The library/net.c and its corresponding include/mbedtls/net.h file are
renamed to library/net_sockets.c and include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h
respectively. This is to avoid naming collisions in projects which also
have files with the common name 'net'.
Allow the size of the entry_name character array in x509_crt.c to be
configurable through a macro in config.h. entry_name holds a
path/filename string. The macro introduced in
MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN.
The server code parses the client hello extensions even when the
protocol is SSLv3 and this behaviour is non compliant with rfc6101.
Also the server sends extensions in the server hello and omitting
them may prevent interoperability problems.
Fix an issue that caused valid certificates being rejected whenever an
expired or not yet valid version of the trusted certificate was before the
valid version in the trusted certificate list.
This partially reverts 1989caf71c (only the changes to Makefile and
CMakeLists, the addition to scripts/config.pl is kept).
Modifying config.h in the apidoc target creates a race condition with
make -j4 all apidoc
where some parts of the library, tests or programs could be built with the
wrong config.h, resulting in all kinds of (semi-random) errors. Recent
versions of CMake mitigate this by adding a .NOTPARALLEL target to the
generated Makefile, but people would still get errors with older CMake
versions that are still in use (eg in RHEL 5), and with plain make.
An additional issue is that, by failing to use cp -p, the apidoc target was
updating the timestamp on config.h, which seems to cause further build issues.
Let's get back to the previous, safe, situation. The improved apidoc building
will be resurrected in a script in the next commit.
fixes#390fixes#391
armar doesn't understand the syntax without dash. OTOH, the syntax with dash
is the only one specified by POSIX, and it's accepted by GNU ar, BSD ar (as
bundled with OS X) and armar, so it looks like the most portable syntax.
fixes#386
See for example page 8 of
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
The previous constant probably came from a typo as it was 2^26 - 2^5 instead
of 2^36 - 2^5. Clearly the intention was to allow for a constant bigger than
2^32 as the ull suffix and cast to uint64_t show.
fixes#362
In case an entry with the given OID already exists in the list passed to
mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data() and there is not enough memory to allocate
room for the new value, the existing entry will be freed but the preceding
entry in the list will sill hold a pointer to it. (And the following entries
in the list are no longer reachable.) This results in memory leak or a double
free.
The issue is we want to leave the list in a consistent state on allocation
failure. (We could add a warning that the list is left in inconsistent state
when the function returns NULL, but behaviour changes that require more care
from the user are undesirable, especially in a stable branch.)
The chosen solution is a bit inefficient in that there is a time where both
blocks are allocated, but at least it's safe and this should trump efficiency
here: this code is only used for generating certificates, which is unlikely to
be done on very constrained devices, or to be in the critical loop of
anything. Also, the sizes involved should be fairly small anyway.
fixes#367
Remove check on the pathLenConstraint value when looking for a parent to the
EE cert, as the constraint is on the number of intermediate certs below the
parent, and that number is always 0 at that point, so the constraint is always
satisfied.
The check was actually off-by-one, which caused valid chains to be rejected
under the following conditions:
- the parent certificate is not a trusted root, and
- it has pathLenConstraint == 0 (max_pathlen == 1 in our representation)
fixes#280
* iotssl-519-asn1write-overflows-restricted:
Fix other int casts in bounds checking
Fix other occurrences of same bounds check issue
Fix potential buffer overflow in asn1write
* iotssl-515-max-pathlen:
Add Changelog entries for this branch
Fix a style issue
Fix whitespace at EOL issues
Use symbolic constants in test data
Fixed pathlen contraint enforcement.
Additional corner cases for testing pathlen constrains. Just in case.
Added test case for pathlen constrains in intermediate certificates
fixes#310
Actually all key exchanges that use a certificate use signatures too, and
there is no key exchange that uses signatures but no cert, so merge those two
flags.
Two possible integer overflows (during << 2 or addition in BITS_TO_LIMB())
could result in far too few memory to be allocated, then overflowing the
buffer in the subsequent for loop.
Both integer overflows happen when slen is close to or greater than
SIZE_T_MAX >> 2 (ie 2^30 on a 32 bit system).
Note: one could also avoid those overflows by changing BITS_TO_LIMB(s << 2) to
CHARS_TO_LIMB(s >> 1) but the solution implemented looks more robust with
respect to future code changes.
Found by Guido Vranken.
Two possible integer overflows (during << 2 or addition in BITS_TO_LIMB())
could result in far too few memory to be allocated, then overflowing the
buffer in the subsequent for loop.
Both integer overflows happen when slen is close to or greater than
SIZE_T_MAX >> 2 (ie 2^30 on a 32 bit system).
Note: one could also avoid those overflows by changing BITS_TO_LIMB(s << 2) to
CHARS_TO_LIMB(s >> 1) but the solution implemented looks more robust with
respect to future code changes.
There is only one length byte but for some reason we skipped two, resulting in
reading one byte past the end of the extension. Fortunately, even if that
extension is at the very end of the ClientHello, it can't be at the end of the
buffer since the ClientHello length is at most SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN and the
buffer has some more room after that for MAC and so on. So there is no
buffer overread.
Possible consequences are:
- nothing, if the next byte is 0x00, which is a comment first byte for other
extensions, which is why the bug remained unnoticed
- using a point format that was not offered by the peer if next byte is 0x01.
In that case the peer will reject our ServerKeyExchange message and the
handshake will fail.
- thinking that we don't have a common point format even if we do, which will
cause us to immediately abort the handshake.
None of these are a security issue.
The same bug was fixed client-side in fd35af15
