MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN main purpose is to determine
a miximum size for the TLS 1.2 pre-master secret.
This is not relevant to TLS 1.3 thus disable in
TLS 1.3 case the check against MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN
when setting during the handshake the PSK through
mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(). This fixes the session
resumption with 384 bits PSKs when MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN
is smaller than that.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Per gnutls anti replay issue, it needs millionsecond time delay for
improve the fail rate.
From test result of #6712, this can improve the fail rate from 4%
to 92%.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Yu <jerry.h.yu@arm.com>
These variables were both uses to select the default version of OpenSSL
to use for tests:
- when running compat.sh or ssl-opt.sh directly, OPENSSL_CMD was used;
- when running all.sh, OPENSSL was used.
This caused surprising situations if you had one but not the other set
in your environment. For example I used to have OPENSSL_CMD set but not
OPENSSL, so ssl-opt.sh was failing in some all.sh components but passing
when I ran it manually in the same configuration and build, a rather
unpleasant experience.
The natural name would be OPENSSL, and that's what set in the Docker
images used by the CI. However back in the 1.3.x days, that name was
already used in library/Makefile, so it was preferable to pick a
different one, hence OPENSSL_CMD. However the build system has not been
using this name since at least Mbed TLS 2.0.0, so it's now free for use
again (as demonstrated by the fact that it's been set in the CI without
causing any trouble).
So, unify things and use OPENSSL everywhere. Just leave an error message
for the benefit of developers which might have OPENSSL_CMD, not OPENSSL,
set in their environment from the old days.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
It might not be obvious that this option goes beyond adding new
functions, but also automagically modifies the behaviour of TLS
in some circumstances. Moreover, the exact modifications and
circumstances were not documented anywhere outside the ChangeLog.
Fix that.
While at it, adjust the test that checks no restartable behaviour with
other key exchanges, to use a key exchange that allows cert-based client
authentication so that we can check that this is not restartable either.
We don't have any automated test checking that the server is never
affected. That would require adding an ec_max_ops command-line option to
ssl_server2 that never has any effect, just to check that it indeed
doesn't. I'm not sure that's worth it. I tested manually and could
confirm that the server never has restartable behaviour, even for the
parts that are shared between client and server such as cert chain
verification.
Note (from re-reading the code): all restartable behaviour is controlled
by the flag ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled which is only client-side with
the ECDHE-ECDSA key exchange (TLS 1.2).
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Added mixed cases:
- server using opaque password, while client not
- client using opaque password, while server not
Added a test with mismatched passwords in case both server and
client are using opaque passwords (the same test was already
present for the non-opaque case)
Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti <vsetti@baylibre.com>
We don't need to have two copies of the test with one of them depending
on legacy/compat CID: we can have just one copy, but make sure we run
ssl-opt.sh both in a build with standard CID and in a build with
legacy/compat - that's the job of all.sh (see next commit).
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Per suggestion from Manuel, I removed this redundant test.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
OpenSSL may be configured to support features such as cipher suites or
protocol versions that are disabled by default. Enable them all: we're
testing, we don't care about enabling insecure stuff. This is not needed
with the builds of OpenSSL that we're currently using on the Jenkins CI, but
it's needed with more recent versions such as typically found on developer
machines, and with future CI additions.
The syntax to do that was only introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.0; fortunately we
don't need to do anything special with earlier versions.
With OpenSSL 1.1.1f on Ubuntu 20.04, this allows SHA-1 in certificates,
which is still needed for a few test cases in ssl-opt.sh. Curiously, this is
also needed for the cipher suite TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 (and
no other, including other DHE-PSK or ARIA cipher suites).
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
The value of the first sent signature algorithm is overwritten.
This test forces only a single algorithm to be sent and then
validates that the client received such algorithm.
04 03 is the expected value for SECP256R1_SHA256.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
Add fields to mbedtls_ssl_context
Add write early data indication function
Add check whether write early data indication
Add early data option to ssl_client2
Add test cases for early data
Signed-off-by: Xiaokang Qian <xiaokang.qian@arm.com>
In the PSK exchange modes extension declare first
PSK ephemeral if we support both PSK ephemeral
and PSK. This is aligned with our implementation
giving precedence to PSK ephemeral over pure PSK
and improve compatibility with GnuTLS.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Simplify TLS 1.3 dependencies taking into
account that
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
implies that MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is
defined.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Remove requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_enabled
and use `requires_any_configs_enabled` directly instead.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Use MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED
instead of MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED to guard
code specific to one of the TLS 1.3 key exchange mode with
PSK.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Use MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
instead of MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED to guard
code specific to the TLS 1.3 ephemeral key exchange mode.
Use it also for the dependencies of TLS 1.3 only tests
relying on ephemeral key exchange mode, but for
tests in tls13-kex-modes.sh where the change is done
later using all
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_.*ENABLED macros.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Change function name to ssl_session_set_hostname()
Remove hostname_len
Change hostname to c_string
Update test cases to multi session tickets
Signed-off-by: Xiaokang Qian <xiaokang.qian@arm.com>
Instead of fully validating beforehand
signature algorithms with regards to the
private key, do minimum validation and then
just try to compute the signature. If it
fails try another reasonable algorithm if any.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
When selecting the server certificate based on
the signature algorithms supported by the client,
check the signature algorithms as close as possible
to the way they are checked to compute the
signature for the server to prove it possesses
the private key associated to the certificate.
That way we minimize the odds of selecting a
certificate for which the server will not be
able to compute the signature to prove it
possesses the private key associated to the
certificate.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
The DTLS 1.2 CID specification has been published as RFC 9146. This PR updates the implementation to match the RFC content.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@arm.com>
Allow PSK exchange mode on GnuTLS server for
NewSessionTicket message test as otherwise
the GnuTLS server does not send tickets.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
In "Authentication: client cert not trusted,
server required" ssl-opt.sh test, depending
on client and server execution speed, the
handshake on the client side may complete
successfully: the TLS connection is aborted
by the server because it is not able to
authenticate the client but at that time
the client may have completed the handshake
on its side. Thus, do not check that the
client handshake failed.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
The other "Event-driven I/O" tests are not relevant
to TLS 1.3 yet: no ticket and session resumption
support.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
The other "Non-blocking I/O" tests are not relevant
to TLS 1.3 yet: no ticket and session resumption
support.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
