Merge remote-tracking branch 'restricted/development-restricted' into mbedtls-3.3.0rc0-pr
This commit is contained in:
commit
a5b2c52885
4 changed files with 117 additions and 37 deletions
4
ChangeLog.d/fix-in-cid-buffer-size.txt
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4
ChangeLog.d/fix-in-cid-buffer-size.txt
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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Security
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* Fix potential heap buffer overread and overwrite in DTLS if
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID is enabled and
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MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX > 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX.
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10
ChangeLog.d/rsa-fix-priviliged-side-channel.txt
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ChangeLog.d/rsa-fix-priviliged-side-channel.txt
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@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
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Security
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* An adversary with access to precise enough information about memory
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accesses (typically, an untrusted operating system attacking a secure
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enclave) could recover an RSA private key after observing the victim
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performing a single private-key operation if the window size used for the
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exponentiation was 3 or smaller. Found and reported by Zili KOU,
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Wenjian HE, Sharad Sinha, and Wei ZHANG. See "Cache Side-channel Attacks
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and Defenses of the Sliding Window Algorithm in TEEs" - Design, Automation
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and Test in Europe 2023.
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138
library/bignum.c
138
library/bignum.c
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@ -1590,11 +1590,11 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
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mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR )
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{
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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size_t wbits, wsize, one = 1;
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size_t window_bitsize;
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size_t i, j, nblimbs;
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size_t bufsize, nbits;
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mbedtls_mpi_uint ei, mm, state;
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mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[ 1 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ], WW, Apos;
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mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[ (size_t) 1 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ], WW, Apos;
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int neg;
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MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
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@ -1623,21 +1623,59 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
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i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( E );
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wsize = ( i > 671 ) ? 6 : ( i > 239 ) ? 5 :
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window_bitsize = ( i > 671 ) ? 6 : ( i > 239 ) ? 5 :
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( i > 79 ) ? 4 : ( i > 23 ) ? 3 : 1;
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#if( MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE < 6 )
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if( wsize > MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE )
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wsize = MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE;
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if( window_bitsize > MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE )
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window_bitsize = MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE;
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#endif
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const size_t w_table_used_size = (size_t) 1 << window_bitsize;
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/*
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* This function is not constant-trace: its memory accesses depend on the
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* exponent value. To defend against timing attacks, callers (such as RSA
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* and DHM) should use exponent blinding. However this is not enough if the
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* adversary can find the exponent in a single trace, so this function
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* takes extra precautions against adversaries who can observe memory
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* access patterns.
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*
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* This function performs a series of multiplications by table elements and
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* squarings, and we want the prevent the adversary from finding out which
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* table element was used, and from distinguishing between multiplications
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* and squarings. Firstly, when multiplying by an element of the window
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* W[i], we do a constant-trace table lookup to obfuscate i. This leaves
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* squarings as having a different memory access patterns from other
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* multiplications. So secondly, we put the accumulator X in the table as
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* well, and also do a constant-trace table lookup to multiply by X.
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*
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* This way, all multiplications take the form of a lookup-and-multiply.
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* The number of lookup-and-multiply operations inside each iteration of
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* the main loop still depends on the bits of the exponent, but since the
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* other operations in the loop don't have an easily recognizable memory
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* trace, an adversary is unlikely to be able to observe the exact
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* patterns.
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*
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* An adversary may still be able to recover the exponent if they can
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* observe both memory accesses and branches. However, branch prediction
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* exploitation typically requires many traces of execution over the same
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* data, which is defeated by randomized blinding.
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*
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* To achieve this, we make a copy of X and we use the table entry in each
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* calculation from this point on.
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*/
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const size_t x_index = 0;
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mbedtls_mpi_init( &W[x_index] );
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mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[x_index], X );
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j = N->n + 1;
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/* All W[i] and X must have at least N->n limbs for the mpi_montmul()
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* and mpi_montred() calls later. Here we ensure that W[1] and X are
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* large enough, and later we'll grow other W[i] to the same length.
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* They must not be shrunk midway through this function!
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*/
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, j ) );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[x_index], j ) );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[1], j ) );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T, j * 2 ) );
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@ -1686,28 +1724,36 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
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mpi_montmul( &W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T );
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/*
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* X = R^2 * R^-1 mod N = R mod N
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* W[x_index] = R^2 * R^-1 mod N = R mod N
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*/
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, &RR ) );
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mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[x_index], &RR ) );
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mpi_montred( &W[x_index], N, mm, &T );
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if( wsize > 1 )
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if( window_bitsize > 1 )
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{
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/*
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* W[1 << (wsize - 1)] = W[1] ^ (wsize - 1)
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* W[i] = W[1] ^ i
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*
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* The first bit of the sliding window is always 1 and therefore we
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* only need to store the second half of the table.
