In "Authentication: client cert not trusted,
server required" ssl-opt.sh test, depending
on client and server execution speed, the
handshake on the client side may complete
successfully: the TLS connection is aborted
by the server because it is not able to
authenticate the client but at that time
the client may have completed the handshake
on its side. Thus, do not check that the
client handshake failed.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
GCC 12 emits a warning because it thinks `buffer1` is used after having been
freed. The code is correct C because we're only using the value of
`(uintptr_t)buffer1`, not `buffer1`. However, we aren't using the value for
anything useful: it doesn't really matter if an alloc-free-alloc sequence
returns the same address twice. So don't print that bit of information, and
this way we don't need to save the old address.
Fixes#5974.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Fix an issue whereby a variable was used to check the size of incoming
TLS records against the configured maximum prior to it being set to the
right value.
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
The other "Event-driven I/O" tests are not relevant
to TLS 1.3 yet: no ticket and session resumption
support.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
The other "Non-blocking I/O" tests are not relevant
to TLS 1.3 yet: no ticket and session resumption
support.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
This is an external function, so in the absence of link-time
optimisation (LTO) the compiler can't know anything about it and has to
call it the number of times it's called in the source code.
This only matters for pk_ec, but change pk_rsa as well for the sake of
uniformity.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
According to the TLS 1.3 standard the CCS records must be unencrypted.
When a record is not encrypted the counter, used in the dynamic IV
creation, is not incremented.
Signed-off-by: Gabor Mezei <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
Trusting the caller to perform the appropriate check is both risky, and
a bit user-unfriendly. Returning NULL on error seems both safer
(dereferencing a NULL pointer is more likely to result in a clean crash,
while mis-casting a pointer might have deeper, less predictable
consequences) and friendlier (the caller can just check the return
value for NULL, which is a common idiom).
Only add that as an additional way of using the function, for the sake
of backwards compatibility. Calls where we know the type of the context
for sure (for example because we just set it up) were legal and safe, so
they should remain legal without checking the result for NULL, which
would be redundant.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
The previous wording "ensure it holds an XXX" context did not mean
anything without looking at the source.
Looking at the source, the criterion is:
- for mbedtls_pk_rsa(), that the info structure uses rsa_alloc_wrap;
- for mbedtls_pk_ec(), that it uses eckey_alloc_wrap or
ecdsa_alloc_wrap, since mbedtls_ecdsa_context is a typedef for
mbedtls_ecp_keypair. (Note that our test code uses mbedtls_pk_ec() on
contexts of type MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA.)
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
The issue was fixed while adding support for static ECDH with Opaque
keys: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/5624
This is just adding the ChangeLog entry for that fix.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
The abi_check script has common false positives. Document the intent of each
family of checks and typical cases of false positives that can be overridden.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Promise that we will try to keep backward compatibility with basic driver
usage, but not with more experimental aspects.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
