/** * \file psa/crypto_extra.h * * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS vendor extensions * * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must * include psa/crypto.h. * * This file is reserved for vendor-specific definitions. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H #include "mbedtls/private_access.h" #include "crypto_types.h" #include "crypto_compat.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* UID for secure storage seed */ #define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID 0xFFFFFF52 /* See mbedtls_config.h for definition */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32 #endif /** \addtogroup attributes * @{ */ /** \brief Declare the enrollment algorithm for a key. * * An operation on a key may indifferently use the algorithm set with * psa_set_key_algorithm() or with this function. * * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. * \param alg2 A second algorithm that the key may be used * for, in addition to the algorithm set with * psa_set_key_algorithm(). * * \warning Setting an enrollment algorithm is not recommended, because * using the same key with different algorithms can allow some * attacks based on arithmetic relations between different * computations made with the same key, or can escalate harmless * side channels into exploitable ones. Use this function only * if it is necessary to support a protocol for which it has been * verified that the usage of the key with multiple algorithms * is safe. */ static inline void psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_algorithm_t alg2) { attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2) = alg2; } /** Retrieve the enrollment algorithm policy from key attributes. * * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. * * \return The enrollment algorithm stored in the attribute structure. */ static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) /** Retrieve the slot number where a key is stored. * * A slot number is only defined for keys that are stored in a secure * element. * * This information is only useful if the secure element is not entirely * managed through the PSA Cryptography API. It is up to the secure * element driver to decide how PSA slot numbers map to any other interface * that the secure element may have. * * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. * \param[out] slot_number On success, the slot number containing the key. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The key is located in a secure element, and \p *slot_number * indicates the slot number that contains it. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * The caller is not permitted to query the slot number. * Mbed TLS currently does not return this error. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The key is not located in a secure element. */ psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number); /** Choose the slot number where a key is stored. * * This function declares a slot number in the specified attribute * structure. * * A slot number is only meaningful for keys that are stored in a secure * element. It is up to the secure element driver to decide how PSA slot * numbers map to any other interface that the secure element may have. * * \note Setting a slot number in key attributes for a key creation can * cause the following errors when creating the key: * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if the selected secure element does * not support choosing a specific slot number. * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED if the caller is not permitted to * choose slot numbers in general or to choose this specific slot. * - #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT if the chosen slot number is not * valid in general or not valid for this specific key. * - #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS if there is already a key in the * selected slot. * * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. * \param slot_number The slot number to set. */ static inline void psa_set_key_slot_number( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number) { attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags) |= MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER; attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(slot_number) = slot_number; } /** Remove the slot number attribute from a key attribute structure. * * This function undoes the action of psa_set_key_slot_number(). * * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. */ static inline void psa_clear_key_slot_number( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags) &= ~MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER; } /** Register a key that is already present in a secure element. * * The key must be located in a secure element designated by the * lifetime field in \p attributes, in the slot set with * psa_set_key_slot_number() in the attribute structure. * This function makes the key available through the key identifier * specified in \p attributes. * * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the existing key. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The key was successfully registered. * Note that depending on the design of the driver, this may or may * not guarantee that a key actually exists in the designated slot * and is compatible with the specified attributes. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS * There is already a key with the identifier specified in * \p attributes. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * The secure element driver for the specified lifetime does not * support registering a key. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The identifier in \p attributes is invalid, namely the identifier is * not in the user range, or * \p attributes specifies a lifetime which is not located * in a secure element, or no slot number is specified in \p attributes, * or the specified slot number is not valid. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * The caller is not authorized to register the specified key slot. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ /**@}*/ /** * \brief Library deinitialization. * * This function clears all data associated with the PSA layer, * including the whole key store. * * This is an Mbed TLS extension. */ void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(void); /** \brief Statistics about * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore. * * \note The content of this structure is not part of the stable API and ABI * of Mbed TLS and may change arbitrarily from version to version. */ typedef struct mbedtls_psa_stats_s { /** Number of slots containing key material for a volatile key. */ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(volatile_slots); /** Number of slots containing key material for a key which is in * internal persistent storage. */ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_slots); /** Number of slots containing a reference to a key in a * secure element. */ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(external_slots); /** Number of slots which are occupied, but do not contain * key material yet. */ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(half_filled_slots); /** Number of slots that contain cache data. */ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cache_slots); /** Number of slots that are not used for anything. */ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(empty_slots); /** Number of slots that are locked. */ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(locked_slots); /** Largest key id value among open keys in internal persistent storage. */ psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_open_internal_key_id); /** Largest key id value among open keys in secure elements. */ psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_open_external_key_id); } mbedtls_psa_stats_t; /** \brief Get statistics about * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore. * * \note When Mbed TLS is built as part of a service, with isolation * between the application and the keystore, the service may or * may not expose this function. */ void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats); /** * \brief Inject an initial entropy seed for the random generator into * secure storage. * * This function injects data to be used as a seed for the random generator * used by the PSA Crypto implementation. On devices that lack a trusted * entropy source (preferably a hardware random number generator), * the Mbed PSA Crypto implementation uses this value to seed its * random generator. * * On devices without a trusted entropy source, this function must be * called exactly once in the lifetime of the device. On devices with * a trusted entropy source, calling this function is optional. * In all cases, this function may only be called before calling any * other function in the PSA Crypto API, including psa_crypto_init(). * * When this function returns successfully, it populates a file in * persistent storage. Once the file has been created, this function * can no longer succeed. * * If any error occurs, this function does not change the system state. * You can call this function again after correcting the reason for the * error if