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Add psa_pake_set_password_mhf()

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Using memory hard functions with PAKEs is the more secure option. It
should be as convenient and efficient to use as less secure options, but
so far it required creating an additional temporary key object.

With psa_pake_set_password_mhf() this eliminates the need for this.

Similarly we could add a convenience function to supply the password
directly from character strings, but that would make the less secure
option more convenient again and therfore we are not doing it now.

Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Janos Follath 2021-05-13 12:25:15 +01:00
parent 56cc9ccc39
commit fe0c4493f5
1 changed files with 32 additions and 1 deletions
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33
include/psa/crypto.h
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@ -4322,7 +4322,7 @@ static psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_operation_init(void);
psa_status_t psa_pake_setup(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite);
/** Set the password for a password-authenticated key exchange.
/** Set the password for a password-authenticated key exchange from key ID.
*
* \param password Identifier of the key holding the password or a
* value derived from the password (eg. by a
@ -4350,6 +4350,37 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_setup(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t password);
/** Set the password for a password-authenticated key exchange with memory hard
* function.
*
* Some protocols require using values derived from passwords via memory hard
* functions to mitigate dictionary attacks. Memory hard functions can be
* accessed through the key derivation interface and the result can be supplied
* to the PAKE operation in the form of a key derivation object.
*
* \param key_derivation An ongoing key derivation operation set up from
* the password and in a state suitable for
* calling psa_key_derivation_output_bytes().
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* Success.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
* \p key_derivation is not ready for a call to
* psa_key_derivation_output_bytes().
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
* The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
* It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
* results in this error code.
*/
psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_mhf(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
psa_pake_operation_t *key_derivation);
/** Set the user ID for a password-authenticated key exchange.
*
* Some PAKE algorithms assiciate only a single user identifier with the