diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index 1f834420a..7b1849cb9 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -2871,92 +2871,13 @@ static int ssl_tls13_write_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
 /*
- * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA( WAIT_EOED )
- *
- * RFC 8446 section A.2
- *
- *                 |
- *    +------> WAIT_EOED -+
- *    |       Recv |      | Recv EndOfEarlyData
- *    | early data |      | K_recv = handshake
- *    +------------+      |
- *                        |
- *  WAIT_FLIGHT2 <--------+
- *                                 |
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
  */
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_process_wait_eoed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+static int ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
-
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_process_wait_eoed"));
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0)) != 0) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    /* RFC 8446 section 4.5
-     *
-     * struct {} EndOfEarlyData;
-     */
-    if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE        &&
-        ssl->in_msg[0]  == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
-            1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic"
-                "( K_recv = handshake )"));
-        mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(ssl, handshake->transform_handshake);
-        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_WAIT_FLIGHT2);
-
-        ret = mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(
-            ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 0);
-        if (0 != ret) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
-                1, ("mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum"), ret);
-        }
-
-        goto cleanup;
-
-    }
-
-    /* RFC 8446 section 2.3 figure 4
-     *
-     * 0-RTT data is sent via application data message.
-     */
-    ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-    if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
-            2, ("Unexpected message type %d", ssl->in_msgtype));
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Output early data
-     *
-     * For the time being, we print received data via debug message.
-     *
-     * TODO: Remove it when `mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data` is ready.
-     */
-    ssl->in_msg[ssl->in_msglen] = 0;
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("\n%s", ssl->in_msg));
-
-    /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1
-     *
-     * A server receiving more than max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data
-     * SHOULD terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.
-     *
-     * TODO: Add received data size check here.
-     */
-
-    ret = 0;
-
-cleanup:
-    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
-                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-    }
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_process_wait_eoed"));
+    ((void) ssl);
     return ret;
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
@@ -3403,7 +3324,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
         case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
-            ret = ssl_tls13_process_wait_eoed(ssl);
+            ret = ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data(ssl);
             break;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */