Merge pull request #282 from ARMmbed/iotssl-469-rsa-crt-restricted

Add counter-measure against RSA-CRT attack
This commit is contained in:
Simon Butcher 2015-09-08 13:05:51 +01:00
commit e5a21b4493
2 changed files with 45 additions and 3 deletions

View file

@ -2,6 +2,11 @@ mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
= mbed TLS 2.1.0 released 2015-09-04 = mbed TLS 2.1.0 released 2015-09-04
Security
* Add countermeasure against Lenstra's RSA-CRT attack for PKCS#1 v1.5
signatures. (Found by Florian Weimer, Red Hat.)
https://securityblog.redhat.com/2015/09/02/factoring-rsa-keys-with-tls-perfect-forward-secrecy/
Features Features
* Added support for yotta as a build system. * Added support for yotta as a build system.
* Primary open source license changed to Apache 2.0 license. * Primary open source license changed to Apache 2.0 license.

View file

@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
#else #else
#include <stdio.h> #include <stdio.h>
#define mbedtls_printf printf #define mbedtls_printf printf
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif #endif
/* /*
@ -1005,6 +1007,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
size_t nb_pad, olen, oid_size = 0; size_t nb_pad, olen, oid_size = 0;
unsigned char *p = sig; unsigned char *p = sig;
const char *oid = NULL; const char *oid = NULL;
unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL;
size_t i;
unsigned char diff;
volatile unsigned char diff_no_optimize;
int ret;
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@ -1067,9 +1074,39 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
memcpy( p, hash, hashlen ); memcpy( p, hash, hashlen );
} }
return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) return( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) );
: mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ) );
/*
* In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a
* temporary buffer and check it before returning it.
*/
sig_try = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len );
verif = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len );
if( sig_try == NULL || verif == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) );
/* Compare in constant time just in case */
for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < ctx->len; i++ )
diff |= verif[i] ^ sig[i];
diff_no_optimize = diff;
if( diff_no_optimize != 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy( sig, sig_try, ctx->len );
cleanup:
mbedtls_free( sig_try );
mbedtls_free( verif );
return( ret );
} }
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */