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Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/development' into psa-m-aead

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Conflicts:
* None
This commit is contained in:
Paul Elliott 2021-06-01 17:13:19 +01:00
commit b2ce2ed6d8
247 changed files with 6005 additions and 22524 deletions
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8
.gitignore vendored
View file

@ -37,14 +37,6 @@ massif-*
# Microsoft CMake extension for Visual Studio Code generates a build directory by default
/build/
# Visual Studio artifacts
/visualc/VS2010/.localhistory/
/visualc/VS2010/.vs/
/visualc/VS2010/Debug/
/visualc/VS2010/Release/
/visualc/VS2010/*.vcxproj.filters
/visualc/VS2010/*.vcxproj.user
# Generated documentation:
/apidoc

7
.travis.yml
View file

@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ jobs:
script:
- tests/scripts/all.sh -k 'check_*'
- tests/scripts/all.sh -k test_default_out_of_box
- tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl
- tests/scripts/all.sh -k test_ref_configs
- tests/scripts/all.sh -k build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_arm5vte build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_m0plus
- name: full configuration
@ -39,11 +39,12 @@ jobs:
before_install:
- choco install python --version=3.5.4
env:
# Add the directory where the Choco package goes
# Add the directory where the Choco packages go
- PATH=/c/Python35:/c/Python35/Scripts:$PATH
script:
- type perl; perl --version
- type python; python --version
- python scripts/generate_psa_constants.py
- scripts/make_generated_files.bat
# Logs appear out of sequence on Windows. Give time to catch up.
- sleep 5
- scripts/windows_msbuild.bat v141 # Visual Studio 2017

31
CMakeLists.txt
View file

@ -56,17 +56,6 @@ else()
endif()
# Warning string - created as a list for compatibility with CMake 2.8
set(WARNING_BORDER "*******************************************************\n")
set(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L1 "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined!\n")
set(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L2 "**** THIS BUILD HAS NO DEFINED ENTROPY SOURCES\n")
set(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L3 "**** AND IS *NOT* SUITABLE FOR PRODUCTION USE\n")
set(NULL_ENTROPY_WARNING "${WARNING_BORDER}"
"${NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L1}"
"${NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L2}"
"${NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L3}"
"${WARNING_BORDER}")
set(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L1 "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY defined!\n")
set(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L2 "**** Using 128-bit keys for CTR_DRBG limits the security of generated\n")
set(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L3 "**** keys and operations that use random values generated to 128-bit security\n")
@ -99,26 +88,6 @@ if(MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE)
message(WARNING ${CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARNING})
endif()
# If NULL Entropy is configured, display an appropriate warning
execute_process(COMMAND ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/scripts/config.py -f ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/mbedtls/config.h get MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY
RESULT_VARIABLE result)
if(${result} EQUAL 0)
message(WARNING ${NULL_ENTROPY_WARNING})
if(NOT UNSAFE_BUILD)
message(FATAL_ERROR "\
\n\
Warning! You have enabled MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY. \
This option is not safe for production use and negates all security \
It is intended for development use only. \
\n\
To confirm you want to build with this option, re-run cmake with the \
option: \n\
cmake -DUNSAFE_BUILD=ON ")
return()
endif()
endif()
endif()
# If this is the root project add longer list of available CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE values

5
ChangeLog.d/aria-alt.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
Bugfix
* Fix some issues affecting MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT implementations: a misplaced
directive in a header and a missing initialization in the self-test.
* Fix a missing initialization in the Camellia self-test, affecting
MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT implementations.

6
ChangeLog.d/cipher-delayed-output.txt Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
API changes
* For multi-part AEAD operations with the cipher module, calling
mbedtls_cipher_finish() is now mandatory. Previously the documentation
was unclear on this point, and this function happened to never do
anything with the currently implemented AEADs, so in practice it was
possible to skip calling it, which is no longer supported.

4
ChangeLog.d/ciphersuite-sha1-sha384-guard.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
Bugfix
* The cipher suite TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 was not available
when SHA-1 was disabled and was offered when SHA-1 was enabled but SHA-384
was disabled. Fix the dependency. Fixes #4472.

2
ChangeLog.d/ciphersuite-sha384-guard.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
Bugfix
* Do not offer SHA384 cipher suites when SHA-384 is disabled. Fixes #4499.

5
ChangeLog.d/fix-mingw-build.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
Changes
* fix build failure on MinGW toolchain when __USE_MING_ANSI_STDIO is on.
When that flag is on, standard GNU C printf format specifiers
should be used.

17
ChangeLog.d/gcm-update.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
API changes
* The interface of the GCM module has changed to remove restrictions on
how the input to multipart operations is broken down. mbedtls_gcm_finish()
now takes an extra output parameter for the last partial output block.
mbedtls_gcm_update() now takes extra parameters for the output length.
The software implementation always produces the full output at each
call to mbedtls_gcm_update(), but alternative implementations activated
by MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT may delay partial blocks to the next call to
mbedtls_gcm_update() or mbedtls_gcm_finish(). Furthermore, applications
no longer pass the associated data to mbedtls_gcm_starts(), but to the
new function mbedtls_gcm_update_ad().
These changes are backward compatible for users of the cipher API.
Features
* The multi-part GCM interface (mbedtls_gcm_update() or
mbedtls_cipher_update()) no longer requires the size of partial inputs to
be a multiple of 16.

3
ChangeLog.d/host_test-int32.txt Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Bugfix
* Fix test suite code on platforms where int32_t is not int, such as
Arm Cortex-M. Fixes #4530.

3
ChangeLog.d/issue4055.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
API changes
* The function mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension() has an extra parameter
which allows to mark an extension as critical. Fixes #4055.

11
ChangeLog.d/issue4286.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
Removals
* Remove the TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 and DTLS 1.0 support by removing the following
library constants: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED,
MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV, MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE,
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK, and functions:
mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting(),
mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls(), mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback().
Fixes #4286.

3
ChangeLog.d/issue4361.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Removals
* Remove the MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING option and enable by default its
previous action. Fixes #4361.

2
ChangeLog.d/issue4403.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
Removals
* Remove the MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT config.h option. Fixes #4403.

3
ChangeLog.d/make-generate-tests-python.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Changes
* When building the test suites with GNU make, invoke python3 or python, not
python2, which is no longer supported upstream.

7
ChangeLog.d/no-generated-files.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
Requirement changes
* If you build the development version of Mbed TLS, rather than an official
release, some configuration-independent files are now generated at build
time rather than checked into source control. This includes some library
source files as well as the Visual Studio solution. Perl, Python 3 and a
C compiler for the host platform are required. See “Generated source files
in the development branch” in README.md for more information.

5
ChangeLog.d/psa-without-genprime-fix.txt Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
Bugfix
* Restore the ability to configure PSA via Mbed TLS options to support RSA
key pair operations but exclude RSA key generation. When MBEDTLS_GENPRIME
is not defined PSA will no longer attempt to use mbedtls_rsa_gen_key().
Fixes #4512.

2
ChangeLog.d/psa_sign_message.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
Features
* Implement psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message().

7
ChangeLog.d/relaxed-psk-semantics.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
API changes
* Modify semantics of `mbedtls_ssl_conf_[opaque_]psk()`:
In Mbed TLS 2.X, the API prescribes that later calls overwrite
the effect of earlier calls. In Mbed TLS 3.0, calling
`mbedtls_ssl_conf_[opaque_]psk()` more than once will fail,
leaving the PSK that was configured first intact.
Support for more than one PSK may be added in 3.X.

4
ChangeLog.d/remove-max-content-len.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
Removals
* Remove MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN configuration option, since
MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN replace
it. Fixes #4362.

9
ChangeLog.d/remove-rsa-mode-parameter.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
Removals
* The RSA module no longer supports private-key operations with the public
key and vice versa.
API changes
* Remove the mode parameter from RSA operation functions. Signature and
decryption functions now always use the private key and verification and
encryption use the public key. Verification functions also no longer have
RNG parameters.
* The RNG is now mandatory for all private-key RSA operations.

2
ChangeLog.d/remove_null_entropy.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
API changes
* Remove the MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY config option. Fixes #4388.

5
ChangeLog.d/session-cache-api.txt Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
API changes
* The getter and setter API of the SSL session cache (used for
session-ID based session resumption) has changed to that of
a key-value store with keys being session IDs and values
being opaque instances of `mbedtls_ssl_session`.

7
ChangeLog.d/sha224_sha384.txt Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
API changes
* Replace MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 config option with MBEDTLS_SHA384_C.
This separates config option enabling the SHA384 algorithm from option
enabling the SHA512 algorithm. Fixes #4034.
* Introduce MBEDTLS_SHA224_C.
This separates config option enabling the SHA224 algorithm from option
enabling SHA256.

6
ChangeLog.d/sha512-output-type.txt Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
API changes
* The output parameter of mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret, mbedtls_sha512_ret,
mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret and mbedtls_sha256_ret now has a pointer type
rather than array type. This removes spurious warnings in some compilers
when outputting a SHA-384 or SHA-224 hash into a buffer of exactly
the hash size.

6
ChangeLog.d/ssl-error-code-cleanup.txt Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
API changes
* Remove SSL error codes `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED`
and `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH` which are never
returned from the public SSL API.
* Remove `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE` and return
`MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL` instead.

4
ChangeLog.d/undefined_reference_without_psa.txt Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
Bugfix
* With MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C disabled, some functions were getting built
nonetheless, resulting in undefined reference errors when building a
shared library. Reported by Guillermo Garcia M. in #4411.

56
Makefile
View file

@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
DESTDIR=/usr/local
PREFIX=mbedtls_
PERL ?= perl
.SILENT:
@ -22,6 +23,37 @@ tests: lib mbedtls_test
mbedtls_test:
$(MAKE) -C tests mbedtls_test
library/%:
$(MAKE) -C library $*
programs/%:
$(MAKE) -C programs $*
tests/%:
$(MAKE) -C tests $*
.PHONY: generated_files
generated_files: library/generated_files
generated_files: programs/generated_files
generated_files: tests/generated_files
generated_files: visualc_files
.PHONY: visualc_files
VISUALC_FILES = visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.sln visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj
# TODO: $(app).vcxproj for each $(app) in programs/
visualc_files: $(VISUALC_FILES)
# Ensure that the .c files that generate_visualc_files.pl enumerates are
# present before it runs. It doesn't matter if the files aren't up-to-date,
# they just need to be present.
$(VISUALC_FILES): | library/generated_files
$(VISUALC_FILES): scripts/generate_visualc_files.pl
$(VISUALC_FILES): scripts/data_files/vs2010-app-template.vcxproj
$(VISUALC_FILES): scripts/data_files/vs2010-main-template.vcxproj
$(VISUALC_FILES): scripts/data_files/vs2010-sln-template.sln
# TODO: also the list of .c and .h source files, but not their content
$(VISUALC_FILES):
echo " Gen $@ ..."
$(PERL) scripts/generate_visualc_files.pl
ifndef WINDOWS
install: no_test
mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)/include/mbedtls
@ -59,12 +91,6 @@ uninstall:
done
endif
WARNING_BORDER =*******************************************************\n
NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L1=**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined! ****\n
NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L2=**** THIS BUILD HAS NO DEFINED ENTROPY SOURCES ****\n
NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L3=**** AND IS *NOT* SUITABLE FOR PRODUCTION USE ****\n
NULL_ENTROPY_WARNING=\n$(WARNING_BORDER)$(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L1)$(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L2)$(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L3)$(WARNING_BORDER)
WARNING_BORDER_LONG =**********************************************************************************\n
CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L1=**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY defined! ****\n
@ -81,19 +107,29 @@ ifndef WINDOWS
-scripts/config.py get MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY && ([ $$? -eq 0 ]) && \
echo '$(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARNING)'
# If NULL Entropy is configured, display an appropriate warning
-scripts/config.py get MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY && ([ $$? -eq 0 ]) && \
echo '$(NULL_ENTROPY_WARNING)'
endif
clean:
clean: clean_more_on_top
$(MAKE) -C library clean
$(MAKE) -C programs clean
$(MAKE) -C tests clean
clean_more_on_top:
ifndef WINDOWS
find . \( -name \*.gcno -o -name \*.gcda -o -name \*.info \) -exec rm {} +
endif
neat: clean_more_on_top
$(MAKE) -C library neat
$(MAKE) -C programs neat
$(MAKE) -C tests neat
ifndef WINDOWS
rm -f visualc/VS2010/*.vcxproj visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.sln
else
if exist visualc\VS2010\*.vcxproj del /Q /F visualc\VS2010\*.vcxproj
if exist visualc\VS2010\mbedTLS.sln del /Q /F visualc\VS2010\mbedTLS.sln
endif
check: lib tests
$(MAKE) -C tests check

25
README.md
View file

@ -51,8 +51,27 @@ You need the following tools to build the library with the provided makefiles:
* GNU Make or a build tool that CMake supports.
* A C99 toolchain (compiler, linker, archiver). We actively test with GCC 5.4, Clang 3.8, IAR8 and Visual Studio 2013. More recent versions should work. Slightly older versions may work.
* Python 3 to generate the test code.
* Perl to run the tests.
* Python 3 to generate the test code, and to generate sample programs in the development branch.
* Perl to run the tests, and to generate some source files in the development branch.
### Generated source files in the development branch
The source code of Mbed TLS includes some files that are automatically generated by scripts and whose content depends only on the Mbed TLS source, not on the platform or on the library configuration. These files are not included in the development branch of Mbed TLS, but the generated files are included in official releases. This section explains how to generate the missing files in the development branch.
The following tools are required:
* Perl, for some library source files and for Visual Studio build files.
* Python 3, for some sample programs and test data.
* A C compiler for the host platform, for some test data.
If you are cross-compiling, you must set the `CC` environment variable to a C compiler for the host platform when generating the configuration-independent files.
Any of the following methods are available to generate the configuration-independent files:
* If not cross-compiling, running `make` with any target, or just `make`, will automatically generate required files.
* Run `make generated_files` to generate all the configuration-independent files.
* On Unix/POSIX systems, run `tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh -u` to generate all the configuration-independent files.
* On Windows, run `scripts\make_generated_files.bat` to generate all the configuration-independent files.
### Make
@ -174,6 +193,8 @@ The build files for Microsoft Visual Studio are generated for Visual Studio 2010
The solution file `mbedTLS.sln` contains all the basic projects needed to build the library and all the programs. The files in tests are not generated and compiled, as these need Python and perl environments as well. However, the selftest program in `programs/test/` is still available.
In the development branch of Mbed TLS, the Visual Studio solution files need to be generated first as described in [“Generated source files in the development branch”](#generated-source-files-in-the-development-branch).
Example programs
----------------

7
configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h
View file

@ -48,6 +48,10 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C
#define MBEDTLS_MD_C
#define MBEDTLS_NET_C
/* The library does not currently support enabling SHA-224 without SHA-256.
* A future version of the library will have this option disabled
* by default. */
#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
@ -79,7 +83,8 @@
* both ends of the connection! (See comments in "mbedtls/ssl.h".)
* The optimal size here depends on the typical size of records.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 1024
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 1024
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 1024
#include "mbedtls/check_config.h"

75
configs/config-mini-tls1_1.h
View file

@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
/**
* \file config-mini-tls1_1.h
*
* \brief Minimal configuration for TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)
*/
/*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
/*
* Minimal configuration for TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), implementing only the
* required ciphersuite: MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
*
* See README.txt for usage instructions.
*/
#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H
#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H
/* System support */
#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
/* mbed TLS feature support */
#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1
/* mbed TLS modules */
#define MBEDTLS_AES_C
#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C
#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C
#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
#define MBEDTLS_DES_C
#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C
#define MBEDTLS_MD_C
#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C
#define MBEDTLS_NET_C
#define MBEDTLS_OID_C
#define MBEDTLS_PK_C
#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C
#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C
/* For test certificates */
#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C
#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C
/* For testing with compat.sh */
#define MBEDTLS_FS_IO
#include "mbedtls/check_config.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */

5
configs/config-no-entropy.h
View file

@ -73,7 +73,12 @@
#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C
/* The library does not currently support enabling SHA-224 without SHA-256.
* A future version of the library will have this option disabled
* by default. */
#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C

8
configs/config-suite-b.h
View file

@ -63,7 +63,12 @@
#define MBEDTLS_OID_C
#define MBEDTLS_PK_C
#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
/* The library does not currently support enabling SHA-224 without SHA-256.
* A future version of the library will have this option disabled
* by default. */
#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
@ -107,7 +112,8 @@
* The minimum size here depends on the certificate chain used as well as the
* typical size of records.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 1024
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 1024
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 1024
#include "mbedtls/check_config.h"

5
configs/config-symmetric-only.h
View file

@ -84,7 +84,12 @@
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C
#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
/* The library does not currently support enabling SHA-224 without SHA-256.
* A future version of the library will have this option disabled
* by default. */
#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C

4
configs/config-thread.h
View file

@ -67,6 +67,10 @@
#define MBEDTLS_OID_C
#define MBEDTLS_PK_C
#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
/* The library does not currently support enabling SHA-224 without SHA-256.
* A future version of the library will have this option disabled
* by default. */
#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C

15
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/cipher-delayed-output.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
Calling `mbedtls_cipher_finish()` is mandatory for all multi-part operations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
This only affects people who use the cipher module to perform AEAD operations
using the multi-part API.
Previously, the documentation didn't state explicitly if it was OK to call
`mbedtls_cipher_check_tag()` or `mbedtls_cipher_write_tag()` directly after
the last call to `mbedtls_cipher_update()` - that is, without calling
`mbedtls_cipher_finish()` in-between. If you code was missing that call,
please add it and be prepared to get as much as 15 bytes of output.
Currently the output is always 0 bytes, but it may be more when alternative
implementations of the underlying primitives are in use, or with future
versions of the library.