possible. * * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status. * * \warning If you use this function, you should use it as part of a * factory provisioning process. The value of the injected seed * is critical to the security of the device. It must be * *secret*, *unpredictable* and (statistically) *unique per device*. * You should be generate it randomly using a cryptographically * secure random generator seeded from trusted entropy sources. * You should transmit it securely to the device and ensure * that its value is not leaked or stored anywhere beyond the * needs of transmitting it from the point of generation to * the call of this function, and erase all copies of the value * once this function returns. * * This is an Mbed TLS extension. * * \note This function is only available on the following platforms: * * If the compile-time option MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is enabled. * Note that you must provide compatible implementations of * mbedtls_nv_seed_read and mbedtls_nv_seed_write. * * In a client-server integration of PSA Cryptography, on the client side, * if the server supports this feature. * \param[in] seed Buffer containing the seed value to inject. * \param[in] seed_size Size of the \p seed buffer. * The size of the seed in bytes must be greater * or equal to both #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE * and the value of \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM * in `library/entropy_poll.h` in the Mbed TLS source * code. * It must be less or equal to * #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The seed value was injected successfully. The random generator * of the PSA Crypto implementation is now ready for use. * You may now call psa_crypto_init() and use the PSA Crypto * implementation. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p seed_size is out of range. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE * There was a failure reading or writing from storage. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * The library has already been initialized. It is no longer * possible to call this function. */ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed, size_t seed_size); /** \addtogroup crypto_types * @{ */ /** DSA public key. * * The import and export format is the * representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a big-endian byte * string. The length of the byte string is the length of the base prime `p` * in bytes. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4002) /** DSA key pair (private and public key). * * The import and export format is the * representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte string. The * length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes (leading zeroes * are not stripped). * * Deterministic DSA key derivation with psa_generate_derived_key follows * FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2: interpret the byte string as integer * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA, * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC). * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*. * */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7002) /** Whether a key type is a DSA key (pair or public-only). */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(type) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY) #define PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000400) /** DSA signature with hashing. * * This is the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4, * with a random per-message secret number (*k*). * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. * * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_DSA(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000500) #define PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG /** Deterministic DSA signature with hashing. * * This is the deterministic variant defined by RFC 6979 of * the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4. * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. * * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm. * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported * hash algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(hash_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) #define PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) \ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \ PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE) #define PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0) #define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) #define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) /* We need to expand the sample definition of this macro from * the API definition. */ #undef PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN #define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \ PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) /**@}*/ /** \addtogroup attributes * @{ */ /** Custom Diffie-Hellman group. * * For keys of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM) or * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM), the group data comes * from domain parameters set by psa_set_key_domain_parameters(). */ #define PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x7e) /** PAKE operation stages. */ #define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP 0 #define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS 1 #define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION 2 /** * \brief Set domain parameters for a key. * * Some key types require additional domain parameters in addition to * the key type identifier and the key size. Use this function instead * of psa_set_key_type() when you need to specify domain parameters. * * The format for the required domain parameters varies based on the key type. * * - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), * the domain parameter data consists of the public exponent, * represented as a big-endian integer with no leading zeros. * This information is used when generating an RSA key pair. * When importing a key, the public exponent is read from the imported * key data and the exponent recorded in the attribute structure is ignored. * As an exception, the public exponent 65537 is represented by an empty * byte string. * - For DSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR), * the `Dss-Params` format as defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.2. * ``` * Dss-Params ::= SEQUENCE { * p INTEGER, * q INTEGER, * g INTEGER * } * ``` * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange keys * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM) or * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM)), the * `DomainParameters` format as defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.3. * ``` * DomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE { * p INTEGER, -- odd prime, p=jq +1 * g INTEGER, -- generator, g * q INTEGER, -- factor of p-1 * j INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- subgroup factor * validationParams ValidationParams OPTIONAL * } * ValidationParams ::= SEQUENCE { * seed BIT STRING, * pgenCounter INTEGER * } * ``` * * \note This function may allocate memory or other resources. * Once you have called this function on an attribute structure, * you must call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free these resources. * * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change * in future versions of the library. * * \param[in,out] attributes Attribute structure where the specified domain * parameters will be stored. * If this function fails, the content of * \p attributes is not modified. * \param type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value). * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key domain parameters. * The content of this buffer is interpreted * according to \p type as described above. * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription */ psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_type_t type, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length); /** * \brief Get domain parameters for a key. * * Get the domain parameters for a key with this function, if any. The format * of the domain parameters written to \p data is specified in the * documentation for psa_set_key_domain_parameters(). * * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change * in future versions of the library. * * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. * \param[out] data On success, the key domain parameters. * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. * The buffer is guaranteed to be large * enough if its size in bytes is at least * the value given by * PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(). * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes * that make up the key domain parameters data. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL \emptydescription */ psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); /** Safe output buffer size for psa_get_key_domain_parameters(). * * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are * compile-time constants. * * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain * side effects. * * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change * in future versions of the library. * * \param key_type A supported key type. * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. * * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that * psa_get_key_domain_parameters() will not fail with * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported * by the implementation, this macro shall return either a * sensible size or 0. * If the parameters are not valid, the * return value is unspecified. */ #define PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? sizeof(int) : \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(key_type) ? PSA_DH_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) : \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(key_type) ? PSA_DSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) : \ 0) #define PSA_DH_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) \ (4 + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 5) * 3 /*without optional parts*/) #define PSA_DSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) \ (4 + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 5) * 2 /*p, g*/ + 34 /*q*/) /**@}*/ /** \defgroup psa_tls_helpers TLS helper functions * @{ */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) #include /** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the Mbed TLS encoding to PSA. * * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. * * \param grpid An Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). * \param[out] bits On success, the bit size of the curve. * * \return The corresponding PSA elliptic curve identifier * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). * \return \c 0 on failure (\p grpid is not recognized). */ static inline psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, size_t *bits) { switch (grpid) { case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: *bits = 192; return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: *bits = 224; return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: *bits = 256; return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: *bits = 384; return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: *bits = 521; return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: *bits = 256; return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: *bits = 384; return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: *bits = 512; return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: *bits = 255; return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY; case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: *bits = 192; return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: *bits = 224; return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: *bits = 256; return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: *bits = 448; return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY; default: *bits = 0; return 0; } } /** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the PSA encoding to Mbed TLS. * * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. * * \param curve A PSA elliptic curve identifier * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). * \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve. * \param bits_is_sloppy If true, \p bits may be the bit-length rounded up * to the nearest multiple of 8. This allows the caller * to infer the exact curve from the length of a key * which is supplied as a byte string. * * \return The corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \c curve is not recognized. * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \p bits is not * correct for \p curve. */ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t bits, int bits_is_sloppy); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ /**@}*/ /** \defgroup psa_external_rng External random generator * @{ */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) /** External random generator function, implemented by the platform. * * When the compile-time option #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG is enabled, * this function replaces Mbed TLS's entropy and DRBG modules for all * random generation triggered via PSA crypto interfaces. * * \note This random generator must deliver random numbers with cryptographic * quality and high performance. It must supply unpredictable numbers * with a uniform distribution. The implementation of this function * is responsible for ensuring that the random generator is seeded * with sufficient entropy. If you have a hardware TRNG which is slow * or delivers non-uniform output, declare it as an entropy source * with mbedtls_entropy_add_source() instead of enabling this option. * * \param[in,out] context Pointer to the random generator context. * This is all-bits-zero on the first call * and preserved between successive calls. * \param[out] output Output buffer. On success, this buffer * contains random data with a uniform * distribution. * \param output_size The size of the \p output buffer in bytes. * \param[out] output_length On success, set this value to \p output_size. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. The output buffer contains \p output_size bytes of * cryptographic-quality random data, and \c *output_length is * set to \p output_size. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY * The random generator requires extra entropy and there is no * way to obtain entropy under current environment conditions. * This error should not happen under normal circumstances since * this function is responsible for obtaining as much entropy as * it needs. However implementations of this function may return * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY if there is no way to obtain * entropy without blocking indefinitely. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE * A failure of the random generator hardware that isn't covered * by #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY. */ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ /**@}*/ /** \defgroup psa_builtin_keys Built-in keys * @{ */ /** The minimum value for a key identifier that is built into the * implementation. * * The range of key identifiers from #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN * to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX within the range from * #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN and #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX and must not intersect * with any other set of implementation-chosen key identifiers. * * This value is part of the library's ABI since changing it would invalidate * the values of built-in key identifiers in applications. */ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fff0000) /** The maximum value for a key identifier that is built into the * implementation. * * See #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN for more information. */ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fffefff) /** A slot number identifying a key in a driver. * * Values of this type are used to identify built-in keys. */ typedef uint64_t psa_drv_slot_number_t; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) /** Test whether a key identifier belongs to the builtin key range. * * \param key_id Key identifier to test. * * \retval 1 * The key identifier is a builtin key identifier. * \retval 0 * The key identifier is not a builtin key identifier. */ static inline int psa_key_id_is_builtin(psa_key_id_t key_id) { return (key_id >= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN) && (key_id <= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX); } /** Platform function to obtain the location and slot number of a built-in key. * * An application-specific implementation of this function must be provided if * #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS is enabled. This would typically be provided * as part of a platform's system image. * * #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(\p key_id) needs to be in the range from * #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX. * * In a multi-application configuration * (\c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER is defined), * this function should check that #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(\p key_id) * is allowed to use the given key. * * \param key_id The key ID for which to retrieve the * location and slot attributes. * \param[out] lifetime On success, the lifetime associated with the key * corresponding to \p key_id. Lifetime is a * combination of which driver contains the key, * and with what persistence level the key is * intended to be used. If the platform * implementation does not contain specific * information about the intended key persistence * level, the persistence level may be reported as * #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT. * \param[out] slot_number On success, the slot number known to the driver * registered at the lifetime location reported * through \p lifetime which corresponds to the * requested built-in key. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The requested key identifier designates a built-in key. * In a multi-application configuration, the requested owner * is allowed to access it. