Merge pull request #6608 from mprse/ecjpake_password_fix

Make a copy of the password key in operation object while setting j-pake password
This commit is contained in:
Gilles Peskine 2022-11-22 14:52:12 +01:00 committed by GitHub
commit 4f19d86e3f
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GPG key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
6 changed files with 106 additions and 45 deletions

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@ -1829,7 +1829,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_abort( psa_pake_operation_t * operation );
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE)
#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT {PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, \
MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT, \
NULL, 0 , \
PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE, {0}, 0, 0, \
{.dummy = 0}}
#else
@ -1920,7 +1920,8 @@ struct psa_pake_operation_s
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE)
unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(input_step);
unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_step);
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password);
uint8_t* MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password);
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_len);
psa_pake_role_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(role);
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer[MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE]);
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer_length);

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@ -877,20 +877,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_restrict_key_policy(
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and policy constraints
* and lock it.
*
* The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is
* nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is
* zero, the algorithm is not checked.
*
* In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key
* into a key slot if not already done.
*
* On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of
* the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore.
*/
static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_key_slot_t **p_slot,
psa_key_usage_t usage,

View file

@ -183,6 +183,24 @@ static inline psa_key_slot_number_t psa_key_slot_get_slot_number(
}
#endif
/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and policy constraints
* and lock it.
*
* The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is
* nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is
* zero, the algorithm is not checked.
*
* In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key
* into a key slot if not already done.
*
* On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of
* the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore.
*/
psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_key_slot_t **p_slot,
psa_key_usage_t usage,
psa_algorithm_t alg );
/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy.
*
* Persistent storage is not affected.

View file

@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
psa_key_type_t type;
psa_key_usage_t usage;
psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ||
operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP )
@ -273,7 +274,27 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
if( ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED );
operation->password = password;
if( operation->password != NULL )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( password, &slot,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE,
PSA_ALG_JPAKE );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
operation->password = mbedtls_calloc( 1, slot->key.bytes );
if( operation->password == NULL )
{
psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
}
memcpy( operation->password, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes );
operation->password_len = slot->key.bytes;
status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
@ -348,9 +369,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
static psa_status_t psa_pake_ecjpake_setup( psa_pake_operation_t *operation )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ecjpake_role role;
psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
if( operation->role == PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT )
role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT;
@ -359,22 +378,20 @@ static psa_status_t psa_pake_ecjpake_setup( psa_pake_operation_t *operation )
else
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
if( psa_is_valid_key_id( operation->password, 1 ) == 0 )
if( operation->password_len == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( operation->password, &slot );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &operation->ctx.ecjpake,
role,
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1,
slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes );
operation->password,
operation->password_len );
psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
slot = NULL;
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->password, operation->password_len );
mbedtls_free( operation->password );
operation->password = NULL;
operation->password_len = 0;
if( ret != 0 )
return( mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error( ret ) );
@ -840,7 +857,11 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t * operation)
{
operation->input_step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_INVALID;
operation->output_step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_INVALID;
operation->password = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
if( operation->password_len > 0 )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->password, operation->password_len );
mbedtls_free( operation->password );
operation->password = NULL;
operation->password_len = 0;
operation->role = PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE;
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->buffer, MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE );
operation->buffer_length = 0;

View file

@ -6549,11 +6549,16 @@ ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_
PSA PAKE: ecjpake rounds
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS
ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0
ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0:0
PSA PAKE: ecjpake rounds, client input first
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS
ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":1
ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":1:0
# This test case relies on implementation (it may need to be adjusted in the future)
PSA PAKE: ecjpake rounds - key is destroyed after being passed to set_password_key
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS
ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0:1
PSA PAKE: ecjpake no input errors
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256

View file

@ -31,6 +31,27 @@
#define ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ) TEST_ASSERT( operation.id != 0 )
#define ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ) TEST_ASSERT( operation.id == 0 )
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE)
int ecjpake_operation_setup( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
psa_pake_role_t role,
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
size_t key_available )
{
PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_abort( operation ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_setup( operation, cipher_suite ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_role( operation, role) );
if( key_available )
PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( operation, key ) );
return 0;
exit:
return 1;
}
#endif
/** An invalid export length that will never be set by psa_export_key(). */
static const size_t INVALID_EXPORT_LENGTH = ~0U;
@ -8740,7 +8761,6 @@ void ecjpake_setup( int alg_arg, int key_type_pw_arg, int key_usage_pw_arg,
{
psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init();
psa_pake_operation_t operation = psa_pake_operation_init();
psa_pake_operation_t op_copy = psa_pake_operation_init();
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
psa_pake_primitive_t primitive = primitive_arg;
psa_key_type_t key_type_pw = key_type_pw_arg;
@ -8839,22 +8859,25 @@ void ecjpake_setup( int alg_arg, int key_type_pw_arg, int key_usage_pw_arg,
if( input_first )
{
/* Invalid parameters (input) */
op_copy = operation;
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
NULL, 0 ),
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
/* Invalid parameters (step) */
op_copy = operation;
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10,
TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role,
key, pw_data->len ) , 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10,
output_buffer, size_zk_proof ),
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
/* Invalid first step */
op_copy = operation;
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role,
key, pw_data->len ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
output_buffer, size_zk_proof ),
PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
/* Possibly valid */
TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role,
key, pw_data->len ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
output_buffer, size_key_share ),
expected_status_input_output);
@ -8875,22 +8898,25 @@ void ecjpake_setup( int alg_arg, int key_type_pw_arg, int key_usage_pw_arg,
else
{
/* Invalid parameters (output) */
op_copy = operation;
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
NULL, 0, NULL ),
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
op_copy = operation;
/* Invalid parameters (step) */
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10,
TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role,
key, pw_data->len ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10,
output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
/* Invalid first step */
op_copy = operation;
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role,
key, pw_data->len ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
/* Possibly valid */
TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role,
key, pw_data->len ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
expected_status_input_output );
@ -8974,7 +9000,7 @@ exit:
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */
void ecjpake_rounds( int alg_arg, int primitive_arg, int hash_arg,
int derive_alg_arg, data_t *pw_data,
int client_input_first )
int client_input_first, int destroy_key )
{
psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init();
psa_pake_operation_t server = psa_pake_operation_init();
@ -9025,6 +9051,9 @@ void ecjpake_rounds( int alg_arg, int primitive_arg, int hash_arg,
PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( &server, key ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( &client, key ) );
if( destroy_key == 1 )
psa_destroy_key( key );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &server, &server_derive ),
PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &client, &client_derive ),