Threat Model: improve wording
Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
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SECURITY.md
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SECURITY.md
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@ -42,14 +42,14 @@ Ciphers](#block-ciphers) section.
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### Local attacks
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The attacker is capable of running code on the same hardware as Mbed TLS, but
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there is still a security boundary between them (ie. the attacker can't for
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example read secrets from Mbed TLS' memory directly).
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The attacker can run software on the same machine. The attacker has
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insufficient privileges to directly access Mbed TLS assets such as memory and
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files.
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#### Timing attacks
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The attacker can gain information about the time taken by certain sets of
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instructions in Mbed TLS operations. (See for example the [Flush+Reload
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The attacker is able to observe the timing of instructions executed by Mbed
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TLS.(See for example the [Flush+Reload
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paper](https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/448.pdf).)
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(Technically, timing information can be observed over the network or through
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