Specific return code for PK sig length mismatch

This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2014-04-08 12:40:15 +02:00 committed by Paul Bakker
parent 35e95ddca4
commit 2abed84225
5 changed files with 28 additions and 6 deletions

View file

@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ Features
Changes
* x509_crt_info() now prints information about parsed extensions as well
* pk_verify() now returns a specific error code when the signature is valid
but shorter than the supplied length.
Security
* Avoid potential timing leak in ecdsa_sign() by blinding modular division.

View file

@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
* PEM 1 9
* PKCS#12 1 4 (Started from top)
* X509 2 18
* PK 2 13 (Started from top)
* PK 2 14 (Started from top, plus 0x2000)
* DHM 3 9
* PKCS5 3 4 (Started from top)
* RSA 4 9

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@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG -0x2A80 /**< The algorithm tag or value is invalid. */
#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE -0x2A00 /**< Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported). */
#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x2980 /**< Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key. */
#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x2000 /**< The signature is valid but its length is less than expected. */
#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
@ -288,6 +289,8 @@ int pk_can_do( pk_context *ctx, pk_type_t type );
* \param sig_len Signature length
*
* \return 0 on success (signature is valid),
* POLARSSL_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if the signature is
* valid but its actual length is less than sig_len,
* or a specific error code.
*
* \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg

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@ -308,6 +308,8 @@ void polarssl_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen )
snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported)" );
if( use_ret == -(POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key" );
if( use_ret == -(POLARSSL_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) )
snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - The signature is valid but its length is less than expected" );
#endif /* POLARSSL_PK_C */
#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS12_C)

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@ -64,11 +64,20 @@ static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
if( sig_len != ((rsa_context *) ctx)->len )
int ret;
if( sig_len < ((rsa_context *) ctx)->len )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
return( rsa_pkcs1_verify( (rsa_context *) ctx, NULL, NULL,
RSA_PUBLIC, md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) );
if( ( ret = rsa_pkcs1_verify( (rsa_context *) ctx, NULL, NULL,
RSA_PUBLIC, md_alg,
(unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( sig_len > ((rsa_context *) ctx)->len )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH );
return( 0 );
}
static int rsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
@ -292,10 +301,16 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
int ret;
((void) md_alg);
return( ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) ctx,
hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ) );
ret = ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) ctx,
hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len );
if( ret == POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH );
return( ret );
}
static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,