9
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/csr-add-critical-extension.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
Change the API to allow adding critical extensions to CSRs
------------------------------------------------------------------
This affects applications that call the `mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension`
function.
The API is changed to include the parameter `critical` which allow to mark an
extension included in a CSR as critical. To get the previous behaviour pass
`0`.

10
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/gcm-alt.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
GCM interface changes: impact for alternative implementations
-------------------------------------------------------------
The GCM multipart interface has changed as described in [“GCM multipart interface: application changes”](#gcm-multipart-interface:-application-changes). The consequences for an alternative implementation of GCM (`MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT`) are as follows:
* `mbedtls_gcm_starts()` now only sets the mode and the nonce (IV). The new function `mbedtls_gcm_update_ad()` receives the associated data. It may be called multiple times.
* `mbedtls_gcm_update()` now allows arbitrary-length inputs, takes an extra parameter to indicate the actual output length. Alternative implementations may choose between two modes:
* Always return the partial output immediately, even if it does not consist of a whole number of blocks.
* Buffer the data for the last partial block, to be returned in the next call to `mbedtls_gcm_update()` or `mbedtls_gcm_finish()`.
* `mbedtls_gcm_finish()` now takes an extra output buffer for the last partial block if needed.

13
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/gcm-multipart.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
GCM multipart interface: application changes
--------------------------------------------
The GCM module now supports arbitrary chunked input in the multipart interface.
This changes the interface for applications using the GCM module directly for multipart operations.
Applications using one-shot GCM or using GCM via the `mbedtls_cipher_xxx` or `psa_aead_xxx` interfaces do not require any changes.
* `mbedtls_gcm_starts()` now only sets the mode and the nonce (IV). Call the new function `mbedtls_gcm_update_ad()` to pass the associated data.
* The current implementation has a limitation that `mbedtls_gcm_update_ad()` may only be called once. This limitation will be lifted shortly; watch https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4351 for updates.
* `mbedtls_gcm_update()` now takes an extra parameter to indicate the actual output length. In Mbed TLS 2.x, applications had to pass inputs consisting of whole 16-byte blocks except for the last block (this limitation has been lifted). In this case:
* As long as the input remains block-aligned, the output length is exactly the input length, as before.
* If the length of the last input is not a multiple of 16, alternative implementations may return the last partial block in the call to `mbedtls_gcm_finish()` instead of returning it in the last call to `mbedtls_gcm_update()`.
* `mbedtls_gcm_finish()` now takes an extra output buffer for the last partial block. This is needed for alternative implementations that can only process a whole block at a time.

12
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/modify_SHA384_option_behaviour.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
Replaced MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 with MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
------------------------------------------------------
This does not affect users who use the default `config.h`.
MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 was disabled by default, now MBEDTLS_SHA384_C is
enabled by default.
If you were using a config file with both MBEDTLS_SHA512_C and
MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384, then just remove the MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384.
If you were using a config file with MBEDTLS_SHA512_C and without
MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 and you need the SHA-384 algorithm, then add
`#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C` to your config file.

18
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/relaxed-psk-semantics.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
Relaxed semantics for PSK configuration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
This affects users which call the PSK configuration APIs
`mbedtlsl_ssl_conf_psk()` and `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()`
multiple times on the same SSL configuration.
In Mbed TLS 2.x, users would observe later calls overwriting
the effect of earlier calls, with the prevailing PSK being
the one that has been configured last. In Mbed TLS 3.0,
calling `mbedtls_ssl_conf_[opaque_]psk()` multiple times
will return an error, leaving the first PSK intact.
To achieve equivalent functionality when migrating to Mbed TLS 3.0,
users calling `mbedtls_ssl_conf_[opaque_]psk()` multiple times should
remove all but the last call, so that only one call to _either_
`mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk()` _or_ `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()`
remains.

10
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove-max-content-len.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
Remove the `MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN` configuration option
-------------------------------------------------------------
This affects users who use the `MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN` option to
set the maximum length of incoming and outgoing plaintext fragments,
which can save memory by reducing the size of the TLS I/O buffers.
This option is replaced by the more fine-grained options
`MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN` and `MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN` that set
the maximum incoming and outgoing plaintext fragment lengths, respectively.

11
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove-null-entropy.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
Remove the option to build the library without any entropy sources
------------------------------------------------------------------
This does not affect users who use the default `config.h`, as this option was
already off by default.
If you were using the `MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY` option and your platform
doesn't have any entropy source, you should use `MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED`
and make sure your device is provisioned with a strong random seed.
Alternatively, for testing purposes only, you can create and register a fake
entropy function.

29
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove-rsa-mode-parameter.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
Remove the mode parameter from RSA functions
--------------------------------------------
This affects all users who use the RSA encryption, decryption, sign and
verify APIs.
The RSA module no longer supports private-key operations with the public key or
vice versa. As a consequence, RSA operation functions no longer have a mode
parameter. If you were calling RSA operations with the normal mode (public key
for verification or encryption, private key for signature or decryption), remove
the `MBEDTLS_MODE_PUBLIC` or `MBEDTLS_MODE_PRIVATE` argument. If you were calling
RSA operations with the wrong mode, which rarely makes sense from a security
perspective, this is no longer supported.
Remove the RNG parameter from RSA verify functions
--------------------------------------------------
RSA verification functions also no longer take random generator arguments (this
was only needed when using a private key). This affects all applications using
the RSA verify functions.
RNG is now mandatory in all RSA private key operations
------------------------------------------------------
The random generator is now mandatory for blinding in all RSA private-key
operations (`mbedtls_rsa_private`, `mbedtls_rsa_xxx_sign`,
`mbedtls_rsa_xxx_decrypt`) as well as for encryption
(`mbedtls_rsa_xxx_encrypt`). This means that passing a null `f_rng` is no longer
supported.

11
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_option.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
Remove MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT option
-------------------------------------------
This change does not affect users who used the default `config.h`, as the option
MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT was already on by default.
This option was a trade-off between functionality and code size: it allowed
users who didn't need that feature to avoid paying the cost in code size, by
disabling it.
This option is no longer present, but its functionality is now always enabled.

13
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove_ssl_record_checking.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
Remove MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING option and enable its action by default
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
This change does not affect users who use the default config.h, as the
option MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING was already on by default.
This option was added only to control compilation of one function,
mbedtls_ssl_check_record(), which is only useful in some specific cases, so it
was made optional to allow users who don't need it to save some code space.
However, the same effect can be achieve by using link-time garbage collection.
Users who changed the default setting of the option need to change the config/
build system to remove that change.

11
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove_support_for_tls_1.0_1.1_and_dtls_1.0.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
Remove suport for TLS 1.0, 1.1 and DTLS 1.0
-------------------------------------------
This change affects users of the TLS 1.0, 1.1 and DTLS 1.0 protocols.
The versions of (D)TLS that are being removed are not as secure as the latest
versions. Keeping them in the library creates opportunities for misconfiguration
and possibly downgrade attacks. More generally, more code means a larger attack
surface, even if the code is supposedly not used.
The migration path is to adopt the latest versions of the protocol.

11
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/separate_SHA224_from_SHA256.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
Separated MBEDTLS_SHA224_C and MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
This does not affect users who use the default `config.h`. MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
was enabled by default. Now both MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and MBEDTLS_SHA224_C are
enabled.
If you were using custom config file with MBEDTLS_SHA256_C enabled, then
you will need to add `#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C` option your config.
Current version of the library does not support enabling MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
without MBEDTLS_SHA224_C.

28
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/session-cache-api.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
Session Cache API Change
-----------------------------------------------------------------
This affects users who use `mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache()`
to configure a custom session cache implementation different
from the one Mbed TLS implements in `library/ssl_cache.c`.
Those users will need to modify the API of their session cache
implementation to that of a key-value store with keys being
session IDs and values being instances of `mbedtls_ssl_session`:
```
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t( void *data,
unsigned char const *session_id,
size_t session_id_len,
mbedtls_ssl_session *session );
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t( void *data,
unsigned char const *session_id,
size_t session_id_len,
const mbedtls_ssl_session *session );
```
Since the structure of `mbedtls_ssl_session` is no longer public from 3.0
onwards, portable session cache implementations must not access fields of
`mbedtls_ssl_session`. See the corresponding migration guide. Users that
find themselves unable to migrate their session cache functionality without
accessing fields of `mbedtls_ssl_session` should describe their usecase
on the Mbed TLS mailing list.

8
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/sha512-output-type.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
SHA-512 and SHA-256 output type change
--------------------------
The output parameter of `mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret()`, `mbedtls_sha256_ret()`, `mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret()`, `mbedtls_sha512_ret()` now has a pointer type rather than array type. This makes no difference in terms of C semantics, but removes spurious warnings in some compilers when outputting a SHA-384 hash into a 48-byte buffer or a SHA-224 hash into a 28-byte buffer.
This makes no difference to a vast majority of applications. If your code takes a pointer to one of these functions, you may need to change the type of the pointer.
Alternative implementations of the SHA256 and SHA512 modules must adjust their functions' prototype accordingly.

20
docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/ssl-error-code-cleanup.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
Removal of some SSL error codes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
This affects users manually checking for the following error codes:
- `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED`
- `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH`
- `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE`
Migration paths:
- `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED` and `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH`
should never be returned from Mbed TLS, and there is no need to check for it.
Users should simply remove manual checks for those codes, and let the Mbed TLS
team know if -- contrary to the team's understanding -- there is in fact a situation
where one of them was ever returned.
- `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE` has been removed, and
`MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL` is returned instead if the user's own certificate
is too large to fit into the output buffers. Users should check for
`MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL` instead, and potentially compare the size of their
own certificate against the configured size of the output buffer to understand if
the error is due to an overly large certificate.

8
include/mbedtls/aria.h
View file

@ -51,14 +51,14 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x005E /**< Invalid data input length. */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT)
// Regular implementation
//
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT)
// Regular implementation
//
/**
* \brief The ARIA context-type definition.
*/

55
include/mbedtls/check_config.h
View file

@ -201,15 +201,6 @@
#endif
#undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \
( !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) )
#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) )
#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but entropy sources too"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && ( \
!defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) )
#error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
@ -618,18 +609,16 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 defined without MBEDTLS_SHA512_C"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_SHA384_C defined without MBEDTLS_SHA512_C"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) )
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 defined, but not all prerequisites"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_SHA224_C defined without MBEDTLS_SHA256_C"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) )
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 defined, but not all prerequisites"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C defined without MBEDTLS_SHA224_C"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && \
@ -642,8 +631,7 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) ||\
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
!(defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
@ -660,7 +648,6 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
@ -678,16 +665,10 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2))
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but no protocols are active"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1))
#error "Illegal protocol selection"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
@ -719,21 +700,12 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX too large (max 255)"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) && \
( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) )
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC defined, but not all prerequsites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET defined, but not all prerequsites"
#endif
@ -742,10 +714,6 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION defined, but not all prerequisites"
@ -860,6 +828,13 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4031"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) //no-check-names
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 (TLS v1.0 support) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4286"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) //no-check-names
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 (TLS v1.1 support) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4286"
#endif
/*
* Avoid warning from -pedantic. This is a convenient place for this

51
include/mbedtls/cipher.h
View file

@ -437,10 +437,23 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx );
/**
* \brief This function initializes a cipher context for
* \brief This function prepares a cipher context for
* use with the given cipher primitive.
*
* \param ctx The context to initialize. This must be initialized.
* \note After calling this function, you should call
* mbedtls_cipher_setkey() and, if the mode uses padding,
* mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(), then for each
* message to encrypt or decrypt with this key, either:
* - mbedtls_cipher_crypt() for one-shot processing with
* non-AEAD modes;
* - mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() or
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() for one-shot
* processing with AEAD modes or NIST_KW;
* - for multi-part processing, see the documentation of
* mbedtls_cipher_reset().
*
* \param ctx The context to prepare. This must be initialized by
* a call to mbedtls_cipher_init() first.
* \param cipher_info The cipher to use.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
@ -448,10 +461,6 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx );
* parameter-verification failure.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the
* cipher-specific context fails.
*
* \internal Currently, the function also clears the structure.
* In future versions, the caller will be required to call
* mbedtls_cipher_init() on the structure first.
*/
int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info );
@ -687,7 +696,30 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
/**
* \brief This function resets the cipher state.
*
* \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized.
* \note With non-AEAD ciphers, the order of calls for each message
* is as follows:
* 1. mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() if the mode uses an IV/nonce.
* 2. mbedtls_cipher_reset()
* 3. mbedtls_cipher_update() one or more times
* 4. mbedtls_cipher_finish()
* .
* This sequence can be repeated to encrypt or decrypt multiple
* messages with the same key.
*
* \note With AEAD ciphers, the order of calls for each message
* is as follows:
* 1. mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() if the mode uses an IV/nonce.
* 2. mbedtls_cipher_reset()
* 3. mbedtls_cipher_update_ad()
* 4. mbedtls_cipher_update() one or more times
* 5. mbedtls_cipher_finish()
* 6. mbedtls_cipher_check_tag() (for decryption) or
* mbedtls_cipher_write_tag() (for encryption).
* .
* This sequence can be repeated to encrypt or decrypt multiple
* messages with the same key.
*
* \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be bound to a key.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
@ -724,11 +756,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
* Exception: For MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, expects a single block
* in size. For example, 16 Bytes for AES.
*
* \note If the underlying cipher is used in GCM mode, all calls
* to this function, except for the last one before
* mbedtls_cipher_finish(), must have \p ilen as a
* multiple of the block size of the cipher.
*
* \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and
* bound to a key.
* \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a

218
include/mbedtls/config.h
View file

@ -527,23 +527,6 @@
//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT
//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY
*
* Enables testing and use of mbed TLS without any configured entropy sources.
* This permits use of the library on platforms before an entropy source has
* been integrated (see for example the MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT or the
* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED switches).
*
* WARNING! This switch MUST be disabled in production builds, and is suitable
* only for development.
* Enabling the switch negates any security provided by the library.
*
* Requires MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES
*
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT
*
@ -1441,18 +1424,6 @@
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384
*
* Disable the SHA-384 option of the SHA-512 module. Use this to save some
* code size on devices that don't use SHA-384.
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
*
* Uncomment to disable SHA-384
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES
*
@ -1467,20 +1438,6 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING
*
* Enable the function mbedtls_ssl_check_record() which can be used to check
* the validity and authenticity of an incoming record, to verify that it has
* not been seen before. These checks are performed without modifying the
* externally visible state of the SSL context.
*
* See mbedtls_ssl_check_record() for more information.
*
* Uncomment to enable support for record checking.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
*
@ -1573,9 +1530,7 @@
*
* This only affects CBC ciphersuites, and is useless if none is defined.
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or
* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or
* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
* Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
*
* Comment this macro to disable support for Encrypt-then-MAC
*/
@ -1591,32 +1546,12 @@
* renegotiation), since it actually fixes a more fundamental issue in the
* original SSL/TLS design, and has implications beyond Triple Handshake.
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or
* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or
* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
* Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
*
* Comment this macro to disable support for Extended Master Secret.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV
*
* Enable support for RFC 7507: Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV)
* for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks.
*
* For servers, it is recommended to always enable this, unless you support
* only one version of TLS, or know for sure that none of your clients
* implements a fallback strategy.
*
* For clients, you only need this if you're using a fallback strategy, which
* is not recommended in the first place, unless you absolutely need it to
* interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) servers.
*
* Comment this macro to disable support for FALLBACK_SCSV
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE
*
@ -1639,18 +1574,6 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING
*
* Enable 1/n-1 record splitting for CBC mode in TLS 1.0.
*
* This is a countermeasure to the BEAST attack, which also minimizes the risk
* of interoperability issues compared to sending 0-length records.
*
* Comment this macro to disable 1/n-1 record splitting.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION
*
@ -1692,30 +1615,6 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1
*
* Enable support for TLS 1.0.
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C
* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
*
* Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.0
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1
*
* Enable support for TLS 1.1 (and DTLS 1.0 if DTLS is enabled).
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C
* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
*
* Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.1 / DTLS 1.0
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
*
@ -1752,11 +1651,9 @@
*
* Enable support for DTLS (all available versions).
*
* Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 to enable DTLS 1.0,
* and/or this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2.
* Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2.
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1
* or MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
* Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
*
* Comment this macro to disable support for DTLS
*/
@ -1851,17 +1748,6 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT
*
* Enable support for a limit of records with bad MAC.
*
* See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit().
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
*
@ -2781,10 +2667,9 @@
* library/pem.c
* library/ssl_tls.c
*
* This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, and for TLS 1.2
* depending on the handshake parameters. Further, it is used for checking
* MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 when decrypting PEM-encoded
* encrypted keys.
* This module is required for TLS 1.2 depending on the handshake parameters.
* Further, it is used for checking MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1
* when decrypting PEM-encoded encrypted keys.
*
* \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a
* security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on
@ -3104,8 +2989,8 @@
* library/ssl_tls.c
* library/x509write_crt.c
*
* This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, for TLS 1.2
* depending on the handshake parameters, and for SHA1-signed certificates.
* This module is required for TLS 1.2 depending on the handshake parameters,
* and for SHA1-signed certificates.
*
* \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes
* a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies
@ -3114,10 +2999,29 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SHA224_C
*
* Enable the SHA-224 cryptographic hash algorithm.
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C. The library does not currently support enabling
* SHA-224 without SHA-256.
*
* Module: library/sha256.c
* Caller: library/md.c
* library/ssl_cookie.c
*
* This module adds support for SHA-224.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
*
* Enable the SHA-224 and SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithms.
* Enable the SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithm.
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA224_C. The library does not currently support enabling
* SHA-256 without SHA-224.
*
* Module: library/sha256.c
* Caller: library/entropy.c
@ -3126,23 +3030,39 @@
* library/ssl_srv.c
* library/ssl_tls.c
*
* This module adds support for SHA-224 and SHA-256.
* This module adds support for SHA-256.
* This module is required for the SSL/TLS 1.2 PRF function.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
*
* Enable the SHA-384 cryptographic hash algorithm.
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
*
* Module: library/sha512.c
* Caller: library/md.c
* library/ssl_cli.c
* library/ssl_srv.c
*
* Comment to disable SHA-384
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
*
* Enable the SHA-384 and SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms.
* Enable SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms.
*
* Module: library/sha512.c
* Caller: library/entropy.c
* library/md.c
* library/ssl_cli.c
* library/ssl_srv.c
* library/ssl_tls.c
* library/ssl_cookie.c
*
* This module adds support for SHA-384 and SHA-512.
* This module adds support for SHA-512.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
@ -3531,32 +3451,6 @@
/* SSL options */
/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN
*
* Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming and outgoing plaintext fragments.
*
* This determines the size of both the incoming and outgoing TLS I/O buffers
* in such a way that both are capable of holding the specified amount of
* plaintext data, regardless of the protection mechanism used.
*
* To configure incoming and outgoing I/O buffers separately, use
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN,
* which overwrite the value set by this option.
*
* \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is
* recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to
* inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there
* is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about
* restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless
* the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended
* to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
* while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer.
*
* Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of both
* incoming and outgoing I/O buffers.
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384
/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN
*
* Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming plaintext fragments.
@ -3565,9 +3459,6 @@
* that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data,
* regardless of the protection mechanism used.
*
* If this option is undefined, it inherits its value from
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN.
*
* \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is
* recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to
* inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there
@ -3577,8 +3468,7 @@
* to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
* while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer.
*
* Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer
* independently of the outgoing I/O buffer.
* Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer.
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384
@ -3637,9 +3527,6 @@
* that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data,
* regardless of the protection mechanism used.
*
* If this option undefined, it inherits its value from
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN.
*
* It is possible to save RAM by setting a smaller outward buffer, while keeping
* the default inward 16384 byte buffer to conform to the TLS specification.
*
@ -3648,8 +3535,7 @@
* The specific size requirement depends on the configured ciphers and any
* certificate data which is sent during the handshake.
*
* Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer
* independently of the incoming I/O buffer.
* Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer.
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384

48
include/mbedtls/config_psa.h
View file

@ -38,6 +38,30 @@
extern "C" {
#endif
/****************************************************************/
/* De facto synonyms */
/****************************************************************/
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA)
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY
#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA)
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW
#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN
#endif
/****************************************************************/
/* Require built-in implementations based on PSA requirements */
/****************************************************************/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG)
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
@ -149,7 +173,7 @@ extern "C" {
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1
#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256)
@ -159,7 +183,7 @@ extern "C" {
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1
#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512)
@ -497,6 +521,12 @@ extern "C" {
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */
/****************************************************************/
/* Infer PSA requirements from Mbed TLS capabilities */
/****************************************************************/
#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */
/*
@ -522,6 +552,7 @@ extern "C" {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY 1
// Only add in DETERMINISTIC support if ECDSA is also enabled
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
@ -586,6 +617,7 @@ extern "C" {
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW 1
#endif /* MBEDTLSS_PKCS1_V15 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1
@ -604,18 +636,22 @@ extern "C" {
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1
#endif

13
include/mbedtls/debug.h
View file

@ -98,8 +98,13 @@
*/
#if defined(__has_attribute)
#if __has_attribute(format)
#if defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 1
#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) \
__attribute__((format (printf, string_index, first_to_check)))
__attribute__((__format__ (gnu_printf, string_index, first_to_check)))
#else /* defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 1 */
#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) \
__attribute__((format(printf, string_index, first_to_check)))
#endif
#else /* __has_attribute(format) */
#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check)
#endif /* __has_attribute(format) */
@ -119,14 +124,14 @@
*
* This module provides debugging functions.
*/
#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800)
#if (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800)
#include <inttypes.h>
#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET PRIuPTR
#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG "I64d"
#else /* defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */
#else /* (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */
#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET "zu"
#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG "lld"
#endif /* defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */
#endif /* (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {

6
include/mbedtls/error.h
View file

@ -106,8 +106,10 @@
* HKDF 5 1 (Started from top)
* SSL 5 2 (Started from 0x5F00)
* CIPHER 6 8 (Started from 0x6080)
* SSL 6 24 (Started from top, plus 0x6000)
* SSL 7 32
* SSL 6 23 (Started from top, plus 0x6000, gaps at
* 0x6600)
* SSL 7 28 (Started from 0x7080, gaps at
* 0x7300, 0x7500, 0x7580, 0x7800)
*
* Module dependent error code (5 bits 0x.00.-0x.F8.)
*/

112
include/mbedtls/gcm.h
View file

@ -227,6 +227,32 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
* \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of
* at least \p iv_len Bytes.
* \param iv_len The length of the IV.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
*/
int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
int mode,
const unsigned char *iv,
size_t iv_len );
/**
* \brief This function feeds an input buffer as associated data
* (authenticated but not encrypted data) in a GCM
* encryption or decryption operation.
*
* Call this function after mbedtls_gcm_starts() to pass
* the associated data. If the associated data is empty,
* you do not need to call this function. You may not
* call this function after calling mbedtls_cipher_update().
*
* \note This function may only be called once per operation:
* you must pass the whole associated data in a single
* call. This limitation will be lifted in a future version
* of Mbed TLS.
*
* \param ctx The GCM context. This must have been started with
* mbedtls_gcm_starts() and must not have yet received
* any input with mbedtls_gcm_update().
* \param add The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL
* if \p add_len is \c 0.
* \param add_len The length of the additional data. If \c 0,
@ -234,42 +260,65 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
*/
int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
int mode,
const unsigned char *iv,
size_t iv_len,
const unsigned char *add,
size_t add_len );
int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *add,
size_t add_len );
/**
* \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing GCM
* encryption or decryption operation.
*
* ` The function expects input to be a multiple of 16
* Bytes. Only the last call before calling
* mbedtls_gcm_finish() can be less than 16 Bytes.
* You may call this function zero, one or more times
* to pass successive parts of the input: the plaintext to
* encrypt, or the ciphertext (not including the tag) to
* decrypt. After the last part of the input, call
* mbedtls_gcm_finish().
*
* This function may produce output in one of the following
* ways:
* - Immediate output: the output length is always equal
* to the input length.
* - Buffered output: the output consists of a whole number
* of 16-byte blocks. If the total input length so far
* (not including associated data) is 16 \* *B* + *A*
* with *A* < 16 then the total output length is 16 \* *B*.
*
* In particular:
* - It is always correct to call this function with
* \p output_size >= \p input_length + 15.
* - If \p input_length is a multiple of 16 for all the calls
* to this function during an operation, then it is
* correct to use \p output_size = \p input_length.
*
* \note For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as
* input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer
* must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer.
*
* \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
* \param length The length of the input data. This must be a multiple of
* 16 except in the last call before mbedtls_gcm_finish().
* \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater
* than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that
* size in Bytes.
* \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is
* greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at
* least that size in Bytes.
* \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
* \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p input_length
* is greater than zero, this must be a readable buffer
* of at least \p input_length bytes.
* \param input_length The length of the input data in bytes.
* \param output The buffer for the output data. If \p output_size
* is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of
* of at least \p output_size bytes.
* \param output_size The size of the output buffer in bytes.
* See the function description regarding the output size.
* \param output_length On success, \p *output_length contains the actual
* length of the output written in \p output.
* On failure, the content of \p *output_length is
* unspecified.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure:
* total input length too long,
* unsupported input/output buffer overlap detected,
* or \p output_size too small.
*/
int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
size_t length,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output );
const unsigned char *input, size_t input_length,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
size_t *output_length );
/**
* \brief This function finishes the GCM operation and generates
@ -283,13 +332,26 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
* buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
* \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. This must be at least
* four.
* \param output The buffer for the final output.
* If \p output_size is nonzero, this must be a writable
* buffer of at least \p output_size bytes.
* \param output_size The size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
* This must be large enough for the output that
* mbedtls_gcm_update() has not produced. In particular:
* - If mbedtls_gcm_update() produces immediate output,
* or if the total input size is a multiple of \c 16,
* then mbedtls_gcm_finish() never produces any output,
* so \p output_size can be \c 0.
* - \p output_size never needs to be more than \c 15.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure:
* invalid value of \p tag_len,
* or \p output_size too small.
*/
int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
unsigned char *tag,
size_t tag_len );
unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len );
/**
* \brief This function clears a GCM context and the underlying

1
include/mbedtls/oid.h
View file

@ -145,6 +145,7 @@
#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2E" /**< id-at-dnQualifier AttributeType:= {id-at 46} */
#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x41" /**< id-at-pseudonym AttributeType:= {id-at 65} */
#define MBEDTLS_OID_UID "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x01" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) uid(1)} */
#define MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x19" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) domainComponent(25)} */
/*

4
include/mbedtls/pk.h
View file

@ -229,12 +229,12 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec( const mbedtls_pk_context pk )
/**
* \brief Types for RSA-alt abstraction
*/
typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func)( void *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen,
typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func)( void *ctx, size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
size_t output_max_len );
typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func)( void *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig );
typedef size_t (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func)( void *ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */

8
include/mbedtls/psa_util.h
View file

@ -136,15 +136,19 @@ static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_md( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_224 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_512 );
#endif

264
include/mbedtls/rsa.h
View file

@ -57,8 +57,6 @@
/*
* RSA constants
*/
#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC 0 /**< Request private key operation. */
#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE 1 /**< Request public key operation. */
#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 0 /**< Use PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding. */
#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 1 /**< Use PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. */
@ -423,7 +421,7 @@ size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx );
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA context used to hold the key.
* \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for key generation.
* This must not be \c NULL.
* This is mandatory and must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng.
* This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
* \param nbits The size of the public key in bits.
@ -544,11 +542,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* of a PRNG.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function, used for blinding. It is discouraged
* and deprecated to pass \c NULL here, in which case
* blinding will be omitted.
* \param f_rng The RNG function, used for blinding. It is mandatory.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to pass to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL
* if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
* if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
* \param input The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer
* of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
* for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
@ -571,29 +567,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* operation.
*
* It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 encryption
* operation using the \p mode from the context.
*
* \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function
* in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library
* are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it
* implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC.
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
* operation.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG to use. It is mandatory for PKCS#1 v2.1 padding
* encoding, and for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding encoding when used
* with \p mode set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. For PKCS#1 v1.5
* padding encoding and \p mode set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
* it is used for blinding and should be provided in this
* case; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more.
* \param f_rng The RNG to use. It is used for padding generation
* and it is mandatory.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. May be
* \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng doesn't
* need a context argument.
* \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated).
* \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
* \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes.
* \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable
* buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
@ -608,7 +588,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode, size_t ilen,
size_t ilen,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output );
@ -616,25 +596,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption operation
* (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCRYPT).
*
* \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function
* in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library
* are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it
* implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC.
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function to use. It is needed for padding generation
* if \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. If \p mode is
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (discouraged), it is used for
* blinding and should be provided; see mbedtls_rsa_private().
* \param f_rng The RNG function to use. It is mandatory and used for
* padding generation.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may
* be \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng
* doesn't need a context argument.
* \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated).
* be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
* \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes.
* \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable
* buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
@ -649,7 +615,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode, size_t ilen,
size_t ilen,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output );
@ -660,22 +626,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* \note The output buffer must be as large as the size
* of ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used.
*
* \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function
* in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library
* are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it
* implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC.
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The initnialized RSA context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This is needed for padding
* generation and must be provided.
* generation and is mandatory.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may
* be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
* \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated).
* \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use.
* This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len
* Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0.
@ -694,7 +649,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
size_t ilen,
const unsigned char *input,
@ -705,7 +659,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* message padding.
*
* It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 decryption
* operation using the \p mode from the context.
* operation.
*
* \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be
* as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N (for example,
@ -714,24 +668,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided,
* the function returns \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE.
*
* \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function
* in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library
* are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it
* implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
* this is used for blinding and should be provided; see
* mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is
* mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
* \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context.
* \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated).
* \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
* \param olen The address at which to store the length of
* the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL.
* \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer
@ -747,7 +688,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode, size_t *olen,
size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output,
size_t output_max_len );
@ -763,24 +704,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided,
* the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE.
*
* \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function
* in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library
* are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it
* implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
* this is used for blinding and should be provided; see
* mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is
* mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
* \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context.
* \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated).
* \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
* \param olen The address at which to store the length of
* the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL.
* \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer
@ -797,7 +725,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode, size_t *olen,
size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output,
size_t output_max_len );
@ -814,24 +742,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* ciphertext provided, the function returns
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE.
*
* \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function
* in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library
* are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it
* implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
* this is used for blinding and should be provided; see
* mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is
* mandatory.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
* \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context.
* \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated).
* \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
* \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use.
* This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len
* Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0.
@ -851,7 +766,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *input,
@ -863,7 +777,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* a message digest using PKCS#1.
*
* It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1
* signature using the \p mode from the context.
* signature.
*
* \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size
* of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used.
@ -872,25 +786,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() for details on
* \p md_alg and \p hash_id.
*
* \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function
* in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library
* are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it
* implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If the padding mode is PKCS#1 v2.1,
* this must be provided. If the padding mode is PKCS#1 v1.5 and
* \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, it is used for blinding
* and should be provided; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more
* more. It is ignored otherwise.
* \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This is mandatory and
* must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL
* if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context argument.
* \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated).
* if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
* \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
* Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
* \param hashlen The length of the message digest.
@ -911,7 +811,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
@ -921,24 +820,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature
* operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN).
*
* \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function
* in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library
* are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it
* implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
* this is used for blinding and should be provided; see
* mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is
* mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL
* if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context argument.
* \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated).
* if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
* \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
* Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
* \param hashlen The length of the message digest.
@ -959,7 +845,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
@ -984,7 +869,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. It must not be \c NULL.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. It is mandatory and must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL
* if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
* \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
@ -1039,21 +924,10 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* the key size in bytes), this function returns
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
*
* \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function
* in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library
* are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it
* implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. It must not be \c NULL.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. It is mandatory and must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL
* if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
* \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated).
* \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
* Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
* \param hashlen The length of the message digest.
@ -1074,7 +948,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
@ -1085,29 +958,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* the message digest.
*
* This is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1
* verification using the mode from the context.
* verification.
*
* \note For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on
* mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify() about \p md_alg and
* \p hash_id.
*
* \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function
* in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library
* are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it
* set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC.
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
* this is used for blinding and should be provided; see
* mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
* \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context.
* \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated).
* \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
* Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
* \param hashlen The length of the message digest.
@ -1125,9 +982,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
@ -1137,23 +991,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 verification
* operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY).
*
* \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function
* in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library
* are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it
* set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC.
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
* this is used for blinding and should be provided; see
* mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
* \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context.
* \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated).
* \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
* Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
* \param hashlen The length of the message digest.
@ -1171,9 +1009,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
@ -1194,23 +1029,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* same. If \p hash_id in the RSA context is unset,
* the \p md_alg from the function call is used.
*
* \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function
* in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library
* are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it
* implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC.
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
* this is used for blinding and should be provided; see
* mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
* \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context.
* \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated).
* \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
* Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
* \param hashlen The length of the message digest.
@ -1228,9 +1047,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
@ -1249,13 +1065,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* \note The \p hash_id in the RSA context is ignored.
*
* \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use.
* \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
* this is used for blinding and should be provided; see
* mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
* \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context.
* \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.
* \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
* Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
* \param hashlen The length of the message digest.
@ -1276,9 +1085,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,