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*
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* (There are two special elements in the table: W[0] for the
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* accumulator/result and W[1] for A in Montgomery form. Both of these
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* are already set at this point.)
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*/
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j = one << ( wsize - 1 );
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j = w_table_used_size / 2;
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[j], N->n + 1 ) );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[j], &W[1] ) );
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for( i = 0; i < wsize - 1; i++ )
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for( i = 0; i < window_bitsize - 1; i++ )
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mpi_montmul( &W[j], &W[j], N, mm, &T );
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/*
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* W[i] = W[i - 1] * W[1]
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*/
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for( i = j + 1; i < ( one << wsize ); i++ )
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for( i = j + 1; i < w_table_used_size; i++ )
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{
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[i], N->n + 1 ) );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[i], &W[i - 1] ) );
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@ -1719,7 +1765,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
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nblimbs = E->n;
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bufsize = 0;
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nbits = 0;
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wbits = 0;
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size_t exponent_bits_in_window = 0;
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state = 0;
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while( 1 )
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@ -1747,9 +1793,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
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if( ei == 0 && state == 1 )
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{
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/*
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* out of window, square X
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* out of window, square W[x_index]
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*/
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mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, w_table_used_size, x_index ) );
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mpi_montmul( &W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T );
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continue;
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}
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@ -1759,25 +1806,30 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
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state = 2;
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nbits++;
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wbits |= ( ei << ( wsize - nbits ) );
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exponent_bits_in_window |= ( ei << ( window_bitsize - nbits ) );
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if( nbits == wsize )
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if( nbits == window_bitsize )
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{
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/*
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* X = X^wsize R^-1 mod N
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* W[x_index] = W[x_index]^window_bitsize R^-1 mod N
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*/
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for( i = 0; i < wsize; i++ )
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mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T );
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for( i = 0; i < window_bitsize; i++ )
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{
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, w_table_used_size,
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x_index ) );
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mpi_montmul( &W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T );
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}
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/*
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* X = X * W[wbits] R^-1 mod N
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* W[x_index] = W[x_index] * W[exponent_bits_in_window] R^-1 mod N
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*/
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, (size_t) 1 << wsize, wbits ) );
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mpi_montmul( X, &WW, N, mm, &T );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, w_table_used_size,
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exponent_bits_in_window ) );
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mpi_montmul( &W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T );
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state--;
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nbits = 0;
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wbits = 0;
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exponent_bits_in_window = 0;
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}
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}
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@ -1786,31 +1838,45 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
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*/
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for( i = 0; i < nbits; i++ )
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{
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mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, w_table_used_size, x_index ) );
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mpi_montmul( &W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T );
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wbits <<= 1;
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exponent_bits_in_window <<= 1;
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if( ( wbits & ( one << wsize ) ) != 0 )
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mpi_montmul( X, &W[1], N, mm, &T );
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if( ( exponent_bits_in_window & ( (size_t) 1 << window_bitsize ) ) != 0 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, w_table_used_size, 1 ) );
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mpi_montmul( &W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T );
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}
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}
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/*
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* X = A^E * R * R^-1 mod N = A^E mod N
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* W[x_index] = A^E * R * R^-1 mod N = A^E mod N
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*/
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mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T );
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mpi_montred( &W[x_index], N, mm, &T );
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if( neg && E->n != 0 && ( E->p[0] & 1 ) != 0 )
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{
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X->s = -1;
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, N, X ) );
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W[x_index].s = -1;
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &W[x_index], N, &W[x_index] ) );
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}
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/*
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* Load the result in the output variable.
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*/
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mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, &W[x_index] );
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cleanup:
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for( i = ( one << ( wsize - 1 ) ); i < ( one << wsize ); i++ )
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/* The first bit of the sliding window is always 1 and therefore the first
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* half of the table was unused. */
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for( i = w_table_used_size/2; i < w_table_used_size; i++ )
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mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[i] );
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mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[1] ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Apos );
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mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[x_index] );
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mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[1] );
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mbedtls_mpi_free( &T );
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mbedtls_mpi_free( &Apos );
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mbedtls_mpi_free( &WW );
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if( prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL )
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@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_transform
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
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uint8_t in_cid_len;
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uint8_t out_cid_len;
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unsigned char in_cid [ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
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unsigned char in_cid [ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ];
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unsigned char out_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
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