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Fix a few more typos

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Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2022-02-08 10:33:11 +01:00
parent 8ebed21216
commit 80759c4917
2 changed files with 4 additions and 4 deletions
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2
docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-limitations.md
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@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ algorithms can differ from each other.
- salt length: either <= hashlen (see note), or any depending on algorithm
Note: above, "<= hashlen" means that hashlen is used if possible, but if it
doesn't fit because the key is too short, then the maximum lenght that fits is
doesn't fit because the key is too short, then the maximum length that fits is
used.
The RSA/PK API is in principle more flexible than the PSA Crypto API. The

6
docs/architecture/psa-migration/strategy.md
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@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ are:
both of them, but then `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` won't have the desired
effect)
- to avoid a hard/default dependency of TLS, X.509 and PK on
`MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C`, for backwards compatibility reasons:
`MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C`, for backward compatibility reasons:
- when `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C` is enabled and used, applications need to call
`psa_crypto_init()` before TLS/X.509 uses PSA functions
- `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C` has a hard depend on `MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C ||
@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ to the existing code and the less code there is at this point the better,
whereas extending to more protocol features will require the same amount of
work either way.
### Backwards compatibility issues with making it always on
### Backward compatibility issues with making it always on
1. Existing applications may not be calling `psa_crypto_init()` before using
TLS, X.509 or PK. We can try to work around that by calling (the relevant
@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ one-shot function `mbedtls_md()`.
There are two variants of this strategy: one where using the new setup
function also allows for key isolation (the key is only held by PSA,
supporting both G1 and G2 in that area), and one without isolation (the key is
still stored outsede of PSA most of the time, supporting only G1).
still stored outside of PSA most of the time, supporting only G1).
This strategy, with support for key isolation, is currently (end of 2021) used for ECDSA
signature generation in the PK layer - see `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()`. This