The user data is typically a pointer to a data structure or a handle which
may no longer be valid after the session is restored. If the user data needs
to be preserved, let the application do it. This way, it is a conscious
decision for the application to save/restore either the pointer/handle
itself or the object it refers to.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Fix library references, tests and programs.
Testing is performed in the already present all.sh test.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
As we have now a minimal viable implementation of TLS 1.3,
let's remove EXPERIMENTAL from the config option enabling
it.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Under gcc11(+) both message and received would cause errors for
potentially being used uninitialised. We fixed many of these issues in
another PR, but this one is only seen under certain configs.
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
All function declaration provided by ssl_invasive.h is needed only for
testing purposes and all of them are provided by constant_time.h as well.
Signed-off-by: gabor-mezei-arm <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
Still check that encryption and decryption are inverse to each other
if the granularity does not match the one used in the KAT.
Signed-off-by: Hanno Becker <hanno.becker@arm.com>
This commit adds four known answer tests for TLS 1.3 record protection
from the following sources:
- RFC 8448 "Example Handshake Traces for TLS 1.3"
- tls13.ulfheim.net "The New Illustrated TLS Connection"
It extends the test coverage of the existing record protection tests
in the following ways:
- The existing record protection tests hand-craft record transform
structures; the new tests use the function
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform()
from library source to create an TLS 1.3 transform from raw
key material and connection information.
- The existing record protection tests only check that encryption
and decryption are inverse to each other; as such, they don't
catch non-compliant implementations of encryption and decryption
which happen to be inverse to each other. By adding a known answer
test for TLS 1.3 record protection, can gain confidence that our
implementation is indeed standards-compliant.
Signed-off-by: Hanno Becker <hanno.becker@arm.com>
Instances of `mbedtls_ssl_session` represent data enabling session resumption.
With the introduction of TLS 1.3, the format of this data changes. We therefore
need TLS-version field as part of `mbedtlsl_ssl_session` which allows distinguish
1.2 and 1.3 sessions.
This commit introduces such a TLS-version field to mbedtls_ssl_session.
The change has a few ramifications:
- Session serialization/deserialization routines need to be adjusted.
This is achieved by adding the TLS-version after the header of
Mbed TLS version+config, and by having the subsequent structure
of the serialized data depend on the value of this field.
The details are described in terms of the RFC 8446 presentation language.
The 1.2 session (de)serialization are moved into static helper functions,
while the top-level session (de)serialization only parses the Mbed TLS
version+config header and the TLS-version field, and dispatches according
to the found version.
This way, it will be easy to add support for TLS 1.3 sessions in the future.
- Tests for session serialization need to be adjusted
- Once we add support for TLS 1.3, with runtime negotiation of 1.2 vs. 1.3,
we will need to have some logic comparing the TLS version of the proposed session
to the negotiated TLS version. For now, however, we only support TLS 1.2,
and no such logic is needed. Instead, we just store the TLS version in the
session structure at the same point when we populate mbedtls_ssl_context.minor_ver.
The change introduces some overlap between `mbedtls_ssl_session.minor_ver` and
`mbedtls_ssl_context.minor_ver`, which should be studied and potentially resolved.
However, with both fields being private and explicitly marked so, this can happen
in a later change.
Signed-off-by: Hanno Becker <hanno.becker@arm.com>