12
include/mbedtls/sha256.h
View file

@ -127,13 +127,14 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
* \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized
* and have a hash operation started.
* \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result.
* This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes.
* This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 bytes
* for SHA-256, \c 28 bytes for SHA-224.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
unsigned char output[32] );
unsigned char *output );
/**
* \brief This function processes a single data block within
@ -163,14 +164,15 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
* \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable
* buffer of length \p ilen Bytes.
* \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes.
* \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must
* be a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes.
* \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result.
* This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 bytes
* for SHA-256, \c 28 bytes for SHA-224.
* \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be
* either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224.
*/
int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input,
size_t ilen,
unsigned char output[32],
unsigned char *output,
int is224 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)

18
include/mbedtls/sha512.h
View file

@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_sha512_context
uint64_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */
uint64_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */
unsigned char buffer[128]; /*!< The data block being processed. */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
int is384; /*!< Determines which function to use:
0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. */
#endif
@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ void mbedtls_sha512_clone( mbedtls_sha512_context *dst,
* \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be
* either \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384.
*
* \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must
* be \c 0, or the function will return
* \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA384_C is not defined,
* \p is384 must be \c 0, or the function will return
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
@ -134,13 +134,14 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx,
* \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized
* and have a hash operation started.
* \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result.
* This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes.
* This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 bytes
* for SHA-512, \c 48 bytes for SHA-384.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx,
unsigned char output[64] );
unsigned char *output );
/**
* \brief This function processes a single data block within
@ -171,11 +172,12 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx,
* a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes.
* \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes.
* \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result.
* This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes.
* This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 bytes
* for SHA-512, \c 48 bytes for SHA-384.
* \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either
* \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384.
*
* \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must
* \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA384_C is not defined, \p is384 must
* be \c 0, or the function will return
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
*
@ -184,7 +186,7 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx,
*/
int mbedtls_sha512_ret( const unsigned char *input,
size_t ilen,
unsigned char output[64],
unsigned char *output,
int is384 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)

209
include/mbedtls/ssl.h
View file

@ -67,17 +67,17 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC -0x7180 /**< Verification of the message MAC failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD -0x7200 /**< An invalid SSL record was received. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF -0x7280 /**< The connection indicated an EOF. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -0x7300 /**< An unknown cipher was received. */
/* NOTE: Error space gap */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN -0x7380 /**< The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG -0x7400 /**< No RNG was provided to the SSL module. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -0x7480 /**< No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE -0x7500 /**< Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED -0x7580 /**< The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server. */
/* NOTE: Error space gap */
/* NOTE: Error space gap */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED -0x7600 /**< The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED -0x7680 /**< No CA Chain is set, but required to operate. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -0x7700 /**< An unexpected message was received from our peer. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE -0x7780 /**< A fatal alert message was received from our peer. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED -0x7800 /**< Verification of our peer failed. */
/* NOTE: Error space gap */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY -0x7880 /**< The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO -0x7900 /**< Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO -0x7980 /**< Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed. */
@ -111,7 +111,7 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT -0x6780 /**< The client initiated a reconnect from the same port. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD -0x6700 /**< Record header looks valid but is not expected. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL -0x6680 /**< The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH -0x6600 /**< Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify */
/* NOTE: Error space gap */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING -0x6580 /**< Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS -0x6500 /**< The asynchronous operation is not completed yet. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE -0x6480 /**< Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early. */
@ -131,8 +131,8 @@
* - RFC 8446: see section 4.2.1
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 3
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 1 /*!< TLS v1.0 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 2 /*!< TLS v1.1 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 1 /*!< TLS v1.0 deprecated */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 2 /*!< TLS v1.1 deprecated */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 3 /*!< TLS v1.2 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 4 /*!< TLS v1.3 (experimental) */
@ -156,9 +156,6 @@
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED 1
@ -198,9 +195,6 @@
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB 2
@ -236,16 +230,12 @@
* if you're using the Max Fragment Length extension and you know all your
* peers are using it too!
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 /**< Size of the input / output buffer */
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384
#endif
/*
@ -286,7 +276,6 @@
* Signaling ciphersuite values (SCSV)
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF /**< renegotiation info ext */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE 0x5600 /**< RFC 7507 section 2 */
/*
* Supported Signature and Hash algorithms (For TLS 1.2)
@ -484,6 +473,7 @@ typedef enum
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256
}
mbedtls_tls_prf_types;
/**
* \brief Callback type: send data on the network.
*
@ -609,6 +599,56 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert;
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item;
#endif
/**
* \brief Callback type: server-side session cache getter
*
* The session cache is logically a key value store, with
* keys being session IDs and values being instances of
* mbedtls_ssl_session.
*
* This callback retrieves an entry in this key-value store.
*
* \param data The address of the session cache structure to query.
* \param session_id The buffer holding the session ID to query.
* \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in Bytes.
* \param session The address of the session structure to populate.
* It is initialized with mbdtls_ssl_session_init(),
* and the callback must always leave it in a state
* where it can safely be freed via
* mbedtls_ssl_session_free() independent of the
* return code of this function.
*
* \return \c 0 on success
* \return A non-zero return value on failure.
*
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t( void *data,
unsigned char const *session_id,
size_t session_id_len,
mbedtls_ssl_session *session );
/**
* \brief Callback type: server-side session cache setter
*
* The session cache is logically a key value store, with
* keys being session IDs and values being instances of
* mbedtls_ssl_session.
*
* This callback sets an entry in this key-value store.
*
* \param data The address of the session cache structure to modify.
* \param session_id The buffer holding the session ID to query.
* \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in Bytes.
* \param session The address of the session to be stored in the
* session cache.
*
* \return \c 0 on success
* \return A non-zero return value on failure.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t( void *data,
unsigned char const *session_id,
size_t session_id_len,
const mbedtls_ssl_session *session );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/**
@ -827,7 +867,7 @@ typedef void mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 32
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 48
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
@ -954,9 +994,9 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_config
void *p_rng; /*!< context for the RNG function */
/** Callback to retrieve a session from the cache */
int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *);
mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *f_get_cache;
/** Callback to store a session into the cache */
int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *);
mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *f_set_cache;
void *p_cache; /*!< context for cache callbacks */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
@ -1111,9 +1151,7 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_config
that triggers renegotiation */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT)
unsigned int badmac_limit; /*!< limit of records with a bad MAC */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
unsigned int dhm_min_bitlen; /*!< min. bit length of the DHM prime */
@ -1145,9 +1183,6 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_config
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
unsigned int anti_replay : 1; /*!< detect and prevent replay? */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING)
unsigned int cbc_record_splitting : 1; /*!< do cbc record splitting */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
unsigned int disable_renegotiation : 1; /*!< disable renegotiation? */
#endif
@ -1157,9 +1192,6 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_config
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
unsigned int session_tickets : 1; /*!< use session tickets? */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
unsigned int fallback : 1; /*!< is this a fallback? */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
unsigned int cert_req_ca_list : 1; /*!< enable sending CA list in
Certificate Request messages? */
@ -1192,10 +1224,7 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context
int major_ver; /*!< equal to MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 */
int minor_ver; /*!< one of MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_x macros */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT)
unsigned badmac_seen; /*!< records with a bad MAC received */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */
@ -1309,10 +1338,6 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context
uint16_t mtu; /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING)
signed char split_done; /*!< current record already splitted? */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */
/*
* PKI layer
*/
@ -1795,7 +1820,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING)
/**
* \brief Check whether a buffer contains a valid and authentic record
* that has not been seen before. (DTLS only).
@ -1843,7 +1867,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout )
int mbedtls_ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */
/**
* \brief Set the timer callbacks (Mandatory for DTLS.)
@ -2233,7 +2256,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT)
/**
* \brief Set a limit on the number of records with a bad MAC
* before terminating the connection.
@ -2258,7 +2280,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode );
* many bogus packets.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
@ -2366,9 +2387,9 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t min,
* \param f_set_cache session set callback
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
void *p_cache,
int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *),
int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *) );
void *p_cache,
mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *f_get_cache,
mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *f_set_cache );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
@ -2553,12 +2574,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, size_t len,
* \param ciphersuites 0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites
* \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
* supported)
* \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
* MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2,
* MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported)
* \param minor Minor version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
* supported)
*
* \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0
* and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2
* \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const int *ciphersuites,
@ -2693,8 +2712,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
/**
* \brief Configure a pre-shared key (PSK) and identity
* to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
* \brief Configure pre-shared keys (PSKs) and their
* identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
*
* Only one PSK can be registered, through either
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
* If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function
* fails, though this may change in future versions, which
* may add support for multiple PSKs.
*
* \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually
* want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead.
@ -2702,13 +2727,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
* \note A PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback
* takes precedence over a PSK configured by this function.
*
* \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key.
* Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() more
* than once will overwrite values configured in previous calls.
* Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting
* one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature,
* but feedback is welcomed.
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with.
* \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key to use.
* \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes.
@ -2721,7 +2739,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
* of the SSL configuration.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs
* can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact.
* \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len,
@ -2729,8 +2749,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* \brief Configure an opaque pre-shared key (PSK) and identity
* to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
* \brief Configure one or more opaque pre-shared keys (PSKs) and
* their identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
*
* Only one PSK can be registered, through either
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
* If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function
* fails, though this may change in future versions, which
* may add support for multiple PSKs.
*
* \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually
* want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead.
@ -2739,13 +2765,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
* the PSK callback takes precedence over an opaque PSK
* configured by this function.
*
* \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key.
* Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() more than
* once will overwrite values configured in previous calls.
* Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting
* one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature,
* but feedback is welcomed.
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with.
* \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK.
* Until \p conf is destroyed or this function is successfully
@ -2762,7 +2781,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
* SSL configuration.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs
* can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact.
* \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
psa_key_id_t psk,
@ -3208,8 +3229,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ss
*
* \note This ignores ciphersuites from higher versions.
*
* \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 and
* MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2
* \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported)
@ -3220,13 +3240,12 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int mino
/**
* \brief Set the minimum accepted SSL/TLS protocol version
* (Default: TLS 1.0)
* (Default: TLS 1.2)
*
* \note Input outside of the SSL_MAX_XXXXX_VERSION and
* SSL_MIN_XXXXX_VERSION range is ignored.
*
* \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 and
* MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2
* \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported)
@ -3236,29 +3255,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int mino
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
/**
* \brief Set the fallback flag (client-side only).
* (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK).
*
* \note Set to MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK when preparing a fallback
* connection, that is a connection with max_version set to a
* lower value than the value you're willing to use. Such
* fallback connections are not recommended but are sometimes
* necessary to interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant)
* servers.
*
* \warning You should NOT set this to MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK for
* non-fallback connections! This would appear to work for a
* while, then cause failures when the server is upgraded to
* support a newer TLS version.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param fallback MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char fallback );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
/**
* \brief Enable or disable Encrypt-then-MAC
@ -3353,21 +3349,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_c
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int truncate );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING)
/**
* \brief Enable / Disable 1/n-1 record splitting
* (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED)
*
* \note Only affects TLS 1.0, not higher versions.
* Does not affect non-CBC ciphersuites in any version.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param split MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED or
* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char split );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
/**
* \brief Enable / Disable session tickets (client only).
@ -3619,7 +3600,7 @@ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
/**
* \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for
* the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment
* length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN.
* length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN.
* If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function
* works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len().
*

37
include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h
View file

@ -67,11 +67,13 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
mbedtls_time_t timestamp; /*!< entry timestamp */
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_session session; /*!< entry session */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
mbedtls_x509_buf peer_cert; /*!< entry peer_cert */
#endif
unsigned char session_id[32]; /*!< session ID */
size_t session_id_len;
unsigned char *session; /*!< serialized session */
size_t session_len;
mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *next; /*!< chain pointer */
};
@ -99,19 +101,32 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache );
* \brief Cache get callback implementation
* (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled)
*
* \param data SSL cache context
* \param session session to retrieve entry for
* \param data The SSL cache context to use.
* \param session_id The pointer to the buffer holding the session ID
* for the session to load.
* \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in bytes.
* \param session The address at which to store the session
* associated with \p session_id, if present.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session );
int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data,
unsigned char const *session_id,
size_t session_id_len,
mbedtls_ssl_session *session );
/**
* \brief Cache set callback implementation
* (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled)
*
* \param data SSL cache context
* \param session session to store entry for
* \param data The SSL cache context to use.
* \param session_id The pointer to the buffer holding the session ID
* associated to \p session.
* \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in bytes.
* \param session The session to store.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session );
int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data,
unsigned char const *session_id,
size_t session_id_len,
const mbedtls_ssl_session *session );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
/**

2
include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h
View file

@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
* \param ctx CSR context to use
* \param oid OID of the extension
* \param oid_len length of the OID
* \param critical Set to 1 to mark the extension as critical, 0 otherwise.
* \param val value of the extension OCTET STRING
* \param val_len length of the value data
*
@ -242,6 +243,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
int critical,
const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len );
/**

119
include/psa/crypto.h
View file

@ -2889,6 +2889,123 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t *operation);
* @{
*/
/**
* \brief Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms,
* this includes the hashing step.
*
* \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature algorithm, first use
* a multi-part hash operation and then pass the resulting hash to
* psa_sign_hash(). PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the
* hash algorithm to use.
*
* \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
* It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must
* allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE.
* \param[in] alg An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX
* value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg)
* is true), that is compatible with the type of
* \p key.
* \param[in] input The input message to sign.
* \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
* \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written.
* \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This
* must be appropriate for the selected
* algorithm and key:
* - The required signature size is
* #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
* where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and
* bit-size respectively of key.
* - #PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the
* maximum signature size of any supported
* signature algorithm.
* \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up
* the returned signature value.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
* The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag,
* or it does not permit the requested algorithm.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
* The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
* determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
* #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
* where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
* respectively of \p key.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
* The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
* It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
* results in this error code.
*/
psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_length,
uint8_t * signature,
size_t signature_size,
size_t * signature_length );
/** \brief Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using
* a hash-and-sign verification algorithm.
*
* \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature verification
* algorithm, first use a multi-part hash operation to hash the message
* and then pass the resulting hash to psa_verify_hash().
* PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the hash algorithm
* to use.
*
* \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
* It must be a public key or an asymmetric key
* pair. The key must allow the usage
* #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE.
* \param[in] alg An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX
* value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg)
* is true), that is compatible with the type of
* \p key.
* \param[in] input The message whose signature is to be verified.
* \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
* \param[out] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify.
* \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
* The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag,
* or it does not permit the requested algorithm.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
* The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed signature
* is not a valid signature.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
* The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
* It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
* results in this error code.
*/
psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_length,
const uint8_t * signature,
size_t signature_length );
/**
* \brief Sign a hash or short message with a private key.
*
@ -2942,7 +3059,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
size_t *signature_length);
/**
* \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public key.
* \brief Verify the signature of a hash or short message using a public key.
*
* Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must
* first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()

