Unify similar functions
Use common funtion for psa_sign_hash and psa_sign_message and one for psa_verify_hash and psa_verify_message to unify them. Signed-off-by: gabor-mezei-arm <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
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gabor-mezei-arm
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5b44652593
1 changed files with 148 additions and 126 deletions
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@ -2460,26 +2460,51 @@ cleanup:
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/* Asymmetric cryptography */
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/****************************************************************/
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psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
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psa_algorithm_t alg,
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const uint8_t * input,
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size_t input_length,
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uint8_t * signature,
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size_t signature_size,
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size_t * signature_length )
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typedef enum
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{
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PSA_SIGN_INVALID = 0,
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PSA_SIGN_HASH = 1,
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PSA_SIGN_MESSAGE
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} psa_sign_operation_t;
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typedef enum
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{
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PSA_VERIFY_INVALID = 0,
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PSA_VERIFY_HASH = 1,
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PSA_VERIFY_MESSAGE
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} psa_verify_operation_t;
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static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
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psa_sign_operation_t operation,
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psa_algorithm_t alg,
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const uint8_t * input,
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size_t input_length,
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uint8_t * signature,
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size_t signature_size,
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size_t * signature_length )
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{
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psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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psa_key_slot_t *slot;
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size_t hash_length;
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uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
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*signature_length = 0;
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if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) )
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return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
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if( operation == PSA_SIGN_MESSAGE )
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{
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if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) )
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return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
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if ( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) )
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if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
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{
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if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) )
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return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
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}
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/* Curently only hash-then-sign algorithms are supported. */
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else
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return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
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}
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else if( operation == PSA_SIGN_INVALID )
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return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
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/* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees
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@ -2489,9 +2514,12 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
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if( signature_size == 0 )
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return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
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status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
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PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE,
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alg );
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status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
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key, &slot,
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operation == PSA_SIGN_HASH ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH :
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PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE,
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alg );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto exit;
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@ -2505,23 +2533,33 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
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.core = slot->attr
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};
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status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ),
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input, input_length,
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hash, sizeof( hash ),
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&hash_length );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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if( operation == PSA_SIGN_MESSAGE )
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{
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memset( hash, 0, sizeof( hash ) );
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goto exit;
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size_t hash_length;
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uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
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status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ),
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input, input_length,
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hash, sizeof( hash ),
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&hash_length );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto exit;
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status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
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&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
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alg, hash, hash_length,
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signature, signature_size, signature_length );
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}
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else if( operation == PSA_SIGN_HASH )
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{
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status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
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&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
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alg, input, input_length,
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signature, signature_size, signature_length );
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}
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status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
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&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
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alg, hash, hash_length,
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signature, signature_size, signature_length );
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memset( hash, 0, hash_length );
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exit:
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/* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error,
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@ -2541,28 +2579,42 @@ exit:
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return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
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}
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psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
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psa_algorithm_t alg,
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const uint8_t * input,
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size_t input_length,
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const uint8_t * signature,
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size_t signature_length )
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static psa_status_t psa_verify_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
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psa_verify_operation_t operation,
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psa_algorithm_t alg,
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const uint8_t * input,
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size_t input_length,
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const uint8_t * signature,
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size_t signature_length )
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{
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psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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psa_key_slot_t *slot;
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size_t hash_length;
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uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
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if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) )
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if( operation == PSA_VERIFY_MESSAGE )
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{
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if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) )
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return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
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if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
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{
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if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) )
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return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
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}
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/* Curently only hash-then-sign algorithms are supported. */
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else
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return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
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}
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else if( operation == PSA_VERIFY_INVALID )
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return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
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if ( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) )
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return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
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status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
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key, &slot,
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operation == PSA_VERIFY_HASH ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH :
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PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE,
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alg );
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status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
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PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE,
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alg );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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return( status );
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@ -2570,28 +2622,62 @@ psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
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.core = slot->attr
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};
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status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ),
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input, input_length,
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hash, sizeof( hash ),
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&hash_length );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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if( operation == PSA_VERIFY_MESSAGE )
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{
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memset( hash, 0, sizeof( hash ) );
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goto exit;
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size_t hash_length;
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uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
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status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ),
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input, input_length,
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hash, sizeof( hash ),
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&hash_length );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto exit;
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status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
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&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
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alg, hash, hash_length,
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signature, signature_length );
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}
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else if( operation == PSA_VERIFY_HASH )
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{
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status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
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&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
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alg, input, input_length,
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signature, signature_length );
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}
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status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
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&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
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alg, hash, hash_length,
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signature, signature_length );
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memset( hash, 0, hash_length );
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exit:
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unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
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return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
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}
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psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
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psa_algorithm_t alg,
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const uint8_t * input,
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size_t input_length,
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uint8_t * signature,
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size_t signature_size,
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size_t * signature_length )
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{
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return psa_sign_internal(
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key, PSA_SIGN_MESSAGE, alg, input, input_length,
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signature, signature_size, signature_length );
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}
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psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
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psa_algorithm_t alg,
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const uint8_t * input,
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size_t input_length,
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const uint8_t * signature,
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size_t signature_length )
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{
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return psa_verify_internal(
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key, PSA_VERIFY_MESSAGE, alg, input, input_length,
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signature, signature_length );
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}
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psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_internal(
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@ -2660,54 +2746,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
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size_t signature_size,
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size_t *signature_length )
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{
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psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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psa_key_slot_t *slot;
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*signature_length = signature_size;
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/* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees
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* that signature must be a valid pointer. (On the other hand, the hash
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* buffer can in principle be empty since it doesn't actually have
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* to be a hash.) */
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if( signature_size == 0 )
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return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
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status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
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PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH,
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alg );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto exit;
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if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) )
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{
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status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
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goto exit;
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}
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psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
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.core = slot->attr
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};
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status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
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&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
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alg, hash, hash_length,
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return psa_sign_internal(
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key, PSA_SIGN_HASH, alg, hash, hash_length,
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signature, signature_size, signature_length );
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exit:
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/* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error,
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* the trailing part on success) with something that isn't a valid mac
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* (barring an attack on the mac and deliberately-crafted input),
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* in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */
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if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
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memset( signature + *signature_length, '!',
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signature_size - *signature_length );
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else
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memset( signature, '!', signature_size );
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/* If signature_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not call
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* memset because signature may be NULL in this case. */
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unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
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return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
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}
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psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_internal(
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@ -2774,28 +2815,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_verify_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
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const uint8_t *signature,
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size_t signature_length )
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{
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psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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psa_key_slot_t *slot;
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status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
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PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
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alg );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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return( status );
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psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
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.core = slot->attr
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};
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status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
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&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
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alg, hash, hash_length,
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return psa_verify_internal(
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key, PSA_VERIFY_HASH, alg, hash, hash_length,
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signature, signature_length );
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unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
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return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
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}
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP)
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