yuzu-emu/mbedtls
2
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity

Merge pull request #170 from gilles-peskine-arm/at-misra-2012

Browse source 
Use stdint.h types
This commit is contained in:
Gilles Peskine 2019-07-15 14:42:15 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit f61bf9c13b
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
5 changed files with 24 additions and 24 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

12
include/psa/crypto.h
View file

@ -1853,7 +1853,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
*/
psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
unsigned char *iv,
uint8_t *iv,
size_t iv_size,
size_t *iv_length);
@ -1888,7 +1888,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
*/
psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
const unsigned char *iv,
const uint8_t *iv,
size_t iv_length);
/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation.
@ -1926,7 +1926,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
const uint8_t *input,
size_t input_length,
unsigned char *output,
uint8_t *output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *output_length);
@ -2319,7 +2319,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
*/
psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
unsigned char *nonce,
uint8_t *nonce,
size_t nonce_size,
size_t *nonce_length);
@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
*/
psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
const unsigned char *nonce,
const uint8_t *nonce,
size_t nonce_length);
/** Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD.
@ -2507,7 +2507,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
const uint8_t *input,
size_t input_length,
unsigned char *output,
uint8_t *output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *output_length);

2
include/psa/crypto_extra.h
View file

@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ void mbedtls_psa_get_stats( mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats );
* The library has already been initialized. It is no longer
* possible to call this function.
*/
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const unsigned char *seed,
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(uint8_t *seed,
size_t seed_size);
#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)

4
include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
View file

@ -649,7 +649,7 @@
* size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes);
* size_t buffer_size = PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE(key_type, key_bits);
* psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
* unsigned char *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
* uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
* if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...);
* size_t buffer_length;
* status = psa_export_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length);
@ -669,7 +669,7 @@
* size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes);
* size_t buffer_size = PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE(public_key_type, key_bits);
* psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
* unsigned char *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
* uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
* if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...);
* size_t buffer_length;
* status = psa_export_public_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length);

2
include/psa/crypto_struct.h
View file

@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ typedef struct psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_s
* hence we must store it for the lifetime of the operation.
* This is different from HKDF, where the key is only used
* in the extraction phase, but not during expansion. */
unsigned char *key;
uint8_t *key;
size_t key_len;
/* `A(i) + seed` in the notation of RFC 5246, Sect. 5 */

28
library/psa_crypto.c
View file

@ -2207,7 +2207,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_hmac_setup_internal( psa_hmac_internal_data *hmac,
size_t key_length,
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg )
{
unsigned char ipad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t ipad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
size_t i;
size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_SIZE( hash_alg );
size_t block_size = psa_get_hash_block_size( hash_alg );
@ -2281,7 +2281,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
size_t key_bits;
psa_key_usage_t usage =
is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY;
unsigned char truncated = PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( alg );
uint8_t truncated = PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( alg );
psa_algorithm_t full_length_alg = PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg );
/* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */
@ -2446,7 +2446,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_hmac_finish_internal( psa_hmac_internal_data *hmac,
uint8_t *mac,
size_t mac_size )
{
unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
uint8_t tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = hmac->hash_ctx.alg;
size_t hash_size = 0;
size_t block_size = psa_get_hash_block_size( hash_alg );
@ -3227,7 +3227,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
if( slot->type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES && key_bits == 128 )
{
/* Two-key Triple-DES is 3-key Triple-DES with K1=K3 */
unsigned char keys[24];
uint8_t keys[24];
memcpy( keys, slot->data.raw.data, 16 );
memcpy( keys + 16, slot->data.raw.data, 8 );
ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &operation->ctx.cipher,
@ -3300,7 +3300,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
}
psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
unsigned char *iv,
uint8_t *iv,
size_t iv_size,
size_t *iv_length )
{
@ -3333,7 +3333,7 @@ exit:
}
psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
const unsigned char *iv,
const uint8_t *iv,
size_t iv_length )
{
psa_status_t status;
@ -3360,7 +3360,7 @@ exit:
psa_status_t psa_cipher_update( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
const uint8_t *input,
size_t input_length,
unsigned char *output,
uint8_t *output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *output_length )
{
@ -4024,7 +4024,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block(
psa_hmac_internal_data hmac;
psa_status_t status, cleanup_status;
unsigned char *Ai;
uint8_t *Ai;
size_t Ai_len;
/* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise
@ -4517,7 +4517,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_hkdf_setup( psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hk
*/
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_setup(
psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf,
const unsigned char *key,
const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len,
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
const uint8_t *salt,
@ -4572,7 +4572,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_setup(
/* Set up a TLS-1.2-PSK-to-MS-based operation. */
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_psk_to_ms_setup(
psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf,
const unsigned char *psk,
const uint8_t *psk,
size_t psk_len,
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
const uint8_t *salt,
@ -4581,7 +4581,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_psk_to_ms_setup(
size_t label_length )
{
psa_status_t status;
unsigned char pms[ 4 + 2 * PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN ];
uint8_t pms[ 4 + 2 * PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN ];
if( psk_len > PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
@ -4942,8 +4942,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key(
size_t data_length )
{
psa_status_t status;
unsigned char pms[ 4 + 2 * PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN ];
unsigned char* cur = pms;
uint8_t pms[ 4 + 2 * PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN ];
uint8_t *cur = pms;
if( data_length > PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
@ -5313,7 +5313,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_generate_random( uint8_t *output,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY)
#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h"
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( const unsigned char *seed,
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( const uint8_t *seed,
size_t seed_size )
{
if( global_data.initialized )