When USE_PSA is disabled and ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is enabled, generating
ECDSA signatures via PK requires use of the hash via the MD layer (in
HMAC-DRBG, used by deterministic ECDSA).
When USE_PSA is enabled, ECDSA signatures via PK go through PSA which
always uses non-deterministic ECDSA, so does not rely on HMAC-DRBG/MD.
The condition used here is slightly too strong, but expressing exactly
the optimal condition seems more effort than it's worth for just 3 test
cases.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Allow PSK exchange mode on GnuTLS server for
NewSessionTicket message test as otherwise
the GnuTLS server does not send tickets.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Using VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA was justified by the fact that
until a few commits ago, the test functions here computed hashes using
either MD or PSA, depending on whether USE_PSA was defined (which itself
was justified by the loose reasoning that "PK is USE_PSA territory").
A few commits ago, test code stopped computing hashes because the hash
values became part of the test data. PK itself does not compute hashes.
As a result, VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA is no longer justified.
There are now two kinds of tests:
- those that only rely on hash data (ECDSA, RSA PKCS#1 v1.5) should
depend on VIA_LOWLEVEL_OR_PSA as that is the minimal dependency, hence
the one used for data
- those that were the layer below PK will internally compute a hash (RSA
PKCS#1 v2.1): currently this hash is always computed using MD (on which
MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 depends), so legacy dependencies like MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
should be used for now. The previous dependency was morally wrong, it
didn't show in the driver-only tests only because PKCS#1 v2.1 is
disabled in this test for now.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Fix usage with sed:
s/MBEDTLS_OR_PSA_WANT_\([A-Z_0-9]*\)/MBEDTLS_HAS_\1_VIA_LOWLEVEL_OR_PSA/
s/MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_WANT_\([A-Z_0-9]*\)/MBEDTLS_HAS_\1_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA/
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
If there is a PSK involved in the key exchange
and thus no certificate we do not go through the
MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST state thus there
is no reason to check that in the coordination
function of that state.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
ECDHE operations have to be done in
ephemeral and PSK-ephemeral key exchange
mode, not just ephemeral key exhange mode.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
lstat is not available on some platforms (e.g. Ubuntu 16.04). In this
particular case stat is sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>