yuzu-emu/mbedtls
2
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity

Document that psa_close_key(0) and psa_destroy_key(0) succeed

Browse source 
Document that passing 0 to a close/destroy function does nothing and
returns PSA_SUCCESS.

Although this was not written explicitly, the specification strongly
suggested that this would return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE. While
returning INVALID_HANDLE makes sense, it was awkward for a very common
programming style where applications can store 0 in a handle variable
to indicate that the handle has been closed or has never been open:
applications had to either check if (handle != 0) before calling
psa_close_key(handle) or psa_destroy_key(handle), or ignore errors
from the close/destroy function. Now applications following this style
can just call psa_close_key(handle) or psa_destroy_key(handle).
This commit is contained in:
Gilles Peskine 2019-10-08 15:43:13 +02:00
parent 9ab7c07f1f
commit 2493401af4
1 changed files with 8 additions and 1 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

9
include/psa/crypto.h
View file

@ -459,9 +459,12 @@ psa_status_t psa_open_key(psa_key_id_t id,
* maintain the key handle until after the multipart operation has finished. * maintain the key handle until after the multipart operation has finished.
* *
* \param handle The key handle to close. * \param handle The key handle to close.
* If this is \c 0, do nothing and return \c PSA_SUCCESS.
* *
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* \p handle was a valid handle or \c 0. It is now closed.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
* \p handle is not a valid handle nor \c 0.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
@ -579,13 +582,17 @@ psa_status_t psa_copy_key(psa_key_handle_t source_handle,
* key will cause the multipart operation to fail. * key will cause the multipart operation to fail.
* *
* \param handle Handle to the key to erase. * \param handle Handle to the key to erase.
* If this is \c 0, do nothing and return \c PSA_SUCCESS.
* *
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* The key material has been erased. * \p handle was a valid handle and the key material that it
* referred to has been erased.
* Alternatively, \p handle is \c 0.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
* The key cannot be erased because it is * The key cannot be erased because it is
* read-only, either due to a policy or due to physical restrictions. * read-only, either due to a policy or due to physical restrictions.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
* \p handle is not a valid handle nor \c 0.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
* There was an failure in communication with the cryptoprocessor. * There was an failure in communication with the cryptoprocessor.
* The key material may still be present in the cryptoprocessor. * The key material may still be present in the cryptoprocessor.