Reduced the input / output overhead with 200+ bytes and covered corner
case The actual input / output buffer overhead is only 301 instead of 512. This requires a proper check on the padding_idx to prevent out of bounds reads. Previously a remote party could potentially trigger an access error and thus stop the application when sending a malicious packet having MAX_CONTENT_LEN of data, 32 bytes of MAC and a decrypted padlen of . This would result in reading from in_ctr + 13 + 32 + MAX_CONTENT_LEN - 1 - 1 for 256 bytes (including fake padding check). Or 13 + 32 bytes over the buffer length. We now reset padding_idx to 0, if it's clear that it will never be a valid padding (padlen > msg_len || msg_len + padlen + 256 > buffer_len)
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3 changed files with 23 additions and 4 deletions
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@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ Bugfix
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* Memory leak in benchmark application
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* Fixed x509_crt_parse_path() bug on Windows platforms
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Security
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* Possible remotely-triggered out-of-bounds memory access fixed (found by
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TrustInSoft)
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= PolarSSL 1.3.2 released on 2013-11-04
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Features
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* PK tests added to test framework
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@ -237,8 +237,8 @@
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#endif /* !POLARSSL_CONFIG_OPTIONS */
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/*
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* Allow an extra 512 bytes for the record header
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* and encryption overhead (counter + MAC + padding)
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* Allow an extra 301 bytes for the record header
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* and encryption overhead: counter (8) + header (5) + MAC (32) + padding (256)
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* and allow for a maximum of 1024 of compression expansion if
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* enabled.
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*/
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@ -248,9 +248,9 @@
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#define SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 0
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#endif
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#define SSL_BUFFER_LEN (SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD + 512)
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#define SSL_BUFFER_LEN (SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD + 301)
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#define SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF /**< renegotiation info ext */
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#define SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF /**< renegotiation info ext */
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/*
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* Supported Signature and Hash algorithms (For TLS 1.2)
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@ -1610,6 +1610,21 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl_context *ssl )
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size_t pad_count = 0, real_count = 1;
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size_t padding_idx = ssl->in_msglen - padlen - 1;
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/*
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* Padding is guaranteed to be incorrect if:
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* 1. padlen - 1 > ssl->in_msglen
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*
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* 2. ssl->in_msglen + padlen >
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* SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 256 (max padding)
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*
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* In both cases we reset padding_idx to a safe value (0) to
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* prevent out-of-buffer reads.
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*/
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correct &= ( ssl->in_msglen >= padlen - 1 );
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correct &= ( ssl->in_msglen + padlen <= SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 256 );
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padding_idx *= correct;
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for( i = 1; i <= 256; i++ )
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{
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real_count &= ( i <= padlen );
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