tls_prf: support an empty master secret
In TLS, the master secret is always a key. But EAP-TLS uses the TLS PRF to derive an IV with an empty string for the "secret" input. The code always stored the secret into a key slot before calling the TLS PRF, but this doesn't work when the secret is empty, since PSA Crypto no longer supports empty keys. Add a special case for an empty secret.
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1 changed files with 32 additions and 13 deletions
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@ -711,9 +711,18 @@ static psa_status_t setup_psa_key_derivation( psa_key_derivation_operation_t* de
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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return( status );
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return( status );
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status = psa_key_derivation_input_key( derivation,
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if( slot == 0 )
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PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
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{
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slot );
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status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(
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derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
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NULL, 0 );
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}
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else
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{
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status = psa_key_derivation_input_key(
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derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
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slot );
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}
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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return( status );
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return( status );
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@ -743,8 +752,7 @@ static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
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{
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{
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psa_status_t status;
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psa_status_t status;
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psa_algorithm_t alg;
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psa_algorithm_t alg;
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psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
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psa_key_handle_t master_slot = 0;
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psa_key_handle_t master_slot;
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psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation =
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psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation =
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PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
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PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
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@ -753,14 +761,24 @@ static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
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else
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else
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alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
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alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
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key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
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/* Normally a "secret" should be long enough to be impossible to
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psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
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* find by brute force, and in particular should not be empty. But
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psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, alg );
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* this PRF is also used to derive an IV, in particular in EAP-TLS,
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psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE );
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* and for this use case it makes sense to have a 0-length "secret".
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* Since the key API doesn't allow importing a key of length 0,
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* keep master_slot=0, which setup_psa_key_derivation() understands
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* to mean a 0-length "secret" input. */
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if( slen != 0 )
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{
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psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
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psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
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psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, alg );
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psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE );
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status = psa_import_key( &key_attributes, secret, slen, &master_slot );
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status = psa_import_key( &key_attributes, secret, slen, &master_slot );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
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}
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status = setup_psa_key_derivation( &derivation,
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status = setup_psa_key_derivation( &derivation,
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master_slot, alg,
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master_slot, alg,
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@ -790,7 +808,8 @@ static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
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}
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}
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status = psa_destroy_key( master_slot );
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if( master_slot != 0 )
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status = psa_destroy_key( master_slot );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
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