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Fix verion-major intolerance

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This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2014-02-12 10:14:54 +01:00
parent c9093085ed
commit 6b1e207081
2 changed files with 25 additions and 11 deletions
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1
ChangeLog
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@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ Bugfix
statistics
* Fix buf in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 "reversed" operations
* Fixed testing with out-of-source builds using cmake
* Fixed version-major intolerance in server
= PolarSSL 1.3.4 released on 2014-01-27
Features

35
library/ssl_srv.c
View file

@ -1071,15 +1071,20 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello( ssl_context *ssl )
buf[1], buf[2] ) );
/*
* SSLv3 Client Hello
* SSLv3/TLS Client Hello
*
* Record layer:
* 0 . 0 message type
* 1 . 2 protocol version
* 3 . 4 message length
*/
/* According to RFC 5246 Appendix E.1, the version here is typically
* "{03,00}, the lowest version number supported by the client, [or] the
* value of ClientHello.client_version", so the only meaningful check here
* is the major version shouldn't be less than 3 */
if( buf[0] != SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
buf[1] != SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 )
buf[1] < SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
@ -1134,21 +1139,24 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello( ssl_context *ssl )
/*
* Check the handshake type and protocol version
*/
if( buf[0] != SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ||
buf[4] != SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 )
if( buf[0] != SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
ssl->major_ver = SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3;
ssl->minor_ver = ( buf[5] <= ssl->max_minor_ver )
? buf[5] : ssl->max_minor_ver;
ssl->major_ver = buf[4];
ssl->minor_ver = buf[5];
if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->min_minor_ver )
ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = ssl->major_ver;
ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = ssl->minor_ver;
if( ssl->major_ver < ssl->min_major_ver ||
ssl->minor_ver < ssl->min_minor_ver )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client only supports ssl smaller than minimum"
" [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
" [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]",
ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
ssl->min_major_ver, ssl->min_minor_ver ) );
ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
@ -1157,8 +1165,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello( ssl_context *ssl )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
}
ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = buf[4];
ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = buf[5];
if( ssl->major_ver > ssl->max_major_ver )
{
ssl->major_ver = ssl->max_major_ver;
ssl->minor_ver = ssl->max_minor_ver;
}
else if( ssl->minor_ver > ssl->max_minor_ver )
ssl->minor_ver = ssl->max_minor_ver;
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 6, 32 );