Use fixed-length encoding for internal RNG seed
CTR-DRBG and HMAC-DRBG may used the seed differently depending on its length. To avoid leaks, pass them a constant-length seed. Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
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25705e6757
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1 changed files with 31 additions and 12 deletions
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@ -172,16 +172,24 @@ static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng,
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}
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/* DRBG context seeding */
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static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *secret )
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static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx,
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const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len )
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{
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const unsigned char *secret_p = (const unsigned char *) secret->p;
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const size_t secret_size = secret->n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint );
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int ret;
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unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
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/* The list starts with strong hashes */
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const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = mbedtls_md_list()[0];
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const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type );
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return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( ctx, md_info, secret_p, secret_size ) );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret,
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secret_bytes, secret_len ) );
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ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( ctx, md_info, secret_bytes, secret_len );
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cleanup:
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mbedtls_platform_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len );
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return( ret );
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}
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#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
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@ -223,13 +231,22 @@ static int ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len)
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}
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/* DRBG context seeding */
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static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *secret )
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static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx,
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const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len )
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{
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const unsigned char *secret_p = (const unsigned char *) secret->p;
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const size_t secret_size = secret->n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint );
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int ret;
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unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
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return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( ctx, ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy, NULL,
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secret_p, secret_size ) );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret,
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secret_bytes, secret_len ) );
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ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( ctx, ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy, NULL,
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secret_bytes, secret_len );
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cleanup:
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mbedtls_platform_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len );
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return( ret );
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}
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#else
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@ -2267,7 +2284,8 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
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rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_seeded == 0 )
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#endif
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{
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( p_rng, m ) );
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const size_t m_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( p_rng, m, m_len ) );
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}
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
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if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL )
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@ -2551,7 +2569,8 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
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#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
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if( f_rng == NULL )
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{
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( &drbg_ctx, m ) );
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const size_t m_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( &drbg_ctx, m, m_len ) );
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f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random;
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p_rng = &drbg_ctx;
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}
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