34
include/psa/crypto_values.h
View file

@ -1549,6 +1549,20 @@
PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) || \
PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used
* with psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message().
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a
* message. 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used
* to sign an already-calculated hash. 0 if \p alg is not a signature
* algorithm. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a
* supported algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) || (alg) == PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA )
/** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm.
*
* A hash-and-sign algorithm is a signature algorithm which is
@ -2198,6 +2212,26 @@ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key )
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000200)
/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation or for
* an asymmetric message signature operation, if otherwise permitted by the
* key’s type and policy.
*
* For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000400)
/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation or for
* an asymmetric message signature verification operation, if otherwise
* permitted by the key’s type and policy.
*
* For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000800)
/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation

4
library/.gitignore vendored
View file

@ -2,3 +2,7 @@
libmbed*
*.sln
*.vcxproj
# Automatically generated files
/error.c
/version_features.c

32
library/Makefile
View file

@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ endif
# To compile on Plan9:
# CFLAGS += -D_BSD_EXTENSION
PERL ?= perl
# if were running on Windows build for Windows
ifdef WINDOWS
WINDOWS_BUILD=1
@ -271,6 +273,29 @@ libmbedcrypto.dll: $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
echo " CC $<"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ -c $<
.PHONY: generated_files
GENERATED_FILES = error.c version_features.c
generated_files: $(GENERATED_FILES)
error.c: ../scripts/generate_errors.pl
error.c: ../scripts/data_files/error.fmt
error.c: $(filter-out %config%,$(wildcard ../include/mbedtls/*.h))
error.c:
echo " Gen $@"
$(PERL) ../scripts/generate_errors.pl
version_features.c: ../scripts/generate_features.pl
version_features.c: ../scripts/data_files/version_features.fmt
## The generated file only depends on the options that are present in config.h,
## not on which options are set. To avoid regenerating this file all the time
## when switching between configurations, don't declare config.h as a
## dependency. Remove this file from your working tree if you've just added or
## removed an option in config.h.
#version_features.c: ../include/mbedtls/config.h
version_features.c:
echo " Gen $@"
$(PERL) ../scripts/generate_features.pl
clean:
ifndef WINDOWS
rm -f *.o libmbed*
@ -280,3 +305,10 @@ else
if exist libmbed* del /Q /F libmbed*
del /Q /F del_errors_out_if_the_file_list_is_empty_but_not_if_a_file_does_not_exist $(subst /,\,$(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS))
endif
neat: clean
ifndef WINDOWS
rm -f $(GENERATED_FILES)
else
for %f in ($(subst /,\,$(GENERATED_FILES))) if exist %f del /Q /F %f
endif

4
library/aes.c
View file

@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86)
if( aes_padlock_ace )
if( aes_padlock_ace > 0)
{
if( mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) == 0 )
return( 0 );
@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86)
if( aes_padlock_ace )
if( aes_padlock_ace > 0 )
{
if( mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc( ctx, mode, length, iv, input, output ) == 0 )
return( 0 );

11
library/aria.c
View file

@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ static const uint8_t aria_test2_ctr_ct[3][48] = // CTR ciphertext
{ \
if( verbose ) \
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \
return( 1 ); \
goto exit; \
} else { \
if( verbose ) \
mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); \
@ -935,6 +935,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose )
int i;
uint8_t blk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE];
mbedtls_aria_context ctx;
int ret = 1;
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR))
size_t j;
@ -946,6 +947,8 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose )
uint8_t buf[48], iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE];
#endif
mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx );
/*
* Test set 1
*/
@ -1065,7 +1068,11 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose )
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
return( 0 );
ret = 0;
exit:
mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */

20
library/camellia.c
View file

@ -942,9 +942,11 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose )
unsigned char nonce_counter[16];
unsigned char stream_block[16];
#endif
int ret = 1;
mbedtls_camellia_context ctx;
mbedtls_camellia_init( &ctx );
memset( key, 0, 32 );
for( j = 0; j < 6; j++ ) {
@ -974,8 +976,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose )
{
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
return( 1 );
goto exit;
}
}
@ -1027,8 +1028,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose )
{
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
return( 1 );
goto exit;
}
}
@ -1071,8 +1071,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose )
{
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
return( 1 );
goto exit;
}
}
else
@ -1087,8 +1086,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose )
{
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
return( 1 );
goto exit;
}
}
@ -1100,7 +1098,11 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose )
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
return( 0 );
ret = 0;
exit:
mbedtls_camellia_free( &ctx );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */

21
library/cipher.c
View file

@ -415,6 +415,15 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
{
return( mbedtls_gcm_starts( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
ctx->operation,
iv, iv_len ) );
}
#endif
if ( actual_iv_size != 0 )
{
memcpy( ctx->iv, iv, actual_iv_size );
@ -466,8 +475,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
{
return( mbedtls_gcm_starts( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->operation,
ctx->iv, ctx->iv_size, ad, ad_len ) );
return( mbedtls_gcm_update_ad( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
ad, ad_len ) );
}
#endif
@ -545,9 +554,9 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM )
{
*olen = ilen;
return( mbedtls_gcm_update( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, input,
output ) );
return( mbedtls_gcm_update( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
input, ilen,
output, ilen, olen ) );
}
#endif
@ -1101,6 +1110,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
return( mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
NULL, 0,
tag, tag_len ) );
#endif
@ -1153,6 +1163,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(
(mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
NULL, 0,
check_tag, tag_len ) ) )
{
return( ret );

2
library/ecdsa.c
View file

@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN];
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN] = {0};
unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof( buf );
size_t len = 0;

17
library/entropy.c
View file

@ -21,12 +21,6 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY)
#warning "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined! "
#warning "**** THIS BUILD HAS NO DEFINED ENTROPY SOURCES "
#warning "**** THIS BUILD IS *NOT* SUITABLE FOR PRODUCTION USE "
#endif
#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
#include "entropy_poll.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
@ -73,11 +67,6 @@ void mbedtls_entropy_init( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx )
/* Reminder: Update ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG in the test files
* when adding more strong entropy sources here. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY)
mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_null_entropy_poll, NULL,
1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG );
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY)
mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll, NULL,
@ -524,7 +513,6 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *
#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY)
/*
* Dummy source function
*/
@ -538,7 +526,6 @@ static int entropy_dummy_source( void *data, unsigned char *output,
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
@ -646,17 +633,14 @@ cleanup:
int mbedtls_entropy_self_test( int verbose )
{
int ret = 1;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY)
mbedtls_entropy_context ctx;
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 };
unsigned char acc[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 };
size_t i, j;
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( " ENTROPY test: " );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY)
mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx );
/* First do a gather to make sure we have default sources */
@ -704,7 +688,6 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_self_test( int verbose )
cleanup:
mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */
if( verbose != 0 )
{

17
library/entropy_poll.c
View file

@ -211,23 +211,6 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data,
#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY)
int mbedtls_null_entropy_poll( void *data,
unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen )
{
((void) data);
((void) output);
*olen = 0;
if( len < sizeof(unsigned char) )
return( 0 );
output[0] = 0;
*olen = sizeof(unsigned char);
return( 0 );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
int mbedtls_hardclock_poll( void *data,
unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen )

8
library/entropy_poll.h
View file

@ -43,14 +43,6 @@ extern "C" {
#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Minimum for the hardware source */
#endif
/**
* \brief Entropy poll callback that provides 0 entropy.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY)
int mbedtls_null_entropy_poll( void *data,
unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen );
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY)
/**
* \brief Platform-specific entropy poll callback

865
library/error.c
View file

@ -1,865 +0,0 @@
/*
* Error message information
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include "common.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
#include "mbedtls/aria.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C)
#include "mbedtls/base64.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C)
#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
#include "mbedtls/camellia.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
#include "mbedtls/des.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
#include "mbedtls/dhm.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C)
#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C)
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C)
#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C)
#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C)
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C)
#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C)
#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C)
#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)
#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C)
#include "mbedtls/xtea.h"
#endif
const char * mbedtls_high_level_strerr( int error_code )
{
int high_level_error_code;
if( error_code < 0 )
error_code = -error_code;
/* Extract the high-level part from the error code. */
high_level_error_code = error_code & 0xFF80;
switch( high_level_error_code )
{
/* Begin Auto-Generated Code. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
return( "CIPHER - The selected feature is not available" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "CIPHER - Bad input parameters" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED):
return( "CIPHER - Failed to allocate memory" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING):
return( "CIPHER - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED):
return( "CIPHER - Decryption of block requires a full block" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED):
return( "CIPHER - Authentication failed (for AEAD modes)" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT):
return( "CIPHER - The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "DHM - Bad input parameters" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED):
return( "DHM - Reading of the DHM parameters failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED):
return( "DHM - Making of the DHM parameters failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED):
return( "DHM - Reading of the public values failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED):
return( "DHM - Making of the public value failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED):
return( "DHM - Calculation of the DHM secret failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT):
return( "DHM - The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED):
return( "DHM - Allocation of memory failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR):
return( "DHM - Read or write of file failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED):
return( "DHM - Setting the modulus and generator failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "ECP - Bad input parameters to function" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
return( "ECP - The buffer is too small to write to" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
return( "ECP - The requested feature is not available, for example, the requested curve is not supported" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED):
return( "ECP - The signature is not valid" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED):
return( "ECP - Memory allocation failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED):
return( "ECP - Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY):
return( "ECP - Invalid private or public key" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH):
return( "ECP - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS):
return( "ECP - Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
return( "MD - The selected feature is not available" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "MD - Bad input parameters to function" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED):
return( "MD - Failed to allocate memory" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR):
return( "MD - Opening or reading of file failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT):
return( "PEM - No PEM header or footer found" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA):
return( "PEM - PEM string is not as expected" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED):
return( "PEM - Failed to allocate memory" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV):
return( "PEM - RSA IV is not in hex-format" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG):
return( "PEM - Unsupported key encryption algorithm" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED):
return( "PEM - Private key password can't be empty" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH):
return( "PEM - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
return( "PEM - Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combination" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "PEM - Bad input parameters to function" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED):
return( "PK - Memory allocation failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH):
return( "PK - Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "PK - Bad input parameters to function" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR):
return( "PK - Read/write of file failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION):
return( "PK - Unsupported key version" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT):
return( "PK - Invalid key tag or value" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG):
return( "PK - Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported)" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED):
return( "PK - Private key password can't be empty" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH):
return( "PK - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY):
return( "PK - The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported)" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG):
return( "PK - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE):
return( "PK - Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported)" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
return( "PK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH):
return( "PK - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "PKCS12 - Bad input parameters to function" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
return( "PKCS12 - Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption scheme" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT):
return( "PKCS12 - PBE ASN.1 data not as expected" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH):
return( "PKCS12 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "PKCS5 - Bad input parameters to function" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT):
return( "PKCS5 - Unexpected ASN.1 data" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
return( "PKCS5 - Requested encryption or digest alg not available" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH):
return( "PKCS5 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "RSA - Bad input parameters to function" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING):
return( "RSA - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED):
return( "RSA - Something failed during generation of a key" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED):
return( "RSA - Key failed to pass the validity check of the library" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED):
return( "RSA - The public key operation failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED):
return( "RSA - The private key operation failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED):
return( "RSA - The PKCS#1 verification failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE):
return( "RSA - The output buffer for decryption is not large enough" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED):
return( "RSA - The random generator failed to generate non-zeros" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
return( "SSL - The requested feature is not available" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "SSL - Bad input parameters to function" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC):
return( "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD):
return( "SSL - An invalid SSL record was received" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF):
return( "SSL - The connection indicated an EOF" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER):
return( "SSL - An unknown cipher was received" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN):
return( "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG):
return( "SSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL module" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE):
return( "SSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE):
return( "SSL - Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED):
return( "SSL - The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED):
return( "SSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED):
return( "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE):
return( "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE):
return( "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED):
return( "SSL - Verification of our peer failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY):
return( "SSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO):
return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO):
return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE):
return( "SSL - Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST):
return( "SSL - Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE):
return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE):
return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE):
return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP):
return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS):
return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY):
return( "SSL - Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC):
return( "SSL - Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED):
return( "SSL - Processing of the Finished handshake message failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED):
return( "SSL - Memory allocation failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED):
return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function returned with error" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH):
return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION):
return( "SSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET):
return( "SSL - Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED):
return( "SSL - Session ticket has expired" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH):
return( "SSL - Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key)" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY):
return( "SSL - Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity)" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR):
return( "SSL - Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module)" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING):
return( "SSL - A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged)" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO):
return( "SSL - Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED):
return( "SSL - DTLS client must retry for hello verification" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
return( "SSL - A buffer is too small to receive or write a message" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE):
return( "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages)" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ):
return( "SSL - No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE):
return( "SSL - Connection requires a write call" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT):
return( "SSL - The operation timed out" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT):
return( "SSL - The client initiated a reconnect from the same port" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD):
return( "SSL - Record header looks valid but is not expected" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL):
return( "SSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH):
return( "SSL - Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING):
return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS):
return( "SSL - The asynchronous operation is not completed yet" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE):
return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID):
return( "SSL - An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH):
return( "SSL - An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS):
return( "SSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG):
return( "SSL - Invalid value in SSL config" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
return( "X509 - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combination" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID):
return( "X509 - Requested OID is unknown" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT):
return( "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expected" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION):
return( "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalid" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL):
return( "X509 - The serial tag or value is invalid" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG):
return( "X509 - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME):
return( "X509 - The name tag or value is invalid" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE):
return( "X509 - The date tag or value is invalid" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE):
return( "X509 - The signature tag or value invalid" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS):
return( "X509 - The extension tag or value is invalid" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION):
return( "X509 - CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version number" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG):
return( "X509 - Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupported" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH):
return( "X509 - Signature algorithms do not match. (see \\c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid)" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED):
return( "X509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT):
return( "X509 - Format not recognized as DER or PEM" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "X509 - Input invalid" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED):
return( "X509 - Allocation of memory failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR):
return( "X509 - Read/write of file failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
return( "X509 - Destination buffer is too small" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR):
return( "X509 - A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */
/* End Auto-Generated Code. */
default:
break;
}
return( NULL );
}
const char * mbedtls_low_level_strerr( int error_code )
{
int low_level_error_code;
if( error_code < 0 )
error_code = -error_code;
/* Extract the low-level part from the error code. */
low_level_error_code = error_code & ~0xFF80;
switch( low_level_error_code )
{
/* Begin Auto-Generated Code. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH):
return( "AES - Invalid key length" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH):
return( "AES - Invalid data input length" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "AES - Invalid input data" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "ARIA - Bad input data" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH):
return( "ARIA - Invalid data input length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA):
return( "ASN1 - Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structure" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG):
return( "ASN1 - ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH):
return( "ASN1 - Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH):
return( "ASN1 - Actual length differs from expected length" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA):
return( "ASN1 - Data is invalid" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED):
return( "ASN1 - Memory allocation failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL):
return( "ASN1 - Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
return( "BASE64 - Output buffer too small" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER):
return( "BASE64 - Invalid character in input" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR):
return( "BIGNUM - An error occurred while reading from or writing to a file" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "BIGNUM - Bad input parameters to function" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER):
return( "BIGNUM - There is an invalid character in the digit string" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
return( "BIGNUM - The buffer is too small to write to" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE):
return( "BIGNUM - The input arguments are negative or result in illegal output" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO):
return( "BIGNUM - The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE):
return( "BIGNUM - The input arguments are not acceptable" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED):
return( "BIGNUM - Memory allocation failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "BLOWFISH - Bad input data" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH):
return( "BLOWFISH - Invalid data input length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "CAMELLIA - Bad input data" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH):
return( "CAMELLIA - Invalid data input length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT):
return( "CCM - Bad input parameters to the function" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED):
return( "CCM - Authenticated decryption failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "CHACHA20 - Invalid input parameter(s)" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE):
return( "CHACHAPOLY - The requested operation is not permitted in the current state" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED):
return( "CHACHAPOLY - Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED):
return( "CTR_DRBG - The entropy source failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG):
return( "CTR_DRBG - The requested random buffer length is too big" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG):
return( "CTR_DRBG - The input (entropy + additional data) is too large" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR):
return( "CTR_DRBG - Read or write error in file" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH):
return( "DES - The data input has an invalid length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED):
return( "ENTROPY - Critical entropy source failure" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES):
return( "ENTROPY - No more sources can be added" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED):
return( "ENTROPY - No sources have been added to poll" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE):
return( "ENTROPY - No strong sources have been added to poll" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR):
return( "ENTROPY - Read/write error in file" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR):
return( "ERROR - Generic error" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED):
return( "ERROR - This is a bug in the library" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED):
return( "PLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED):
return( "PLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platform" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED):
return( "GCM - Authenticated decryption failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT):
return( "GCM - Bad input parameters to function" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "HKDF - Bad input parameters to function" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG):
return( "HMAC_DRBG - Too many random requested in single call" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG):
return( "HMAC_DRBG - Input too large (Entropy + additional)" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR):
return( "HMAC_DRBG - Read/write error in file" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED):
return( "HMAC_DRBG - The entropy source failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED):
return( "NET - Failed to open a socket" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED):
return( "NET - The connection to the given server / port failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED):
return( "NET - Binding of the socket failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED):
return( "NET - Could not listen on the socket" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED):
return( "NET - Could not accept the incoming connection" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED):
return( "NET - Reading information from the socket failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED):
return( "NET - Sending information through the socket failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET):
return( "NET - Connection was reset by peer" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST):
return( "NET - Failed to get an IP address for the given hostname" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
return( "NET - Buffer is too small to hold the data" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT):
return( "NET - The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED):
return( "NET - Polling the net context failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "NET - Input invalid" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND):
return( "OID - OID is not found" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL):
return( "OID - output buffer is too small" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "POLY1305 - Invalid input parameter(s)" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "SHA1 - SHA-1 input data was malformed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "SHA256 - SHA-256 input data was malformed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "SHA512 - SHA-512 input data was malformed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
return( "THREADING - Bad input parameters to function" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR):
return( "THREADING - Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C)
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH):
return( "XTEA - The data input has an invalid length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */
/* End Auto-Generated Code. */
default:
break;
}
return( NULL );
}
void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen )
{
size_t len;
int use_ret;
const char * high_level_error_description = NULL;
const char * low_level_error_description = NULL;
if( buflen == 0 )
return;
memset( buf, 0x00, buflen );
if( ret < 0 )
ret = -ret;
if( ret & 0xFF80 )
{
use_ret = ret & 0xFF80;
// Translate high level error code.
high_level_error_description = mbedtls_high_level_strerr( ret );
if( high_level_error_description == NULL )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", (unsigned int) use_ret );
else
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "%s", high_level_error_description );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
// Early return in case of a fatal error - do not try to translate low
// level code.
if(use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE))
return;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
}
use_ret = ret & ~0xFF80;
if( use_ret == 0 )
return;
// If high level code is present, make a concatenation between both
// error strings.
//
len = strlen( buf );
if( len > 0 )
{
if( buflen - len < 5 )
return;
mbedtls_snprintf( buf + len, buflen - len, " : " );
buf += len + 3;
buflen -= len + 3;
}
// Translate low level error code.
low_level_error_description = mbedtls_low_level_strerr( ret );
if( low_level_error_description == NULL )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", (unsigned int) use_ret );
else
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "%s", low_level_error_description );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */
/*
* Provide an non-function in case MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is not defined
*/
void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen )
{
((void) ret);
if( buflen > 0 )
buf[0] = '\0';
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
void (*mbedtls_test_hook_error_add)( int, int, const char *, int );
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C || MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */

256
library/gcm.c
View file

@ -269,11 +269,8 @@ static void gcm_mult( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char x[16],
}
int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
int mode,
const unsigned char *iv,
size_t iv_len,
const unsigned char *add,
size_t add_len )
int mode,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char work_buf[16];
@ -283,16 +280,11 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
/* IV and AD are limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */
/* IV is are limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */
/* IV is not allowed to be zero length */
if( iv_len == 0 ||
( (uint64_t) iv_len ) >> 61 != 0 ||
( (uint64_t) add_len ) >> 61 != 0 )
{
if( iv_len == 0 || (uint64_t) iv_len >> 61 != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT );
}
memset( ctx->y, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->y) );
memset( ctx->buf, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->buf) );
@ -337,6 +329,26 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
return( ret );
}
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len )
{
const unsigned char *p;
size_t use_len, i;
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
/* IV is are limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */
if( (uint64_t) add_len >> 61 != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT );
/* Calling update_ad multiple times is not yet supported */
if( ctx->add_len != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT );
ctx->add_len = add_len;
p = add;
while( add_len > 0 )
@ -355,72 +367,129 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
return( 0 );
}
/* Increment the counter. */
static void gcm_incr( unsigned char y[16] )
{
size_t i;
for( i = 16; i > 12; i-- )
if( ++y[i - 1] != 0 )
break;
}
/* Calculate and apply the encryption mask. Process use_len bytes of data,
* starting at position offset in the mask block. */
static int gcm_mask( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
unsigned char ectr[16],
size_t offset, size_t use_len,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output )
{
size_t i;
size_t olen = 0;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr,
&olen ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ectr, 16 );
return( ret );
}
for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
{
if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT )
ctx->buf[offset + i] ^= input[i];
output[i] = ectr[offset + i] ^ input[i];
if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT )
ctx->buf[offset + i] ^= output[i];
}
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
size_t length,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output )
const unsigned char *input, size_t input_length,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
size_t *output_length )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char ectr[16];
size_t i;
const unsigned char *p;
const unsigned char *p = input;
unsigned char *out_p = output;
size_t use_len, olen = 0;
size_t offset;
unsigned char ectr[16];
if( output_size < input_length )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( output_length != NULL );
*output_length = input_length;
/* Exit early if input_length==0 so that we don't do any pointer arithmetic
* on a potentially null pointer. */
if( input_length == 0 )
return( 0 );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
if( output > input && (size_t) ( output - input ) < length )
if( output > input && (size_t) ( output - input ) < input_length )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT );
/* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes
* Also check for possible overflow */
if( ctx->len + length < ctx->len ||
(uint64_t) ctx->len + length > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull )
if( ctx->len + input_length < ctx->len ||
(uint64_t) ctx->len + input_length > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT );
}
ctx->len += length;
p = input;
while( length > 0 )
offset = ctx->len % 16;
if( offset != 0 )
{
use_len = ( length < 16 ) ? length : 16;
size_t use_len = 16 - offset;
if( use_len > input_length )
use_len = input_length;
for( i = 16; i > 12; i-- )
if( ++ctx->y[i - 1] != 0 )
break;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr,
&olen ) ) != 0 )
{
if( ( ret = gcm_mask( ctx, ectr, offset, use_len, p, out_p ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
{
if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT )
ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i];
out_p[i] = ectr[i] ^ p[i];
if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT )
ctx->buf[i] ^= out_p[i];
}
if( offset + use_len == 16 )
gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf );
gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf );
length -= use_len;
ctx->len += use_len;
input_length -= use_len;
p += use_len;
out_p += use_len;
}
ctx->len += input_length;
while( input_length >= 16 )
{
gcm_incr( ctx->y );
if( ( ret = gcm_mask( ctx, ectr, 0, 16, p, out_p ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf );
input_length -= 16;
p += 16;
out_p += 16;
}
if( input_length > 0 )
{
gcm_incr( ctx->y );
if( ( ret = gcm_mask( ctx, ectr, 0, input_length, p, out_p ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ectr, sizeof( ectr ) );
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
unsigned char *tag,
size_t tag_len )
unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
unsigned char work_buf[16];
size_t i;
@ -430,12 +499,20 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL );
/* We never pass any output in finish(). The output parameter exists only
* for the sake of alternative implementations. */
(void) output;
(void) output_size;
orig_len = ctx->len * 8;
orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8;
if( tag_len > 16 || tag_len < 4 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT );
if( ctx->len % 16 != 0 )
gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf );
memcpy( tag, ctx->base_ectr, tag_len );
if( orig_len || orig_add_len )
@ -472,6 +549,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
unsigned char *tag )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t olen;
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
@ -480,13 +558,17 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( ctx, mode, iv, iv_len, add, add_len ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( ctx, mode, iv, iv_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( ctx, length, input, output ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad( ctx, add, add_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( ctx, tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( ctx, input, length,
output, length, &olen ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( ctx, NULL, 0, tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
return( 0 );
@ -780,6 +862,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose )
unsigned char tag_buf[16];
int i, j, ret;
mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES;
size_t olen;
for( j = 0; j < 3; j++ )
{
@ -893,38 +976,51 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose )
goto exit;
ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT,
iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]],
iv_len_test_data[i],
additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]],
add_len_test_data[i] );
iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]],
iv_len_test_data[i] );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad( &ctx,
additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]],
add_len_test_data[i] );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
if( pt_len_test_data[i] > 32 )
{
size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32;
ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, 32,
ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx,
pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]],
buf );
32,
buf, sizeof( buf ), &olen );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
if( olen != 32 )
goto exit;
ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, rest_len,
pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]] + 32,
buf + 32 );
ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx,
pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]] + 32,
rest_len,
buf + 32, sizeof( buf ) - 32, &olen );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
if( olen != rest_len )
goto exit;
}
else
{
ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, pt_len_test_data[i],
ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx,
pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]],
buf );
pt_len_test_data[i],
buf, sizeof( buf ), &olen );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
if( olen != pt_len_test_data[i] )
goto exit;
}
ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, tag_buf, 16 );
ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, NULL, 0, tag_buf, 16 );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
@ -954,8 +1050,11 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose )
goto exit;
ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT,
iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]],
iv_len_test_data[i],
iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]],
iv_len_test_data[i] );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad( &ctx,
additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]],
add_len_test_data[i] );
if( ret != 0 )
@ -964,27 +1063,36 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose )
if( pt_len_test_data[i] > 32 )
{
size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32;
ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, 32, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i],
buf );
ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx,
ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], 32,
buf, sizeof( buf ), &olen );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
if( olen != 32 )
goto exit;
ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, rest_len,
ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx,
ct_test_data[j * 6 + i] + 32,
buf + 32 );
rest_len,
buf + 32, sizeof( buf ) - 32, &olen );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
if( olen != rest_len )
goto exit;
}
else
{
ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, pt_len_test_data[i],
ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx,
ct_test_data[j * 6 + i],
buf );
pt_len_test_data[i],
buf, sizeof( buf ), &olen );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
if( olen != pt_len_test_data[i] )
goto exit;
}
ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, tag_buf, 16 );
ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, NULL, 0, tag_buf, 16 );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;

113
library/md.c
View file

@ -97,14 +97,16 @@ const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info = {
};
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info = {
"SHA224",
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224,
28,
64,
};
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = {
"SHA256",
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
@ -113,8 +115,7 @@ const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = {
};
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = {
"SHA384",
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
@ -123,6 +124,7 @@ const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = {
};
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info = {
"SHA512",
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512,
@ -138,13 +140,16 @@ static const int supported_digests[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512,
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224,
#endif
@ -202,17 +207,19 @@ const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string( const char *md_name )
if( !strcmp( "SHA1", md_name ) || !strcmp( "SHA", md_name ) )
return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
if( !strcmp( "SHA224", md_name ) )
return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
if( !strcmp( "SHA256", md_name ) )
return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
if( !strcmp( "SHA384", md_name ) )
return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
if( !strcmp( "SHA512", md_name ) )
return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 );
#endif
@ -243,17 +250,19 @@ const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type )
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
return( &mbedtls_sha1_info );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
return( &mbedtls_sha224_info );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
return( &mbedtls_sha256_info );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
return( &mbedtls_sha384_info );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
return( &mbedtls_sha512_info );
#endif
@ -301,16 +310,22 @@ void mbedtls_md_free( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx )
mbedtls_sha1_free( ctx->md_ctx );
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx->md_ctx );
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx->md_ctx );
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
mbedtls_sha512_free( ctx->md_ctx );
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
mbedtls_sha512_free( ctx->md_ctx );
break;
@ -369,16 +384,22 @@ int mbedtls_md_clone( mbedtls_md_context_t *dst,
mbedtls_sha1_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx );
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
mbedtls_sha256_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx );
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
mbedtls_sha256_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx );
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
mbedtls_sha512_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx );
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
mbedtls_sha512_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx );
break;
@ -435,16 +456,22 @@ int mbedtls_md_setup( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_inf
ALLOC( sha1 );
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
ALLOC( sha256 );
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
ALLOC( sha256 );
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
ALLOC( sha512 );
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
ALLOC( sha512 );
break;
@ -494,17 +521,19 @@ int mbedtls_md_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx )
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
return( mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
return( mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 1 ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
return( mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 0 ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
return( mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 1 ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
return( mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 0 ) );
#endif
@ -540,15 +569,19 @@ int mbedtls_md_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, si
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
return( mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
return( mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
return( mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
return( mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
return( mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) );
#endif
@ -584,15 +617,19 @@ int mbedtls_md_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output )
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
return( mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
return( mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
return( mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
return( mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
return( mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) );
#endif
@ -629,17 +666,19 @@ int mbedtls_md( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, si
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
return( mbedtls_sha1_ret( input, ilen, output ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
return( mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, 1 ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
return( mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, 0 ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
return( mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, 1 ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
return( mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, 0 ) );
#endif
@ -839,15 +878,19 @@ int mbedtls_md_process( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *data )
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
return( mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
return( mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
return( mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
return( mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
return( mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) );
#endif

8
library/md_wrap.h
View file

@ -72,14 +72,16 @@ extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info;
#endif

8
library/nist_kw.c
View file

@ -189,8 +189,6 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
uint64_t t = 0;
unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2];
unsigned char inbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2];
unsigned char *R2 = output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
unsigned char *A = output;
*out_len = 0;
/*
@ -266,6 +264,9 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
}
else
{
unsigned char *R2 = output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
unsigned char *A = output;
/*
* Do the wrapping function W, as defined in RFC 3394 section 2.2.1
*/
@ -329,7 +330,7 @@ static int unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
uint64_t t = 0;
unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2];
unsigned char inbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2];
unsigned char *R = output + ( semiblocks - 2 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
unsigned char *R = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
if( semiblocks < MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT )
@ -339,6 +340,7 @@ static int unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
memcpy( A, input, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH );
memmove( output, input + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, ( semiblocks - 1 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH );
R = output + ( semiblocks - 2 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
/* Calculate intermediate values */
for( t = s; t >= 1; t-- )

36
library/oid.c
View file

@ -237,6 +237,10 @@ static const oid_x520_attr_t oid_x520_attr_type[] =
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM, "id-at-pseudonym", "Pseudonym" ),
"pseudonym",
},
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_UID, "id-uid", "User Id" ),
"uid",
},
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, "id-domainComponent", "Domain component" ),
"DC",
@ -360,21 +364,25 @@ static const oid_sig_alg_t oid_sig_alg[] =
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
},
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224, "sha224WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-224" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
},
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256, "sha256WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-256" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
},
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384, "sha384WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-384" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
},
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512, "sha512WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-512" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
@ -394,21 +402,25 @@ static const oid_sig_alg_t oid_sig_alg[] =
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
},
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224, "ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ECDSA with SHA224" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
},
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256, "ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ECDSA with SHA256" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
},
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384, "ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ECDSA with SHA384" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
},
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512, "ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ECDSA with SHA512" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
@ -621,21 +633,25 @@ static const oid_md_alg_t oid_md_alg[] =
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1,
},
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224, "id-sha224", "SHA-224" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224,
},
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256, "id-sha256", "SHA-256" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
},
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384, "id-sha384", "SHA-384" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
},
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512, "id-sha512", "SHA-512" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512,
@ -673,21 +689,25 @@ static const oid_md_hmac_t oid_md_hmac[] =
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1,
},
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224, "hmacSHA224", "HMAC-SHA-224" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224,
},
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256, "hmacSHA256", "HMAC-SHA-256" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
},
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384, "hmacSHA384", "HMAC-SHA-384" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
},
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
{
OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512, "hmacSHA512", "HMAC-SHA-512" ),
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512,

