Entries in ChangeLog and Migration guide files
have been merged to cover both the removal of
MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC and
MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
For TLS, secp256k1 is deprecated by RFC 8422 §5.1.1. For X.509,
secp256k1 is not deprecated, but it isn't used in practice, especially
in the context of TLS where there isn't much point in having an X.509
certificate which most peers do not support. So remove it from the
default profile. We can add it back later if there is demand.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Meld the migration guide for the removal of
MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES into the migration guide for
the strengthening of TLS and X.509 defaults, which is more general. The
information in the SHA-1 section was largely already present in the
strengthening section. It is now less straightforward to figure out how to
enable SHA-1 in certificates, but that's a good thing, since no one should
still be doing this in 2021.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
The default curve is now Curve25519, which doesn't support restartable ECC.
So run the restartable ECC tests with a curve that does support it. Use
secp256r1 which is required for these tests anyway for the server's
certificate.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Rewrite mbedtls_debug_print_mpi to be simpler and smaller. Leverage
mbedtls_mpi_bitlen() instead of manually looking for the leading
zeros.
Fix#4608: the old code made an invalid memory dereference when
X->n==0 (freshly initialized bignum with the value 0).
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
There was already a test case for 0 but with a non-empty representation
(X->n == 1). Add a test case with X->n == 0 (freshly initialized mpi).
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
TLS used to prefer larger curves, under the idea that a larger curve has a
higher security strength and is therefore harder to attack. However, brute
force attacks are not a practical concern, so this was not particularly
meaningful. If a curve is considered secure enough to be allowed, then we
might as well use it.
So order curves by resource usage. The exact definition of what this means
is purposefully left open. It may include criteria such as performance and
memory usage. Risk of side channels could be a factor as well, although it
didn't affect the current choice.
The current list happens to exactly correspond to the numbers reported by
one run of the benchmark program for "full handshake/s" on my machine.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
We stated that curves were listed "in order of preference", but we never
explained what the preference was, so this was not meaningful.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE is a compromise between memory usage (growing based
on the value) and performance (faster with larger values). There are
disminishing returns as the value grows larger. Based on Manuel's benchmarks
recorded in https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4127, 4 is a good
compromise point, with larger values bringing little advantage. So reduce
the default from 6 to 4.
Document the default value as in optimized for performance mostly, but don't
document the specific value, so we may change it later or make it
platform-dependent.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Upgrade the default list of hashes and curves allowed for TLS. The list is
now aligned with X.509 certificate verification: hashes and curves with at
least 255 bits (Curve25519 included), and RSA 2048 and above.
Remove MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE which would no
longer do anything.
Document more precisely what is allowed by default.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Upgrade the default X.509 certificate verification profile
mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default to the former value of
mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next, which is hashes and curves with at least 255
bits (Curve25519 included), and RSA 2048 and above.
Document more precisely what goes into the default profile.
Keep the "next" profile unchanged for now.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
in file tests/suite/test_suite_aes.function, aes_crypt_xts_size()
did not free the context upon the function exit.
The function now frees the context on exit.
Fixes#4176
Signed-off-by: JoeSubbiani <Joe.Subbiani@arm.com>
This makes it easier to ensure that crypto_spe.h is included everywhere it
needs to be, and that it's included early enough to do its job (it must be
included before any mention of psa_xxx() functions with external linkage,
because it defines macros to rename these functions).
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
These fields are supposed to be manipulated directly, that's how people
create custom profiles.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Also make sure to initialize the DRBG before using it in fuzz_server
(dummy_random uses ctr_drbg internally).
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Merge part of the RSA entries into this one, as I think it's easier for
users to have all similar changes in one place regardless of whether
they were introduce in the same PR or not.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
We know that Montgomery multiplication will never be called without an
RNG, so make that clear from the beginning of the function.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
It was used to remove the code used when mbedtls_ecp_mul() received a
NULL RNG parameter. This code is no longer relevant (as the RNG may no
longer be NULL) and will be unconditionally removed in the next commit.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
This is necessary for the case where the public part of an EC keypair
needs to be computed from the private part - either because it was not
included (it's an optional component) or because it was compressed (a
format we can't parse).
This changes the API of two public functions: mbedtls_pk_parse_key() and
mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile().
Tests and programs have been adapted. Some programs use a non-secure RNG
(from the test library) just to get things to compile and run; in a
future commit this should be improved in order to demonstrate best
practice.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
- mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() because it calls ecp_mul()
- mbedtls_pk_check_pair() because it calls the former
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
It was indirectly calling ecp_mul() without an RNG. That's actually the
rare case where this should be allowed, as ecp_muladd() is typically
used on non-secret data (to verify signatures or ZKPs) and documented as
not being constant-time.
Refactor a bit in order to keep the ability to call ecp_mul() without a
RNG, but not exposed publicly (except though muladd).
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Fix trivial faulty calls in ECP test suite and ECP/ECJPAKE self-tests (by
adding a dummy RNG).
Several tests suites are not passing yet, as a couple of library
function do call ecp_mul() with a NULL RNG. The complexity of the fixes
range from "simple refactoring" to "requires API changes", so these will
be addressed in separate commits.
This makes the option MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG, as well as the whole
"internal RNG" code, obsolete. This will be addressed in a future
commit, after getting the test suites to pass again.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
(This commit is best reviewed using `git show -b` as indentation levels
have changed.)
The documentation already states that the RNG parameter is mandatory,
since PRs #4488 and #4515. There are several families of functions to
consider here:
- private-key operations (sign, decrypt) all call
mbedtls_rsa_private() where this commit adds a non-NULL check;
- encrypt operations need an RNG for masking/padding and already had a
non-NULL check since #4515 (conditional on \p mode before that)
- verify operations no longer take an RNG parameter since #4515
So, after this commit, all RSA functions that accept an RNG will reach a
non-NULL check before the RNG is used.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