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST * The requested key identifier is not a built-in key which is known * to this function. If a key exists in the key storage with this * identifier, the data from the storage will be used. * \return (any other error) * Any other error is propagated to the function that requested the key. * Common errors include: * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: the key exists but the requested owner * is not allowed to access it. */ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, psa_key_lifetime_t *lifetime, psa_drv_slot_number_t *slot_number); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ /** @} */ /** \addtogroup crypto_types * @{ */ #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000000) /** Whether the specified algorithm is a password-authenticated key exchange. * * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). * * \return 1 if \p alg is a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) * algorithm, 0 otherwise. * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ #define PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE) /** The Password-authenticated key exchange by juggling (J-PAKE) algorithm. * * This is J-PAKE as defined by RFC 8236, instantiated with the following * parameters: * * - The group can be either an elliptic curve or defined over a finite field. * - Schnorr NIZK proof as defined by RFC 8235 and using the same group as the * J-PAKE algorithm. * - A cryptographic hash function. * * To select these parameters and set up the cipher suite, call these functions * in any order: * * \code * psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_JPAKE); * psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(cipher_suite, * PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(type, family, bits)); * psa_pake_cs_set_hash(cipher_suite, hash); * \endcode * * For more information on how to set a specific curve or field, refer to the * documentation of the individual \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants. * * After initializing a J-PAKE operation, call * * \code * psa_pake_setup(operation, cipher_suite); * psa_pake_set_user(operation, ...); * psa_pake_set_peer(operation, ...); * psa_pake_set_password_key(operation, ...); * \endcode * * The password is provided as a key. This can be the password text itself, * in an agreed character encoding, or some value derived from the password * as required by a higher level protocol. * * (The implementation converts the key material to a number as described in * Section 2.3.8 of _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_ * (https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf), before reducing it modulo \c q. Here * \c q is order of the group defined by the primitive set in the cipher suite. * The \c psa_pake_set_password_key() function returns an error if the result * of the reduction is 0.) * * The key exchange flow for J-PAKE is as follows: * -# To get the first round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call * \code * // Get g1 * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); * // Get the ZKP public key for x1 * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); * // Get the ZKP proof for x1 * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); * // Get g2 * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); * // Get the ZKP public key for x2 * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); * // Get the ZKP proof for x2 * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); * \endcode * -# To provide the first round data received from the peer to the operation, * call * \code * // Set g3 * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); * // Set the ZKP public key for x3 * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); * // Set the ZKP proof for x3 * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); * // Set g4 * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); * // Set the ZKP public key for x4 * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); * // Set the ZKP proof for x4 * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); * \endcode * -# To get the second round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call * \code * // Get A * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); * // Get ZKP public key for x2*s * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); * // Get ZKP proof for x2*s * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); * \endcode * -# To provide the second round data received from the peer to the operation, * call * \code * // Set B * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); * // Set ZKP public key for x4*s * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); * // Set ZKP proof for x4*s * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); * \endcode * -# To access the shared secret call * \code * // Get Ka=Kb=K * psa_pake_get_implicit_key() * \endcode * * For more information consult the documentation of the individual * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants. * * At this point there is a cryptographic guarantee that only the authenticated * party who used the same password is able to compute the key. But there is no * guarantee that the peer is the party it claims to be and was able to do so. * * That is, the authentication is only implicit (the peer is not authenticated * at this point, and no action should be taken that assume that they are - like * for example accessing restricted files). * * To make the authentication explicit there are various methods, see Section 5 * of RFC 8236 for two examples. * */ #define PSA_ALG_JPAKE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000100) /** @} */ /** \defgroup pake Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) * * This is a proposed PAKE interface for the PSA Crypto API. It is not part of * the official PSA Crypto API yet. * * \note The content of this section is not part of the stable API and ABI * of Mbed TLS and may change arbitrarily from version to version. * Same holds for the corresponding macros #PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE and * #PSA_ALG_JPAKE. * @{ */ /** \brief Encoding of the application role of PAKE * * Encodes the application's role in the algorithm is being executed. For more * information see the documentation of individual \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_XXX * constants. */ typedef uint8_t psa_pake_role_t; /** Encoding of input and output indicators for PAKE. * * Some PAKE algorithms need to exchange more data than just a single key share. * This type is for encoding additional input and output data for such * algorithms. */ typedef uint8_t psa_pake_step_t; /** Encoding of the type of the PAKE's primitive. * * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff. * Vendors who define additional types must use an encoding in this range. * * For more information see the documentation of individual * \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants. */ typedef uint8_t psa_pake_primitive_type_t; /** \brief Encoding of the family of the primitive associated with the PAKE. * * For more information see the documentation of individual * \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants. */ typedef uint8_t psa_pake_family_t; /** \brief Encoding of the primitive associated with the PAKE. * * For more information see the documentation of the #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE macro. */ typedef uint32_t psa_pake_primitive_t; /** A value to indicate no role in a PAKE algorithm. * This value can be used in a call to psa_pake_set_role() for symmetric PAKE * algorithms which do not assign roles. */ #define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x00) /** The first peer in a balanced PAKE. * * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them needs an * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not * need this, both #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST and #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND are * accepted. */ #define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x01) /** The second peer in a balanced PAKE. * * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them needs an * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not * need this, either #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST or #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND are * accepted. */ #define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x02) /** The client in an augmented PAKE. * * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server. */ #define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x11) /** The server in an augmented PAKE. * * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server. */ #define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x12) /** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of elliptic curves. * * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify a * specific elliptic curve, using the same mapping that is used for ECC * (::psa_ecc_family_t) keys. * * (Here \c family means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_family() and * \c bits means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_bits().) * * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar * values: * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the * specific curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of * psa_export_public_key(). * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific * curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of * psa_export_key(). */ #define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t) 0x01) /** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of Diffie-Hellman groups. * * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify * a specific Diffie-Hellman group, using the same mapping that is used for * Diffie-Hellman (::psa_dh_family_t) keys. * * (Here \c family means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_family() and * \c bits means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_bits().) * * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar * values: * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the * specific group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of * psa_export_public_key(). * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific * group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of * psa_export_key(). */ #define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t) 0x02) /** Construct a PAKE primitive from type, family and bit-size. * * \param pake_type The type of the primitive * (value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t). * \param pake_family The family of the primitive * (the type and interpretation of this parameter depends * on \p type, for more information consult the * documentation of individual ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t * constants). * \param pake_bits The bit-size of the primitive * (Value of type \c size_t. The interpretation * of this parameter depends on \p family, for more * information consult the documentation of individual * ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t constants). * * \return The constructed primitive value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t. * Return 0 if the requested primitive can't be encoded as * ::psa_pake_primitive_t. */ #define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(pake_type, pake_family, pake_bits) \ ((pake_bits & 0xFFFF) != pake_bits) ? 0 : \ ((psa_pake_primitive_t) (((pake_type) << 24 | \ (pake_family) << 16) | (pake_bits))) /** The key share being sent to or received from the peer. * * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would * be. * * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of * psa_export_public_key(). * * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. */ #define PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x01) /** A Schnorr NIZKP public key. * * This is the ephemeral public key in the Schnorr Non-Interactive * Zero-Knowledge Proof (the value denoted by the letter 'V' in RFC 8235). * * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would * be. * * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of * psa_export_public_key(). * * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. */ #define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x02) /** A Schnorr NIZKP proof. * * This is the proof in the Schnorr Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (the * value denoted by the letter 'r' in RFC 8235). * * Both for input and output, the value at this step is an integer less than * the order of the group selected in the cipher suite. The format depends on * the group as well: * * - For Montgomery curves, the encoding is little endian. * - For everything else the encoding is big endian (see Section 2.3.8 of * _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_ at https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf). * * In both cases leading zeroes are allowed as long as the length in bytes does * not exceed the byte length of the group order. * * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. */ #define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x03) /** The type of the data structure for PAKE cipher suites. * * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ typedef struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_t; /** Return an initial value for a PAKE cipher suite object. */ static psa_pake_cipher_suite_t psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void); /** Retrieve the PAKE algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite. * * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. * * \return The PAKE algorithm stored in the cipher suite structure. */ static psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm( const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); /** Declare the PAKE algorithm for the cipher suite. * * This function overwrites any PAKE algorithm * previously set in \p cipher_suite. * * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to. * \param algorithm The PAKE algorithm to write. * (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type ::psa_algorithm_t * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true.) * If this is 0, the PAKE algorithm in * \p cipher_suite becomes unspecified. */ static void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, psa_algorithm_t algorithm); /** Retrieve the primitive from a PAKE cipher suite. * * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. * * \return The primitive stored in the cipher suite structure. */ static psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive( const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); /** Declare the primitive for a PAKE cipher suite. * * This function overwrites any primitive previously set in \p cipher_suite. * * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to. * \param primitive The primitive to write. If this is 0, the * primitive type in \p cipher_suite becomes * unspecified. */ static void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, psa_pake_primitive_t primitive); /** Retrieve the PAKE family from a PAKE cipher suite. * * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. * * \return The PAKE family stored in the cipher suite structure. */ static psa_pake_family_t psa_pake_cs_get_family( const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); /** Retrieve the PAKE primitive bit-size from a PAKE cipher suite. * * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. * * \return The PAKE primitive bit-size stored in the cipher suite structure. */ static uint16_t psa_pake_cs_get_bits( const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); /** Retrieve the hash algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite. * * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. * * \return The hash algorithm stored in the cipher suite structure. The return * value is 0 if the PAKE is not parametrised by a hash algorithm or if * the hash algorithm is not set. */ static psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_hash( const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); /** Declare the hash algorithm for a PAKE cipher suite. * * This function overwrites any hash algorithm * previously set in \p cipher_suite. * * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) * for more information. * * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to. * \param hash The hash involved in the cipher suite. * (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type ::psa_algorithm_t * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\c alg) is true.) * If this is 0, the hash algorithm in * \p cipher_suite becomes unspecified. */ static void psa_pake_cs_set_hash(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, psa_algorithm_t hash); /** The type of the state data structure for PAKE operations. * * Before calling any function on a PAKE operation object, the application * must initialize it by any of the following means: * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: * \code * psa_pake_operation_t operation; * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); * \endcode * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: * \code * psa_pake_operation_t operation = {0}; * \endcode * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT, * for example: * \code * psa_pake_operation_t operation = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT; * \endcode * - Assign the result of the function psa_pake_operation_init() * to the structure, for example: * \code * psa_pake_operation_t operation; * operation = psa_pake_operation_init(); * \endcode * * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ typedef struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_t; /** The type of input values for PAKE operations. */ typedef struct psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_s psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t; /** The type of computation stage for J-PAKE operations. */ typedef struct psa_jpake_computation_stage_s psa_jpake_computation_stage_t; /** Return an initial value for a PAKE operation object. */ static psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_operation_init(void); /** Get the length of the password in bytes from given inputs. * * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. * \param[out] password_len Password length. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * Password hasn't been set yet. */ psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password_len( const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, size_t *password_len); /** Get the password from given inputs. * * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. * \param[out] buffer Return buffer for password. * \param buffer_size Size of the return buffer in bytes. * \param[out] buffer_length Actual size of the password in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * Password hasn't been set yet. */ psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password( const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_size, size_t *buffer_length); /** Get the length of the user id in bytes from given inputs. * * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. * \param[out] user_len User id length. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * User id hasn't been set yet. */ psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user_len( const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, size_t *user_len); /** Get the length of the peer id in bytes from given inputs. * * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. * \param[out] peer_len Peer id length. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * Peer id hasn't been set yet. */ psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer_len( const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, size_t *peer_len); /** Get the user id from given inputs. * * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. * \param[out] user_id User id. * \param user_id_size Size of \p user_id in bytes. * \param[out] user_id_len Size of the user id in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * User id hasn't been set yet. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p user_id is too small. */ psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user( const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_size, size_t *user_id_len); /** Get the peer id from given inputs. * * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. * \param[out] peer_id Peer id. * \param peer_id_size Size of \p peer_id in bytes. * \param[out] peer_id_length Size of the peer id in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * Peer id hasn't been set yet. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p peer_id is too small. */ psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer( const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, uint8_t *peer_id, size_t peer_id_size, size_t *peer_id_length); /** Get the cipher suite from given inputs. * * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. * \param[out] cipher_suite Return buffer for role. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * Cipher_suite hasn't been set yet. */ psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_cipher_suite( const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); /** Set the session information for a password-authenticated key exchange. * * The sequence of operations to set up a password-authenticated key exchange * is as follows: * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions * listed here. * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the * documentation for #psa_pake_operation_t, e.g. * #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT. * -# Call psa_pake_setup() to specify the cipher suite. * -# Call \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions on the operation to complete the * setup. The exact sequence of \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions that needs * to be called depends on the algorithm in use. * * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) * for more information. * * A typical sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key * exchange: * -# Call psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to get the * key share that needs to be sent to the peer. * -# Call psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to provide * the key share that was received from the peer. * -# Depending on the algorithm additional calls to psa_pake_output() and * psa_pake_input() might be necessary. * -# Call psa_pake_get_implicit_key() for accessing the shared secret. * * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) * for more information. * * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_pake_setup(), * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_pake_abort(). The * application may call psa_pake_abort() at any time after the operation * has been initialized. * * After a successful call to psa_pake_setup(), the application must * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an * operation: * - A call to psa_pake_abort(). * - A successful call to psa_pake_get_implicit_key(). * * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have * been initialized but not set up yet. * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite to use. (A cipher suite fully * characterizes a PAKE algorithm and determines * the algorithm as well.) * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a PAKE algorithm, or the * PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not compatible with the * PAKE algorithm, or the hash algorithm in \p cipher_suite is invalid * or not compatible with the PAKE algorithm and primitive. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a supported PAKE algorithm, * or the PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not supported or not * compatible with the PAKE algorithm, or the hash algorithm in * \p cipher_suite is not supported or not compatible with the PAKE * algorithm and primitive. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid, or * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_pake_setup(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); /** Set the password for a password-authenticated key exchange from key ID. * * Call this function when the password, or a value derived from the password, * is already present in the key store. * * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the password for. It * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must * be on operation for which the password hasn't * been set yet (psa_pake_set_password_key() * hasn't been called yet). * \param password Identifier of the key holding the password or a * value derived from the password (eg. by a * memory-hard function). It must remain valid * until the operation terminates. It must be of * type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD or * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH. It has to allow * the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \p password is not a valid key identifier. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE flag, or it does not * permit the \p operation's algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The key type for \p password is not #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD or * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH, or \p password is not compatible with * the \p operation's cipher suite. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * The key type or key size of \p password is not supported with the * \p operation's cipher suite. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must have been set up.), or * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t password); /** Set the user ID for a password-authenticated key exchange. * * Call this function to set the user ID. For PAKE algorithms that associate a * user identifier with each side of the session you need to call * psa_pake_set_peer() as well. For PAKE algorithms that associate a single * user identifier with the session, call psa_pake_set_user() only. * * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) * for more information. * * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the user ID for. It * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must * be on operation for which the user ID hasn't * been set (psa_pake_set_user() hasn't been * called yet). * \param[in] user_id The user ID to authenticate with. * \param user_id_len Size of the \p user_id buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p user_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher * suite. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * The value of \p user_id is not supported by the implementation. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid, or * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_len); /** Set the peer ID for a password-authenticated key exchange. * * Call this function in addition to psa_pake_set_user() for PAKE algorithms * that associate a user identifier with each side of the session. For PAKE * algorithms that associate a single user identifier with the session, call * psa_pake_set_user() only. * * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) * for more information. * * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the peer ID for. It * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must * be on operation for which the peer ID hasn't * been set (psa_pake_set_peer() hasn't been * called yet). * \param[in] peer_id The peer's ID to authenticate. * \param peer_id_len Size of the \p peer_id buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p user_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher * suite. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * The algorithm doesn't associate a second identity with the session. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * Calling psa_pake_set_peer() is invalid with the \p operation's * algorithm, the operation state is not valid, or the library has not * been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *peer_id, size_t peer_id_len); /** Set the application role for a password-authenticated key exchange. * * Not all PAKE algorithms need to differentiate the communicating entities. * It is optional to call this function for PAKEs that don't require a role * to be specified. For such PAKEs the application role parameter is ignored, * or #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE can be passed as \c role. * * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) * for more information. * * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to specify the * application's role for. It must have been set up * by psa_pake_setup() and not yet in use (neither * psa_pake_output() nor psa_pake_input() has been * called yet). It must be on operation for which * the application's role hasn't been specified * (psa_pake_set_role() hasn't been called yet). * \param role A value of type ::psa_pake_role_t indicating the * application's role in the PAKE the algorithm * that is being set up. For more information see * the documentation of \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_XXX * constants. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The \p role is not a valid PAKE role in the \p operation’s algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * The \p role for this algorithm is not supported or is not valid. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid, or * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, psa_pake_role_t role); /** Get output for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. * * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this * function several times or you might not need to call this at all. * * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more * information. * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. * \param step The step of the algorithm for which the output is * requested. * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written in the * format appropriate for this \p step. Refer to * the documentation of the individual * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more * information. * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. This must * be at least #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p * primitive, \p step) where \p alg and * \p primitive are the PAKE algorithm and primitive * in the operation's cipher suite, and \p step is * the output step. * * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes of the returned * output. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p step is not supported with the operation's algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set * up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements * for ordering of input and output steps), or * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_pake_output(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, psa_pake_step_t step, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); /** Provide input for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. * * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this * function several times or you might not need to call this at all. * * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more * information. * * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort(). * * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. * \param step The step for which the input is provided. * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input in the format * appropriate for this \p step. Refer to the * documentation of the individual * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more * information. * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE * The verification fails for a #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF input step. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \p is not compatible with the \p operation’s algorithm, or the * \p input is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher suite * or \p step. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * \p step p is not supported with the \p operation's algorithm, or the * \p input is not supported for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher * suite or \p step. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set * up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements * for ordering of input and output steps), or * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_pake_input(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, psa_pake_step_t step, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length); /** Get implicitly confirmed shared secret from a PAKE. * * At this point there is a cryptographic guarantee that only the authenticated * party who used the same password is able to compute the key. But there is no * guarantee that the peer is the party it claims to be and was able to do so. * * That is, the authentication is only implicit. Since the peer is not * authenticated yet, no action should be taken yet that assumes that the peer * is who it claims to be. For example, do not access restricted files on the * peer's behalf until an explicit authentication has succeeded. * * This function can be called after the key exchange phase of the operation * has completed. It imports the shared secret output of the PAKE into the * provided derivation operation. The input step * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is used when placing the shared key * material in the key derivation operation. * * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more * information. * * When this function returns successfully, \p operation becomes inactive. * If this function returns an error status, both \p operation * and \p key_derivation operations enter an error state and must be aborted by * calling psa_pake_abort() and psa_key_derivation_abort() respectively. * * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. * \param[out] output A key derivation operation that is ready * for an input step of type * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is not compatible with the * algorithm in the \p output key derivation operation. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED * Input from a PAKE is not supported by the algorithm in the \p output * key derivation operation. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The PAKE operation state is not valid (it must be active, but beyond * that validity is specific to the algorithm), or * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(), * or the state of \p output is not valid for * the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET step. This can happen if the * step is out of order or the application has done this step already * and it may not be repeated. * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_pake_get_implicit_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, psa_key_derivation_operation_t *output); /** Abort a PAKE operation. * * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c * operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused * for another operation by calling psa_pake_setup() again. * * This function may be called at any time after the operation * object has been initialized as described in #psa_pake_operation_t. * * In particular, calling psa_pake_abort() after the operation has been * terminated by a call to psa_pake_abort() or psa_pake_get_implicit_key() * is safe and has no effect. * * \param[in,out] operation The operation to abort. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t *operation); /**@}*/ /** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_pake_output(). * * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed * that psa_pake_output() will not fail due to an insufficient output buffer * size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call. * * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE * * \param alg A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true). * \param primitive A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is * compatible with algorithm \p alg. * \param output_step A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the * algorithm \p alg. * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified * PAKE algorithm, primitive, and output step. If the * PAKE algorithm, primitive, or output step is not * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, * return 0. */ #define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, output_step) \ (alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE && \ primitive == PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, \ PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256) ? \ ( \ output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ? 65 : \ output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ? 