2
library/padlock.h
View file

@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ extern "C" {
*
* \param feature The feature to detect
*
* \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise
* \return non-zero if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise
*/
int mbedtls_padlock_has_support( int feature );

9
library/pk.c
View file

@ -367,11 +367,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options,
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *ctx ),
NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash,
pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id,
pss_opts->expected_salt_len,
sig );
md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash,
pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id,
pss_opts->expected_salt_len,
sig );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );

19
library/pk_wrap.c
View file

@ -90,9 +90,9 @@ static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
if( sig_len < rsa_len )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa, NULL, NULL,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, md_alg,
(unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa, md_alg,
(unsigned int) hash_len,
hash, sig ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
/* The buffer contains a valid signature followed by extra data.
@ -120,8 +120,9 @@ static int rsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
*sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa );
return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) );
return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa, f_rng, p_rng,
md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len,
hash, sig ) );
}
static int rsa_decrypt_wrap( void *ctx,
@ -135,7 +136,7 @@ static int rsa_decrypt_wrap( void *ctx,
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa, f_rng, p_rng,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize ) );
olen, input, output, osize ) );
}
static int rsa_encrypt_wrap( void *ctx,
@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ static int rsa_encrypt_wrap( void *ctx,
if( *olen > osize )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE );
return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa, f_rng, p_rng,
ilen, input, output ) );
}
@ -770,7 +771,7 @@ static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
if( *sig_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
return( rsa_alt->sign_func( rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
return( rsa_alt->sign_func( rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng,
md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) );
}
@ -788,7 +789,7 @@ static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap( void *ctx,
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
return( rsa_alt->decrypt_func( rsa_alt->key,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize ) );
olen, input, output, osize ) );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)

335
library/psa_crypto.c
View file

@ -1492,6 +1492,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_policy( const psa_key_policy_t *policy )
PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION |
@ -2458,7 +2460,254 @@ cleanup:
/* Asymmetric cryptography */
/****************************************************************/
psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_internal(
static psa_status_t psa_sign_verify_check_alg( int input_is_message,
psa_algorithm_t alg )
{
if( input_is_message )
{
if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
{
if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
}
else
{
if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
int input_is_message,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_length,
uint8_t * signature,
size_t signature_size,
size_t * signature_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
*signature_length = 0;
status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg( input_is_message, alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return status;
/* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees
* that signature must be a valid pointer. (On the other hand, the input
* buffer can in principle be empty since it doesn't actually have
* to be a hash.) */
if( signature_size == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
key, &slot,
input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE :
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH,
alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto exit;
}
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
.core = slot->attr
};
if( input_is_message )
{
status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message(
&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
alg, input, input_length,
signature, signature_size, signature_length );
}
else
{
status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
alg, input, input_length,
signature, signature_size, signature_length );
}
exit:
/* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error,
* the trailing part on success) with something that isn't a valid signature
* (barring an attack on the signature and deliberately-crafted input),
* in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
memset( signature + *signature_length, '!',
signature_size - *signature_length );
else
memset( signature, '!', signature_size );
/* If signature_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not call
* memset because signature may be NULL in this case. */
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
}
static psa_status_t psa_verify_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
int input_is_message,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_length,
const uint8_t * signature,
size_t signature_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg( input_is_message, alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return status;
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
key, &slot,
input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE :
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
.core = slot->attr
};
if( input_is_message )
{
status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message(
&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
alg, input, input_length,
signature, signature_length );
}
else
{
status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
alg, input, input_length,
signature, signature_length );
}
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
}
psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer,
size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *input,
size_t input_length,
uint8_t *signature,
size_t signature_size,
size_t *signature_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
{
size_t hash_length;
uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute(
PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ),
input, input_length,
hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return status;
return psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
alg, hash, hash_length,
signature, signature_size, signature_length );
}
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_length,
uint8_t * signature,
size_t signature_size,
size_t * signature_length )
{
return psa_sign_internal(
key, 1, alg, input, input_length,
signature, signature_size, signature_length );
}
psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer,
size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *input,
size_t input_length,
const uint8_t *signature,
size_t signature_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
{
size_t hash_length;
uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute(
PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ),
input, input_length,
hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return status;
return psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
alg, hash, hash_length,
signature, signature_length );
}
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_length,
const uint8_t * signature,
size_t signature_length )
{
return psa_verify_internal(
key, 1, alg, input, input_length,
signature, signature_length );
}
psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
@ -2524,57 +2773,12 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
size_t signature_size,
size_t *signature_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
*signature_length = signature_size;
/* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees
* that signature must be a valid pointer. (On the other hand, the hash
* buffer can in principle be empty since it doesn't actually have
* to be a hash.) */
if( signature_size == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH,
alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto exit;
}
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
.core = slot->attr
};
status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
alg, hash, hash_length,
return psa_sign_internal(
key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length,
signature, signature_size, signature_length );
exit:
/* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error,
* the trailing part on success) with something that isn't a valid mac
* (barring an attack on the mac and deliberately-crafted input),
* in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
memset( signature + *signature_length, '!',
signature_size - *signature_length );
else
memset( signature, '!', signature_size );
/* If signature_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not call
* memset because signature may be NULL in this case. */
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
}
psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_internal(
psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
@ -2638,28 +2842,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_verify_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
const uint8_t *signature,
size_t signature_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
.core = slot->attr
};
status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
alg, hash, hash_length,
return psa_verify_internal(
key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length,
signature, signature_length );
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP)
@ -2733,7 +2918,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa,
mbedtls_psa_get_random,
MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
input_length,
input,
output ) );
@ -2748,7 +2932,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( rsa,
mbedtls_psa_get_random,
MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
salt, salt_length,
input_length,
input,
@ -2840,7 +3023,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa,
mbedtls_psa_get_random,
MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
output_length,
input,
output,
@ -2856,7 +3038,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( rsa,
mbedtls_psa_get_random,
MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
salt, salt_length,
output_length,
input,
@ -5127,7 +5308,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal(
}
else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
if ( type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR )
{
return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( attributes,
@ -5136,7 +5318,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal(
key_buffer_length ) );
}
else
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) */
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR)
* defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR)
if ( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) )

86
library/psa_crypto_core.h
View file

@ -378,6 +378,86 @@ psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
size_t key_buffer_size,
size_t *key_buffer_length );
/** Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms,
* this includes the hashing step.
*
* \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
* sign_message entry point. This function behaves as a sign_message
* entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
* transparent drivers.
*
* \note This function will call the driver for psa_sign_hash
* and go through driver dispatch again.
*
* \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the
* operation.
* \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context.
* \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
* \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
* the type of the key.
* \param[in] input The input message to sign.
* \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
* \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written.
* \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
* \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes
* that make up the returned signature value.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
* The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
* determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
* #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
* where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
* respectively of the key.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
*/
psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length,
uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length );
/** Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using
* a hash-and-sign verification algorithm.
*
* \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
* verify_message entry point. This function behaves as a verify_message
* entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
* transparent drivers.
*
* \note This function will call the driver for psa_verify_hash
* and go through driver dispatch again.
*
* \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the
* operation.
* \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context.
* \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
* \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
* the type of the key.
* \param[in] input The message whose signature is to be verified.
* \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
* \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify.
* \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* The signature is valid.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
* The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
* signature is not a valid signature.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
*/
psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length,
const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length );
/** Sign an already-calculated hash with a private key.
*
* \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
@ -388,7 +468,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
* \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the
* operation.
* \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context.
* format.
* \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
* \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
* the type of the key.
@ -412,7 +491,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
*/
psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_internal(
psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
@ -429,7 +508,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_internal(
* \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the
* operation.
* \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context.
* format.
* \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
* \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
* the type of the key.
@ -448,7 +526,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_internal(
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
*/
psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_internal(
psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,

185
library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c
View file

@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS)
/* Include test driver definition when running tests */
@ -65,6 +67,152 @@
#endif
/* Start delegation functions */
psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer,
size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *input,
size_t input_length,
uint8_t *signature,
size_t signature_size,
size_t *signature_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_location_t location =
PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime );
switch( location )
{
case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:
/* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so
* cycle through all known transparent accelerators */
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_message(
attributes,
key_buffer,
key_buffer_size,
alg,
input,
input_length,
signature,
signature_size,
signature_length );
/* Declared with fallback == true */
if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
return( status );
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
break;
/* Add cases for opaque driver here */
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION:
status = mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_message(
attributes,
key_buffer,
key_buffer_size,
alg,
input,
input_length,
signature,
signature_size,
signature_length );
if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
return( status );
break;
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
default:
/* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
(void)status;
break;
}
return( psa_sign_message_builtin( attributes,
key_buffer,
key_buffer_size,
alg,
input,
input_length,
signature,
signature_size,
signature_length ) );
}
psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer,
size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *input,
size_t input_length,
const uint8_t *signature,
size_t signature_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_location_t location =
PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime );
switch( location )
{
case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:
/* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so
* cycle through all known transparent accelerators */
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_message(
attributes,
key_buffer,
key_buffer_size,
alg,
input,
input_length,
signature,
signature_length );
/* Declared with fallback == true */
if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
return( status );
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
break;
/* Add cases for opaque driver here */
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION:
return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_message(
attributes,
key_buffer,
key_buffer_size,
alg,
input,
input_length,
signature,
signature_length ) );
if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
return( status );
break;
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
default:
/* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
(void)status;
break;
}
return( psa_verify_message_builtin( attributes,
key_buffer,
key_buffer_size,
alg,
input,
input_length,
signature,
signature_length ) );
}
psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
@ -117,15 +265,15 @@ psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
/* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */
return( psa_sign_hash_internal( attributes,
key_buffer,
key_buffer_size,
alg,
hash,
hash_length,
signature,
signature_size,
signature_length ) );
return( psa_sign_hash_builtin( attributes,
key_buffer,
key_buffer_size,
alg,
hash,
hash_length,
signature,
signature_size,
signature_length ) );
/* Add cases for opaque driver here */
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
@ -201,14 +349,14 @@ psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
return( psa_verify_hash_internal( attributes,
key_buffer,
key_buffer_size,
alg,
hash,
hash_length,
signature,
signature_length ) );
return( psa_verify_hash_builtin( attributes,
key_buffer,
key_buffer_size,
alg,
hash,
hash_length,
signature,
signature_length ) );
/* Add cases for opaque driver here */
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
@ -1988,4 +2136,5 @@ psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort(
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
}
/* End of automatically generated file. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */

21
library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
View file

@ -28,6 +28,27 @@
/*
* Signature functions
*/
psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer,
size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *input,
size_t input_length,
uint8_t *signature,
size_t signature_size,
size_t *signature_length );
psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer,
size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *input,
size_t input_length,
const uint8_t *signature,
size_t signature_length );
psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,

4
library/psa_crypto_hash.c
View file

@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( psa_algorithm_t alg )
case PSA_ALG_SHA_1:
return( &mbedtls_sha1_info );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
case PSA_ALG_SHA_224:
return( &mbedtls_sha224_info );
#endif
@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( psa_algorithm_t alg )
case PSA_ALG_SHA_256:
return( &mbedtls_sha256_info );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
case PSA_ALG_SHA_384:
return( &mbedtls_sha384_info );
#endif

20
library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
View file

@ -274,7 +274,8 @@ static psa_status_t rsa_export_public_key(
#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) ||
* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */
#if defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR)
#if defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
static psa_status_t psa_rsa_read_exponent( const uint8_t *domain_parameters,
size_t domain_parameters_size,
int *exponent )
@ -332,7 +333,8 @@ static psa_status_t rsa_generate_key(
return( status );
}
#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) */
#endif /* defined(BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR)
* defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) */
/****************************************************************/
/* Sign/verify hashes */
@ -419,7 +421,6 @@ static psa_status_t rsa_sign_hash(
ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa,
mbedtls_psa_get_random,
MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
md_alg,
(unsigned int) hash_length,
hash,
@ -434,7 +435,6 @@ static psa_status_t rsa_sign_hash(
ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( rsa,
mbedtls_psa_get_random,
MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
(unsigned int) hash_length,
hash,
@ -492,9 +492,6 @@ static psa_status_t rsa_verify_hash(
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15,
MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa,
mbedtls_psa_get_random,
MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
md_alg,
(unsigned int) hash_length,
hash,
@ -507,9 +504,6 @@ static psa_status_t rsa_verify_hash(
{
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg );
ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( rsa,
mbedtls_psa_get_random,
MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
(unsigned int) hash_length,
hash,
@ -565,7 +559,8 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key(
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) ||
* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length )
@ -573,7 +568,8 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key(
return( rsa_generate_key( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
key_buffer_length ) );
}
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) */
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR)
* defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS)

