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Rename mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new to mbedtls_ct_uint_if

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Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Dave Rodgman 2023-05-17 15:51:59 +01:00
parent 2243137715
commit 2b4486a014
5 changed files with 9 additions and 9 deletions
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6
library/bignum.c
View file

@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi *X,
mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool(assign); mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool(assign);
X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(do_assign, Y->s, X->s); X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_assign, Y->s, X->s);
mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, do_assign); mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, do_assign);
@ -168,8 +168,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X,
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Y, X->n)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Y, X->n));
s = X->s; s = X->s;
X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(do_swap, Y->s, X->s); X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_swap, Y->s, X->s);
Y->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(do_swap, s, Y->s); Y->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_swap, s, Y->s);
mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(X->p, Y->p, X->n, do_swap); mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(X->p, Y->p, X->n, do_swap);

2
library/constant_time.c
View file

@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ void mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(void *start, size_t total, size_t offset)
for (size_t n = 0; n < total - 1; n++) { for (size_t n = 0; n < total - 1; n++) {
unsigned char current = buf[n]; unsigned char current = buf[n];
unsigned char next = buf[n+1]; unsigned char next = buf[n+1];
buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(no_op, current, next); buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(no_op, current, next);
} }
buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if0(no_op, buf[total-1]); buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if0(no_op, buf[total-1]);
} }

2
library/constant_time_impl.h
View file

@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
return (size_t) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0); return (size_t) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0);
} }
static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
unsigned if1, unsigned if1,
unsigned if0) unsigned if0)
{ {

2
library/constant_time_internal.h
View file

@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
* *
* \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0.
*/ */
static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
unsigned if1, unsigned if1,
unsigned if0); unsigned if0);

6
library/rsa.c
View file

@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input,
* buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
* validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
* size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */ * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new( plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
(unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3)); (unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3));
@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input,
* - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
* plaintext does not fit in the output buffer. * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
* - 0 if the padding is correct. */ * - 0 if the padding is correct. */
ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new( ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
bad, bad,
(unsigned) (-(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING)), (unsigned) (-(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING)),
mbedtls_ct_uint_if0( mbedtls_ct_uint_if0(
@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input,
* Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
* revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
* for a Bleichenbacher attack. */ * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(output_too_large, plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large,
(unsigned) plaintext_max_size, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
(unsigned) plaintext_size); (unsigned) plaintext_size);