Sanity length checks in ssl_read_record() and ssl_fetch_input()
Both are already covered in other places, but not in a clear fashion. So for instance Coverity thinks the value is still tainted.
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1 changed files with 16 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -1908,6 +1908,12 @@ int ssl_fetch_input( ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> fetch input" ) );
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if( nb_want > SSL_BUFFER_LEN - 8 )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "requesting more data than fits" ) );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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}
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while( ssl->in_left < nb_want )
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{
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len = nb_want - ssl->in_left;
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@ -2131,13 +2137,20 @@ int ssl_read_record( ssl_context *ssl )
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
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}
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/* Sanity check (outer boundaries) */
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if( ssl->in_msglen < 1 || ssl->in_msglen > SSL_BUFFER_LEN - 13 )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
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}
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/*
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* Make sure the message length is acceptable
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* Make sure the message length is acceptable for the current transform
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* and protocol version.
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*/
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if( ssl->transform_in == NULL )
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{
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if( ssl->in_msglen < 1 ||
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ssl->in_msglen > SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN )
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if( ssl->in_msglen > SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
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