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Merge pull request #4708 from mstarzyk-mobica/ccm_chunked

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Ccm chunked - enable multipart CCM in PSA
This commit is contained in:
Gilles Peskine 2021-09-21 13:46:52 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit f0f2294f57
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GPG key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
5 changed files with 1234 additions and 277 deletions
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8
ChangeLog.d/chunked_ccm.txt Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
Changes
* Implement multi-part CCM API.
The multi-part functions: mbedtls_ccm_starts(), mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(),
mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(), mbedtls_ccm_update(), mbedtls_ccm_finish()
were introduced in mbedTLS 3.0 release, however their implementation was
postponed until now.
Implemented functions support chunked data input for both CCM and CCM*
algorithms.

20
include/mbedtls/ccm.h
View file

@ -76,7 +76,27 @@ extern "C" {
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_ccm_context
{
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(y)[16]; /*!< The Y working buffer */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctr)[16]; /*!< The counter buffer */
mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(plaintext_len); /*!< Total plaintext length */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(add_len); /*!< Total authentication data length */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tag_len); /*!< Total tag length */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(processed); /*!< Track how many bytes of input data
were processed (chunked input).
Used independently for both auth data
and plaintext/ciphertext.
This variable is set to zero after
auth data input is finished. */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(q); /*!< The Q working value */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); /*!< The operation to perform:
#MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT or
#MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT or
#MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT or
#MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT. */
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /*!< Working value holding context's
state. Used for chunked data
input */
}
mbedtls_ccm_context;

585
library/ccm.c
View file

@ -36,31 +36,23 @@
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#include <stdio.h>
#define mbedtls_printf printf
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT)
#define CCM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT )
#define CCM_VALIDATE( cond ) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond )
#define CCM_ENCRYPT 0
#define CCM_DECRYPT 1
/*
* Initialize context
*/
void mbedtls_ccm_init( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx )
{
CCM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL );
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) );
}
@ -72,9 +64,6 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL );
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits,
MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB );
if( cipher_info == NULL )
@ -108,82 +97,67 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_free( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) );
}
/*
* Macros for common operations.
* Results in smaller compiled code than static inline functions.
*/
/*
* Update the CBC-MAC state in y using a block in b
* (Always using b as the source helps the compiler optimise a bit better.)
*/
#define UPDATE_CBC_MAC \
for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) \
y[i] ^= b[i]; \
\
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, y, 16, y, &olen ) ) != 0 ) \
return( ret );
#define CCM_STATE__CLEAR 0
#define CCM_STATE__STARTED (1 << 0)
#define CCM_STATE__LENGHTS_SET (1 << 1)
#define CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED (1 << 2)
#define CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED (1 << 3)
#define CCM_STATE__ERROR (1 << 4)
/*
* Encrypt or decrypt a partial block with CTR
* Warning: using b for temporary storage! src and dst must not be b!
* This avoids allocating one more 16 bytes buffer while allowing src == dst.
*/
#define CTR_CRYPT( dst, src, len ) \
do \
{ \
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctr, \
16, b, &olen ) ) != 0 ) \
{ \
return( ret ); \
} \
\
for( i = 0; i < (len); i++ ) \
(dst)[i] = (src)[i] ^ b[i]; \
} while( 0 )
static int mbedtls_ccm_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
size_t offset, size_t use_len,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output )
{
size_t i;
size_t olen = 0;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char tmp_buf[16] = {0};
/*
* Authenticated encryption or decryption
*/
static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, 16, tmp_buf,
&olen ) ) != 0 )
{
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf));
return ret;
}
for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
output[i] = input[i] ^ tmp_buf[offset + i];
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf));
return ret;
}
static void mbedtls_ccm_clear_state(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) {
ctx->state = CCM_STATE__CLEAR;
memset( ctx->y, 0, 16);
memset( ctx->ctr, 0, 16);
}
static int ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char i;
unsigned char q;
size_t len_left, olen;
unsigned char b[16];
unsigned char y[16];
unsigned char ctr[16];
const unsigned char *src;
unsigned char *dst;
/*
* Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1
* Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code.
* 'length' checked later (when writing it to the first block)
*
* Also, loosen the requirements to enable support for CCM* (IEEE 802.15.4).
/* length calulcation can be done only after both
* mbedtls_ccm_starts() and mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() have been executed
*/
if( tag_len == 2 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
if( !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__STARTED) || !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__LENGHTS_SET) )
return 0;
/* Also implies q is within bounds */
if( iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13 )
if( ctx->tag_len == 0 && \
( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT || ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
if( add_len >= 0xFF00 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len;
/*
* First block B_0:
* First block:
* 0 .. 0 flags
* 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv)
* 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv) - set by: mbedtls_ccm_starts()
* iv_len+1 .. 15 length
*
* With flags as (bits):
@ -192,56 +166,40 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
* 5 .. 3 (t - 2) / 2
* 2 .. 0 q - 1
*/
b[0] = 0;
b[0] |= ( add_len > 0 ) << 6;
b[0] |= ( ( tag_len - 2 ) / 2 ) << 3;
b[0] |= q - 1;
ctx->y[0] |= ( ctx->add_len > 0 ) << 6;
ctx->y[0] |= ( ( ctx->tag_len - 2 ) / 2 ) << 3;
ctx->y[0] |= ctx->q - 1;
memcpy( b + 1, iv, iv_len );
for( i = 0, len_left = length; i < q; i++, len_left >>= 8 )
b[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len_left );
for( i = 0, len_left = ctx->plaintext_len; i < ctx->q; i++, len_left >>= 8 )
ctx->y[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len_left );
if( len_left > 0 )
{
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
}
/* Start CBC-MAC with first block*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen ) ) != 0 )
{
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
return( ret );
}
return (0);
}
int mbedtls_ccm_starts( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
int mode,
const unsigned char *iv,
size_t iv_len )
{
/* Also implies q is within bounds */
if( iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
/* Start CBC-MAC with first block */
memset( y, 0, 16 );
UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
/*
* If there is additional data, update CBC-MAC with
* add_len, add, 0 (padding to a block boundary)
*/
if( add_len > 0 )
{
size_t use_len;
len_left = add_len;
src = add;
memset( b, 0, 16 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( add_len, b, 0 );
use_len = len_left < 16 - 2 ? len_left : 16 - 2;
memcpy( b + 2, src, use_len );
len_left -= use_len;
src += use_len;
UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
while( len_left > 0 )
{
use_len = len_left > 16 ? 16 : len_left;
memset( b, 0, 16 );
memcpy( b, src, use_len );
UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
len_left -= use_len;
src += use_len;
}
}
ctx->mode = mode;
ctx->q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len;
/*
* Prepare counter block for encryption:
@ -253,62 +211,290 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
* 7 .. 3 0
* 2 .. 0 q - 1
*/
ctr[0] = q - 1;
memcpy( ctr + 1, iv, iv_len );
memset( ctr + 1 + iv_len, 0, q );
ctr[15] = 1;
memset( ctx->ctr, 0, 16);
ctx->ctr[0] = ctx->q - 1;
memcpy( ctx->ctr + 1, iv, iv_len );
memset( ctx->ctr + 1 + iv_len, 0, ctx->q );
ctx->ctr[15] = 1;
/*
* Authenticate and {en,de}crypt the message.
*
* The only difference between encryption and decryption is
* the respective order of authentication and {en,de}cryption.
* See ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready() for block layout description
*/
len_left = length;
src = input;
dst = output;
memcpy( ctx->y + 1, iv, iv_len );
while( len_left > 0 )
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__STARTED;
return ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(ctx);
}
int mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
size_t total_ad_len,
size_t plaintext_len,
size_t tag_len )
{
/*
* Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1
* Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code.
* 'length' checked later (when writing it to the first block)
*
* Also, loosen the requirements to enable support for CCM* (IEEE 802.15.4).
*/
if( tag_len == 2 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
if( total_ad_len >= 0xFF00 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
ctx->plaintext_len = plaintext_len;
ctx->add_len = total_ad_len;
ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
ctx->processed = 0;
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__LENGHTS_SET;
return ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(ctx);
}
int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *add,
size_t add_len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char i;
size_t olen, use_len, offset;
if( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR )
{
size_t use_len = len_left > 16 ? 16 : len_left;
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
if( mode == CCM_ENCRYPT )
if( add_len > 0 )
{
if( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED )
{
memset( b, 0, 16 );
memcpy( b, src, use_len );
UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
CTR_CRYPT( dst, src, use_len );
if( mode == CCM_DECRYPT )
if( !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED) )
{
memset( b, 0, 16 );
memcpy( b, dst, use_len );
UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
if ( add_len > ctx->add_len )
{
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
ctx->y[0] ^= (unsigned char)( ( ctx->add_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
ctx->y[1] ^= (unsigned char)( ( ctx->add_len ) & 0xFF );
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED;
}
else if ( ctx->processed + add_len > ctx->add_len )
{
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
dst += use_len;
src += use_len;
len_left -= use_len;
while( add_len > 0 )
{
offset = (ctx->processed + 2) % 16; /* account for y[0] and y[1]
* holding total auth data length */
use_len = 16 - offset;
/*
* Increment counter.
* No need to check for overflow thanks to the length check above.
