Merge pull request #8066 from paul-elliott-arm/aes_memcpy_iv_fix
Fix potential corruption of IV for AES CBC with zero length
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ChangeLog.d/fix-aes-cbc-iv-corruption
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ChangeLog.d/fix-aes-cbc-iv-corruption
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Bugfix
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* Fix a potential corruption of the passed-in IV when mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc()
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is called with zero length and padlock is not enabled.
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@ -1094,6 +1094,11 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
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}
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/* Nothing to do if length is zero. */
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if (length == 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (length % 16) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
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}
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