65 : \ 32 \ ) : \ 0) /** A sufficient input buffer size for psa_pake_input(). * * The value returned by this macro is guaranteed to be large enough for any * valid input to psa_pake_input() in an operation with the specified * parameters. * * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE * * \param alg A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true). * \param primitive A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is * compatible with algorithm \p alg. * \param input_step A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the * algorithm \p alg. * \return A sufficient input buffer size for the specified * input, cipher suite and algorithm. If the cipher suite, * the input type or PAKE algorithm is not recognized, or * the parameters are incompatible, return 0. */ #define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, input_step) \ (alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE && \ primitive == PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, \ PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256) ? \ ( \ input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ? 65 : \ input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ? 65 : \ 32 \ ) : \ 0) /** Output buffer size for psa_pake_output() for any of the supported PAKE * algorithm and primitive suites and output step. * * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. * * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value * returned by PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE() * * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p step). */ #define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE 65 /** Input buffer size for psa_pake_input() for any of the supported PAKE * algorithm and primitive suites and input step. * * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. * * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value * returned by PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE() * * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p step). */ #define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE 65 /** Returns a suitable initializer for a PAKE cipher suite object of type * psa_pake_cipher_suite_t. */ #define PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT { PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, 0, 0, PSA_ALG_NONE } /** Returns a suitable initializer for a PAKE operation object of type * psa_pake_operation_t. */ #define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP, \ { 0 }, { { 0 } } } struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s { psa_algorithm_t algorithm; psa_pake_primitive_type_t type; psa_pake_family_t family; uint16_t bits; psa_algorithm_t hash; }; static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm( const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) { return cipher_suite->algorithm; } static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm( psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, psa_algorithm_t algorithm) { if (!PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(algorithm)) { cipher_suite->algorithm = 0; } else { cipher_suite->algorithm = algorithm; } } static inline psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive( const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) { return PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(cipher_suite->type, cipher_suite->family, cipher_suite->bits); } static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive( psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, psa_pake_primitive_t primitive) { cipher_suite->type = (psa_pake_primitive_type_t) (primitive >> 24); cipher_suite->family = (psa_pake_family_t) (0xFF & (primitive >> 16)); cipher_suite->bits = (uint16_t) (0xFFFF & primitive); } static inline psa_pake_family_t psa_pake_cs_get_family( const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) { return cipher_suite->family; } static inline uint16_t psa_pake_cs_get_bits( const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) { return cipher_suite->bits; } static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_hash( const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) { return cipher_suite->hash; } static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_hash(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, psa_algorithm_t hash) { if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash)) { cipher_suite->hash = 0; } else { cipher_suite->hash = hash; } } struct psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_s { uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password); size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_len); uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user); size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_len); uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer); size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_len); psa_key_attributes_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(attributes); psa_pake_cipher_suite_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_suite); }; typedef enum psa_jpake_step { PSA_PAKE_STEP_INVALID = 0, PSA_PAKE_STEP_X1_X2 = 1, PSA_PAKE_STEP_X2S = 2, PSA_PAKE_STEP_DERIVE = 3, } psa_jpake_step_t; typedef enum psa_jpake_state { PSA_PAKE_STATE_INVALID = 0, PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP = 1, PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY = 2, PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X1_X2 = 3, PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_X2S = 4, PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X1_X2 = 5, PSA_PAKE_INPUT_X4S = 6, } psa_jpake_state_t; typedef enum psa_jpake_sequence { PSA_PAKE_SEQ_INVALID = 0, PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 1, /* also X2S & X4S KEY_SHARE */ PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 2, /* also X2S & X4S ZK_PUBLIC */ PSA_PAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 3, /* also X2S & X4S ZK_PROOF */ PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 4, PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 5, PSA_PAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 6, PSA_PAKE_SEQ_END = 7, } psa_jpake_sequence_t; typedef enum psa_crypto_driver_pake_step { PSA_JPAKE_STEP_INVALID = 0, /* Invalid step */ PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 1, /* Round 1: input/output key share (for ephemeral private key X1).*/ PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 2, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X1 key */ PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 3, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X1 key */ PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 4, /* Round 1: input/output key share (for ephemeral private key X2).*/ PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 5, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X2 key */ PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 6, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X2 key */ PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 7, /* Round 2: output X2S key (our key) */ PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 8, /* Round 2: output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X2S key (our key) */ PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 9, /* Round 2: output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X2S key (our key) */ PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 10, /* Round 2: input X4S key (from peer) */ PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 11, /* Round 2: input Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X4S key (from peer) */ PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 12 /* Round 2: input Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X4S key (from peer) */ } psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t; struct psa_jpake_computation_stage_s { psa_jpake_state_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); psa_jpake_sequence_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sequence); psa_jpake_step_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(input_step); psa_jpake_step_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_step); }; struct psa_pake_operation_s { /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); /* Algorithm of the PAKE operation */ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); /* A primitive of type compatible with algorithm */ psa_pake_primitive_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(primitive); /* Stage of the PAKE operation: waiting for the setup, collecting inputs * or computing. */ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(stage); /* Holds computation stage of the PAKE algorithms. */ union { uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) psa_jpake_computation_stage_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(jpake); #endif } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(computation_stage); union { psa_driver_pake_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(inputs); } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(data); }; static inline struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void) { const struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s v = PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT; return v; } static inline struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_init(void) { const struct psa_pake_operation_s v = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT; return v; } #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H */