*/
for( i = 0; i < q; i++ )
if( ++ctr[15-i] != 0 )
if( use_len > add_len )
use_len = add_len;
for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
ctx->y[i + offset] ^= add[i];
ctx->processed += use_len;
add_len -= use_len;
add += use_len;
if( use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->add_len )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen ) ) != 0 )
{
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
return( ret );
}
}
}
if( ctx->processed == ctx->add_len )
{
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED;
ctx->processed = 0; // prepare for mbedtls_ccm_update()
}
}
return (0);
}
int mbedtls_ccm_update( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
size_t *output_len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char i;
size_t use_len, offset, olen;
unsigned char local_output[16];
if( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR )
{
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
if( ctx->processed + input_len > ctx->plaintext_len )
{
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
if( output_size < input_len )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
*output_len = input_len;
ret = 0;
while ( input_len > 0 )
{
offset = ctx->processed % 16;
use_len = 16 - offset;
if( use_len > input_len )
use_len = input_len;
ctx->processed += use_len;
if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT || \
ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT )
{
for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
ctx->y[i + offset] ^= input[i];
if( use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen ) ) != 0 )
{
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
goto exit;
}
}
ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt( ctx, offset, use_len, input, output );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
}
if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT || \
ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT )
{
/* Since output may be in shared memory, we cannot be sure that
* it will contain what we wrote to it. Therefore, we should avoid using
* it as input to any operations.
* Write decrypted data to local_output to avoid using output variable as
* input in the XOR operation for Y.
*/
ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt( ctx, offset, use_len, input, local_output );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
ctx->y[i + offset] ^= local_output[i];
memcpy( output, local_output, use_len );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( local_output, 16 );
if( use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen ) ) != 0 )
{
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
goto exit;
}
}
}
if( use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len )
{
for( i = 0; i < ctx->q; i++ )
if( ++(ctx->ctr)[15-i] != 0 )
break;
}
input_len -= use_len;
input += use_len;
output += use_len;
}
exit:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( local_output, 16 );
return ret;
}
int mbedtls_ccm_finish( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char i;
if( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR )
{
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
}
if( ctx->add_len > 0 && !( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED ) )
{
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
if( ctx->plaintext_len > 0 && ctx->processed != ctx->plaintext_len )
{
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
/*
* Authentication: reset counter and crypt/mask internal tag
*/
for( i = 0; i < q; i++ )
ctr[15-i] = 0;
for( i = 0; i < ctx->q; i++ )
ctx->ctr[15-i] = 0;
CTR_CRYPT( y, y, 16 );
memcpy( tag, y, tag_len );
ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt( ctx, 0, 16, ctx->y, ctx->y );
if( ret != 0 )
return ret;
if( tag != NULL )
memcpy( tag, ctx->y, tag_len );
mbedtls_ccm_clear_state(ctx);
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Authenticated encryption or decryption
*/
static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t olen;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_starts( ctx, mode, iv, iv_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( ctx, add_len, length, tag_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( ctx, add, add_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_update( ctx, input, length,
output, length, &olen ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_finish( ctx, tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
return( 0 );
}
@ -322,13 +508,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
return( ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len,
return( ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len,
add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) );
}
@ -338,78 +518,75 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
if( tag_len == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
return( mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( ctx, length, iv, iv_len, add,
add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) );
return( ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len,
add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) );
}
/*
* Authenticated decryption
*/
int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
static int mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags(const unsigned char *tag1, const unsigned char *tag2, size_t tag_len)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char check_tag[16];
unsigned char i;
int diff;
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
/* Check tag in "constant-time" */
for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ )
diff |= tag1[i] ^ tag2[i];
if( ( ret = ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, CCM_DECRYPT, length,
if( diff != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED );
}
return( 0 );
}
static int ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char check_tag[16];
if( ( ret = ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, mode, length,
iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
input, output, check_tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
/* Check tag in "constant-time" */
for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ )
diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i];
if( diff != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, length );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED );
return( ret );
}
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
return ccm_auth_decrypt( ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT, length,
iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
input, output, tag, tag_len );
}
int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
if( tag_len == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
return( mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( ctx, length, iv, iv_len, add,
add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) );
return ccm_auth_decrypt( ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT, length,
iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
input, output, tag, tag_len );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */

227
tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.data
View file

@ -174,6 +174,10 @@ CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #24