237
library/rsa.c
View file

@ -1156,7 +1156,6 @@ exit:
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
size_t ilen,
const unsigned char *input,
@ -1170,15 +1169,10 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL );
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( f_rng == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@ -1232,9 +1226,7 @@ exit:
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output )
: mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) );
return( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
@ -1244,8 +1236,7 @@ exit:
*/
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode, size_t ilen,
void *p_rng, size_t ilen,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output )
{
@ -1254,14 +1245,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
unsigned char *p = output;
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
olen = ctx->len;
/* first comparison checks for overflow */
@ -1271,43 +1257,32 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen;
*p++ = 0;
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
if( f_rng == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
*p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
while( nb_pad-- > 0 )
{
if( f_rng == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
int rng_dl = 100;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
do {
ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, 1 );
} while( *p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0 );
while( nb_pad-- > 0 )
{
int rng_dl = 100;
/* Check if RNG failed to generate data */
if( rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) );
do {
ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, 1 );
} while( *p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0 );
/* Check if RNG failed to generate data */
if( rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) );
p++;
}
}
else
{
*p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
while( nb_pad-- > 0 )
*p++ = 0xFF;
p++;
}
*p++ = 0;
if( ilen != 0 )
memcpy( p, input, ilen );
return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output )
: mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) );
return( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
@ -1317,13 +1292,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode, size_t ilen,
size_t ilen,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output )
{
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
@ -1331,14 +1304,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, ilen,
input, output );
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng,
ilen, input, output );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0,
ilen, input, output );
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0,
ilen, input, output );
#endif
default:
@ -1353,7 +1326,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *input,
@ -1370,8 +1342,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
@ -1380,7 +1350,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
/*
* Parameters sanity checks
*/
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 )
if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
ilen = ctx->len;
@ -1401,9 +1371,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
/*
* RSA operation
*/
ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, input, buf )
: mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
ret = mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
if( ret != 0 )
goto cleanup;
@ -1591,7 +1559,7 @@ static void mem_move_to_left( void *start,
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode, size_t *olen,
size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output,
size_t output_max_len )
@ -1616,8 +1584,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
unsigned output_too_large;
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
@ -1627,15 +1593,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
ilen - 11 :
output_max_len );
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, input, buf )
: mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
ret = mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
if( ret != 0 )
goto cleanup;
@ -1644,37 +1608,20 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
bad |= buf[0];
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE )
{
/* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
* where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
/* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
* the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
{
pad_done |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
}
}
else
{
/* Decode EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00
* where PS must be at least 8 bytes with the value 0xFF. */
bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
/* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
* where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
/* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
* the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count.
* If there's a non-0xff byte in the padding, the padding is bad. */
for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
{
pad_done |= if_int( buf[i], 0, 1 );
pad_count += if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 );
bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, buf[i] ^ 0xFF );
}
/* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
* the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
{
pad_done |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
}
/* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 );
@ -1763,14 +1710,12 @@ cleanup:
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode, size_t *olen,
size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output,
size_t output_max_len)
{
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
@ -1779,13 +1724,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, olen,
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, olen,
input, output, output_max_len );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0,
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0,
olen, input, output,
output_max_len );
#endif
@ -1799,7 +1744,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
@ -1815,14 +1759,12 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
hashlen == 0 ) ||
hash != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 )
if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( f_rng == NULL )
@ -1923,9 +1865,7 @@ exit:
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig )
: mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ) );
return mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig );
}
/*
@ -1941,7 +1881,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int saltlen,
unsigned char *sig )
{
return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, md_alg,
return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig );
}
@ -1952,13 +1892,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
unsigned char *sig )
{
return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
@ -2104,7 +2043,6 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
@ -2114,14 +2052,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL;
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
hashlen == 0 ) ||
hash != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/*
@ -2132,16 +2068,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
ctx->len, sig ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
/*
* Call respective RSA primitive
*/
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
{
/* Skip verification on a public key operation */
return( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) );
}
/* Private key operation
*
* In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a
@ -2184,15 +2110,12 @@ cleanup:
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
unsigned char *sig )
{
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
hashlen == 0 ) ||
hash != NULL );
@ -2202,14 +2125,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
hashlen, hash, sig );
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng,
md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
hashlen, hash, sig );
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
hashlen, hash, sig );
#endif
default:
@ -2222,9 +2145,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
*/
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
@ -2245,24 +2165,17 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
hashlen == 0 ) ||
hash != NULL );
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
siglen = ctx->len;
if( siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof( buf ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf )
: mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf );
ret = mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
@ -2372,9 +2285,6 @@ exit:
* Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
*/
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
@ -2382,8 +2292,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
{
mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id;
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
hashlen == 0 ) ||
@ -2393,10 +2301,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id
: md_alg;
return( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode,
md_alg, hashlen, hash,
mgf1_hash_id, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY,
sig ) );
return( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( ctx,
md_alg, hashlen, hash,
mgf1_hash_id,
MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY,
sig ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
@ -2406,9 +2315,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function
*/
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
@ -2419,8 +2325,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *encoded_expected = NULL;
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
hashlen == 0 ) ||
@ -2428,9 +2332,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
sig_len = ctx->len;
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/*
* Prepare expected PKCS1 v1.5 encoding of hash.
*/
@ -2450,9 +2351,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* Apply RSA primitive to get what should be PKCS1 encoded hash.
*/
ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, encoded )
: mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, encoded );
ret = mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, encoded );
if( ret != 0 )
goto cleanup;
@ -2489,17 +2388,12 @@ cleanup:
* Do an RSA operation and check the message digest
*/
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
const unsigned char *sig )
{
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
hashlen == 0 ) ||
@ -2509,14 +2403,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
hashlen, hash, sig );
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( ctx, md_alg,
hashlen, hash, sig );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
hashlen, hash, sig );
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( ctx, md_alg,
hashlen, hash, sig );
#endif
default:
@ -2719,7 +2613,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose )
memcpy( rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN );
if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL,
PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext,
rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
{
@ -2733,7 +2627,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose )
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : " );
if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL,
&len, rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted,
sizeof(rsa_decrypted) ) != 0 )
{
@ -2769,7 +2663,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose )
}
if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &rsa, myrand, NULL,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0,
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0,
sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
{
if( verbose != 0 )
@ -2782,8 +2676,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose )
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: " );
if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, NULL, NULL,
MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0,
if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0,
sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
{
if( verbose != 0 )

18
library/sha256.c
View file

@ -103,7 +103,12 @@ void mbedtls_sha256_clone( mbedtls_sha256_context *dst,
int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 )
{
SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 );
#else
SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 );
#endif
ctx->total[0] = 0;
ctx->total[1] = 0;
@ -122,6 +127,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 )
}
else
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
/* SHA-224 */
ctx->state[0] = 0xC1059ED8;
ctx->state[1] = 0x367CD507;
@ -131,6 +137,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 )
ctx->state[5] = 0x68581511;
ctx->state[6] = 0x64F98FA7;
ctx->state[7] = 0xBEFA4FA4;
#endif
}
ctx->is224 = is224;
@ -332,7 +339,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
* SHA-256 final digest
*/
int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
unsigned char output[32] )
unsigned char *output )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
uint32_t used;
@ -388,7 +395,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[5], output, 20 );
PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[6], output, 24 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
if( ctx->is224 == 0 )
#endif
PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[7], output, 28 );
return( 0 );
@ -401,13 +410,18 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
*/
int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input,
size_t ilen,
unsigned char output[32],
unsigned char *output,
int is224 )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_sha256_context ctx;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 );
#else
SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 );
#endif
SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL );

22
library/sha512.c
View file

@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ void mbedtls_sha512_clone( mbedtls_sha512_context *dst,
int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 )
{
SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 || is384 == 1 );
#else
SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 );
@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 )
}
else
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#else
/* SHA-384 */
@ -161,10 +161,10 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 )
ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x8EB44A8768581511);
ctx->state[6] = UL64(0xDB0C2E0D64F98FA7);
ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x47B5481DBEFA4FA4);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
ctx->is384 = is384;
#endif
@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx,
* SHA-512 final digest
*/
int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx,
unsigned char output[64] )
unsigned char *output )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned used;
@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx,
sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[4], output, 32 );
sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[5], output, 40 );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
if( ctx->is384 == 0 )
#endif
{
@ -453,13 +453,13 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx,
*/
int mbedtls_sha512_ret( const unsigned char *input,
size_t ilen,
unsigned char output[64],
unsigned char *output,
int is384 )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_sha512_context ctx;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 || is384 == 1 );
#else
SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 );
@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ static const size_t sha512_test_buflen[3] =
static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[][64] =
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
/*
* SHA-384 test vectors
*/
@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[][64] =
0x79, 0x72, 0xCE, 0xC5, 0x70, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0x5B,
0x07, 0xB8, 0xB3, 0xDC, 0x38, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xEB,
0xAE, 0x97, 0xDD, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x3D, 0x89, 0x85 },
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
/*
* SHA-512 test vectors
@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_self_test( int verbose )
for( i = 0; i < (int) ARRAY_LENGTH(sha512_test_sum); i++ )
{
j = i % 3;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
k = i < 3;
#else
k = 0;

418
library/ssl_cache.c
View file

@ -50,83 +50,70 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache )
#endif
}
int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
static int ssl_cache_find_entry( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache,
unsigned char const *session_id,
size_t session_id_len,
mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry **dst )
{
int ret = 1;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time( NULL );
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur;
for( cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
if( cache->timeout != 0 &&
(int) ( t - cur->timestamp ) > cache->timeout )
continue;
#endif
if( session_id_len != cur->session_id_len ||
memcmp( session_id, cur->session_id,
cur->session_id_len ) != 0 )
{
continue;
}
break;
}
if( cur != NULL )
{
*dst = cur;
ret = 0;
}
return( ret );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data,
unsigned char const *session_id,
size_t session_id_len,
mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
{
int ret = 1;
mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data;
mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *entry;
mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *entry;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &cache->mutex ) != 0 )
return( 1 );
#endif
cur = cache->chain;
entry = NULL;
while( cur != NULL )
{
entry = cur;
cur = cur->next;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
if( cache->timeout != 0 &&
(int) ( t - entry->timestamp ) > cache->timeout )
continue;
#endif
if( session->ciphersuite != entry->session.ciphersuite ||
session->compression != entry->session.compression ||
session->id_len != entry->session.id_len )
continue;
if( memcmp( session->id, entry->session.id,
entry->session.id_len ) != 0 )
continue;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( session, &entry->session );
if( ret != 0 )
{
ret = 1;
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/*
* Restore peer certificate (without rest of the original chain)
*/
if( entry->peer_cert.p != NULL )
{
/* `session->peer_cert` is NULL after the call to
* mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(), because cache entries
* have the `peer_cert` field set to NULL. */
if( ( session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1,
sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) ) ) == NULL )
{
ret = 1;
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert );
if( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( session->peer_cert, entry->peer_cert.p,
entry->peer_cert.len ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert );
session->peer_cert = NULL;
ret = 1;
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
ret = 0;
ret = ssl_cache_find_entry( cache, session_id, session_id_len, &entry );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_load( session,
entry->session,
entry->session_len );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
ret = 0;
exit:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
@ -137,158 +124,184 @@ exit:
return( ret );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
static int ssl_cache_pick_writing_slot( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache,
unsigned char const *session_id,
size_t session_id_len,
mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry **dst )
{
int ret = 1;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time( NULL ), oldest = 0;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *old = NULL;
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data;
mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *prv;
int count = 0;
mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *last;
/* Check 1: Is there already an entry with the given session ID?
*
* If yes, overwrite it.
*
* If not, `count` will hold the size of the session cache
* at the end of this loop, and `last` will point to the last
* entry, both of which will be used later. */
last = NULL;
for( cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next )
{
count++;
if( session_id_len == cur->session_id_len &&
memcmp( session_id, cur->session_id, cur->session_id_len ) == 0 )
{
goto found;
}
last = cur;
}
/* Check 2: Is there an outdated entry in the cache?
*
* If so, overwrite it.
*
* If not, remember the oldest entry in `old` for later.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
for( cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next )
{
if( cache->timeout != 0 &&
(int) ( t - cur->timestamp ) > cache->timeout )
{
goto found;
}
if( oldest == 0 || cur->timestamp < oldest )
{
oldest = cur->timestamp;
old = cur;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
/* Check 3: Is there free space in the cache? */
if( count < cache->max_entries )
{
/* Create new entry */
cur = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry) );
if( cur == NULL )
return( 1 );
/* Append to the end of the linked list. */
if( last == NULL )
cache->chain = cur;
else
last->next = cur;
goto found;
}
/* Last resort: The cache is full and doesn't contain any outdated
* elements. In this case, we evict the oldest one, judged by timestamp
* (if present) or cache-order. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
if( old == NULL )
{
/* This should only happen on an ill-configured cache
* with max_entries == 0. */
return( 1 );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
/* Reuse first entry in chain, but move to last place. */
if( cache->chain == NULL )
return( 1 );
old = cache->chain;
cache->chain = old->next;
old->next = NULL;
last->next = old;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
/* Now `old` points to the oldest entry to be overwritten. */
cur = old;
found:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
cur->timestamp = t;
#endif
/* If we're reusing an entry, free it first. */
if( cur->session != NULL )
{
mbedtls_free( cur->session );
cur->session = NULL;
cur->session_len = 0;
memset( cur->session_id, 0, sizeof( cur->session_id ) );
cur->session_id_len = 0;
}
*dst = cur;
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data,
unsigned char const *session_id,
size_t session_id_len,
const mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
{
int ret = 1;
mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data;
mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur;
size_t session_serialized_len;
unsigned char *session_serialized = NULL;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &cache->mutex ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#endif
cur = cache->chain;
prv = NULL;
while( cur != NULL )
{
count++;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
if( cache->timeout != 0 &&
(int) ( t - cur->timestamp ) > cache->timeout )
{
cur->timestamp = t;
break; /* expired, reuse this slot, update timestamp */
}
#endif
if( memcmp( session->id, cur->session.id, cur->session.id_len ) == 0 )
break; /* client reconnected, keep timestamp for session id */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
if( oldest == 0 || cur->timestamp < oldest )
{
oldest = cur->timestamp;
old = cur;
}
#endif
prv = cur;
cur = cur->next;
}
if( cur == NULL )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
/*
* Reuse oldest entry if max_entries reached
*/
if( count >= cache->max_entries )
{
if( old == NULL )
{
ret = 1;
goto exit;
}
cur = old;
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
/*
* Reuse first entry in chain if max_entries reached,
* but move to last place
*/
if( count >= cache->max_entries )
{
if( cache->chain == NULL )
{
ret = 1;
goto exit;
}
cur = cache->chain;
cache->chain = cur->next;
cur->next = NULL;
prv->next = cur;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
else
{
/*
* max_entries not reached, create new entry
*/
cur = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry) );
if( cur == NULL )
{
ret = 1;
goto exit;
}
if( prv == NULL )
cache->chain = cur;
else
prv->next = cur;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
cur->timestamp = t;
#endif
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/*
* If we're reusing an entry, free its certificate first
*/
if( cur->peer_cert.p != NULL )
{
mbedtls_free( cur->peer_cert.p );
memset( &cur->peer_cert, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/* Copy the entire session; this temporarily makes a copy of the
* X.509 CRT structure even though we only want to store the raw CRT.
* This inefficiency will go away as soon as we implement on-demand
* parsing of CRTs, in which case there's no need for the `peer_cert`
* field anymore in the first place, and we're done after this call. */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( &cur->session, session );
ret = ssl_cache_pick_writing_slot( cache,
session_id, session_id_len,
&cur );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
/* Check how much space we need to serialize the session
* and allocate a sufficiently large buffer. */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save( session, NULL, 0, &session_serialized_len );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL )
{
ret = 1;
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* If present, free the X.509 structure and only store the raw CRT data. */
if( cur->session.peer_cert != NULL )
session_serialized = mbedtls_calloc( 1, session_serialized_len );
if( session_serialized == NULL )
{
cur->peer_cert.p =
mbedtls_calloc( 1, cur->session.peer_cert->raw.len );
if( cur->peer_cert.p == NULL )
{
ret = 1;
goto exit;
}
memcpy( cur->peer_cert.p,
cur->session.peer_cert->raw.p,
cur->session.peer_cert->raw.len );
cur->peer_cert.len = session->peer_cert->raw.len;
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( cur->session.peer_cert );
mbedtls_free( cur->session.peer_cert );
cur->session.peer_cert = NULL;
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/* Now serialize the session into the allocated buffer. */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save( session,
session_serialized,
session_serialized_len,
&session_serialized_len );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
if( session_id_len > sizeof( cur->session_id ) )
{
ret = 1;
goto exit;
}
cur->session_id_len = session_id_len;
memcpy( cur->session_id, session_id, session_id_len );
cur->session = session_serialized;
cur->session_len = session_serialized_len;
session_serialized = NULL;
ret = 0;
@ -298,6 +311,9 @@ exit:
ret = 1;
#endif
if( session_serialized != NULL )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session_serialized, session_serialized_len );
return( ret );
}
@ -328,13 +344,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache )
prv = cur;
cur = cur->next;
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &prv->session );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
mbedtls_free( prv->peer_cert.p );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
mbedtls_free( prv->session );
mbedtls_free( prv );
}

176
library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
View file

@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA,
@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA,
@ -444,13 +444,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
@ -461,13 +461,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA,
@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
@ -553,13 +553,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
@ -570,13 +570,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
@ -605,13 +605,14 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
@ -715,13 +716,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
@ -740,13 +741,14 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
@ -851,13 +853,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
@ -907,7 +909,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA,
@ -922,7 +924,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
@ -934,13 +936,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
@ -951,13 +953,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
@ -1016,7 +1018,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA,
@ -1031,7 +1033,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
@ -1043,13 +1045,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
@ -1060,13 +1062,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
@ -1104,13 +1106,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
@ -1122,13 +1124,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA",
@ -1178,13 +1180,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
@ -1196,13 +1198,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
@ -1231,13 +1233,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
@ -1249,13 +1251,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA",
@ -1305,13 +1307,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
@ -1323,13 +1325,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
@ -1359,13 +1361,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA",
@ -1393,13 +1395,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
@ -1428,13 +1430,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
@ -1446,13 +1448,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA",
@ -1480,13 +1482,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
@ -1498,13 +1500,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
@ -1578,13 +1580,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK },
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK },
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
@ -1604,13 +1606,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK },
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK },
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
@ -1630,13 +1632,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK },
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK },
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
@ -1656,13 +1658,13 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK },
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK },
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */
@ -1670,7 +1672,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
"TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA,
@ -1678,7 +1680,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
"TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA,
@ -1707,7 +1709,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK,
@ -1715,7 +1717,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK,
@ -1744,7 +1746,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
"TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK,
@ -1752,7 +1754,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
"TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK,
@ -1781,7 +1783,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED)
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
"TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA,
@ -1789,7 +1791,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
"TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA,
@ -1818,7 +1820,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED)
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA,
@ -1826,7 +1828,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA,
@ -1855,7 +1857,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
"TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK,
@ -1876,7 +1878,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA,
@ -1884,7 +1886,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA,
@ -1913,7 +1915,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA,
@ -1921,7 +1923,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA,
@ -1950,7 +1952,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA,
@ -1958,7 +1960,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA,
@ -1987,7 +1989,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
"TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK,
@ -1995,7 +1997,7 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
0 },
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C))
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C))
{ MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
"TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384",
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK,

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