Update ChangeLog to make "fix" explicit

Signed-off-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tom Cosgrove 2023-03-08 15:47:00 +00:00
parent ed7b5978cd
commit b3c6a1e04a

View file

@ -106,11 +106,11 @@ Security
* Fix potential heap buffer overread and overwrite in DTLS if
MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID is enabled and
MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX > 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX.
* An adversary with access to precise enough information about memory
accesses (typically, an untrusted operating system attacking a secure
enclave) could recover an RSA private key after observing the victim
performing a single private-key operation if the window size used for the
exponentiation was 3 or smaller. Found and reported by Zili KOU,
* Fix an issue where an adversary with access to precise enough information
about memory accesses (typically, an untrusted operating system attacking
a secure enclave) could recover an RSA private key after observing the
victim performing a single private-key operation if the window size used
for the exponentiation was 3 or smaller. Found and reported by Zili KOU,
Wenjian HE, Sharad Sinha, and Wei ZHANG. See "Cache Side-channel Attacks
and Defenses of the Sliding Window Algorithm in TEEs" - Design, Automation
and Test in Europe 2023.
@ -969,16 +969,17 @@ Security
signature, allowing the recovery of the private key after observing a
large number of signature operations. This completes a partial fix in
Mbed TLS 2.20.0.
* An adversary with access to precise enough information about memory
accesses (typically, an untrusted operating system attacking a secure
enclave) could recover an RSA private key after observing the victim
performing a single private-key operation. Found and reported by
* Fix an issue where an adversary with access to precise enough information
about memory accesses (typically, an untrusted operating system attacking
a secure enclave) could recover an RSA private key after observing the
victim performing a single private-key operation. Found and reported by
Zili KOU, Wenjian HE, Sharad Sinha, and Wei ZHANG.
* An adversary with access to precise enough timing information (typically, a
co-located process) could recover a Curve25519 or Curve448 static ECDH key
after inputting a chosen public key and observing the victim performing the
corresponding private-key operation. Found and reported by Leila Batina,
Lukas Chmielewski, Björn Haase, Niels Samwel and Peter Schwabe.
* Fix an issue where an adversary with access to precise enough timing
information (typically, a co-located process) could recover a Curve25519
or Curve448 static ECDH key after inputting a chosen public key and
observing the victim performing the corresponding private-key operation.
Found and reported by Leila Batina, Lukas Chmielewski, Björn Haase, Niels
Samwel and Peter Schwabe.
Bugfix
* Fix premature fopen() call in mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file which may