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":"ABF21C0B02FEB88F856DF4A37381BCE3CC128517D4":"008D493B30AE8B3C9696766CFA":"6E37A6EF546D955D34AB6059":"F32905B88A641B04B9C9FFB58CC390900F3DA12AB16DCE9E82EFA16DA62059"
CCM encrypt and tag AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-128 #1 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"43b1a6bc8d0d22d6d1ca95c18593cca5":"a2b381c7d1545c408fe29817a21dc435a154c87256346b05":"9882578e750b9682c6ca7f8f86":"2084f3861c9ad0ccee7c63a7e05aece5db8b34bd8724cc06b4ca99a7f9c4914f":"cc69ed76985e0ed4c8365a72775e5a19bfccc71aeb116c85a8c74677"
@ -1517,3 +1521,226 @@ mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FD
CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #24
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"9DC9EDAE2FF5DF8636E8C6DE0EED55F7867E33337D":"003B8FD8D3A937B160B6A31C1C":"A4D499F78419728C19178B0C":"4B198156393B0F7796086AAFB454F8C3F034CCA966945F1FCEA7E11BEE6A2F"
CCM encrypt, skip ad AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
CCM* encrypt, skip ad AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
CCM decrypt, skip ad AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
CCM* decrypt, skip ad AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
CCM encrypt, skip ad NIST VADT AES-128 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d24a3d3dde8c84830280cb87abad0bb3":"7c86135ed9c2a515aaae0e9a208133897269220f30870006":"f1100035bb24a8d26004e0e24b":"1faeb0ee2ca2cd52f0aa3966578344f24e69b742c4ab37ab":"1123301219c70599b7c373ad4b3ad67b"
CCM* encrypt, skip ad NIST VADT AES-128 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d24a3d3dde8c84830280cb87abad0bb3":"7c86135ed9c2a515aaae0e9a208133897269220f30870006":"f1100035bb24a8d26004e0e24b":"1faeb0ee2ca2cd52f0aa3966578344f24e69b742c4ab37ab":"1123301219c70599b7c373ad4b3ad67b"
CCM decrypt, skip ad NIST DVPT AES-192 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"411986d04d6463100bff03f7d0bde7ea2c3488784378138c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":"ddc93a54"
CCM* decrypt, skip ad NIST DVPT AES-192 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"411986d04d6463100bff03f7d0bde7ea2c3488784378138c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":"ddc93a54"
CCM encrypt, skip update AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
CCM decrypt, skip update AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
CCM* encrypt, skip update AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
CCM* decrypt, skip update AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"":"eba8347baa6d61f87b67c2dd7c6d2053"
CCM encrypt, skip update NIST VPT AES-128 #1 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"2ebf60f0969013a54a3dedb19d20f6c8":"1de8c5e21f9db33123ff870add":"e1de6c6119d7db471136285d10b47a450221b16978569190ef6a22b055295603":"0ead29ef205fbb86d11abe5ed704b880"
CCM* encrypt, skip update NIST VPT AES-128 #1 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"2ebf60f0969013a54a3dedb19d20f6c8":"1de8c5e21f9db33123ff870add":"e1de6c6119d7db471136285d10b47a450221b16978569190ef6a22b055295603":"0ead29ef205fbb86d11abe5ed704b880"
CCM decrypt, skip update NIST DVPT AES-256 #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"867b0d87cf6e0f718200a97b4f6d5ad5"
CCM* decrypt, skip update NIST DVPT AES-256 #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"867b0d87cf6e0f718200a97b4f6d5ad5"
CCM encrypt, overflow ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM encrypt, incomplete ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM encrypt, full ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM encrypt, incomplete ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM encrypt, overflow update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM encrypt, incomplete update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM encrypt, full update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM encrypt, incomplete update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM decrypt, overflow ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM decrypt, incomplete ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM decrypt, full ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM decrypt, incomplete ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM decrypt, overflow update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16))
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM decrypt, incomplete update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16))
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM decrypt, full update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM decrypt, incomplete update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM* encrypt, overflow ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM* encrypt, incomplete ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM* encrypt, full ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM* encrypt, overflow update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM* encrypt, incomplete ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM* encrypt, incomplete update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM* encrypt, full update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM* encrypt, incomplete update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM* decrypt, overflow ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM* decrypt, incomplete ad NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM* decrypt, full ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM* decrypt, incomplete ad and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"a6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6"
CCM* decrypt, overflow update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM* decrypt, incomplete update NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM* decrypt, full update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM* decrypt, incomplete update and overflow NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM encrypt, instant finish NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98"
CCM decrypt, instant finish NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98"
CCM* encrypt, instant finish NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98"
CCM* decrypt, instant finish NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98"
CCM encrypt, instant finish AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af"
CCM decrypt, instant finish AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af"
CCM* encrypt, instant finish AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af"
CCM* decrypt, instant finish AES-128 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af"
CCM pass unexpected auth data, NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
mbedtls_ccm_unexpected_ad::MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"
CCM encrypt, unexpected ciphertext/plaintext data, NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
mbedtls_ccm_unexpected_text:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa"

671
tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function
View file

@ -1,5 +1,64 @@
/* BEGIN_HEADER */
#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
/* Use the multipart interface to process the encrypted data in two parts
* and check that the output matches the expected output.
* The context must have been set up with the key. */
static int check_multipart( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
int mode,
const data_t *iv,
const data_t *add,
const data_t *input,
const data_t *expected_output,
const data_t *tag,
size_t n1,
size_t n1_add)
{
int ok = 0;
uint8_t *output = NULL;
size_t n2 = input->len - n1;
size_t n2_add = add->len - n1_add;
size_t olen;
/* Sanity checks on the test data */
TEST_ASSERT( n1 <= input->len );
TEST_ASSERT( n1_add <= add->len );
TEST_EQUAL( input->len, expected_output->len );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( ctx, add->len, input->len, tag->len ) );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( ctx, add->x, n1_add) );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( ctx, add->x + n1_add, n2_add ) );
/* Allocate a tight buffer for each update call. This way, if the function
* tries to write beyond the advertised required buffer size, this will
* count as an overflow for memory sanitizers and static checkers. */
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, n1 );
olen = 0xdeadbeef;
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( ctx, input->x, n1, output, n1, &olen ) );
TEST_EQUAL( n1, olen );
ASSERT_COMPARE( output, olen, expected_output->x, n1 );
mbedtls_free( output );
output = NULL;
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, n2 );
olen = 0xdeadbeef;
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( ctx, input->x + n1, n2, output, n2, &olen ) );
TEST_EQUAL( n2, olen );
ASSERT_COMPARE( output, olen, expected_output->x + n1, n2 );
mbedtls_free( output );
output = NULL;
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, tag->len );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_finish( ctx, output, tag->len ) );
ASSERT_COMPARE( output, tag->len, tag->x, tag->len );
mbedtls_free( output );
output = NULL;
ok = 1;
exit:
mbedtls_free( output );
return( ok );
}
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@ -122,71 +181,115 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( int cipher_id, data_t * key,
data_t * add, data_t * result )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
size_t tag_len;
uint8_t * msg_n_tag = (uint8_t *)malloc( result->len + 2 );
size_t n1, n1_add;
uint8_t* io_msg_buf = NULL;
uint8_t* tag_buf = NULL;
const size_t expected_tag_len = result->len - msg->len;
const uint8_t* expected_tag = result->x + msg->len;
/* Prepare input/output message buffer */
ASSERT_ALLOC( io_msg_buf, msg->len );
if( msg->len != 0 )
memcpy( io_msg_buf, msg->x, msg->len );
/* Prepare tag buffer */
ASSERT_ALLOC( tag_buf, expected_tag_len );
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
memset( msg_n_tag, 0, result->len + 2 );
memcpy( msg_n_tag, msg->x, msg->len );
tag_len = result->len - msg->len;
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
/* Test with input == output */
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg->len, iv->x, iv->len, add->x, add->len,
msg_n_tag, msg_n_tag, msg_n_tag + msg->len, tag_len ) == 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg->len, iv->x, iv->len, add->x, add->len,
io_msg_buf, io_msg_buf, tag_buf, expected_tag_len ), 0);
TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( msg_n_tag, result->x, result->len ) == 0 );
ASSERT_COMPARE( io_msg_buf, msg->len, result->x, msg->len );
ASSERT_COMPARE( tag_buf, expected_tag_len, expected_tag, expected_tag_len );
/* Check we didn't write past the end */
TEST_ASSERT( msg_n_tag[result->len] == 0 && msg_n_tag[result->len + 1] == 0 );
/* Prepare data_t structures for multipart testing */
const data_t encrypted_expected = { .x = result->x,
.len = msg->len };
const data_t tag_expected = { .x = (uint8_t*) expected_tag, /* cast to conform with data_t x type */
.len = expected_tag_len };
for( n1 = 0; n1 <= msg->len; n1 += 1 )
{
for( n1_add = 0; n1_add <= add->len; n1_add += 1 )
{
mbedtls_test_set_step( n1 * 10000 + n1_add );
if( !check_multipart( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT,
iv, add, msg,
&encrypted_expected,
&tag_expected,
n1, n1_add ) )
goto exit;
}
}
exit:
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
free( msg_n_tag );
mbedtls_free( io_msg_buf );
mbedtls_free( tag_buf );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( int cipher_id, data_t * key,
data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
data_t * add, int tag_len, int result,
data_t * add, int expected_tag_len, int result,
data_t * expected_msg )
{
unsigned char tag[16];
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
size_t n1, n1_add;
const size_t expected_msg_len = msg->len - expected_tag_len;
const uint8_t* expected_tag = msg->x + expected_msg_len;
/* Prepare input/output message buffer */
uint8_t* io_msg_buf = NULL;
ASSERT_ALLOC( io_msg_buf, expected_msg_len );
if( expected_msg_len )
memcpy( io_msg_buf, msg->x, expected_msg_len );
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
memset( tag, 0x00, sizeof( tag ) );
msg->len -= tag_len;
memcpy( tag, msg->x + msg->len, tag_len );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
/* Test with input == output */
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg->len, iv->x, iv->len, add->x, add->len,
msg->x, msg->x, msg->x + msg->len, tag_len ) == result );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, expected_msg_len, iv->x, iv->len, add->x, add->len,
io_msg_buf, io_msg_buf, expected_tag, expected_tag_len ), result );
if( result == 0 )
{
TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( msg->x, expected_msg->x, expected_msg->len ) == 0 );
ASSERT_COMPARE( io_msg_buf, expected_msg_len, expected_msg->x, expected_msg_len );
/* Prepare data_t structures for multipart testing */
const data_t encrypted = { .x = msg->x,
.len = expected_msg_len };
const data_t tag_expected = { .x = (uint8_t*) expected_tag,
.len = expected_tag_len };
for( n1 = 0; n1 <= expected_msg_len; n1 += 1 )
{
for( n1_add = 0; n1_add <= add->len; n1_add += 1 )
{
mbedtls_test_set_step( n1 * 10000 + n1_add );
if( !check_multipart( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT,
iv, add, &encrypted,
expected_msg,
&tag_expected,
n1, n1_add ) )
goto exit;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t i;
for( i = 0; i < msg->len; i++ )
TEST_ASSERT( msg->x[i] == 0 );
for( i = 0; i < expected_msg_len; i++ )
TEST_EQUAL( io_msg_buf[i], 0 );
}
/* Check we didn't write past the end (where the original tag is) */
TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( msg->x + msg->len, tag, tag_len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_free(io_msg_buf);
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
@ -199,20 +302,32 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( int cipher_id,
data_t *expected_result, int output_ret )
{
unsigned char iv[13];
unsigned char result[50];
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
size_t iv_len, tag_len;
int ret;
size_t iv_len, expected_tag_len;
size_t n1, n1_add;
uint8_t* io_msg_buf = NULL;
uint8_t* tag_buf = NULL;
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
memset( result, 0x00, sizeof( result ) );
const uint8_t* expected_tag = expected_result->x + msg->len;
/* Calculate tag length */
if( sec_level % 4 == 0)
tag_len = 0;
expected_tag_len = 0;
else
tag_len = 1 << ( sec_level % 4 + 1);
expected_tag_len = 1 << ( sec_level % 4 + 1);
/* Prepare input/output message buffer */
ASSERT_ALLOC( io_msg_buf, msg->len );
if( msg->len )
memcpy( io_msg_buf, msg->x, msg->len );
/* Prepare tag buffer */
if( expected_tag_len == 0 )
ASSERT_ALLOC( tag_buf, 16 );
else
ASSERT_ALLOC( tag_buf, expected_tag_len );
/* Calculate iv */
TEST_ASSERT( source_address->len == 8 );
TEST_ASSERT( frame_counter->len == 4 );
memcpy( iv, source_address->x, source_address->len );
@ -220,24 +335,46 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( int cipher_id,
iv[source_address->len + frame_counter->len] = sec_level;
iv_len = sizeof( iv );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id,
key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 );
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id,
key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
/* Test with input == output */
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg->len, iv, iv_len,
add->x, add->len, io_msg_buf,
io_msg_buf, tag_buf, expected_tag_len), output_ret );
ret = mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg->len, iv, iv_len,
add->x, add->len, msg->x,
result, result + msg->len, tag_len );
ASSERT_COMPARE( io_msg_buf, msg->len, expected_result->x, msg->len );
ASSERT_COMPARE( tag_buf, expected_tag_len, expected_tag, expected_tag_len );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == output_ret );
if( output_ret == 0 )
{
const data_t iv_data = { .x = iv,
.len = iv_len };
TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( result,
expected_result->x, expected_result->len ) == 0 );
const data_t encrypted_expected = { .x = expected_result->x,
.len = msg->len };
const data_t tag_expected = { .x = (uint8_t*)expected_tag,
.len = expected_tag_len };
/* Check we didn't write past the end */
TEST_ASSERT( result[expected_result->len] == 0 &&
result[expected_result->len + 1] == 0 );
for( n1 = 0; n1 <= msg->len; n1 += 1 )
{
for( n1_add = 0; n1_add <= add->len; n1_add += 1 )
{
mbedtls_test_set_step( n1 * 10000 + n1_add );
if( !check_multipart( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT,
&iv_data, add, msg,
&encrypted_expected,
&tag_expected,
n1, n1_add ) )
goto exit;
}
}
}
exit:
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
mbedtls_free( io_msg_buf );
mbedtls_free( tag_buf );
}
/* END_CASE */
@ -249,21 +386,27 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( int cipher_id,
data_t *expected_result, int output_ret )
{
unsigned char iv[13];
unsigned char result[50];
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
size_t iv_len, tag_len;
int ret;
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
memset( iv, 0x00, sizeof( iv ) );
memset( result, '+', sizeof( result ) );
size_t iv_len, expected_tag_len;
size_t n1, n1_add;
/* Calculate tag length */
if( sec_level % 4 == 0)
tag_len = 0;
expected_tag_len = 0;
else
tag_len = 1 << ( sec_level % 4 + 1);
expected_tag_len = 1 << ( sec_level % 4 + 1);
const size_t expected_msg_len = msg->len - expected_tag_len;
const uint8_t* expected_tag = msg->x + expected_msg_len;
/* Prepare input/output message buffer */
uint8_t* io_msg_buf = NULL;
ASSERT_ALLOC( io_msg_buf, expected_msg_len );
if( expected_msg_len )
memcpy( io_msg_buf, msg->x, expected_msg_len );
/* Calculate iv */
memset( iv, 0x00, sizeof( iv ) );
TEST_ASSERT( source_address->len == 8 );
TEST_ASSERT( frame_counter->len == 4 );
memcpy( iv, source_address->x, source_address->len );
@ -271,23 +414,405 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( int cipher_id,
iv[source_address->len + frame_counter->len] = sec_level;
iv_len = sizeof( iv );
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 );
/* Test with input == output */
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( &ctx, expected_msg_len, iv, iv_len,
add->x, add->len, io_msg_buf, io_msg_buf,
expected_tag, expected_tag_len ), output_ret );
ret = mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg->len - tag_len, iv, iv_len,
add->x, add->len, msg->x, result,
msg->x + msg->len - tag_len, tag_len );
ASSERT_COMPARE( io_msg_buf, expected_msg_len, expected_result->x, expected_msg_len );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == output_ret );
if( output_ret == 0 )
{
const data_t iv_data = { .x = iv,
.len = iv_len };
TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( result, expected_result->x,
expected_result->len ) == 0 );
const data_t encrypted = { .x = msg->x,
.len = expected_msg_len} ;
/* Check we didn't write past the end (where the original tag is) */
TEST_ASSERT( ( msg->len + 2 ) <= sizeof( result ) );
TEST_EQUAL( result[msg->len], '+' );
TEST_EQUAL( result[msg->len + 1], '+' );
const data_t tag_expected = { .x = (uint8_t*) expected_tag,
.len = expected_tag_len };
for( n1 = 0; n1 <= expected_msg_len; n1 += 1 )
{
for( n1_add = 0; n1_add <= add->len; n1_add += 1 )
{
mbedtls_test_set_step( n1 * 10000 + n1_add );
if( !check_multipart( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT,
&iv_data, add, &encrypted,
expected_result,
&tag_expected,
n1, n1_add ) )
goto exit;
}
}
}
exit:
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
mbedtls_free( io_msg_buf );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* Skip auth data, provide full text */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad( int cipher_id, int mode,
data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
data_t * result, data_t * tag )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
uint8_t *output = NULL;
size_t olen;
/* Sanity checks on the test data */
TEST_EQUAL( msg->len, result->len );
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, 0, msg->len, tag->len ) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, result->len );
olen = 0xdeadbeef;
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len, output, result->len, &olen ) );
TEST_EQUAL( result->len, olen );
ASSERT_COMPARE( output, olen, result->x, result->len );
mbedtls_free( output );
output = NULL;
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, tag->len );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, tag->len ) );
ASSERT_COMPARE( output, tag->len, tag->x, tag->len );
mbedtls_free( output );
output = NULL;
exit:
mbedtls_free( output );
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* Provide auth data, skip full text */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_skip_update( int cipher_id, int mode,
data_t * key, data_t * iv, data_t* add,
data_t * tag )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
uint8_t *output = NULL;
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, 0, tag->len ) );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, tag->len );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, tag->len ) );
ASSERT_COMPARE( output, tag->len, tag->x, tag->len );
mbedtls_free( output );
output = NULL;
exit:
mbedtls_free( output );
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* Provide too much auth data */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad( int cipher_id, int mode,
data_t * key, data_t * iv,
data_t * add )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
// use hardcoded values for msg length and tag length. They are not a part of this test
// subtract 1 from configured auth data length to provoke an overflow
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len - 1, 16, 16 ) );
TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
exit:
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* Provide unexpected auth data */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_unexpected_ad( int cipher_id, int mode,
data_t * key, data_t * iv,
data_t * add )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
// use hardcoded values for msg length and tag length. They are not a part of this test
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, 0, 16, 16 ) );
TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
exit:
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* Provide unexpected plaintext/ciphertext data */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_unexpected_text( int cipher_id, int mode,
data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
data_t * add )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
uint8_t *output = NULL;
size_t olen;
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
// use hardcoded value for tag length. It is not a part of this test
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, 0, 16 ) );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, msg->len );
olen = 0xdeadbeef;
TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len, output, msg->len, &olen ) );
exit:
mbedtls_free( output );
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* Provide incomplete auth data and finish */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad( int cipher_id, int mode,
data_t * key, data_t * iv, data_t* add )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
uint8_t *output = NULL;
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
// use hardcoded values for msg length and tag length. They are not a part of this test
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, 0, 16 ) );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len - 1) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, 16 );
TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, 16 ) );
exit:
mbedtls_free( output );
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* Provide complete auth data on first update_ad.
* Provide unexpected auth data on second update_ad */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow( int cipher_id, int mode,
data_t * key, data_t * iv,
data_t * add )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
// use hardcoded values for msg length and tag length. They are not a part of this test
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, 16, 16 ) );
// pass full auth data
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
// pass 1 extra byte
TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, 1) );
exit:
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* Provide incomplete auth data on first update_ad.
* Provide too much auth data on second update_ad */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad_and_overflow( int cipher_id, int mode,
data_t * key, data_t * iv,
data_t * add )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
uint8_t add_second_buffer[2];
add_second_buffer[0] = add->x[ add->len - 1 ];
add_second_buffer[1] = 0xAB; // some magic value
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
// use hardcoded values for msg length and tag length. They are not a part of this test
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, 16, 16 ) );
// pass incomplete auth data
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len - 1) );
// pass 2 extra bytes (1 missing byte from previous incomplete pass, and 1 unexpected byte)
TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add_second_buffer, 2) );
exit:
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* Provide too much plaintext/ciphertext */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update( int cipher_id, int mode,
data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
data_t * add )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
uint8_t *output = NULL;
size_t olen;
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
// use hardcoded value for tag length. It is a not a part of this test
// subtract 1 from configured msg length to provoke an overflow
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, msg->len - 1, 16 ) );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, msg->len );
TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, \
mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len, output, msg->len, &olen ) );
exit:
mbedtls_free( output );
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* Provide incomplete plaintext/ciphertext and finish */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update( int cipher_id, int mode,
data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
data_t * add )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
uint8_t *output = NULL;
size_t olen;
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
// use hardcoded value for tag length. It is not a part of this test
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, msg->len, 16 ) );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, msg->len );
olen = 0xdeadbeef;
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len - 1, output, msg->len, &olen ) );
mbedtls_free( output );
output = NULL;
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, 16 );
TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, 16 ) );
exit:
mbedtls_free( output );
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* Provide full plaintext/ciphertext of first update
* Provide unexpected plaintext/ciphertext on second update */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow( int cipher_id, int mode,
data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
data_t * add )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
uint8_t *output = NULL;
size_t olen;
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
// use hardcoded value for tag length. It is a not a part of this test
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, msg->len, 16 ) );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, msg->len );
// pass full text
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len, output, msg->len, &olen ) );
// pass 1 extra byte
TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, \
mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, 1, output, 1, &olen ) );
exit:
mbedtls_free( output );
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* Provide incomplete plaintext/ciphertext of first update
* Provide too much plaintext/ciphertext on second update */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update_overflow( int cipher_id, int mode,
data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
data_t * add )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
uint8_t *output = NULL;
size_t olen;
uint8_t msg_second_buffer[2];
msg_second_buffer[0] = msg->x[ msg->len - 1 ];
msg_second_buffer[1] = 0xAB; // some magic value
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
// use hardcoded value for tag length. It is a not a part of this test
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, msg->len, 16 ) );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, msg->len + 1 );
// pass incomplete text
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len - 1, output, msg->len + 1, &olen ) );
// pass 2 extra bytes (1 missing byte from previous incomplete pass, and 1 unexpected byte)
TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, \
mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg_second_buffer, 2, output + msg->len - 1, 2, &olen ) );
exit:
mbedtls_free( output );
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* Finish without passing any auth data or plaintext/ciphertext input */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish( int cipher_id, int mode,
data_t * key, data_t * iv )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
uint8_t *output = NULL;
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
// use hardcoded values for add length, msg length and tag length.
// They are not a part of this test
TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, 16, 16, 16 ) );
ASSERT_ALLOC( output, 16 );
TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, 16 ) );
exit:
mbedtls_free( output );
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */