4279, Sec. 3). Until someone needs this feature, * we use empty support identity hints here. **/ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00; ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ /* * - DHE key exchanges */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe(ciphersuite_info)) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; if (ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no DH parameters set")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } /* * Ephemeral DH parameters: * * struct { * opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>; * opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>; * opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>; * } ServerDHParams; */ if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_set_group(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, &ssl->conf->dhm_P, &ssl->conf->dhm_G)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_set_group", ret); return ret; } if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx), ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, &len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_params", ret); return ret; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; #endif ssl->out_msglen += len; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED */ /* * - ECDHE key exchanges */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe(ciphersuite_info)) { /* * Ephemeral ECDH parameters: * * struct { * ECParameters curve_params; * ECPoint public; * } ServerECDHParams; */ uint16_t *curr_tls_id = ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id; const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; /* Match our preference list against the offered curves */ if ((group_list == NULL) || (curr_tls_id == NULL)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; } for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { for (curr_tls_id = ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id; *curr_tls_id != 0; curr_tls_id++) { if (*curr_tls_id == *group_list) { goto curve_matching_done; } } } curve_matching_done: if (*curr_tls_id == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no matching curve for ECDHE")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDHE curve: %s", mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id))); #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; uint8_t *p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; const size_t header_size = 4; // curve_type(1), namedcurve(2), // data length(1) const size_t data_length_size = 1; psa_ecc_family_t ec_psa_family = 0; size_t ec_bits = 0; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation.")); /* Convert EC's TLS ID to PSA key type. */ if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id, &ec_psa_family, &ec_bits) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid ecc group parse.")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } handshake->ecdh_psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ec_psa_family); handshake->ecdh_bits = ec_bits; key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type); psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits); /* * ECParameters curve_params * * First byte is curve_type, always named_curve */ *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; /* * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*curr_tls_id, p, 0); p += 2; /* Generate ECDH private key. */ status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, &handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_generate_key", ret); return ret; } /* * ECPoint public * * First byte is data length. * It will be filled later. p holds now the data length location. */ /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA. * Make one byte space for the length. */ unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + data_length_size; size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - (own_pubkey - ssl->out_msg)); status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len, &len); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_export_public_key", ret); (void) psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; return ret; } /* Store the length of the exported public key. */ *p = (uint8_t) len; /* Determine full message length. */ len += header_size; #else mbedtls_ecp_group_id curr_grp_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id); if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, curr_grp_id)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret); return ret; } if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &len, ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_params", ret); return ret; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; #endif ssl->out_msglen += len; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */ /* * * Part 2: For key exchanges involving the server signing the * exchange parameters, compute and add the signature here. * */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature(ciphersuite_info)) { if (dig_signed == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } size_t dig_signed_len = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed; size_t hashlen = 0; unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* * 2.1: Choose hash algorithm: * For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension * to choose appropriate hash. */ mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info); unsigned int sig_hash = mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg)); mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(sig_hash); /* For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension * (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */ if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE || md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); /* (... because we choose a cipher suite * only if there is a matching hash.) */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("pick hash algorithm %u for signing", (unsigned) md_alg)); /* * 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed */ if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(ssl, hash, &hashlen, dig_signed, dig_signed_len, md_alg); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen); /* * 2.3: Compute and add the signature */ /* * We need to specify signature and hash algorithm explicitly through * a prefix to the signature. * * struct { * HashAlgorithm hash; * SignatureAlgorithm signature; * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; * * struct { * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; * } DigitallySigned; * */ ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(md_alg); ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) if (ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL) { ret = ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start(ssl, mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl), md_alg, hash, hashlen); switch (ret) { case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH: /* act as if f_async_sign was null */ break; case 0: ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; return ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(ssl, signature_len); case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS: ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS; default: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_async_sign_start", ret); return ret; } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ if (mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl) == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no private key")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; } /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange. * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing * ssl->out_msglen. */ if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl), md_alg, hash, hashlen, ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2, out_buf_len - ssl->out_msglen - 2, signature_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret); return ret; } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ return 0; } /* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message and send it. For ciphersuites * that do not include a ServerKeyExchange message, do nothing. Either * way, if successful, move on to the next step in the SSL state * machine. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t signature_len = 0; #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server key exchange")); #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) /* Extract static ECDH parameters and abort if ServerKeyExchange * is not needed. */ if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs(ciphersuite_info)) { /* For suites involving ECDH, extract DH parameters * from certificate at this point. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh(ciphersuite_info)) { ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(ssl); if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret); return ret; } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ /* Key exchanges not involving ephemeral keys don't use * ServerKeyExchange, so end here. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write server key exchange")); ssl->state++; return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) /* If we have already prepared the message and there is an ongoing * signature operation, resume signing. */ if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("resuming signature operation")); ret = ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(ssl, &signature_len); } else #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ { /* ServerKeyExchange is needed. Prepare the message. */ ret = ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(ssl, &signature_len); } if (ret != 0) { /* If we're starting to write a new message, set ssl->out_msglen * to 0. But if we're resuming after an asynchronous message, * out_msglen is the amount of data written so far and mst be * preserved. */ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server key exchange (pending)")); } else { ssl->out_msglen = 0; } return ret; } /* If there is a signature, write its length. * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange already wrote the signature * itself at its proper place in the output buffer. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) if (signature_len != 0) { ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(signature_len); ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(signature_len); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "my signature", ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, signature_len); /* Skip over the already-written signature */ ssl->out_msglen += signature_len; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ /* Add header and send. */ ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; ssl->state++; if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); return ret; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server key exchange")); return 0; } MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_server_hello_done(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello done")); ssl->out_msglen = 4; ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE; ssl->state++; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl); } #endif if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); return ret; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello done")); return 0; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; size_t n; /* * Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P */ if (*p + 2 > end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } n = ((*p)[0] << 8) | (*p)[1]; *p += 2; if (*p + n > end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } *p += n; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *peer_pms, size_t *peer_pmslen, size_t peer_pmssize) { int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume(ssl, peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize); if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) { ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0; mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(ssl, NULL); } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms", ret); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *p, const unsigned char *end, unsigned char *peer_pms, size_t *peer_pmslen, size_t peer_pmssize) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl); if (own_cert == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no local certificate")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; } mbedtls_pk_context *public_key = &own_cert->pk; mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len(public_key); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) /* If we have already started decoding the message and there is an ongoing * decryption operation, resume signing. */ if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("resuming decryption operation")); return ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(ssl, peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ /* * Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key */ if (p + 2 > end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } if (*p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len) || *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } if (p + len != end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* * Decrypt the premaster secret */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) if (ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL) { ret = ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start(ssl, mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl), p, len); switch (ret) { case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH: /* act as if f_async_decrypt_start was null */ break; case 0: ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; return ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(ssl, peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize); case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS: ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS; default: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_async_decrypt_start", ret); return ret; } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no RSA private key")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; } ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt(private_key, p, len, peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); return ret; } MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *p, const unsigned char *end, size_t pms_offset) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; unsigned char ver[2]; unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48]; unsigned char mask; size_t i, peer_pmslen; unsigned int diff; /* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than * 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't * matter in the end because diff will be nonzero in that case due to * ret being nonzero, and we only care whether diff is 0. * But do initialize peer_pms and peer_pmslen for robustness anyway. This * also makes memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory, * even if it's an unsigned char). */ peer_pms[0] = peer_pms[1] = ~0; peer_pmslen = 0; ret = ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, peer_pms, &peer_pmslen, sizeof(peer_pms)); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) { return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ver, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version); /* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid * padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type * attacks. */ diff = (unsigned int) ret; diff |= peer_pmslen ^ 48; diff |= peer_pms[0] ^ ver[0]; diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1]; /* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */ mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(diff); /* * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding * must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a * bad_record_mac later in the handshake. * To protect against timing-based variants of the attack, we must * not have any branch that depends on whether the decryption was * successful. In particular, always generate the fake premaster secret, * regardless of whether it will ultimately influence the output or not. */ ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof(fake_pms)); if (ret != 0) { /* It's ok to abort on an RNG failure, since this does not reveal * anything about the RSA decryption. */ return ret; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) if (diff != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); } #endif if (sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster) < pms_offset || sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster) - pms_offset < 48) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48; /* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without * data-dependent branches. */ for (i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++) { pms[i] = (mask & fake_pms[i]) | ((~mask) & peer_pms[i]); } return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end) { int ret = 0; uint16_t n; if (ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(ssl->conf) == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no pre-shared key")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; } /* * Receive client pre-shared key identity name */ if (end - *p < 2) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } n = ((*p)[0] << 8) | (*p)[1]; *p += 2; if (n == 0 || n > end - *p) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) { if (ssl->conf->f_psk(ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, *p, n) != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; } } else { /* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear, * but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */ if (n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len || mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n) != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; } } if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Unknown PSK identity", *p, n); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; } *p += n; return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; unsigned char *p, *end; ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client key exchange")); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) && \ (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)) if ((ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) && (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0)) { /* We've already read a record and there is an asynchronous * operation in progress to decrypt it. So skip reading the * record. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("will resume decryption of previously-read record")); } else #endif if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); return ret; } p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA) { if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_dh_public"), ret); return ret; } if (p != end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, ssl->handshake->premaster, MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) size_t data_len = (size_t) (*p++); size_t buf_len = (size_t) (end - p); psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Read the peer's public key.")); /* * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least 1 for data) */ if (buf_len < 2) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid buffer length")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } if (data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid data length")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } /* Store peer's ECDH public key. */ memcpy(handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, p, data_len); handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len = data_len; /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ status = psa_raw_key_agreement( PSA_ALG_ECDH, handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len, handshake->premaster, sizeof(handshake->premaster), &handshake->pmslen); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_raw_key_agreement", ret); if (handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) { (void) psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); } handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; return ret; } if (handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) { status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret); return ret; } } handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; #else if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, p, end - p)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP); if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, ssl->handshake->premaster, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK) { if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); return ret; } if (p != end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); return ret; } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) { /* There is an asynchronous operation in progress to * decrypt the encrypted premaster secret, so skip * directly to resuming this operation. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("PSK identity already parsed")); /* Update p to skip the PSK identity. ssl_parse_encrypted_pms * won't actually use it, but maintain p anyway for robustness. */ p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len + 2; } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); return ret; } if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, 2)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_encrypted_pms"), ret); return ret; } #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); return ret; } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); return ret; } if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_dh_public"), ret); return ret; } if (p != end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster; unsigned char *pms_end = pms + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); size_t pms_len; /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, pms + 2, pms_end - (pms + 2), &pms_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); return ret; } MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(pms_len, pms, 0); pms += 2 + pms_len; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); #else if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint8_t ecpoint_len; mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; return ret; } /* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */ if (p >= end) { psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ecpoint_len = *(p++); if ((size_t) (end - p) < ecpoint_len) { psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } if (ecpoint_len > sizeof(handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey)) { psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } memcpy(handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, p, ecpoint_len); handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len; p += ecpoint_len; /* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows: * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK * - the PSK itself */ unsigned char *psm = ssl->handshake->premaster; const unsigned char * const psm_end = psm + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); /* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */ const size_t zlen_size = 2; size_t zlen = 0; /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH, handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len, psm + zlen_size, psm_end - (psm + zlen_size), &zlen); destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status); } /* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, psm, 0); psm += zlen_size + zlen; #else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); return ret; } if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, p, end - p)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP); if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) { if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, 0)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_parse_encrypted_pms_secret"), ret); return ret; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p, end - p, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO)) != 0) { psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round two", ret); return ret; } #else ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, p, end - p); if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret); return ret; } ssl->state++; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client key exchange")); return 0; } #if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify")); if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify")); ssl->state++; return 0; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } #else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; size_t i, sig_len; unsigned char hash[48]; unsigned char *hash_start = hash; size_t hashlen; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify")); if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify")); ssl->state++; return 0; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify")); ssl->state++; return 0; } #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify")); ssl->state++; return 0; } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ /* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */ ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */); if (0 != ret) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_read_record"), ret); return ret; } ssl->state++; /* Process the message contents */ if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; #else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { /* Should never happen */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ /* * struct { * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; * } DigitallySigned; */ if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* * Hash */ md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(ssl->in_msg[i]); if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, ssl->in_msg[i])) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" " for verify message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) if (MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg) { hash_start += 16; } #endif /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ hashlen = 0; i++; /* * Signature */ if ((pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(ssl->in_msg[i])) == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" " for verify message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } /* * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg */ if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("sig_alg doesn't match cert key")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } i++; if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } sig_len = (ssl->in_msg[i] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[i+1]; i += 2; if (i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* Calculate hash and verify signature */ { size_t dummy_hlen; ret = ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen); if (0 != ret) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("calc_verify"), ret); return ret; } } if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify(peer_pk, md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret); return ret; } ret = mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl); if (0 != ret) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status"), ret); return ret; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate verify")); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t tlen; uint32_t lifetime; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write new session ticket")); ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; /* * struct { * uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint; * opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; * } NewSessionTicket; * * 4 . 7 ticket_lifetime_hint (0 = unspecified) * 8 . 9 ticket_len (n) * 10 . 9+n ticket content */ if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write(ssl->conf->p_ticket, ssl->session_negotiate, ssl->out_msg + 10, ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, &tlen, &lifetime)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write", ret); tlen = 0; } MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(lifetime, ssl->out_msg, 4); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tlen, ssl->out_msg, 8); ssl->out_msglen = 10 + tlen; /* * Morally equivalent to updating ssl->state, but NewSessionTicket and * ChangeCipherSpec share the same state. */ ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); return ret; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write new session ticket")); return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ /* * SSL handshake -- server side -- single step */ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = 0; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("server state: %d", ssl->state)); switch (ssl->state) { case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; break; /* * <== ClientHello */ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: ret = ssl_parse_client_hello(ssl); break; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT: return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED; #endif /* * ==> ServerHello * Certificate * ( ServerKeyExchange ) * ( CertificateRequest ) * ServerHelloDone */ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: ret = ssl_write_server_hello(ssl); break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(ssl); break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: ret = ssl_write_server_key_exchange(ssl); break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: ret = ssl_write_certificate_request(ssl); break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: ret = ssl_write_server_hello_done(ssl); break; /* * <== ( Certificate/Alert ) * ClientKeyExchange * ( CertificateVerify ) * ChangeCipherSpec * Finished */ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(ssl); break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: ret = ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(ssl); break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify(ssl); break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(ssl); break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(ssl); break; /* * ==> ( NewSessionTicket ) * ChangeCipherSpec * Finished */ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) { ret = ssl_write_new_session_ticket(ssl); } else #endif ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(ssl); break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done")); ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(ssl); break; default: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state)); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } return ret; } void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order) { conf->respect_cli_pref = order; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */