diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 40ef2a948..e29979bad 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@
  *  [2] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 8
  *      Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone
  *
+ *  [3] Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks
+ *      Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice and
+ *      Stefan Mangard
+ *      https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08719v2
+ *
  */
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
@@ -356,6 +361,27 @@ cleanup:
     return( ret );
 }
 
+/*
+ * Exponent blinding supposed to prevent side-channel attacks using multiple
+ * traces of measurements to recover the RSA key. The more collisions are there,
+ * the more bits of the key can be recovered. See [3].
+ *
+ * Collecting n collisions with m bit long blinding value requires 2^(m-m/n)
+ * observations on avarage.
+ *
+ * For example with 28 byte blinding to achieve 2 collisions the adversary has
+ * to make 2^112 observations on avarage.
+ *
+ * (With the currently (as of 2017 April) known best algorithms breaking 2048
+ * bit RSA requires approximately as much time as trying out 2^112 random keys.
+ * Thus in this sense with 28 byte blinding the security is not reduced by
+ * side-channel attacks like the one in [3])
+ *
+ * This countermeasure does not help if the key recovery is possible with a
+ * single trace.
+ */
+#define RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING 28
+
 /*
  * Do an RSA private key operation
  */
@@ -368,12 +394,22 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
     int ret;
     size_t olen;
     mbedtls_mpi T, T1, T2;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    mbedtls_mpi P1, Q1;
+    mbedtls_mpi D_blind, R;
+    mbedtls_mpi *D = &ctx->D;
+#endif
 
     /* Make sure we have private key info, prevent possible misuse */
     if( ctx->P.p == NULL || ctx->Q.p == NULL || ctx->D.p == NULL )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T2 );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &P1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q1 );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &D_blind );
+#endif
+
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
@@ -396,13 +432,32 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( rsa_prepare_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) );
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vi ) );
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+        /*
+         * Exponent blinding
+         */
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
+
+        /*
+         * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D
+         */
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
+                         f_rng, p_rng ) );
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &P1, &Q1 ) );
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &R ) );
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D ) );
+
+        D = &D_blind;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
     }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, &ctx->D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
 #else
     /*
-     * faster decryption using the CRT
+     * Faster decryption using the CRT
      *
      * T1 = input ^ dP mod P
      * T2 = input ^ dQ mod Q
@@ -444,6 +499,10 @@ cleanup:
 #endif
 
     mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T2 );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &P1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q1 );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &D_blind );
+#endif
 
     if( ret != 0 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED + ret );